IR 05000254/1987040

Insp Repts 50-254/87-40 & 50-265/87-40 on 870201-0404.No Violations & Several Areas of Improvement Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Outages,Maint,Surveillance,Ler Review, Routine Repts,Headquarters Request & Radiation Protection

ML20213A301
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	04/20/1987
From:	Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20213A288	List: IR 05000254/1987004 IR 05000254/1987040
References
50-254-87-04, 50-254-87-4, 50-265-87-04, 50-265-87-4, IEIN-86-106, NUDOCS 8704270488
Download: ML20213A301 (12)

Text

.- - .

. .

. .

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

,

Reports No. 50-254/87004(DRP);50-265/87004(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Comonwealth Edison Company

,

Post Office Box 767'

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: February 1 through April 4,1987 '

! Inspector: A. D. Morrongiello I Approved By: M. A. Ring, ChiefY Y/M/$7 i Projects Section 1C Date i

Inspection Sunnary

'

Inspection on February 1,1987 through April 4,1987 (Reports N /87004(DRP); 50-265/87004(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of actions on arevious inspection findings; operations; outages; maintenance; surveillance; .ER review; routine reports; headquarter's request; and radiation protection.

>

Results: In the ten areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Several areas of improvements were noted: housekeeping,

outage / job planning, and radiation protection.

i i

l i

!

O O 000

. .

..

DETAILS Persons Contacted  ;

,

• R. Bax, Plant Manager l

T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent '

T. Lihou, Operating Engineer

• R. Robey Technical Services Superintendent

• M. Kool, Compliance Coordinator

• D. Gibson, Quality Assurance

• Denotes those present at the exit interview on April 3,198 . ActiononPreviousItems(92701and92702)

(a) (Closed) Open Item 254/84011-04(DRP);265/84010-05(DRP): Flamable Battery Spacer Materia The licensee was informed that the spacer material in their new batteries may be flamable and this Open Item was initiated to track this concern. In a letter dated February 25, 1986, the licensee was informed by Sargent and Lundy that the material in question had been considered in the determination of fire loading and that it was found to be acceptable and contributed less than 1% of the total combustibles.

'

This item is considered closed and no further action is necessar (b) (Closed)OpenItem 254/85017-03 (DRP); 265/85019-02 (DRP): Final Fix for Refuel Floor Radiation Monitor After numerous refuel floor radiation monitor spurious trips this item was opened to track the licensee's efforts in correcting this situation. The licensee systematically replaced various components of the system without success until the licensee installed new cable in the system. The new cable seems to have solved the problem and this item and an associated LER (LER 254/85016) are considered close No further action is necessar (c) (Closed) Violation 254/86013-01 (DRP): Failure to Follow Procedure This violation and the licensee's corrective action were discussed in Inspection Report 254/86013 (DRP).

No further actions are neede L

. .

..

3. Operations (71707,93702,92706)

The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined the areas stated in the inspection sumar The inspector verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were perfomed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished; quality control records and logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained

as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by

"

appropriate management personnel, i

Further, additional observations were made in the following areas:

(a) Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit I was at full powe At various times during this period the unit operated on Economic Generation Control (EGC).

On February 5,1987, Unit l's Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

system was declared inoperable (see paragraph 7.a.(3)). On March 2, 1987, at 0045 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />, the unit's High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) l

, System was declared inoperable when a suction valve from the t

. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) would not close from the Control Room. Compensatory testing as required by the Technical Specifi- I cations was performed. Electrical Maintenance adjusted the limit switches on this valve and the valve was successfully teste HPCI was declared operable at 1240 hours0.0144 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.7182e-4 months <br /> the same day. The unit <

shut down for a planned maintenance outage on March 13, 1987, returning to service on March 16, 1987. (This is discussed in the outagesection).

For the remainder of the report period, the unit was either at full )

power or on EG l (b) Unit 2 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit 2 was at full powe At various times during this period the unit operated on Economic Generation Control (EGC).

-- .-

..

..

On February 18, 1987, an Unusual Event was declared due to a stuck-open torus to drywell vacuum breaker. The unit returned to service on February 20, 1987 (see paragraph 7.b.(10)).

On March 21,1987, at 0143 hours0.00166 days <br />0.0397 hours <br />2.364418e-4 weeks <br />5.44115e-5 months <br />, the unit scramed from 100% powe The cause of the scram was the actuation of the sudden overpressure relay on the Main Transformer. The transformer was extensively tested and the tests detected no problems with the transfonne The sudden over pressure relay and its associated circuitry were also tested and no problems were found. This relay, however, was replaced. An Onsite Review was held to review the data and-permission was given to synchronize the generator to the grid on March 22, 1987, at 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br />. During the scram all equipment functioned as expecte For the remainder of the report period the unit was either at full power or on EG (c) Both(71710)

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and performed the applicable portions of the Inspection Procedure 71710

"ESF System Walkdown."

No violations or deviations were identifie . Outages In connection with the Unit 1 outage (March 13 through March 16,1987)

the licensee showed evidence of prior planning and assignment of priorities. The plans for the outage were well stated and well disseminate No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance (62703)

Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during-this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by

.__ -.

..

'

..

qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(a) Observed portions of seal replacement to 1C Reactor Feed Pum (b) Observed portions on Unit 2 of QIP 202-1: Determining and Setting the Recirc Pump Runout Limit No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance (61726)

Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(a) Observed Control Room portions of QIS-20: Main Steam Line Low Pressure Isolation Surveillanc (b) Observed Control Room portions of QIS-60: Power Operation Functional Tes No violations or deviations were identifie . LER Review (92700)

(a) Unit 1 (1) (Closed) LER 87001, Revision 00: Reactor Water Cleanup System Valve Closure Due to High Non-Regen Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperatur On January 5, 1987, Unit I was in the RUN mode at 100 percent of rated core thermal power. The Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)

-

system had been shut down earlier that day for instrument repairs. At 1635 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br />, the RWCU system isolation valves closed due to a high temperature signal on the outlet of the

. , , . - .

- -. - .. - _ . -. . .. - . .. ._ -

..

*

non-regenerative heat exchanger. Due to miscomunication

), - - between it was notthe Nuclear realized thatStation OperatorSafety an Engineered and theFeature Shift ESF) Eng(ineer,

'

actuation had occurred. It should be noted that this is not a Group III isolation signal listed in Technical Specification Table 3.7-1 (which is Reactor Low Water Level). Due to the miscomunication, NRC notification was not made until 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br />; 25 minutes later than the four hour notification limi The cause for the RWCU system high temperature valve closure was the result of leakage through the. check valve in the

, return to the feedwater system and the RWCU recirculation pump discharge check valves. The cause for the tardy NRC notification was the result of miscommunication between operating personne The check valves will be repaired during an outage of sufficient duration. The operating department, including the

individuals involved, has been advised that this RWCU system

valve closure due to the high temperature is to be considered an ESF actuation and NRC notification is required, i No further actions are necessary.

!' (2) (Closed) LER 87002, Revision 00: Missed Hourly Fire Watch in Cable Spreading Room Due to Personnel Error.

I On January 7, 1987, Unit 1 was in the RUN mode at 100 percent core thermal power and Unit 2 was in the REFUEL mode for the end of cycle eight refuel and maintenance outage. Due to the

, cable spreading room smoke detectors being out of service, an hourly fire inspection in the . cable spreading room was

, required. Due to personnel errors resulting in communication breakdowns, between 0208 and 0435 hours0.00503 days <br />0.121 hours <br />7.19246e-4 weeks <br />1.655175e-4 months <br /> on January 7,1987, the hourly inspection was not complete This event was determined to be the result of personnel error -

because the individuals sharing this responsibility were all busy with other assigned work and each thought that someone-else had perfomed the necessary inspection. The Shift

} Engineer, when completing the checklist for the fire inspection, incorrectly determined that the hourly inspections had been

,!

completed and therefore initialed the checklist as complete.

i The individuals involved with this event were counseled regarding the importance of completing inspections. This event was discussed at the weekly operating-department safety meetings. The checklist for this inspection requirement is being revised to require the inspection time and initialing by the individual who is performing the inspection.

-

Since the licensee's corrective action was prompt, this LER is considered closed and no further action is needed.

. . ._ _ _ _ _ . __ . _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _

.

..

.

The area of miscomunications was discussed with the licensee in January 1987 (See Inspection Report 254/87002 (DRP);

265/87002(DRP)).

(3) (Closed)LER87003, Revision 00: Unit 1 RCIC Inoperable Due to Flow Controller Failur At 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br />, on February 5,1987, Unit 1 was in the RUN mode at 100 percent core thermal power. While performing QOS 1300-S2 (Reacto' Core Isolation Cooling ((RCIC)) Pump Operabiltty Test), it was discovered that the flow controller did not respond to automatic flow control signals. However, it did work satisfactorily in manual. RCIC was declared inoperable and appropriate notification per 10 CFR 50.72 was made and operability testing per Technical Specification 3.5.E.2 was complete A replacement flow controller, containing a new power supply and setpoint tape controller was installed. The amplifier portion of the original controller was not replaced. RCIC was subsequently determined to be operable the same day, February 5,1987, at 1800 hour0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> The exact cause for the flow controller failure will be reported in a supplemen No further actions are necessar (b) Unit 2 (1) (Closed) LER 86021, Revision 00: ESF Actuation on Loss of Bus 28 Due to Personnel Erro This LER was discussed in Inspection Report 265/87002. No further actions are necessar (2) (Closed) LER 86020, Revision 00: Spurious Trip of "B" Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor Causes Isolation of Reactor Building Ventilatio At 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br /> on December 11, 1986, Unit 2 was in the REFUEL mode at 0 percent core thermal power. Following performance of QIS 34-1 (Reactor Building Ventilation Monitoring Calibration),

the Unit 2 Nuclear Station Operator (NS0) verified that the high radiation annunicator was cleared and that the high high radiation trip light on the monitor was out. He then returned the "B" Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor to

" normal" from " bypass" at the Instrument Mechanic's reques When this was done, the Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and the "B" Standby Gas Treatment System autostarted. Attempts were made to duplicate the event, but were unsuccessful. In addition, the radiation monitor bypass switch was checked for

i

. .. _ _ _ .__ . _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _

J J .,

r

..

I discontinuities. No problems were found. This is considered an. isolated event, and no further corrective action is deemed

, necessar e No further actions are necessary.

(3) (Closed) LER 86019, Revision 00: ' Single Control Rod Scram-

While Shutdown Due to Reactor Protection System Fuse Remova ;- On November 28, 1986, Unit Two was in the REFUEL MODE and

'

completely defueled for the end of cycle eight refuel and i maintenance. outage. Due to HFA relay replacement work being j performed on the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel B, the-902-17 panel was out of service. This caused a scram condition to be present on RPS Channel B. While Unit 2 was in this

'-

condition, maintenance was to be performed on solenoid valve

'

2-302-20A. This valve is one of two valves that

,^

supply of air to the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) provide vent and a >

drain valves associated with the Control Rod Drive (CRD)-

system. The work required to be done on the 2-302-20A valve necessitated that the valve be isolated electrically. The 1-electrical feed to this valve is from the RPS bus A. To

de-energize the valve's power supply, a fuse (F-7)-in the

902-15 panel was to be removed. At 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br />, the' fuse was

,

removed and a quarter scram on RPS channel A resulted. This-t de-energized and opened 47 2-302-117 valves which are one of

the pair of valves that open to cause control rods to~ insert

,

on a reactor scram. Since there was already a scram signal

'

present on RPS channel B, this meant that all 177 2-302-118 valves (the other valve that de-energizes and opens to cause  :

control rod insertion on a reactor. scram signal) were already open. Therefore when the 47-RPS channel A valves opened, a

full scram signal was generated to those associated 47-control

'

rods. Coincident with this,- CRD venting was-in progress. This venting was required following maintenance on various CRDs that had been repaired and/or replaced during the outage. Control

,

rod K-3 was being withdrawn from.its fully inserted position to i perform venting when the fuse in the 902-15 panel was remove Therefore, control rod K-3 scrammed in due to the scram signal

! generated. (At the time of the scram Unit 2 was completely unloaded). The root cause for this event has been detemined to be a management deficiency in that the results of this activity were not properly. identified. It was realized that there was a scram signal present on RPS channel B. It was also understood while preparations were being made to take valve

! 2-302-20A out of service, that 47 2-302-117 valves would be 1 j opened when the fuse in the 902-15 panel was removed. However,  ;

j at the time, the relationship between-having 47 2-302-117 valves open and all 177 2-302-118 valves open was not realize .l

'

An Operating Engineer, Shift Engineer, and Shift Control Room Engineer were all involved .in planning and authorizing-the work to be done on solenoid valve 2-302-20A. None of individuals

'

involved properly anticipated the results of removing the fuse necessary to isolate valve 2-302-20A.

4 i 8 l

. .- -- - . _ _ - - . - - . . .- - -. - - . - . - - . . - . .

.__ .- _ - . _ _ . . ._ _ _ - . __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ - -

.

..

'

All personnel involved were-counseled in the importance of thorough work planning.

{ No further actions are needed (see also paragraph 7.a.(2)).

r'

(4) (Closed) LER 87002, Revision 00: RCIC Inoperable Due to Modification Design Erro This LER was addressed in Inspection Report 254/87002(DRP)

and265/87002(DRP).

'

, (5) (Closed) LER 87003, Revision 00: Unit Two HPCI Inoperable

Due to Misadjusted Contacts on HFA Rela This LER was addressed in Inspection Report 254/87002(DRP)and

265/87002(DRP).

(6)- (Closed) LER 85016, Revisicn 00: Refuel Floor Monitor Spike 4 and Start of Standby Gas-Treatment Syste '

l This LER was one of many associated with the problem of spurious actuations of the Standby Gas Treatment System by the refuel floor monitors. Those LERs were bein Items 254/85017-03 (DRP); 265/85019-02 (DRP)g-tracked

. With the as Open resolution of this problem, this LER is considered close (see Paragraph 2.b).

No further actions are necessary.-

(7) (Closed) LER 85005, Revision 00: ' Unit 2 Reactor Scram - MSIV 203-2B Went Full Closed.

! On February 19, 1985, at 0024 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, Unit 2 was at 95 percent

'

core thermal power. While performing the biweekly Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Operability surveillance, the 203-28 outboard MSIV went to the fully closed position instead of stopping at the 10 percent closure limit. The resulting pressure spike caused a trip of the Reactor Protection System, which in turn was followed by a full reactor scram. The

Reactor Protection System functioned as designed to minimize J

the safety consequences of this event. A failed limit switch on this MSIY was replaced and the MSIV 203-2B was tested satisfactorily.

The long term fix was to replace all MSIV Namco Model EA740 limit switches with Namco Model EA180 limit switches (the 180's

'

are more suitable for the high temperature environment where the MSIVs are located). With the completion of that change

,

this LER is considered close No further actions are necessary.

!

..-- - = ,,-.-.-

'

.

?.

(8) (Closed) LER 85018, Revision 00: Low Condensor Vacuum Setpoint-Drif On August 26, 1985, at 1155 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.394775e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 was operating in the RUN mode at approximately 98 percent core thermal powe During the performance of " Low Condenser Vacuum Calibration",

QIS 19-1, the setpoints of Pressure Switches PS-2-503A and PS-2-503C were found to have drifted to 20.8 inches Hg vacuum and 19.4 inches Hg vacuum, respectively. The switches were recalibrated to within Technical Specification The cause of this event was instrument setpoint drift, which for this switch has not occurred ofte No further actions are necessar (9) (Closed) LER 84007, Revisions 00, 01, and 02: Unit Scram caused by #4 Turbine Control Valve Fast Closur On June 10,1984, at 0150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, Unit 2 was at 86% core thermal ;

power and the weekly turbine test, Q0S 5600-1, was in progres '

Control valves 1 through 3 operated properly, but when the test switch for control valve #4 was depressed the valve imediately j fast closed. The resulting pressure collapsed the voids in the i vessel and a trip of the Reactor Protection System was received due to high neutron flux. It has been determined that the 90% ,

closed limit switch remained engaged, causing contacts in the l valve test circuit to remain closed, and thereby fast closing I the #4 control valve in the test mod A modification was initiated to provide visual indication of when the 90% closed limit switches are picked up, letting the operator know that the fast acting solenoid is not energized, and he may proceed with the test. Since the modification is complete, this LER is considered closed.

No further actions are necessar (10) (0 pen) LER 87004, Revision 00: Unit 2 Torus /Drywell Breaker Failed to Close Due to Dimpled Bushing or Corroded Solenoi On February 18, 1987, Unit 2 was in the RUN mode at 100 percent ,

of core thermal power. At 0118 hours0.00137 days <br />0.0328 hours <br />1.951058e-4 weeks <br />4.4899e-5 months <br />, while performing QOS 1600-1, " Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breakers Monthly Exercise", vacuum breaker 2-1601-33A would not return to-its normal closed position after being tested. Based on Technical Specification 3.7.A.4.b., a separation test between the drywell and suppression chamber was performed and this confirmed that the vacuum breaker was stuck open. A Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) Unusual Event was declared and appropriate notifications were completed. Subsequently it was determined that Technical Specification 3.0.A should also be considered to

,

. --. . . -

- _ ._ _ ._

..

.

t e.

'

assure that no set of equipment outages be allowed to persist

that would result in the facility being in an unprotected condition. Therefore. Unit 2 was.placed in hot shutdown at

~

1147 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.364335e-4 months <br /> and cold shutdown at 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br /> on February 18, 1987. The GSEP Unusual Event was then terminate The cause for this failure was determined to be the result of'

, a slightly dimpled valve bushin This LER is being held open pending the Emergency Planning Sections review of licensee action during the GSE (11) (Closed) LER 86013, Revision 00 and 01: Leak Rate for MSIV A0 2-203-2D in Excess of Technical Specification Limit Due to

'

Normal Operational Wea '

On October 11, 1986, Main Steam. Isolation Valve (MSIV) A0 2-203-2D was found to leak in excess of the 11.5 SCFH limit allowed in Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a.3. The excessive leakage for this valve was identified during Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) QTS 100-3, performed while Unit Two was shutdown for the end of cycle eight refueling and maintenance outag The exact cause for the excess leakage was determined to.be the result of normal operational ~ wear. The valve body was ,

reseated, and the pilot seats were lappe '

i A new valve. seat lapping machine for repair of the MSIVs was used in repairing this valv It is anticipated that this will improve future MSIV performances. If the use of the new lapping machine for MSIV repairs does not improve MSIV LLR performance, an Action Item Record will be written to the Station Nuclear Engineering Department to identify additional corrective actions to prevent recurrenc I No further actions are needed, at this tim No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Routine and Special Reports (90713)

The inspector reviewed the Monthly Performance Report for the month of Februar No violations or deviations were identifie ! Headquarter's Request (92704)

l IE Information Notice 86-106 "FEEDWATER LINE BREAK" describes in detail the Surry Power Station event where a catastrophic failure of an 18-inch suction line to the main feedwater pump occurred on December 9, 198 The cause of this event was excessive thinning of.the pipe. A national survey of all PWRs and BWRs has been initiated to gather information on what actions are being taken by licensees to assure similar problems do not exist at their respective facilitie . _ . . - -. . --. - - . .

...

I

,,-

._

~

- Quad cities-Station performs thickness inspections for wall ' degradation due to erosion / corrosion in several categories. They are: (1) Balance of Plant steam piping, (2) Balance of Plant feedwater, condensate an ; connected pipin A comprehensive program is being developed by Station Nuclear Engineering for future inspection activities. The extent and frequency of this .

< program will be determined by Engineering..

'

No violations or deviations were identified.

I 10. RadiationProtection(83524,83526)

The Itcensee has shown consistant evidence of prior planning in various

, jobs that were undertaken. The planning meetings were attended and  :

'

supported by various levels of station management. Out of these meetings '

came controlled and explicit procedures for control of:the various jobs (for example, the cutting and shipping of control rods, the retrieval of i an-IRM, and the replacement of. the 1A Reactor Water Cleanup filter). ;

This planning has resulted in jobs that have gone smoothly.

,

'

No violations or deviations were identifie . Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot . Exit-Interview The inspector _ met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the' conclusion _of the inspection on April 3,1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the ,

inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar l l

l

!

!

l l

1