ML20140F265
| ML20140F265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140F262 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-97-03, 50-338-97-3, 50-339-97-03, 50-339-97-3, NUDOCS 9706130021 | |
| Download: ML20140F265 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1997003
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
l Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339
l License Nos: NPF 4, NPF 7
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Report Nos: 50 338/97 03, 50 339/97 03
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Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPC0)
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Facility: North ~ Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2
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Location: 1022 Haley Drive
i Mineral, Virginia 23117
Dates: April 6 through May 17, 1997
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Inspectors: K. Poertner, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
R. Gibbs, Resident Inspector
P. Byron, Resident Inspector (Surry)
Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure
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9706130021 970606
ADOCK 050003 O
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! EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 338/97-03, 50-339/97 03
i This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
i engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six week
i period of resident inspection.
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Operations
. Operator actions to reduce power following detection of oil in the
Unit 2 main generater were appropriate based on the alarm response
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procedure guidance. Licensee management actions to verbally approve a
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change to the alarm response procedure were conducted in accordance with
approved administrative procedures and based on sound technical
information (Section 01.2).
l . A main feedwater pump swap was carefully controlled (Section 01.3).
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- A non cited violation was identified for failure to perform the
appropriate attachment to align the B boric acid transfer pump resulting
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in a loss of configuration control of the Unit 1 Boric Acid Transfer
System. The loss of configuration control resulted from a lack of
- attention to detail on the part of the operators performing the
evolution (Section 01.4).
. Unit I was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage on May 11, 1997.
Shutdown activities observed were conducted in accordance with approved
procedures. Control room command and control during the power reduction
was good (Section 01.5).
. Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System draindown activities were adequately
controlled and water inventory was closely tracked by the operators and
the shift technical advisor (Section 01.6).
. The Quench Spray System was properly aligned. The inspectors noted
several minor mat 5 rial deficiencies that were appropriately addressed by
the licensee. The inspectors expressed a concern to plant management
about the presence of teflon tape on stainless steel threaded
connections (Section 02.1).
. Simulator training observed appeared challenging and training personnel
provided appropriate feedback to the operating crew following completion
of the simulator exercise (Section 05.1).
l . A Management Safety Review Committee meeting complied with Technical
l Specification (TS) requirements, and substantive assessment issues were
j addressed in committee discussions (Section 07.1).
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. The inspectors reviewed the most recent World Association of Nuclear
Operators Peer Review Report during the inspection period (Section
07.2).
Maintenance
. An unresolved item was identified concerning TS testing requirements for
the Number 4 turbine governor valve. The licensee has submitted a TS
change request to clarify the testing requirement (Section M1.1).
. Operations took appropriate actions to halt an emergency diesel
generator pre lube operation when procedure clarification was required '
(Section M1.2).
. Maintenance activities observed were properl 9) proved, associated i
)rocedures were present at the job sites, una t1e work was performed by !
(nowledgeable individuals (Section M1.3). l
. Control rod drop time testing was performed in accordance with approved
procedures. Drop times met TS requirements and all control rods
exhibited recoil following entry into the dashpot region (Section M1.4).
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Safety Evaluation 97 SE PROC-22 adequately justified installation of an
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electrical jumper to initiate manual spray actuation during the
performance of Periodic Test 1 PT 66.3 (Section E1.1).
Plant Support
. Radiation protection practices observed were conducted properly (Section ;
R1.1).
. The protected area perimeter barrier was properly manned and maintained ,
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(Section S1.1).
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
l Unit 1 began the inspection wriod at 100 percent reactor power and operated ,
, at or near full power until iay 11 when the plant was shutdown for a scheduled
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l Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
I. 0_gerations
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01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 Daily Plant Status Reviews (71707. 40500. 929011
The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper
l staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedures.
The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain
awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to
verify operational safety and compliance with Technical Specifications
(TSs). Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically
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reviewed from control room indications to assess operability. Frequent
plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status and housekeeping.
Deviations Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety
concerns were properly reported and resolved. The inspectors found that
daily operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory
requirements and plant procedures. Good equipment material conditions
were also evident by extended problem free plant operation.
01.2 Unit 2 Power Reduction
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors monitored activities associated with a Unit 2 power
reduction due to oil being detected in a main generator water detector.
b. Observations and Findinas
On April 9, at 11:18 a.m., a Unit 2 power reduction commenced due to
hydrogen seal oil intrusion into the main generator. The oil was
detected due to a high alarm on the generator leads end water detector.
Prior to the oil detection, a hydrogen seal oil transient had occurred
resulting in a high level in the hydrogen seal oil defoaming tank. The
power reduction was initiated in accordance with the alarm response
procedure. Subsequent to the initiation of the power reduction the
i vendor was contacted and vendor reference material was reviewed. The
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review determined that the amount of oil collected from the water level
l detector (approximately 14 ounces) was acce) table and removal of the
j generator from service was not required. T1e alarm response procedure
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was revised verbally by station management and the power reduction was
l terminated at 11:44 a.m. at 97.5 percent power. The unit was returned
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! to 100 percent power at 12:36 p.m. The alarm response procedure was
subsequently revised to reflect the vendor guidance. '
The inspectors monitored activities in the control room during the power
l reduction and attended the meeting where plant management verbally
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changed the alarm response procedure based on the vendor ,
recommendations. The inspectors also reviewed the completed procedure !
action request following verbal approval of the change.
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c. Conclusions l
Operator actions to reduce power following detection of oil in the
Unit 2 main generator were appropriate based on the alarm res)onse
procedure guidance. Licensee actions to verbally approve a clange to
the alarm response procedure were conducted in accordance with approved
administrative procedures and based on sound technical information.
01.3 Main Feedwater (MFW) Pumo Swan
a. Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors observed operators starting Unit 2 MFW pump 2 FW P 1C and
securing McW pump 2 FW P 1B.
b. Observations and Findinas
On April 11, the inspectors observed a swap of MFW pumps in which MFW
pump C was started and MFW pump B was secured. The inspectors attended
the are brief in the control room arj noted that.all personnel involved
in tie evolution were present. The inspectors noted that communications
by the unit Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) were difficult to hear, but
observed that personnel involved asked questions to ensure the SR0's
directions were clear. Overall, the inspectors concluded the brief was
good. The inspectors also observed local operation of placing the
standby condensate pump in service and found no problems. In the
control room, the inspectors observed that procedure execution,
communications, and supervisory oversight were appropriate. The
inspectors also observed that a third reactor operator carefully
monitored steam generator water level. There were no unexpected
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equipment problems during the swap.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the MFW pump swap was carefully
controlled.
01.4 Boric Acid Transfer Pumo (BATP) Operation With No Suction Path
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j a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding an inadvertent
isolation of the suction flow path to the C BATP.
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b. Observations and Findinas
At 9:00 a.m. on May 8. BATP B was placed in service to allow
installation of a suction pressure gauge on the A BATP. This evolution
was accomplished using procedure 0 0P 8.8, " Transferring Boric Acid,"
Revision 1. At 10:15 a.m., the A BATP was restarted per 0-0P 8.8 and
the B BATP was secured. On May 8, at approximately 3:15 p.m. during
review of the comaleted procedure by the unit supervisor, it was
determined that tie wrong attachment was used to place the B BATP in !
service. This resulted in the B BATP being aligned to the B Boric Acid
Tank (BAT) as opposed to the A BAT and it also resulted in isolaticn of
the C BATP suction isolation valve with the C BATP still operating. The
C BATP was secured, the system was realigned, and the C BATP was
restarted and tested. The pump did not exhibit any degradation when
tested.
TS 3.1.2.2 requires that a boron injection flowpath from the BATS via a
'BATP and a charging pump t:e o)erable during power operation. The l
inspectors verified that the ) oration flowpath to Unit I was operable
during the period that the boric acid transfer system was misaligned.
The failure to properly implement procedure 0-0P-8.8 to align the B BATP
to the A BAT is identified as a violation. This item was identified by
the licensee and corrective actions were initiated to address the
failure to adequately implement the procedure. This licensee identified
violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of
the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item is identified as NCV 50 338/
97003 01.
c. Conclusions l
An NCV was identified for failure to perform the appropriate attachment
to align the B BATP resulting in a loss of configuration control of the
Unit 1 boric acid transfer system. The loss of configuration control
resulted from a lack of attention to detail on the part of the operators
performing the evolution.
01.5 Unit 1 Shutdown for Refuelina
a. Inspection Scope (71707) '
On May 11, the inspectors observed portions of the Unit 1 shutdown for a
scheduled refueling outage,
b. Observations and Findinas
, On May 11 at 1:45 a.m., Unit 1 was removed from service to commence a
i scheduled refueling outage. The inspectors observed portions of the
! power reduction, removal of the generator from service, turbine
l overspeed testing, power reduction to below the point of adding heat,
opening of the reactor trip breakers, and rod drop time testing.
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Activities observed were conducted in accordance with approved
procedures. Control room command and control during the )ower reduction
was good. When the reactor was tripped in accordance wit 1 the
controlling procedure, all rods indicated less than ten steps as
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required and emergency boration was not required. Operations management
was in the control room during the shutdown activities.
c. Conclusions
Unit 1 was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage on May 11, 1997.
Shutdown activities observed were conducted in accordance with approved I
procedures. Control room command and control during the power reduction l
was good. l
01.6 Unit 1 heactor Coolant System (RCS) Draindown
a. Inspection Scoce (71707)
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On May 14. the inspectors observed control room activities associated I
with RCS draindown to the 74 inch vessel level.
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b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed control room activities associated with reducing I
RCS level below the reactor vessel flange to allow detensioning of the ,
reactor vessel head. Prior to reducing RCS level below the pressurizer. l
the RCS loops were isolated and drained. The inspectors observed that
procedural compliance was good and water inventory was being closely
tracked by the operators and the shift technical advisor.
c. Conclusions
RCS draindown activities were adequately controlled and water inventory
was being closely tracked by the operators and the shift technical
advisor.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Unit 1 Ouench Soray (0S) System Walkdown
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
On April 30, the inspectors aerformed a walkdown of the primary and
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recirculation flowpaths of t1e Unit 1 QS system. The inspectors did not
inspect inaccessible components in the containment. Since teflon tape
i was observed on the Unit 1 QS system, other plant areas were walked down
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to check for further evidence of teflon tape.
i b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR), Figure 6.2-67. Revision 30; " Piping and Instrument Diagram
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(P&ID)," 11715 FM 091A, Revision 26, sheets 1 and 2: and 1 0P 7.4A,
" Valve Checkoff - Quench Spray System," Revision 7, as references for
the required system valve positions. The inspectors found that all
valves listed in 10P 7.4A were in their required positions.
The inspectors observed that housekeeaing in the safeguards and QS pump ;
houses was excellent. It was noted tlat all components were properly ,
labeled and that minor baron accumulations, none with observed active i
leakage, had Work Order (WO) requests in place that were not excessively l
old. Instrumentation was properly installed and indicated expected !
values with the QS system in standby.
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The inspectors notcd several conditions that were brought to the !
attention of operations and engineering. These conditions included the
following:
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There was an inconsistent representation of heat traced piaing on
the referenced P& ids and the UFSAR figure listed above. T1e
licensee subsequently prepared DR N-97-1054 to address the
inconsistencies.
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Piping insulation at the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) area
was in need of repair. The licensee subsequently prepared a
deficiency card to initiate repairs.
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QS pump recirculation piping supports and s) ring cans supporting
the high and low recirculation piping, whic1 are attached to the
RWST, were corroded. The licensee subsequently determined the
supports to be operable, but in need of repair and issued DR N-97-
1053.
The inspectors observed that teflon tape was used in two different
locations in the QS system. Specifically, teflon tape was found at the
pipe cap threaded connection for 1-0S-104, which is located at test
connection penetration 63, and at QS pump suction pressure gauge, 1-0S-
PI 104B, both of which consisted of stainless steel piping. The
inspectors informed appropriate licensee personnel and DR N 97-1087 was
subsequently issued to document the use of teflon tape.
On May 2, the inspectors walked down the Unit 2 QS, Outside
Recirculation Spray, and Low Head Safety Injection systems to determine
if the teflon tape found on the Unit 1 QS system was an isolated
occurrence. The inspectors identified that teflon tape was present on
various stainless steel instrument connections. On later dates
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throughout the inspection period, the inspectors observed that teflon
l tape was in use in other plant locations, including the Auxiliary
l Building, Fuel Handling Building, and the Unit 1 containment. These
findings were also discussed with the licensee.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program requirements to determine
the restrictions on the use of teflon tape. Document N 95-122,
" Consumable Material Evaluation (CHE)," Revision 2, was reviewed to
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determine if the use of teflon tape was acceptable on systems with
- stainless steel piping such as QS, Outside Recirculation Spray, and Low
. Head Safety Injection. The review determined that teflon tape was not
, allowed.for use on these systems.
The inspectors discussed the use of teflon tape with engineering. The
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Engineering Department provided procedure NAI 0001, " Specification for i
Installation of Instrumentation," Revision 3, Section 7.2.9.7.1, which
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, stated that types of teflon or other materials shall not be used on !
control pneumatic, control hydraulic, or primary instrument tube l
- national pipe thread fittings, piping, or on instrument air distribution i
i tubing fittings. Specification NAI 0001 also stated that when teflon l
! tape is discovered in the plant during the course of maintenance ;
activities, the taae should be removed and another approved sealant
i should be used. T1e specification further stated, however, that it is
! not necessary to disassemble threaded connections for the sole purpose
] of removing the tape. This guidance was added to the specification on
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' February 15, 1994. The licensee subsequently issued engineering
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transmittal, CME 97 0055, " Justification for Installed Teflon Tape,"
Revision 1, to formalize their position on the use of teflon tape.
The inspectors did not identify any instances where teflon tape has been I
incorrectly used during maintenance activities. The fact that teflon
- tape was installed on systems was discussed with the station manager and .
i he stated that the use of teflon tape would be reviewed further. l
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) c. Conclusions
j The inspectors concluded that valves in the main and recirculation flow
j paths for the QS system were properly aligned. The inspectors noted ,
several minor deficiencies in the QS system that were appropriately l
, addressed by the licensee. The inspectors expressed a concern to plant
j management about the presence of teflon tape on stainless steel threaded
connections.
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i 05 Operator Training and Qualification
l 05.1 Licensed Operator Reoualification Simulator Trainina
a. Inspection Scope (71707)
On April 25, the inspectors observed licensed operator requalification
simulator training.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed a simulator training scenario conducted as part
of the licensed operator requalification program. The exercise also
included participation by Security personnel. The scenario observed
appeared challenging to the operating crew and training personnel were
professional and provided appropriate feedback to the crew following
completion of the exercise.
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c. Conclusions i
l Simulator training observed appeared challenging and training personnel
! provided appropriate feedback to tb operating crew following completion j
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations j
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07.1 Manaaement Safety Review Committee (MSRC) Meetina (9100)_
On A3ril 30, the inspectors attended a regularly ::cht duled MSRC meeting
at t1e North Anna site, and observed Station ManagerN plant status
reports. The inspectors determined that the MSRC meeting met TS 4.5.2
requirements for member composition and quorum and that the agenda
appropriately included review items required by TS 6.5.2.7. The
inspectors observed that the Station Manager's reports generated
significant self-critical discussions of station performance. The
inspectors concluded that the MSRC meeting was in compliance with TS
requirements and that substantive assessment issues were being addressed
in the discussions.
07.2 World Association of Nuclear Operators (WAN0) Peer Review Report
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the WAN0 Peer
Review Report and discussed the report with the Branch Chief. The North
Anna Branch Chief also reviewed the report during a site visit conducted
during the insaection period. The WAN0 report findings were generally
consistent wit 1 previous NRC observations.
II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Unit 2 Turbine Valve Freedom Test
a. Inspection Scope (61726)
On A)ril ll, the inspectors observed operators performing 2-PT-34.3,
"Turaine Valve Freedom Test." Revision 19. The test implements TS
surveillance requirement 4.7.1.7.2.a to demonstrate the operability of
the turbine governor and throttle valves. Reactor power was reduced to
approximately 92 percent for the test.
b. Observations and Findinas
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l The inspectors attended the pre-brief and found that it was effective.
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All personnel involved with the work were present and clear direction
was provided by the unit Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) for personnel
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responsibility during the test. Good discussions regarding reactivity
, management were provided by the shift supervisor.
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The insmctors observed the test both in the control room and locally at
the hig1 pressure main turbine. In the control room, the inspectors l
found that procedure execution, operating crew communications, and i
supervisory oversight were effective. In particular, the inspectors l
noted the effective SR0 oversight provided to the reactor operator '
during the power reduction.
The inspectors verified governor valve operation locally. All governor
, valves fully cycled when individually tested except governor valve
Number 4. The ins metors observed that when the Number 4 governor valve
was tested it stro(ed from less than approximately 10 percent open. The
l inspectors, however, observed that the Number 4 valve stroked from
various other open positions when the other three governor valves were ;
tested. The inspectors observed that the Number 4 governor valve was i
not tested from the full open position.
! TS 4.7.1.7.2.a requires that each turbine governor valve be cycled
through one complete cycle of full travel. The inspectors questioned i
whether the as tested condition of the Number 4 governor valve met the '
TS requirement. The licensee stated that their interpretation of
" complete cycle" for the Number 4 governor valve was the position of the ;
valve at 100 percent power and that the valve was cycled above the 100 !
percent value when the other governor valves were cycled. The licensee '
further stated that testing the valve from the fully open position was
not possible due to the design of the electrohydraulic system.-
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Based on the inspectors' question, the licensee contacted the vendor and
verified that the testing conducted was in accordance with the vendor's
l requirements for operability. This information was provided to the
l inspectors for review. The purpose of the surveillance requirement is
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to exercise the valves and verify freedom of movement. Standard TSs do
not contain a requirement to test the turbine governor valves and the
licensee's testing meets vendor requirements. The licensee has
l submitted a TS change request to clarify the testing requirements for
- the Number 4 governor valve. This item is identified as Unresolved Item
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(URI) 50 338, 339/97003 02 pending further NRC review of the licensee's
TS interpretation,
c. Conclusions
A URI was identified concerning TS testing recuirements for the Number 4
turbine governor valve. The inspectors consicered that the testing
conducted adequately demonstrated operability of the Number 4 governor
valve. The licensee has submitted a TS change request to clarify the
testing requirement.
M1.2 2H Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fast Start Test
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a. Insoection Scope (61726)
4 On May 7, the inspectors observed portions of 2 PT 82.3A, "2H Diesel
Generator Test (Simulated Loss of Offsite Power in Conjunction with an
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ESF Actuation Signal)," Revision 37. The ins)ectors also observed i
operators performing portions of 2 0P 6.6A, " Emergency Generator Pre-
0)erational Check for 2H and 2J Diesel," Revision 15. The purpose of ,
t1e test was to demonstrate the operability of the 2H EDG to fast start !
from a simulated loss of offsite power with a Safety Injection signal l
and to be loaded and operated for 60 minutes in accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.2.c(b) and 4.8.1.2. l
b. Observations and Findinas l
The inspectors attended the are brief and observed that the Unit 2 SR0
conducted it effectively. T1e SR0 used the "0)erations Evolution
Checklist" as a guide to ensure the brief was >eneficial. The
inspectors concluded that all personnel involved with the test were ,
properly briefed. I
The inspectors observed the pre lube operation of the EDG. One of the
notes in the precedure, before Step 5.1.20, informs the operator to not
run the EDG if any liquid is observed coming from the cylinder exhaust
petcocks. Wher,the EDG was cranked, using starting air, some evidence
of liquid oil was observed. The operator therefore elected to halt the
test and obtain an engineering clarification. The licensee subsequently
performed a procedure action request to the procedure which clarified
the liquid as water. The inspectors concluded that appropriate actions
were taken by operations to clarify the note before proceeding with the
test.
The inspectors observed operation of the diesel from the control room
and found that the operator carefully monitored its operation and that
supervisory oversight for the test was approariate. The inspectors also
discussed with the shift technical advisor t1e results of the test to
determine if the TS requirements were satisfied. The shift technical
advisor effectively demonstrated understanding of the test results for
engine speed, generator frequency, and generator voltage.
The inspectors reviewed previous test results to determine if the
recuired surveillance interval was satisfied and found no discrepancies.
Adcitionally, the inspectors ensured that test instrumentation was
properly calibrated.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that TS requirements were satisfied for the 2H
EDG during the simulated loss of off site power and engineered safety
features actuation signal fast start test. Additionally, the inspectors
concluded that o)erations took appropriate actions to halt the EDG pre-
lube operation w1en procedure clarification was required.
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l M1.3 Maintenance Activities
a. Inspection Scope (62707) -
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On May 2 through May 6 the inspectors observed various maintenance
activities. Specifically, the inspectors observed the replacement of
the Service Water (SW) intake screen for SW pump 1 SW P 1B, removal of
the MFW pump motor for MFW pump 1 FW-P 1B, repair of the Refuel
l Purification Ion Exchange Resin Fill Valve,1 RP-71, and heat trace l
l troubleshooting efforts.
b. Observations and Findinas
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j The inspectors reviewed the following W0s at the job site to ensure the
maintenance crews were authorized by operations to perform the
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l activities and to ensure the actual work reflected the WO instructions.
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WO 00262090 01, " Install Rebuilt SW Screen Assembly for 1 SW P 1B"
WO 00363008 01 "1 FW P 1B Pump Motor #1 (Outboard) Removal" I
WO 00364537 01, " Refuel Purification Ion Exchange Resin Fill Valve, I
l 1 RP 71 Repair" l
l WO 00362731 01, " Check / Repair Heat Trace Circuit"
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The inspectors verified that plant management was aware of the work by
ensuring the activities were included on the plan of the day. The
inspectors also observed that applicable procedures were at the job site
-and were properly executed by knowledgeable individuals. When
replacement parts were used, the inspectors verified the parts were
identical.
During the replacement work on the SW intake screen, the inspectors
observed that workers were kept aware of confined space conditions in
the SW intake bay area. The inspectors observed multiple uses of the
air quality monitor.
Before actual work began on the 1 RP 71 valve, the inspectors noted that
maintenance personnel stopped the work when they determined the
procedure was not adequate for the job. The inspectors also observed
that careful radiological practices were followed and that health
physics support was effective.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the maintenance activities observed were
properly ap3 roved, associated )rocedures were present at the job sites,
and the wor ( was performed by (nowledgeable individuals.
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M1.4 Control Rod Testina
a. Insoection Scooe (61726)
On May 11, the inspectors observed control rod drop testing.
b. Observations and Findinas
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During the Unit 1 shutdown for refueling, the licensee performed hot rod
drops prior to initiating plant cooldown. The inspectors monitored
activities in the control room and at the control rod drive panels
during the drop time tests. The testing was performed in accordance
with procedure 1 PT-17.2, " Rod Drop Time Measurement," Revision 16. The
ins)ectors verified that shutdown margin requirements were met prior to
wit 1 drawing control rods, rod drop times met TS requirements, and that
all control rods exhibited recoil.
c. Conclusions
Control rod drop time testing was performed in accordance with approved
procedures. Drop times met TS requirements and all control rods
. exhibited recoil following entry into the dashpot region.
III. Enaineerina
El Conduct of Engineering
E1.1 Unit 1 Electrical Jumoer Safety Evaluation Review
a. Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Safety Evaluation 97 SE-PROC 22, applicable
j electrical schematics, and held discussions with engineering personnel
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performing the safety evaluation.
b. Observations and Findinas
- During the performance of Periodic Test 1-PT 66.3, " Containment
Actuation Functional Test " the A train failed to initiate using the
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manual spray actuation switches in the control room. Troubleshooting
determined that the failure resulted from a defective switch and a
replacement switch was not available. The safety evaluation was
performed to allow a temporary jumper to be installed across the
defective switch to allow testing to continue until a replacement switch
could be obtained.
The manual spray actuation switches were not required to be operable
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when the unit is in Mode 5. A WO was initiated to replace the defective
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switch prior to startup.
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c. Conclusions l
Safety Evaluation 97 SE PROC 22 adequately justified installation of an )
electrical jumper to initiate manual spray actuation during the ;
performance of procedure 1 PT 66.3. '
IV. Plant Support
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R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls (71750)
On numerous occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors
reviewed Radiation Protection (RP) practices including radiation control
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area entry and exit, survey results, and radiological area material
conditions. No discrepancies were noted, and the inspectors determined
that RP practices were proper.
! S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)
l On numerous occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors
, performed walkdowns of the protected area perimeter to assess security 4
L and general barrier conditions. No deficiencies were noted and the
inspectors concluded that security posts were properly manned and that
the perimeter barrier's material condition was properly maintained.
V. Manaoement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Sunnary
The inspectors > resented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on May 23. 1997. The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
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! The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the ,
l inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was ,
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identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
B. Foster, Superintendent Station Engineering
C. Funderburk, Superintendent Outage Planning
E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance
J. Hayes, Superintendent, Operations
D. Heacock, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
M. Kansler, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
W. Matthews, Station Manager
M. McCarthy, Director, Nuclear Oversight
R. Shears, Superintendent, Maintenance
A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection
T. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED !
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and i
Preventing Problems l
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations ,
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
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IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 92901: Followup Plant Operations
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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED J
Opened
50 338/97003 01 NCV Failure to properly implement procedure to align
boric acid transfer pump (Section 01.4).
50 338, 339/97003 02 URI Main steam governor valve Number 4 testing
requirements (Section M1.1).
Closed
50-338/97003 01 NCV Failure to properly implement procedure to align ;
BATP (Section 01.4). l
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