IR 05000338/1990020

Insp Repts 50-338/90-20 & 50-339/90-20 on 900906.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20059K684
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	09/06/1990
From:	Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059K682	List: IR 05000338/1990020 ML20059K681
References
50-338-90-20, 50-339-90-20, NUDOCS 9009240170
Download: ML20059K684 (24)

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UNITE-$ STATES

/ p h800q'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N

[ 'n REGION 18

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• Iyr 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

' *%,.... . J SEP 0 01998 Report Nos.: 50-338/90-20 and 50-339/90-20 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060

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Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7 facility Name: North' Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August e-10, 1990 Inspector:

iT.g~$ ,artor, Jr.~, Team

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_ Gate /5fsned Team Members: A. Gooden L. King F. McManus (PNL)

W. Rankin Approved by:M N , G{_, , ^ __

Tg W. H. Rank' n, Chiel te lgned'~

Emergency Preparedness Section . _

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Ernergency Preparedness and Radiological

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Protection Branch-L Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards l'

SUMMARY ,

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved the observation end evaluation of '

the annual energency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Control Room Simulator, Technical l

Support Center (TSC) Operational Support Center (OSC), and Local Emergency l OperationsfacilityILEOF). The inspection also included a review of the I

exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post exercise critique. .

The plurre' pathway exercise-on August 6, 1990, was conducted from 8:45 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. with full participation by State and local governments. Day 2 of the exercise was an ingestion pathway exercise evaluated by FEM DR ADOCK 0500

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Results.

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In the areas inspected violations or devietiens were not identifie <

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Exercise strengths included the licensee's challenging ano cttailed scenarie

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coupled with an energency respense facility lead controller comunications lccp !

that provided excellent exercise control. Licensee perforirance as observed was

- timely' and sufficient to n.itigate offsite consequences of the sin.ulated .l

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j REPORT DETAILS

. Persons Contacted .

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Licensee Employees

• C. M erson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist

• M. Eowi ng Assistant Station Manager i

• J. Crilins, Director, Emergency Planning

• J.'Costello, Surry Station Coordinator. Emergency Planning  ;

• E. Dreyer, Supervit.or, Padiological Protection

• L. Edmonds, Superintendent, Nuclear Training

• E. Hallern. ann, Health Physicist .

• E. Harrell, Vice President Nuclear Operations

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• S. Harrison, Senior Energency Planner

• W. Hartley, Nuclear Oversight Board

• J. Higgins, Director, Nuclear Security

• H. Johnson, Manager, Security

• L. Jones, Supervisor, Health Physics

• G. Kane, Station Manager

• P. Kemp, Supervit.or, Licensing '

• J. Leberstien, Senior Enoineer, Licensing

• J. Lusher, Station Coordinator Emergency Planning.'

• T. Maddy, Supervisor, Security

• J. Maciejewski, Manager, Quality Assurance

• W. Madison, Staff Emergency Planner

• B. McBride, Coordinator, Emergency Planning

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• J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Services

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• W. Renz, Emergency Preparedness Specialist e

• 5. Sowder, Secretary to Manager, Security  :

• A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection

• R. Thomasson, Corporate Health Physicist

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force menbers, technicians, and

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administrative personne ,

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NRC Resident Inspector L

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• M. Lesser Senior Resident Inspector ,

• Attended exit interview ExerciseScenario(82302)

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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capbility and a major '.

portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and iccal Energency Plans and orsenization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),

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10 CFR 50 Appendix E. Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was revicwed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was. discussed with licensee representative The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully e.xercise the onsite and offsite orcrgency organizations of the licensee and '

provided sufficient err.ergency information to the State and local The govertzent agencias fcr their full aarticipation in the exercis ,ad been reviewed cn three separate exercise scenario was. detailed erd occasions to identify and correct any data that was inconsisttnt. In addition to having a scenario with well coordinated data, the licensee had '

also established an excellent process to ensure the scenario events continued to te coordinated after the exercise began by having)a Iced on a e controller in each of tht turgency response facilities (ERFs telephone loop over which all events were coordinattd. This proved '

extremely beneficial with the licensee's first use of the simulator for a >

graded exercise as the results from actions taken by crerotors in the Control Room Simulator were inn.ediately made known to the lead controllers in the other ERis. This. contributed to the consistent and coordinated cxercise control that was characteristic of this exercis ,

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignn.ent of Responsibility (82301)

This area-was observed to' determine that prin.ary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and '

that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A. and specified criteria in NUREG-0654 Section I j Section 5.0 of the North Anna Emerstney Plan specifies that tb Shift Supervisor or Assistant Shift Supervisor initially act in the capacity of :

the Staticn Emergency Manager and take action as outlined in the Emergency The Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) until properly relieve inspectors observed- that the Shif t Supervisor promptly declared the Notification ci Unusual Event and assumed the responsibilities of the Station Emergency Monage Tte initial response organization was aus.nented by designated personnel and there were adequate staff to respond ;

to the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie . OnsiteEmergencyOrganization(82301)

The licensee's on-shift emtrgency organization was obsreved to detemine that the responsibilitics for en,ergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial f acility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the

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interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, l Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I l i

Yhe inspector observed that the initial en-shift energency organizaticn was well defincd and the respcnsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respcod to the crrergency were clear. Section 5.2 of the North Anna Emergency Plan clearly dclineated the ensite energency organization prior to augnentation t,y additionel f.n.ergency response perscnne ,

following an Alert dcclara'. ion, the on-shift emergency organization was augaente.d with the activat'ons of the Technical Support Center (TSC), ,

Operational Eupport Center (OSC), and the Local Emergency Operations  ;

facility (LEOF). The licensee was able to initially activate the above '

energency respense facilities in approximately thirty minute i No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Classification System (82301)

a standard emergency This area was observed to detert.ir.e that clessification and action level schen.e was in use by the nuclear facility licensce as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix Paragraph IV.C and specific criteria in h0 REG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the North Anna Emergency Plan and EPIP-1.01, Emergency Action Level Table, which provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four cn.ergency classification levels. The procedure was effectively used by the Station Emergency Manager (SLM) in the Control Room Simulator to classify the Notification of Unusual Event and the Alert, end by the SEM in the 1SC to classify the Site Area Energency and General Emergenc No violations or deviaticns were identifie . Notific6tionMethodsandProcedures(82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and crergency personnel by the license, and that the content of-' initial and followup This area was further nesseges to response organizations was establishe observed to assure that nicans to provide early notification to the population within the plurre exposure pathway here established pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(5). Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance pronulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654 An inspector observcd that notification n.ethods and procedures had becn 1 estabitsbed in EPIP-2.01, Notificaticn of State and Local Governments, and EPIP-2.02, Notification of NRC. All notifications were made pretptly end

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correctly with two minor exceptions. The first was an incorrect entry for the Alert declaration tirre on tressage (4 from tht Simulator Control Rccm :

and n.essage fl from the TSC. Although the Alert had been declared at 0939 '

(24-hr tint), it had been recorded and transmitted as 1000 on the -

aforetrenti aed nessages until corrected by one of the agencies receiving the nessage il from the TSC. The other exception was that all offsite notifications for an initial tirergency classification were well within the 15 minutes tineliness goal with the exception of the message for General Emergency which convenced at 14 mir.utes af ter the declaration. f!cwever, it was also noted that a decision to nele n. ore conservative Protective '

Action Recontiendations .(PARS) was nede during the 14 trinutes. Thus the PARS trade with the Gereral Eriergency Classification nessage were the inore ;

conservative and therefore did not require a change in the PARS which '

could have been confusing. The inspector also noted that energency sirens within the 10-mile errergency planning zones (EPZs) were naintaintd es a neans to alert the publi No violaticns or deviaticos were identifie , Emergency Conn:unications (82301)

This area was cbserved to determine that provisions existed for prompt consonications among principal response organizations and errergency .

personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E. and specific critoria in NUREG-0654,Section I ,

Connunications arrong the licensee's ERFs and energency organization and

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i between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were' good. One equipn.ent problem was observed in that the instaphone for trating State / local notifications in the TSC was inoperabi The licensee used an alternate means to trake the required notificaticns from the TSC, then the responsibility for State / local notifications was transferred to the LEO No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Education and Inforniation (C2301)

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This area was observed to determine that inforration concerning the simulated energency was made available for dissemination to the public as >

required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFE 50, Ap ndix E, Paragraph IV.D. and '

specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I A news release has published by the Virginia Department of Emergency

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Services en July 31, 1990, giving an overview of the purpose of the exercise and the primary participants. Included was infornetion on the siren system and the interval of tine during which the sirens would be

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sounded to alert the public to tune to their local radio or television Energency Broadcast System (EBS) stations for inforrration on what to do in the event of an incident at the plant. The news release also contained

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information on the Ingestion Pathway exercise that was conduct' on the second day, fio violat' s or deviations were identifie l Emergency facilities and Equipment (82301)

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This area was cbserved to determined that adequate on.orgency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key crergency response facilities to include the Simulator Control Room. TSC, OSC, and LEO Simulator Control Pcom - An inspe". tor observed that the Shif t Supervisor demonstrated excellent corr,and and control throughout the i exercise and classifications and notificetions were accomplished in t precise 6nd tiniely manne Both operators and supervisors >

I demonstrated good use of normL1, abnornal, and emergency procedures l

throughout the exercise. The connunications equipment available in the Simulator was fully adequate with the exception of the eudible alarnis which had to be set off from the Control Roo '

L Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon r.otification by the SEM of the Alert classification. The-inspector observed that the facility layout provided for a good L

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interface between the SEM and his Emergency Directors. Strengths noted in the 15C included good coccand and control of the emergency nrganization which was enhanced by the periodic briefings regarding the incident status and on going mitigatirg actions. Status boards were maintained up-to-date throughout the exercise and the tracking ,

l and prioritirath n of damage control teams was displayed.

l- Operational Support Center - The OSC was proniptly staffed and

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activated following the Alert declaration. Because the exercise had been designed to be damage control intensive, some damage control

. teams were delayed awaiting personnel that were self contained breathingapparatus(SCBA) qualifie , Local Emergency Operations f acil .ty - The LEOF was prceptly staffed and activated with qualified station personnel. An inspector noted that it was not readily apparent as to what energency action level had been met to require the Ger. oral Ercrgency declaration. The inspector noted the Recovery Manager provided good status updates on

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the changing scenario. The inspector also noted that the command and control of the two field nionitoring teams was good. The teams were dispatched ee,rly from the site and were pre-positioned at logical projected plume path ronitoring points. There was also good discipline in minin.izing dose / plume stay time for the field

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nonitoring tear It was noted that MIDAS cross validation of - ,

field reaoings with assumed accident / source tenm was good and that it meshed well with State dat ,

No violations cr deviations were identifie ;

10. Accident Assessrent (82302)

This area was observed to determined whether edequate n.ethods, systen.s and f i

equipment for assessing and nonitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radic1cgical (n.ergency condition stre in use as required by.10CFR50.47(b)(9),10CFR50,AppendixE.ParagraphIV.B.anositcific- l critoria in NUREG-0654 Section I ?

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The accident assessm+nt prograra included both an engineering assessrent of plent status and an assessn.ent of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessn.ent team functioned effectively in enalyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Station En.ergency '

Management concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equiprent, to prevent reltase of radioactive materials end to terminate l the emergency conditio Onsite and offsite monitoring were effectively deronstrated as noted by observations in the onsite energency response facilities and the LEOF as '

discussed in the above paragrap No violations or deviations were identifie . ProtectiveResponses(02301)

This area was observed to determine tLat guidelines for protective actions during the immrgency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and .

in place, and protective actions for en.ergency workers, including !

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cvacuation of nonessential required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(persconel, were implemented promptly Section I .

An inspector verified that the licensee had and used epiersency precedures for fcrmulating PARS for offsite pcpulations within the 10 mile EP Protective actions were initiated for onsite on.ergency workerr folltwing the Alert declaration by conducting a perscnnel accountabilicy of those personnel inside the protected area. The accountability war completed in r

24 minutes. As discussed by the licensee prior to the exert,ise, an actual -i site evacuation was not included in the scope of this exercis No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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12. Radiological Exposure Control (62301)

This area was observed to determine that means for contrciling radiological expcsures, in an energency, are established and implemented for energency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA reconceridation as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and sgcific criteria in-NUREG-0654.Section I As inspector noted that radiological exposures were contro11t.d throughout the exercise and periodic surveys were conducted in the ERFs. Exposure guidelints were in place for various categories of energency actions and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriete. EPIP-5.06 provided guidance for emergency radiation exposure authorizatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)

This recoveryareaand was observed re-entry to determine as required that 50.47 by 10 CFR general p(lans CFR b)(13),10 were50, made for Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 1 ' The licensee developed general plans and procedures for re-entry and recovery which addressed both txisting and potential conditions. The plan contained the position / title, authority and responsibilitics of each key individual in the recovery organizatio No violations or deviations were identifie .

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14. ExerciseCritique(82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the perfornance of the exercise were brought to the attention of n.anaccrent and docun.cnted for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.471b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted facility criticues with the exercise players irrnediately following the exercise tern.ination on the first da !!.icensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to providing formal critique results to n.anagercent on August 10, 1950. The critique was thorough and included a review of the objectives that had been established for demonstration curing the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie \

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15. ActionofPreviousInspectionFindings(92701,92702) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-338, 339/6E-14-Oh ,

Evaluate validity of use of field acnitoring data for calculating a s

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source term and use of same in protecthe action decisior.5 or in

determining emergency classification This finding addressed a change that was to te n,ade with a revision to the RALMET conputer code which is no longer use The licensee l

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now uses MIDA .

(Closed) IFI 50-338, 339/68-14-04: Modify RADMET rnodel to provide

, dose projection estiftatet at future plume position l The licensce's new dose assessment nodel, MIDAS, provided fcr this as well as the fact that RACMET is no longer ust.d closes this item, (Closed) Violation 50-338, 339/88-24-02: Failure to demonstrate the >

capebility of nietir.g staffing roruitenents i for emergency response team perscnne '

The licensee has n,ade tignificant changer to the n.cthods for augnentation of steffing rtruirents.ts i for emergency response tcem !

personnel. For excitple, all thirty minute responders are now on shift to iceet Tabic 0-1 requirements and other iesponders needed for TEC, CSC, and LEOF staffing are on beepers. The licensee has conducted successful tests to insure n.initral staffing requirements were met within itquired time !

(Closed)ExerciseVeekness 50-338,339/89-25-01: Excessive prortpting prevented den.onstration of objective No prorrpting was observed during this year's exercis Exercise control bad been greetly improved since last yea (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-338,339/89-25-02: Onsite and offsite

'- rronitoring not adequately denonstrate The licensee fully nct exercise objectives to demonstrate the e.Lility of Health Physics and Chemistry to conduct radiological nonitoring activities and the ability to rerform off-site dose assessmen (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-338, 339/89-25-03: Onsite :

accountability not adequately den.onstrate he licensee perforned ensite accourtebility in 24 n:inute _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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1 Exit Interview ,

The inspection scope and results v.-cre sumarized on August 30, 1990, with those persons iridicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas insgtted and discussed in detail the insnction results. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting corinents were not received from the license . Federal Evaluation Team Report 1he report by the Federal Evaluation Team (P.egional Assistence Comittee and Feceral Emergency P.ar.agenent Agency, Region 11 staff) concerning the activities of off site agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondenc .

Attachment *

Exercise Scope, Objective, and Time Line

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTE ANNA POWER STATION AUGUST 7 AND 8, 1990 EMBRGENCY EXERCISE panRcIsa scoPB Virginia Electric and Power Company will demonstrate its ability to implement both the Corporate and North Anna Power Station Emergency Plans on August 7 ani 8, 1990. The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the North Anna Emergency. Plan, associated implementing procedures, selected portions of the Corporate Emergency Response Plan in accordance with 10CFR50.47 (b) (14), and to support the implementation of state and local government emergency response plans as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agenc This ingestion pathway exercise will be held in conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the commonwealth of Virginia and several local governments. The list of participants includes 19 state agencies, 31 local governments, 4 volunteer organizations, 2 federal agencies, 4 special f acilities, the State of Maryland and Virginia Power. The exercise will Emergency Management demonstrate that Agency, individuals and agencies assigned those responsibilities in a radiological emergency are capable of providing the necessary protective measures to ensure the-health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at North Anna Power Statio The exercise will demonstrate responses to the four emergency classes established by NUREG-0654, criteria for Prenaration and Evaluation of Radioloalcal Emeraency Response Plans Preparedness in supnort of Nuclear Power Stations. A scenario will be prepared to accomplish a successive escalation through these emergency classes. Free play is encouraged and controllers will only interfere with participants' responses if the exercise lags behind schedule, if emergency response personnel take inappropriate actions to carry them to the next event, or if action is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier than scheduled by the scenari At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the station. Station management may, at-their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goa Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the simulated incident or any parts thereof, with the exception of the exercise date, j

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TIRGINIA POWER  !

NORTE ANNA POWER STATION -

AUGUST 7 AND 8, 1990 HNERGENCY BIERCISE l

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The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrats by actual i performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as .

they relate to the North Anna Power Station Erorgency Pla ~

The simulated -accident will involve emergency classification, ;

notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of i accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope l with the even The event will include a simulated off-site  :

radiological release and ground deposition to support an ingestion l pathway exercis i The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the 3 North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, the Corporate Emergency '

Response Plan, and associated implementing procedure Those ,

emergency response functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be simulate The following objectives were developed to establish the scope of the August 7 and 8, 1990 North Anna Emergency Exercis The >

objectives ensure that required events are included in the exerciso [

scenario and establish evaluation criteria used by the controllers ,

and observer ;

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VIRGINIA POWER  !

NORTE ANNA POWER STATION AUGUST 7 AND 8, 1990 ENERGENCY EXERCISE {

OBJECTIVES i Demonstrate the ability to activate the North Anna Power l Station and Corporate Emergency Response Plans and appropriate implementing procedure l North Anna Power St:: tion and Corporate emergency response organizations will demonstrate this objectiv Initial r activation will occur in the Control Room Simulato All North Anna Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) will be activate As applicable to the ;

events developed by the exercise scenario, each ERF staff will i demonstrate functions described in the implementing l procedures, i The following North Anna Power Station and Corporate facilities will be staffed by the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) for this exercise (1) Control Room Simulator (CRS)

(2) Technical Support Center (TSC)

(3) Operational Support Center (OSC)  ;

(4) Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) ,

(5) Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)

(6) Joint public Information Center (JPIC)

(7) Local Media Center (LMC)

Other ERO Groups participating in this exercise, but not '

responding to the above facilities, include chemistry, Health Physics, Operations, and Securit ,

. Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess Emergency Action Level (EAL) parameters, and classify the i emergency.

l The CRS and TSC ERO will demonstrate this objective by I l initiation and use of EPIP-1.01 and appropriate operational  :

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Status forms detailing radiological monitor and operational i,

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trend data will be issued at periodic interval The ability ,

to acquire data using the Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS) or by back-up methods will be demonstrated in appropriate facilitie . Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-site emergency teams to perform response activitie I l

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As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and OSC staffs will demonstrate this objective by dispatching and controlling. teams in response to scenario events within the Station Protected Are Also, the ability to brief emergency teams and establish appropriate protective measures and communications will be demonstrate Prior to Emergency Response Facility activation, the CRS staff

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will demonstrate this objective by initiating applicable procedure Following facility activation, the TSC and OSC staffs will demonstrate this objective by implementing EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.03, and EPIP-5.0 j 4. Demonstrate the ability to notify and mobilize t;.e North Anna Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Organizatio !

The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will demonstrate this objective. Station ERO notification will be '

conducted in accordance with EPIP-3.01 and EPIP-5.0 .;

Corporate Security will initiate ECP-5 for corporate ERO notificatio . Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and local .

governments and the NRC within established time constraint The CRS, TSC, .and LEOF ERO will demonstrate this objective by providing up-to-date information to federal, state, and local  !

governments within required time limits, r State and Local Government Notification Information for these notifications will be identified and recorded by an Emergency Communicator (EC) on EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1 (Report of Emergency to State and Local Governments), and Attachment 2 (Report of  :

Radiological Conditions to the State). Upon approval by j the Station Emergency Manager (SEM) or the Recovery 3 Manage.r (RM), the EC will transmit the information to the state and/or local government The start time for completing the 15-minute initial  ;

notification will commence when the SEM declares the emergency classificatio Follow-up communications will be maintained using EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1, and will occur at about 30 minute intervals or as conditions chang ,

I- As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit Protective  !

Action Recommendations (PARS) to the State will be demonstrated in accordance with EPIP-1.05 and appropriate ,

notification procedure '

The EC will transmit the initial Report of Radiological (

Conditions (EPIP-2.02, Attachment 2) to the state

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following data assimilation, recording, and approva '

Follow-up notifications on radiological conditions will '

occur at about 30' minute intervals or as conditions chang i The SEM retains responsibility for state and local  ;

government notifications until the LEOF is activate '

Following LEOF activation, responsibility for notification is transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM) . I NRC Notification *

Information for these notifications will be indentified and recorded by the EC on EPIP"2.02, Attachment 1 (Initial Report of Emergency to the NRC), Attachment 2, '

(Supplemental Report of Emergency to the NRC), and EPIP-  :

4.03, Attachment 3 (HPN Communications). Upon approval !

by the SEM, the ECs will transmit the information to the '

NR {

The start time for completing the 1-hour intial- ;

notification commences when the .SEM declares the emergency classification. The initial notification will  ;

be performed from the CR Following initial l

notification and unless directed otherwise, the EC will  ;

maintain continuous communications with NRC Operations l to transmit plant condition change Communication dialogue highlights will be documente Responsibility for NRC Notifications in accordance with  ;

EPIP-2.02 will remain with the TSC ERO. Responsibility for Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be r transferred to the LEOF following activation of that i facilit !

'- Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability of personnel within the Protected Are ;

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The CRS staff and Security will demonstrate this objective in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.0 Also, to support ,

the overall accountability process, the Assembly' Area Leaders will perform area accountability in accordance with EPIP-5.03, i Attachment 1 (Assembly Area Leader Instructions).

7. . Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) based on assessment of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or measurement :

As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM from the CRS or TSC or by the RM in the LEO The CRS and TSC l organizations will monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose projections to support formulation of PAR *

Responsibility for PAR development is transferred to the LEOF

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following activation of that facilit Radiological parameter data generated during the development f of this scenario may be artificially elevated and may not j represent the degree of fuel failure and radiological release  ;

commensurate with the plant dynamic event This may be i necessary to demonstrate this exercise objective ,

8. Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement  !

appropriate protective measures for emergency response ,

personnel, including site access control, contamination  ;

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control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as appropriate, the process for authorization of potassium iodide *

(KI) administratio This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among  ;

the CRS, TSC, and OSC ERO in which the TSC staff will monitor  !

and authorize protective measures for site access, .

contamination control, and exposure contro l The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor [

(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property i per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-4.02 and associated procedures to ,

assess radiologica) condition Protective measures 4 appropriate for conditions will be developed and/or *

implemented for site emergency response personne y Security will implement access control measures in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.0 !

The OSC Staff and other site personnel will implemer,t any necessary actions associated with protacive eqnipment .

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requirements and in-plant access control.

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If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or l

TSC and OSC staffs will demonstrate the process for requesting

! . and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency i l

exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01, EPIP-  ;

j 4.04, EPIP-5.06 and EPIP-5.0 Also, if necessary, the TSC l

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staff will demonstrate the XI authorization process per EPIP- _,

4.01 and EPIP-5.07.

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If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will L demonstrate the planning and notification process for l- evacuating non-essential personnel in accordance with EFIP-4.07 and EPIP-5.0 }

9. Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessmen }

As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by CRS, '

TSC, and LEOF staff The ability to perform initial dose assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of  ;

EPIP-4.01 and associated dose assessment procedures.

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Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4.01, EPIP-4.02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment effor As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staff )

i 10. As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and l Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities, d including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample s analysi j As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in )

accordance with EPIP-4.02. Post Accident Sampling activities <

will be performed in accordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.2 j The field monitoring teams will perform radiological monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-4.1 j i

Reactor coolant and/or containment samples may be obtained i utilizing the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS). l Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring l capabilities will be provided by the controller during sample collection. Isotopic analysis data will be provided following ;

demonstration of proper sample preparation and upon expiration !

of spectrum collection and analysis time )

11. Demonstrate the ability to effectivsly activate the emergency response facilitie Activation of the TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LMC will be !

demonstrated in accordance with the appropriate procedure l 12. Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment adequately support emergency response activities in each facilit This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, OSC, i LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LM . Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective $

communication The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC-staffs, and Field Teams will demonstrate this objectiv Use of backup communications systems will be demonstrated only if primary systems fai i 14. Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control' of the emergency response effor The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command and control from the CRS and TS The RM will demonstrate ,

command and control of the emergency response effort associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facilit ,

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1. The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area-are informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-Tronics). . Remaining site personnel will be notified by other verbal communication metb-xis . All announcements will be preceeded and terminated with the phrase: "This is a drill."

The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to transfer appropriate command and control function The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include (1) Notifications to the state, local governments, and NR (2) Providing PARS to the stat (3) Determining the emergency classificatic (4) Authorizing emergency exposure The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF aret (1) Notifications to the state and local governments and to the NRC via the HP (2) Transmitting PARS to the stat . Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review, and release timely and accurate information to the publi The CERC, JPIC, LEOF and LMC staffs will demonstrate this objectiv Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and transmitted to the LEOF for technical revie Following approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the process for issuing press releases will be demonstrate The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and make-them available to the media in the JPIC and LM . Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control function i Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing an emergency hotlina in accordance with CPIP-2.1 and CPIP-2.3. .

Questions will be called into the Public Information Room requiring respons . Demonstrate the ability to provide continuous emergency response capabilit The ERO within the Emergency Response Facilities will demonstrate this objective by formulating a shift relief roste As appropriate, the ability to provide logistical support for

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' Emergency Response personnel may be demonstrate . Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support ane to i package and transport a contaminated injured person to an of t- i site medical facilit This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team implementing procedures appropriate for the vict!Ns level of injury and by Radiological Protection employing the necessary radiological controls in accordance with EPIP-5.01 and EPIP- i

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4.20 to remove the contaminated victim from the accident '

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scen As necessary, Station Security will implement applicable sections of EPIP-5.09 to summon of f-site support. An of f-site i rescue unit will demonstrate the ability to respond to the Statio The contaminated injured person will be transported to an off- j site medical facility which will demonstrate the ability to )

provide appropriate treatmen ~ 19. Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization and to develop and implement a Recovery Pla !

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This objective will be demonstrated by the 3EM and RM by ,

implementing EPIP-6.01 and CPIP-6.5 to develop both a Recovery ,

Organization and Plan to return the Plant to a normal status.- ;

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2 Demonstrate the ability to establish a support group to assist / advise the state with their recovery effort ,

This objective will be demonstrated by the RM and Recovery Organization in accordance with CPIP-6.5.

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Total population exposure estimates will be provided-to the

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state in accordance with North Anna Emergency Plan, section

' . Demonstrate the ability of the Erudgency Response organization &

to conduct a self-critique and to identify areas for .

improvemen f The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry, Radiological Protection, Operations, and Field Monitoring Teams will conduct a self-critique to identify weaknesses and ;

improvement item t

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' VIRGINIA POWER MORTE ANNA POWER STATION AUGUST,7 AND Si 1990 ENERGENCY EXERCISE TIME LINE NOTE: TIMES ARE APPROXINATE

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EVENT-TIH4

' }; D&Y 1 and observers positione Selected 0800 - Controllers necessary participant briefings controllers ' perform (i.e., exemptions or message format).

0830 - Operations Department participants positioned in the Control Room Simulator and the Operator Assembly Are ,r

- Simulator run starte l(

- 1-AP-42, Loss of.Prodac-250 Computer, being p rforme Annunciator 1A-B6 (EARTHQUAKE -j-0845 - Earthquake detecte f

' INSTRUMENT PANEL TROUBLE) is received, i

- t 1-AP-36, Seismic Event, is in Riated. -

0850 - First Aid emergency occurs ai- the .1-CH-P-1C cubicle

.(contaminated-individual requiring transport). l

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0905 - NOTIFICATION OF' UNUSUAL EVENT (Tab- L-1) declared based on a confirmed earthquake which activates the Event Alarm on the Strong Motion Accelerograp Hathaway power supply failure results in loss of all t nit-1 main board annunciator ,

0950- -;

ALERT (Tab A-11) declared based on"A" simultaneous lossLof through "K": with ;

all annunciator alarms on panels lous.:of unit compute Reactor- Coolant System leakage from the "B" loop 1045 -

accumulator loop penetration begin The leakage

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increases' linearly to 60 gpm within 30 minute )

1055 - 1-hP-16, Increasing. Primary Plant Leakage, is initiate ~

l'-AP-5.1, Unit 1 ' Radiation Monitoring System,. is initiated due to containment radiation' levels increasin PT-52.2, RCS Leakrate, is initiate Letdown secure (

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1115 =- Ramp down commenced due to high' leak rate from the j Reactor Coolant Syste ,

- - !1-OP-2.2, Unit Powar Operation Mode 1, to Mode 2, is  !

- initiated, j i

!! 1135 - SITE AREh EMERGENCY (Tab- A-12) based on failed plant- l computer, loss- of annunciators and an operational 1 L transient in progress.

L - Reg <down is continuin RC-P-1B vibration Alert alarm is receive Loose parts indicated in the reat,or vessel louer hea Reactor.' Coolant System "B" loop accumulator loop ,

penetration rupture l

- Shfety Injection, Containment Depressurization Actuation,  ;

and Containment Phase "A" and Phase "B" isolation occurs, t

- 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection is initiate Containment pressure peaks at 49 psia.

0 - The containment air ejector penetration breaches allowing

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partial. release of the containment atmosphere into the-

! Auxiliary Euilding.

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Associated Radiation Monitors alarm.

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Unit.1 "J" ' Emergency Bus is lost due to an insulator shorting to groun .( - 'l-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power, is initiate .

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1228- - 1-RS-P-1A trips after start due to a grounded moto RS-P-2A starts and the pump shaft shear ;

1229 - Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear'Roon " Smoke" and"" Trouble" alarms are received'on.the-Fire Protection Panels.-

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Source Range channels N31 and N32 energiz GENERAL EMERWENCY (Tab E-5) dec1'ared bued'on ventilation vent' radiation ~. monitor readings: .or projected

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boundary doses.

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1248 - 1-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressu1*e is

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initiate FR-P.1', Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal S 4ock, is initiate Safety Injection automatically realigns from RWST tc the containment sum RS-P-1B power is restored and the pump is starte RS-P-2B power is restored and the pump is starte (

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>1500-- :-t Containment pressure <14.7 psia and the release is .

J terminate . - Terminate emergency on-site; commence area critique '- Commence recovery planning phas ,

-- Establish Environmental Sampling Plan to determine'off- '

y site' plume deposition footprint.

o l-t 1900 ' - Terminate exercise on-site, commence recovery critiqu Terminate plume exposure exercise off-sit Participant break until Day t

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' PM_2 0730 - Controllers and observers positione ,

? 0800 - Ingestion pathway exercise participants positione ,

Con'; rollers brief participants on plant and off-site

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i corditionc to' simulate time advancement to the beginning

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of Day 3.

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- Controllers provide participants the analysis results of the sample plan performed (simulated) on Da Revise Environmental Sampling Plan.

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- Protective Actions recommended for ingestion pathway-tased on initial sample result \ - Ingestion pathway local governments respond in accordance s wdth applicable plans, t

1000 - FJ6d sampling begins based on the revised Environmental.

l Sampling Plan.- ,

1100 - Environmental samples being analyzed by consolidated Laboratory Services (CLS).

1230 - Field sampling complete CLS reports sample analysis results to the Bureau of

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1300 -

Radiological Health Assessment Office " Hot Spots" discovered in evacuated / sheltered areas based-on the revised sample pla Relocation begins.for " Hot Spot" area ,

' - Recovery begins off-sit Selective Re-Entry begins in risk area .

1600 - Recovery.continuee off-site.

o-1700 - Recovery terminates off-site, commence area critique '(

1800 -

Exercise terminates of f-site.

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