IR 05000338/1990020
| ML20059K684 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059K682 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-90-20, 50-339-90-20, NUDOCS 9009240170 | |
| Download: ML20059K684 (24) | |
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UNITE-$ STATES
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/ p h800q'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
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'n REGION 18
Iy 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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r ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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SEP 0 01998
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Report Nos.: 50-338/90-20 and 50-339/90-20 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060
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Docket Nos.:
50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.:
NPF-4 and NPF-7 facility Name: North' Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August e-10, 1990 f/k/f8 iT.g~$,artor, Jr.~, Team
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_ Gate /5fsned Inspector:
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Team Members:
A. Gooden L. King F. McManus (PNL)
W. Rankin Approved by:M N g.
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W. H. Rank' n, Chiel te lgned'~
Emergency Preparedness Section
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p Ernergency Preparedness and Radiological
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Protection Branch-
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L Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards l'
SUMMARY
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Scope:
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This routine, announced inspection involved the observation end evaluation of the annual energency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Control Room Simulator, Technical l
Support Center (TSC)
Operational Support Center (OSC), and Local Emergency OperationsfacilityILEOF).
The inspection also included a review of the l
I exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post exercise critique..
The plurre' pathway exercise-on August 6, 1990, was conducted from 8:45 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. with full participation by State and local governments. Day 2 of the exercise was an ingestion pathway exercise evaluated by FEMA.
9009240170 900906 DR ADOCK 0500
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Results.
In the areas inspected violations or devietiens were not identified.
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Exercise strengths included the licensee's challenging ano cttailed scenarie
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coupled with an energency respense facility lead controller comunications lccp
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that provided excellent exercise control. Licensee perforirance as observed was
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accident.
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REPORT DETAILS j
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- C. M erson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
- M. Eowi ng Assistant Station Manager i
- J. Crilins, Director, Emergency Planning
- J.'Costello, Surry Station Coordinator. Emergency Planning
- E. Dreyer, Supervit.or, Padiological Protection
- L. Edmonds, Superintendent, Nuclear Training
- E. Hallern. ann, Health Physicist
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- E. Harrell, Vice President Nuclear Operations
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- S. Harrison, Senior Energency Planner
- W. Hartley, Nuclear Oversight Board
- J. Higgins, Director, Nuclear Security
- H. Johnson, Manager, Security
- L. Jones, Supervisor, Health Physics
- G. Kane, Station Manager
- P. Kemp, Supervit.or, Licensing
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- J. Leberstien, Senior Enoineer, Licensing
- J. Lusher, Station Coordinator Emergency Planning.'
- T. Maddy, Supervisor, Security
- J. Maciejewski, Manager, Quality Assurance
- W. Madison, Staff Emergency Planner
- B. McBride, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
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- J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Services
- W. Renz, Emergency Preparedness Specialist e
- 5. Sowder, Secretary to Manager, Security
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- A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection
- R. Thomasson, Corporate Health Physicist
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force menbers, technicians, and
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administrative personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspector L
- M. Lesser Senior Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview 2.
ExerciseScenario(82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
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provisions had been made to test the integrated capbility and a major
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portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and iccal Energency Plans and orsenization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
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10 CFR 50 Appendix E. Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was revicwed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was. discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully e.xercise the onsite and offsite orcrgency organizations of the licensee and
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provided sufficient err.ergency information to the State and local The govertzent agencias fcr their full aarticipation in the exercise.
exercise scenario was. detailed erd
,ad been reviewed cn three separate occasions to identify and correct any data that was inconsisttnt.
In addition to having a scenario with well coordinated data, the licensee had
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also established an excellent process to ensure the scenario events continued to te coordinated after the exercise began by having)a Iced controller in each of tht turgency response facilities (ERFs on a e
telephone loop over which all events were coordinattd.
This proved
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extremely beneficial with the licensee's first use of the simulator for a graded exercise as the results from actions taken by crerotors in the
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Control Room Simulator were inn.ediately made known to the lead controllers in the other ERis.
This. contributed to the consistent and coordinated cxercise control that was characteristic of this exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignn.ent of Responsibility (82301)
This area-was observed to' determine that prin.ary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and
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that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A. and specified criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.A.
j Section 5.0 of the North Anna Emerstney Plan specifies that tb Shift Supervisor or Assistant Shift Supervisor initially act in the capacity of the Staticn Emergency Manager and take action as outlined in the Emergency
The Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) until properly relieved.
inspectors observed-that the Shif t Supervisor promptly declared the Notification ci Unusual Event and assumed the responsibilities of the Tte initial response organization was Station Emergency Monager.
aus.nented by designated personnel and there were adequate staff to respond
to the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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OnsiteEmergencyOrganization(82301)
The licensee's on-shift emtrgency organization was obsreved to detemine that the responsibilitics for en,ergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial f acility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the
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interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
i Yhe inspector observed that the initial en-shift energency organizaticn was well defincd and the respcnsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respcod to the crrergency were clear. Section 5.2 of the North Anna Emergency Plan clearly dclineated the ensite energency organization prior to augnentation t,y additionel f.n.ergency response perscnnel.
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following an Alert dcclara'. ion, the on-shift emergency organization was augaente.d with the activat'ons of the Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Eupport Center (OSC), and the Local Emergency Operations
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facility (LEOF).
The licensee was able to initially activate the above
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energency respense facilities in approximately thirty minutes.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
a standard emergency This area was observed to detert.ir.e that clessification and action level schen.e was in use by the nuclear facility licensce as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
Paragraph IV.C and specific criteria in h0 REG-0654,Section II.D.
An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the North Anna Emergency Plan and EPIP-1.01, Emergency Action Level Table, which provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four cn.ergency classification levels.
The procedure was effectively used by the Station Emergency Manager (SLM) in the Control Room Simulator to classify the Notification of Unusual Event and the Alert, end by the SEM in the 1SC to classify the Site Area Energency and General Emergency.
No violations or deviaticns were identified.
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Notific6tionMethodsandProcedures(82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and crergency personnel by the license, and that the content of-' initial and followup This area was further nesseges to response organizations was established.
observed to assure that nicans to provide early notification to the population within the plurre exposure pathway here established pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(5). Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance pronulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654 An inspector observcd that notification n.ethods and procedures had becn
estabitsbed in EPIP-2.01, Notificaticn of State and Local Governments, and EPIP-2.02, Notification of NRC.
All notifications were made pretptly end
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correctly with two minor exceptions. The first was an incorrect entry for the Alert declaration tirre on tressage (4 from tht Simulator Control Rccm
and n.essage fl from the TSC. Although the Alert had been declared at 0939
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(24-hr tint), it had been recorded and transmitted as 1000 on the aforetrenti aed nessages until corrected by one of the agencies receiving
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the nessage il from the TSC.
The other exception was that all offsite notifications for an initial tirergency classification were well within the 15 minutes tineliness goal with the exception of the message for General Emergency which convenced at 14 mir.utes af ter the declaration.
f!cwever, it was also noted that a decision to nele n. ore conservative Protective Action Recontiendations.(PARS) was nede during the 14 trinutes.
Thus the
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PARS trade with the Gereral Eriergency Classification nessage were the inore
conservative and therefore did not require a change in the PARS which
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could have been confusing. The inspector also noted that energency sirens within the 10-mile errergency planning zones (EPZs) were naintaintd es a neans to alert the public.
No violaticns or deviaticos were identified.
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Emergency Conn:unications (82301)
This area was cbserved to determine that provisions existed for prompt consonications among principal response organizations and errergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
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Paragraph IV.E. and specific critoria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
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Connunications arrong the licensee's ERFs and energency organization and
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One equipn.ent problem was observed in that the instaphone for trating State / local notifications in the TSC was inoperabic.
The licensee used an alternate means to trake the required notificaticns from the TSC, then the responsibility for State / local notifications was transferred to the LEOF.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Public Education and Inforniation (C2301)
This area was observed to determine that inforration concerning the
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simulated energency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFE 50, Ap ndix E, Paragraph IV.D. and
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specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
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A news release has published by the Virginia Department of Emergency Services en July 31, 1990, giving an overview of the purpose of the
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exercise and the primary participants.
Included was infornetion on the siren system and the interval of tine during which the sirens would be sounded to alert the public to tune to their local radio or television Energency Broadcast System (EBS) stations for inforrration on what to do in
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the event of an incident at the plant.
The news release also contained
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information on the Ingestion Pathway exercise that was conduct'
on the second day, fio violat'
s or deviations were identified.
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Emergency facilities and Equipment (82301)
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This area was cbserved to determined that adequate on.orgency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key crergency response facilities to include the Simulator Control Room. TSC, OSC, and LEOF.
Simulator Control Pcom - An inspe". tor observed that the Shif t a.
Supervisor demonstrated excellent corr,and and control throughout the i
exercise and classifications and notificetions were accomplished in t precise 6nd tiniely manner.
Both operators and supervisors
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throughout the exercise.
The connunications equipment available in the Simulator was fully adequate with the exception of the eudible alarnis which had to be set off from the Control Room.
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Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon r.otification by the SEM of the Alert classification.
The-L inspector observed that the facility layout provided for a good interface between the SEM and his Emergency Directors.
Strengths
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noted in the 15C included good coccand and control of the emergency nrganization which was enhanced by the periodic briefings regarding the incident status and on going mitigatirg actions.
Status boards were maintained up-to-date throughout the exercise and the tracking
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l and prioritirath n of damage control teams was displayed.
Operational Support Center - The OSC was proniptly staffed and l-c.
activated following the Alert declaration.
Because the exercise had
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been designed to be damage control intensive, some damage control
. teams were delayed awaiting personnel that were self contained breathingapparatus(SCBA) qualified.
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Local Emergency Operations f acil.ty - The LEOF was prceptly staffed and activated with qualified station personnel.
An inspector noted that it was not readily apparent as to what energency action level had been met to require the Ger. oral Ercrgency declaration.
The inspector noted the Recovery Manager provided good status updates on the changing scenario. The inspector also noted that the command and
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control of the two field nionitoring teams was good.
The teams were dispatched ee,rly from the site and were pre-positioned at logical projected plume path ronitoring points.
There was also good discipline in minin.izing dose / plume stay time for the field
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nonitoring tears.
It was noted that MIDAS cross validation of -
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field reaoings with assumed accident / source tenm was good and that it meshed well with State data.
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No violations cr deviations were identified.
10. Accident Assessrent (82302)
f This area was observed to determined whether edequate n.ethods, systen.s and i
equipment for assessing and nonitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radic1cgical (n.ergency condition stre in use as required by.10CFR50.47(b)(9),10CFR50,AppendixE.ParagraphIV.B.anositcific-l critoria in NUREG-0654 Section II.I.
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The accident assessm+nt prograra included both an engineering assessrent of plent status and an assessn.ent of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
During the exercise, the engineering accident assessn.ent team functioned effectively in enalyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Station En.ergency Management concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant
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equiprent, to prevent reltase of radioactive materials end to terminate l
the emergency condition.
Onsite and offsite monitoring were effectively deronstrated as noted by observations in the onsite energency response facilities and the LEOF as
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discussed in the above paragraph.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. ProtectiveResponses(02301)
This area was observed to determine tLat guidelines for protective actions during the immrgency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and
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in place, and protective actions for en.ergency workers, including
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(persconel, were implemented promptly cvacuation of nonessential Section II.J.
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An inspector verified that the licensee had and used epiersency precedures for fcrmulating PARS for offsite pcpulations within the 10 mile EPZ.
Protective actions were initiated for onsite on.ergency workerr folltwing the Alert declaration by conducting a perscnnel accountabilicy of those r
personnel inside the protected area.
The accountability war completed in 24 minutes. As discussed by the licensee prior to the exert,ise, an actual-i site evacuation was not included in the scope of this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Radiological Exposure Control (62301)
This area was observed to determine that means for contrciling radiological expcsures, in an energency, are established and implemented for energency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA reconceridation as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and sgcific criteria in-NUREG-0654.Section II.K.
As inspector noted that radiological exposures were contro11t.d throughout the exercise and periodic surveys were conducted in the ERFs.
Exposure guidelints were in place for various categories of energency actions and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriete.
EPIP-5.06 provided guidance for emergency radiation exposure authorization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11 3. Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)
This area was observed to determine that general p(lans were made for recovery and re-entry as required by 10 CFR 50.47 b)(13),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 11.M.
' The licensee developed general plans and procedures for re-entry and recovery which addressed both txisting and potential conditions.
The plan contained the position / title, authority and responsibilitics of each key individual in the recovery organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14. ExerciseCritique(82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the perfornance of the exercise were brought to the attention of n.anaccrent and docun.cnted for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.471b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted facility criticues with the exercise players irrnediately following the exercise tern.ination on the first day.
!!.icensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to providing formal critique results to n.anagercent on August 10, 1950.
The critique was thorough and included a review of the objectives that had been established for demonstration curing the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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15. ActionofPreviousInspectionFindings(92701,92702)
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-338, 339/6E-14-Oh
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Evaluate validity of use of field acnitoring data for calculating a
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source term and use of same in protecthe action decisior.5 or in s
determining emergency classifications.
This finding addressed a change that was to te n,ade with a revision to the RALMET conputer code which is no longer used.
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now uses MIDAS.
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(Closed) IFI 50-338, 339/68-14-04:
Modify RADMET rnodel to provide
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dose projection estiftatet at future plume positions.
l The licensce's new dose assessment nodel, MIDAS, provided fcr this as well as the fact that RACMET is no longer ust.d closes this item, c.
(Closed) Violation 50-338, 339/88-24-02:
Failure to demonstrate the
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capebility of nietir.g staffing roruitenents for emergency response i
team perscnnel.
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The licensee has n,ade tignificant changer to the n.cthods for augnentation of steffing rtruirents.ts for emergency response tcem
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i For excitple, all thirty minute responders are now on personnel.
shift to iceet Tabic 0-1 requirements and other iesponders needed for TEC, CSC, and LEOF staffing are on beepers.
The licensee has conducted successful tests to insure n.initral staffing requirements were met within itquired times.
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(Closed)ExerciseVeekness 50-338,339/89-25-01:
Excessive prortpting prevented den.onstration of objectives.
No prorrpting was observed during this year's exercise.
Exercise control bad been greetly improved since last year.
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(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-338,339/89-25-02:
Onsite and offsite
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rronitoring not adequately denonstrated.
The licensee fully nct exercise objectives to demonstrate the e.Lility of Health Physics and Chemistry to conduct radiological nonitoring activities and the ability to rerform off-site dose assessment.
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(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-338, 339/89-25-03:
Onsite
accountability not adequately den.onstrated.
1he licensee perforned ensite accourtebility in 24 n:inute _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and results v.-cre sumarized on August 30, 1990, with those persons iridicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas insgtted and discussed in detail the insnction results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting corinents were not received from the licensee.
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Federal Evaluation Team Report 1he report by the Federal Evaluation Team (P.egional Assistence Comittee and Feceral Emergency P.ar.agenent Agency, Region 11 staff) concerning the activities of off site agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
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Attachment *
Exercise Scope, Objective, and Time Line
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VIRGINIA POWER NORTE ANNA POWER STATION AUGUST 7 AND 8, 1990 EMBRGENCY EXERCISE panRcIsa scoPB Virginia Electric and Power Company will demonstrate its ability to implement both the Corporate and North Anna Power Station Emergency Plans on August 7 ani 8,
1990. The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the North Anna Emergency. Plan, associated implementing procedures, selected portions of the Corporate Emergency Response Plan in accordance with 10CFR50.47 (b) (14), and to support the implementation of state and local government emergency response plans as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
This ingestion pathway exercise will be held in conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the commonwealth of Virginia and several local governments. The list of participants includes 19 state agencies, 31 local governments, 4 volunteer organizations, 2 federal agencies, 4 special f acilities, the State of Maryland and Virginia Power. The exercise will Emergency Management Agency, individuals demonstrate that those and agencies assigned responsibilities in a radiological emergency are capable of providing the necessary protective measures to ensure the-health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at North Anna Power Station.
The exercise will demonstrate responses to the four emergency classes established by NUREG-0654, criteria for Prenaration and Evaluation of Radioloalcal Emeraency Response Plans Preparedness in supnort of Nuclear Power Stations.
A scenario will be prepared to accomplish a successive escalation through these emergency classes.
Free play is encouraged and controllers will only interfere with participants' responses if the exercise lags behind schedule, if emergency response personnel take inappropriate actions to carry them to the next event, or if action is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier than scheduled by the scenario.
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the station.
Station management may, at-their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal.
Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the simulated incident or any parts thereof, with the exception of the exercise date, j
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TIRGINIA POWER
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NORTE ANNA POWER STATION
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AUGUST 7 AND 8, 1990 HNERGENCY BIERCISE Os3EcTIVEs summABr l
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The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrats by actual i
performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as
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they relate to the North Anna Power Station Erorgency Plan.
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simulated -accident will involve emergency classification,
notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of i
accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope l
with the event.
The event will include a simulated off-site
radiological release and ground deposition to support an ingestion l
pathway exercise.
i The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the
North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, the Corporate Emergency
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Response Plan, and associated implementing procedures.
Those
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emergency response functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be simulated.
The following objectives were developed to establish the scope of the August 7 and 8,
1990 North Anna Emergency Exercise.
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objectives ensure that required events are included in the exerciso
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scenario and establish evaluation criteria used by the controllers
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and observers.
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VIRGINIA POWER
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NORTE ANNA POWER STATION
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AUGUST 7 AND 8, 1990 ENERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES i
1.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the North Anna Power l
Station and Corporate Emergency Response Plans and appropriate implementing procedures.
l North Anna Power St:: tion and Corporate emergency response organizations will demonstrate this objective.
Initial r
activation will occur in the Control Room Simulator.
All North Anna Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) will be activated.
As applicable to the
events developed by the exercise scenario, each ERF staff will i
demonstrate functions described in the implementing procedures, i
The following North Anna Power Station and Corporate facilities will be staffed by the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) for this exercise (1)
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
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Operational Support Center (OSC)
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Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
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Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
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Joint public Information Center (JPIC)
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Local Media Center (LMC)
Other ERO Groups participating in this exercise, but not
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responding to the above facilities, include chemistry, Health Physics, Operations, and Security.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess Emergency Action Level (EAL) parameters, and classify the i
emergency.
l The CRS and TSC ERO will demonstrate this objective by I
l initiation and use of EPIP-1.01 and appropriate operational
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Status forms detailing radiological monitor and operational i,
trend data will be issued at periodic intervals.
The ability
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to acquire data using the Emergency Response Computer System
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(ERCS)
or by back-up methods will be demonstrated in appropriate facilities.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-
site emergency teams to perform response activities.
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As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and OSC staffs will demonstrate this objective by dispatching and controlling. teams in response to scenario events within the Station Protected Area.
Also, the ability to brief emergency teams and establish appropriate protective measures and communications will be demonstrated.
Prior to Emergency Response Facility activation, the CRS staff will demonstrate this objective by initiating applicable
,
procedures.
Following facility activation, the TSC and OSC staffs will demonstrate this objective by implementing EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.03, and EPIP-5.08.
j 4.
Demonstrate the ability to notify and mobilize t;.e North Anna Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Organization.
!
The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will demonstrate this objective.
Station ERO notification will be
'
conducted in accordance with EPIP-3.01 and EPIP-5.09.
. ;
Corporate Security will initiate ECP-5 for corporate ERO notification.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and local
.
governments and the NRC within established time constraints.
The CRS, TSC,.and LEOF ERO will demonstrate this objective by providing up-to-date information to federal, state, and local
!
governments within required time limits, r
a.
State and Local Government Notification Information for these notifications will be identified and recorded by an Emergency Communicator (EC) on EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1 (Report of Emergency to State and Local Governments),
and Attachment
(Report of
Radiological Conditions to the State).
Upon approval by j
the Station Emergency Manager (SEM)
or the Recovery
Manage.r (RM), the EC will transmit the information to the state and/or local governments.
The start time for completing the 15-minute initial
notification will commence when the SEM declares the emergency classification.
Follow-up communications will be maintained using EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1,
and will occur at about 30 minute intervals or as conditions change.
,
I-As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit Protective
!
Action Recommendations (PARS)
to the State will be demonstrated in accordance with EPIP-1.05 and appropriate
,
notification procedures.
'
The EC will transmit the initial Report of Radiological (
Conditions (EPIP-2.02, Attachment 2)
to the state
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following data assimilation, recording, and approval.
Follow-up notifications on radiological conditions will
'
'
occur at about 30' minute intervals or as conditions change.
i The SEM retains responsibility for state and local
government notifications until the LEOF is activated.
'
Following LEOF activation, responsibility for notification is transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM).
I b.
NRC Notification
Information for these notifications will be indentified and recorded by the EC on EPIP"2.02, Attachment
(Initial Report of Emergency to the NRC), Attachment 2,
'
(Supplemental Report of Emergency to the NRC), and EPIP-
4.03, Attachment 3 (HPN Communications).
Upon approval
!
by the SEM, the ECs will transmit the information to the
'
{
NRC.
The start time for completing the 1-hour intial-
notification commences when the.SEM declares the emergency classification.
The initial notification will
be performed from the CRS.
Following initial l
notification and unless directed otherwise, the EC will
maintain continuous communications with NRC Operations l
to transmit plant condition changes.
Communication dialogue highlights will be documented.
Responsibility for NRC Notifications in accordance with
EPIP-2.02 will remain with the TSC ERO.
Responsibility for Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be r
transferred to the LEOF following activation of that i
facility.
!
' -
6.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability of personnel within the Protected Area.
.
The CRS staff and Security will demonstrate this objective in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.03.
Also, to support
,
the overall accountability process, the Assembly' Area Leaders will perform area accountability in accordance with EPIP-5.03, i
Attachment 1 (Assembly Area Leader Instructions).
7.
. Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) based on assessment of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or measurements.
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM from the CRS or TSC or by the RM in the LEOF.
organizations will monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose projections to support formulation of PARS.
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.
.
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following activation of that facility.
Radiological parameter data generated during the development f
of this scenario may be artificially elevated and may not j
represent the degree of fuel failure and radiological release
commensurate with the plant dynamic events.
This may be i
necessary to demonstrate this exercise objective
,
8.
Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement
!
appropriate protective measures for emergency response
,
personnel, including site access control, contamination
control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as
'
appropriate, the process for authorization of potassium iodide
(KI) administration.
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among
the CRS, TSC, and OSC ERO in which the TSC staff will monitor
!
and authorize protective measures for site access, contamination control, and exposure control.
.
l The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor
[
(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property i
per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-4.02 and associated procedures to
,
assess radiologica)
conditions.
Protective measures
appropriate for conditions will be developed and/or
implemented for site emergency response personnel.
y Security will implement access control measures in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04.
!
The OSC Staff and other site personnel will implemer,t any necessary actions associated with protacive eqnipment
.
'
requirements and in-plant access control.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or
,
l TSC and OSC staffs will demonstrate the process for requesting
!
. and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency i
l exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01, EPIP-
j 4.04, EPIP-5.06 and EPIP-5.08.
Also, if necessary, the TSC l
staff will demonstrate the XI authorization process per EPIP-
'
_,
4.01 and EPIP-5.07.
l_
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will L
demonstrate the planning and notification process for l-evacuating non-essential personnel in accordance with EFIP-4.07 and EPIP-5.05.
}
9.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
}
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by CRS, TSC, and LEOF staffs.
The ability to perform initial dose
'
assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of
EPIP-4.01 and associated dose assessment procedures.
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Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4.01, EPIP-4.02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment effort.
As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.
)
i 10.
As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities, d
including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample s
analysis.
j As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in accordance with EPIP-4.02.
Post Accident Sampling activities
<
will be performed in accordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.23.
j The field monitoring teams will perform radiological monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-4.16.
j i
Reactor coolant and/or containment samples may be obtained i
utilizing the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS).
l Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring l
capabilities will be provided by the controller during sample collection. Isotopic analysis data will be provided following
demonstration of proper sample preparation and upon expiration
!
of spectrum collection and analysis times.
)
11.
Demonstrate the ability to effectivsly activate the emergency response facilities.
Activation of the TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LMC will be demonstrated in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
l 12.
Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment adequately support emergency response activities in each facility.
This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, OSC, i
LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LMC.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective
$
communications.
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC-staffs, and Field Teams will demonstrate this objective.
Use of backup communications systems will be demonstrated only if primary systems fail.
i 14.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control' of the emergency response effort.
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command and control from the CRS and TSC.
The RM will demonstrate
,
command and control of the emergency response effort associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility.
,
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The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area-are
informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-Tronics).. Remaining site personnel will be notified by other verbal communication metb-xis.
All announcements will be preceeded and terminated with the phrase:
"This is a drill."
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to transfer appropriate command and control functions.
a.
The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include (1)
Notifications to the state, local governments, and NRC.
(2)
Providing PARS to the state.
(3)
Determining the emergency classificaticn.
(4)
Authorizing emergency exposures.
b.
The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF aret (1)
Notifications to the state and local governments and to the NRC via the HPN.
(2)
Transmitting PARS to the state.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review, and release timely and accurate information to the public.
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF and LMC staffs will demonstrate this objective.
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and transmitted to the LEOF for technical review.
Following approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the process for issuing press releases will be demonstrated.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and make-them available to the media in the JPIC and LMC.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control functions.
i Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing an emergency hotlina in accordance with CPIP-2.1 and CPIP-2.3..
Questions will be called into the Public Information Room requiring response.
17.
Demonstrate the ability to provide continuous emergency response capability.
The ERO within the Emergency Response Facilities will demonstrate this objective by formulating a shift relief roster.
As appropriate, the ability to provide logistical support for
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Emergency Response personnel may be demonstrated.
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i 28.
Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support ane to package and transport a contaminated injured person to an of t-i site medical facility.
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team implementing procedures appropriate for the vict!Ns level of injury and by Radiological Protection employing the necessary radiological controls in accordance with EPIP-5.01 and EPIP-i
'
4.20 to remove the contaminated victim from the accident
,
scene.
,
As necessary, Station Security will implement applicable sections of EPIP-5.09 to summon of f-site support. An of f-site i
rescue unit will demonstrate the ability to respond to the Station.
The contaminated injured person will be transported to an off-j site medical facility which will demonstrate the ability to
)
provide appropriate treatment.
~ 19.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization
!
and to develop and implement a Recovery Plan.
.
This objective will be demonstrated by the 3EM and RM by
,
implementing EPIP-6.01 and CPIP-6.5 to develop both a Recovery
,
Organization and Plan to return the Plant to a normal status.-
'
20.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a support group to assist / advise the state with their recovery efforts.
,
This objective will be demonstrated by the RM and Recovery Organization in accordance with CPIP-6.5.
I l
Total population exposure estimates will be provided-to the state in accordance with North Anna Emergency Plan, section
,
'
9.2.
21.
Demonstrate the ability of the Erudgency Response organization
&
to conduct a
self-critique and to identify areas for
.
f improvement.
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry, Radiological Protection, Operations, and Field Monitoring Teams will conduct a self-critique to identify weaknesses and
improvement items.
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V VIRGINIA POWER MORTE ANNA POWER STATION AUGUST,7 AND Si 1990 ENERGENCY EXERCISE TIME LINE NOTE:
TIMES ARE APPROXINATE
,
EVENT-TIH4
' };
D&Y 1 Controllers and observers positioned.
Selected 0800 controllers ' perform necessary participant briefings
-
(i.e., exemptions or message format).
Department participants positioned in the Operations 0830
-
Control Room Simulator and the Operator Assembly Area.
,r Simulator run started.
1-AP-42, Loss of.Prodac-250 Computer, being p rformed.
l(
-
-
Earthquake detected.
Annunciator 1A-B6 (EARTHQUAKE-j
-0845 f
-
INSTRUMENT PANEL TROUBLE) is received, i
'
1-AP-36, Seismic Event, is in Riated. -
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-
First Aid emergency occurs ai-the.1-CH-P-1C cubicle 0850
-
.(contaminated-individual requiring transport).
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NOTIFICATION OF' UNUSUAL EVENT (Tab-L-1) declared based 0905 on a confirmed earthquake which activates the Event Alarm
-
on the Strong Motion Accelerograph.
Hathaway power supply failure results in loss of all t nit 0930
-
-1 main board annunciators.
ALERT (Tab A-11) declared based on simultaneous lossLof
,
0950-annunciator alarms on panels
"A" through "K": with
-;
all lous.:of unit computer.
Reactor-Coolant System leakage from the
"B" loop 1045 accumulator loop penetration begins.
The leakage
-
increases' linearly to 60 gpm within 30 minutes.
,
)
1-hP-16, Increasing. Primary Plant Leakage, is initiated.
1055
-
Unit 1 ' Radiation Monitoring System,.
is
~
l'-AP-5.1, 1105 initiated due to containment radiation' levels increasing.
1-PT-52.2, RCS Leakrate, is initiated.
-
Letdown secured.
1109
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Ramp down commenced due to high' leak rate from the j
,
- - !1-OP-2.2, Unit Powar Operation Mode 1,
to Mode 2,
is
- initiated, j
i SITE AREh EMERGENCY (Tab-A-12) based on failed plant-
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1135
-
computer, loss-of annunciators and an operational
L transient in progress.
Reg <down is continuing.
L
-
1 RC-P-1B vibration Alert alarm is received.
1200
-
Loose parts indicated in the reat,or vessel louer head.
-
Reactor.' Coolant System
"B" loop accumulator loop
,
1225
-
penetration ruptures.
Shfety Injection, Containment Depressurization Actuation,
-
and Containment Phase "A" and Phase "B" isolation occurs, t
1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection is initiated.
-
Containment pressure peaks at 49 psia.
1226
-
The containment air ejector penetration breaches allowing
-
partial. release of the containment atmosphere into the-
!
Auxiliary Euilding.
,
Associated Radiation Monitors alarm.
-
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Unit.1
"J" ' Emergency Bus is lost due to an insulator L
1227
-
shorting to ground.
.(
'l-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power, is initiated.
-
.
1-RS-P-1A trips after start due to a grounded motor.
1228-
-
-
1-RS-P-2A starts and the pump shaft shears.
-
Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear'Roon " Smoke" and"" Trouble" 1229
-
alarms are received'on.the-Fire Protection Panels.-
T Source Range channels N31 and N32 energize.
'
1234-
-
GENERAL EMERWENCY (Tab E-5) dec1'ared bued'on ventilation 1246
-
vent' radiation ~. monitor readings:.or projected site
.,
boundary doses.
~
1-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressu1*e is 1248
-
,
initiated.
'
1-FR-P.1', Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal S 4ock,
-
is initiated.
Safety Injection automatically realigns from RWST tc the 1413
-
containment sump.
1-RS-P-1B power is restored and the pump is started.
1445
-
1-RS-P-2B power is restored and the pump is started.
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Containment pressure
<14.7 psia and the release is
.
>1500--
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terminated.
Terminate emergency on-site; commence area critiques.
1700
. -
Commence recovery planning phase.
1800-
,
'-
'
Establish Environmental Sampling Plan to determine'off-
--
y site' plume deposition footprint.
o Terminate exercise on-site, commence recovery critique.
l-1900
' -
t Terminate plume exposure exercise off-site.
2000-
-
Participant break until Day 2.
-
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' PM_2
),
l Controllers and observers positioned.
0730
,
-
Ingestion pathway exercise participants positioned.
?
0800
,
-
'
Con'; rollers brief participants on plant and off-site
-
~
i corditionc to' simulate time advancement to the beginning of Day 3.
l Controllers provide participants the analysis results of
!
-
the sample plan performed (simulated) on Day.2.
Revise Environmental Sampling Plan.
!.
0930
-
Protective Actions recommended for ingestion pathway-
-
l:
tased on initial sample results.
-f.
Ingestion pathway local governments respond in accordance s
\\
-
wdth applicable plans, t
FJ6d sampling begins based on the revised Environmental.
1000
-
l Sampling Plan.-
,
Environmental samples being analyzed by consolidated 1100
-
Laboratory Services (CLS).
Field sampling completed.
1230
-
CLS reports sample analysis results to the Bureau of
,
1300
-
Radiological Health Assessment Officer.
" Hot Spots" discovered in evacuated / sheltered areas based
-
-on the revised sample plan.
Relocation begins.for " Hot Spot" areas.
,
1400
-
Recovery begins off-site.
'
-
Selective Re-Entry begins in risk areas.
1500
-
.
Recovery.continuee off-site.
[
1600
-
o Recovery terminates off-site, commence area critiques.
-1700
-
Exercise terminates of f-site.
1800 l-
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