IR 05000254/1987009
| ML20209G383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1987 |
| From: | Jablonski F, Reynolds S, Walker H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209G325 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-87-09, 50-254-87-9, 50-265-87-09, 50-265-87-9, NUDOCS 8704300536 | |
| Download: ML20209G383 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-254/87009(DRS); No. 50-265/87009(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; No. DPR-30
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: April 7-9, 1987 Inspectors:
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Approved By:
.J onski Date Inspection Summ y Inspection on April 7-9, 1987 (Reports No. 50-254/87009(DRS);
No. 50-265-87009(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee's corrective action program pertaining to Licensee Event Reports (LERs).
This inspection was conducted utilizing inspection procedures 90712 and 92720.
Results:
Two violations were identified: failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition on LERs, Paragraph 2a(2);
and failure to have a procedure for the control of LERs, Paragraph 2b(2).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
P. Bax, Sr., Station Manager
- D. Gibson, Quality Assurance Superintendent J. Hoeller, Technical Staff
- D. Hoogheem, Regulatory Assurance-Engineering Assistant M. Kooi, Regulatory Assurance
- C. Norton, Quality Assurance
- G. Spedl, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent D. Vanpelt, Maintenance Superintendent
- Indicates those attending the exit meeting April 9, 1987.
Other individuals were contacted as a matter of course during
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2.
Areas Inspected The purpose of this inspection was to review the corrective action program pertaining to Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and the methods used for investigation. This inspection was made to determine management involvement in and support for the LER program and the approach to corrective action. The inspection was performed by reviewing procedures and records, and interviewing personnel, a.
Corrective Action (92720B)
(1) References Documents (a) Commonwealth Edison Co Nuclear Fuel Services Department Report No. RSA-Q-86-02, " Quad Cities ECCS Pump Room Response to Loss of Room Cooler," Revision 0.
(b) Deviation /0ccurrence Master Book - Failure Data Master List (uncontrolled).
(c) LERs:
50-265/86-007, " Failure of the Unit 2 Core Spray Room Cooler Due to Burnt Contacts," Revision 00.
50-265/86-008, "2A and 2B Core Spray Subsystems
Inoperable Due to Failure of Room Cooler and Diesel l
Generator," Revision 01.
50-265/86-009, "2B Core Spray Room Cooler Inoperable Due to Drive Belt Failures," Revision 00.
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(2)
Inspection Results
. Prior to the inspection the inspectors reviewed several LERs classified according to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), that is, events
' hat alone could have prevented the fulfillment of.the safety nunction of a system. The inspectors noted in a number of those LERs that action to determine and correct the cause and preclude repetition was lacking. The following are examples of such cases.
(a) LER No. 50-265/86-007, " Failure of the Unit 2 Core Spray Room Cooler Due to Burnt Contacts," Revision 00, stated that the event was caused by pitting and burning of the contacts of the motor control center contactor but the cause of the pitting had not been determined. lThe LER did not state that an attempt was made to determine the cause of the pitting. The LER preparer was interviewed'
and it could not be determined that an attempt was made to determine the cause. The corrective action taken was to replace the failed contactor. No action was taken to
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correct the cause, the cause was not determined, and no action was taken to preclude repetition. Additionall the contacts on other Emergency Core Cooling System (y,ECCS)
room cooler motor control centers were not checked.
(b) LER No. 50-265/86-008, "2A and 2B Core Spray Subsystems Inoperable Due to Failure of Room Cooler and Diesel Generator," Revision 01, stated that one cause of the event was normal wear of the belts on the 2A Core Spray Room Cooler. The corrective action was to replace the belts. The LER stated, "The Operating Department currently performs a daily check of the ECCS room coolers to verify that the belts are intact. This check will promptly identify broken room cooler belt failures so that repairs can be made." The corrective action taken did not preclude repetition. The daily checks only identified belt failures, but did not prevent belt failure.
(c) LER 50-265/86-009, "2B Core Spray Room Cooler Inoperable Due to Drive Belt Failures," Revision 00, stated that the cause of the belt failure on the 2B Core Spray Room Cooler was normal operational wear; however, the belts were replaced approximately 76 days previously.
In discussion with the preparer of the LER, the preparer was not aware that the belts had just been replaced. The preparer stated that equipment maintenance history was not checked and the cause was detennined by review of the Nuclear Work Request (NWR) and discussions with maintenance personnel.
The corrective action was to replace the belts and perform daily checks of the ECCS room coolers. The cause of the event was not properly determined, corrective action was not taken to prevent the cause, and no action was taken to preclude repetition.
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The inspectors discussed these matters with personnel responsible for investigation, documentation, and followup of LERs and noted that the corrective actions were generally those documented on the NWR. There did not appear to be checks of equipment maintenance history files or evaluation to determine the causes so that repetition could be precluded. The inspectors discussed the accessibility of equipment maintenance history files with maintenance personnel.
It was determined to be readily accessible by a computer system. The inspectors determined that LER preparers reviewed the deviation / occurrences master back-failure data master list for previous and similar occurrences; however, the master list was categorized by systems, and deviations were listed by title, which made it difficult to identify similar nccurrences.
c Management was involved in the review of LERs; however, in discussions with management, the inspectors could not determine that reviews of LERs included a determination if the correct cause was identified.
The inspectors reviewed CECO Nuclear Fuel Services Department Report No. RSA-Q-86-02, " Quad Cities ECCS Pump Room Response to Loss of Room Cooler," Revision 0.
The purpose of this report was to evaluate the ECCS pump room's environmental conditions resulting
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from a loss of room cooler combined with a postulated loss of coolant accident. The results were inconclusive and the report stated that a additional assessment was needed.
Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, A pendix B, as implemented by Cour.onwealth Edison Co. (Ceco QA Manual, QR No.16. " Corrective
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I Action " requires, in part, that measures shall be taken to assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition for significant conditions adverse to quality. Failure to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition on the above stated LERs is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (254/87009-01; 265/87009-01),
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Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (907128)
(1) Reference Documents (a) Connonwealth Edison Co. QA Manual, QP No.15-52,
" Nonconforming Materials, Parts and Components For Operations - Deviation and Comments."
(b) DeviationReport(DVR)/LERlogbook(uncontrolled).
(c) NSD Directive NSDD-A10 " Licensee Event Report Preparation Guidelines," Revision 0.
(d) Quad Cities Administrative Procedure QAP 1200-1,
" Deviation Report Procedures," Revision 14.
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(2) Inspection Results The inspectors reviewed Quad Cities Administrative Procedures QAP 1200-1, " Deviation Report Procedures," Revision 14.
The procedure defined deviations and described the reporting process of DVRs; however, it did not address methods to be-used and personnel responsible for investigation, preparation, review and followup of LERs.
Commonwealth Edison Co. QA Manual QP No. 15-51. " Nonconforming Materials, Parts and Components for Operations - Deviation and-Comment" was reviewed.
The procedure generally described responsibilities for identifying, reporting, and documenting deviations; however, it did not provide instructions for methods to be used for investigation, preparation, and review of LERs.
NSD Directive NSDD-A10, " Licensee Event Report Preparation Guidelines," Revision 0, was reviewed and it appeared to be an adequate guideline; however, in discussions with personnel responsible for LER preparation the inspectors could not determine that the guideline was used.
The inspectors examined portions of the DVR/LER logbook and determined that adequate status of LERs was provided.
It was noted that corporate management reviewed all LERs and the status of this review was included in the logbook.
Licansee personnel did not identify any other procedures that applied to LER investigation, preparation, review, or followup.
The inspectors determined that no procedure existed for defining the methods to be used for the investigation, preparation, review, and followup of LERs.
Failure to have an adequate procedure contributed to the cause of the previously identified violation.
In addition, it appeared to the inspectors that training in LER preparation and review was less than adequate.
Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, as implemented by Commonwealth Edison Co. QA Manual, QR No. 5,
" Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," require that activities affecting quality be prescribed by and performed per documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Failure to have a procedure for LERs is considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (254/87009-02; 265/87009-02).
Two violations were identified.
3.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on April 9, 1987, and summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspectors discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such document or processes as proprietary.
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