IR 05000254/1987012
| ML20236L875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1987 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236L824 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-87-12, 50-265-87-12, NUDOCS 8708100386 | |
| Download: ML20236L875 (18) | |
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e t - q ) .. h .] ' U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ll
REGION III
Reports No. 50-254/87012(DRSS); 50-265/87012(DRSS) Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee:. Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 l Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
r ' Inspection At: Quad Cities Station, Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: July 13
Inspectors: mmi [[/ 08/66/ff if. ~Peterson - Dat6 ( Team Leader U.E T Y SAbb7 9. Smith ~ / Date ' i Approved By: W. 6. MI M4/W ' ' W. SnelT, Chief Date-Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection: Summary Inspection on July 13-16, 1987 (Reports No. 50-254/87012(DRSS); No. 50-265/87012(DRSS)) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Quad Cities Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise involving observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
However, certain items were identified during this inspection which require some corrective actions.
These items will be tracked as open items.
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. DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Obe.erved H. Peterson, Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC) Operational Support Center (0SC), High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS), In plant Teams M. Smith, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) F. McManus, CR, TSC A. Morrongiello, OSC R. Higgins, In plant Teams Commonwealth Edison Company T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent G. Spedl, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services F. Geiger, Assistant Superintendent, Planning T. Gilman, Emergency Planning Superintendent L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operations (Byron) T. Markwalter, NS - Emergency Planner S. Flood, Scenario Writer C. Brown, GSEP Coordinator P. Skiermont, GSEP Coordinator J. Wethington, QA Engineer J. Sirovy, Rad / Chem Supervisor
- L. Literski, TSC Controller
- M. DePonzio, TSC Controller
- M. Whitemore, TSC Controller
- B. Schnell, OSC Controller
- K. Neal, HRSS Controller
- Indicates those licensee personnel who did not attend the July 16, 1987 exit interview.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items a.
(Closed) Open Item (254/86011-02; 265/86010-02): Internal breakdowns in communications within the Technical Support Center (TSC) resulted in late awareness of a radioactive release, late awareness of the cause of the loss of secondary containment, and late simulated evacuation of non-essential personnel in the last exercise.
During this exercise the TSC staff demonstrated overall good internal communications.
The new TSC layout and use of written memos and information notes appeared to have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of internal TSC communications.
A new procedure for evacuation of non-essential personnel was adequately demonstrated during this exercise.
These changes were sufficient to close this open item.
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(Closed) Open Item (254/86011-03; 265/86010-03): Technicians involved with post-accident sampling failed to follow procedural guidance regarding handling of samples'at the collection point and to properly shield, label and log receipt of the samples during the p last exercise.
During this exercise the HRSS team adequately' demonstrated the collecting of an RCS liquid and containment air samples.
The samples were packaged,. labeled, transported to the laboratory and analyzed in a controlled and timely manner.. Procedural guidance was adequately followed.
This item is closed, c.
(Closed) Open Item (254/86011-04; 265/86010-04): An excessive l-amount of time was taken to have the EOF fully operational from the time that the decision was made to activate this facility during the last exercise.
During this exercise the E0F was operational in one hour following the decision to activate.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item (254/86017-01; 265/86017-01): During walkthroughs, personnel were unable to complete dose calculations and assessments in a timely manner using the TSC computer.
During this exercise the dose assessment team demonstrated their ability to generate dose projections based on effluent and field data in a timely manner.
They were knowledgeable in the use of their dose assessment computer.
This item is closed.
3.
General A daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) and Quad Cities Annex to the GSEP was conducted at the Quad Cities Station on July 14, 1987.
The exercise tested the licensee's capabilities to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario.
The attachments describe the exercise scope, objective, and scenario.
This was an utility-only exercise.
4.
General Observations a.
Procedures The exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Quad Cities Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) employed by the Station and the E0F.
b.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with five NRC observers.
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Licensee Response ' The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and local ' authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the health and safety of the public.
d.
Critique The licensee held critiques following the exercise.
The NRC critique was held on July 16, 1987 at the Quad Cities Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
Personnel who attended the NRC critique are listed in Paragraph 1.
5.
Specific Observations a.
ControlRoom(CRJ In general, Control Room personnel adequately demonstrated their ability to classify and take appropriate actions in response to the hypothetical emergency conditions.
Assignment of responsibilities among the CR staff was effective.
The Shift Engineer (SE) was able to focus on EAL declarations and event mitigating strategies, while his crew carried out the detailed actions associated with notifications, communications and plant control.
Control Room personnel were knowledgeable regarding the proper procedures to use, and used their procedures.
Notifications to the State and NRC were made expeditiously and in accordwee with procedure.
Log keeping was satisfactory and adequately in detail to be worthwhile for accident reconstruction.
Following the declaration of a NUE and prior to the Alert, the Station Director (SD) assumed the responsibilities from the SE in a perfunctory manner.
Just after the relief occurred, the SD was heard to state, "I've got to get up to speed," indicating he may not have had full confidence in his briefing on existing reactor plant conditions or trends.
The SD, just prior to declaring an Alert, conservatively decided to initiate Assembly and Accountability due to rapidly degrading plant conditions.
The assembly was adequately performed.
Plant personnel assembled in their designated areas and Security conducted the accountability in an orderly fashion.
Assembly and Accountability was completed within 30 minutes with one person missing, who was located within the following 15 minutes.
There was some confusion among support personnel concerning the priority of assembly versus performing assigned tasks in response to an accident.
For example, the person unaccounted for during assembly / accountability was a RAD / CHEM Technician (RCT) who was
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. instructed to take a RCS grab sample in response to the emergency.
Another incident was confusion of the team that was dispatched out by the CR to investigate the apparent emergency situation of the RWCU room.
They did not accomplish their task, as they instead assembled per the Assembly Alarm.
This caused the issuance of a contingency message as the team never reported in or completed ] their assigned task.
More information on in plant teams are in Paragraph Sc.
The interface between the Control Room and support personnel was generally good, but several problems were noted.
On one occasion a CR operator did not know and could not find the alarm setpoint for a CR parameter.
He was sent to the back panels to read the off gas radiation levels.
He could not determine the alarm setpoint until informed that the setpoints were listed on the instrument calibration tags.
On another occasion incorrect information was provided to the CR.
It was reported to the CR, via a non player that the assembly was complete and all personnel were accounted for.
However, at that time one person was still missing.
Although, the misinformation was received in the CR, the TSC followed up on the correct information.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program I was adequate; however, the following item should be considered for , improvement: ' Relief of a senior decision making position, such as SD, should
be implemented in a reasonably formal manner.
Each party to the relief should ensure that plant conditions, trends and -
objectives are fully understood by both individuals prior to ) the relief.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) The Technical Support Center staff demonstrated the ability to adequately classify and take appropriate actions to mitigate emergency conditions in a timely manner.
The classifications and appropriate protective action recommendations were quickly communicated to State and Federal agencies.
The staff also demonstrated professional attitude throughout the exercise.
TSC activation began upon declaration of the Alert and was fully staffed within 30 minutes.
Upon arrivt, TSC personnel immediately went to assigned positions and prepared to assume their duties.
Status boards were filled out as initial data became available and were maintained adequately throughout the exercise.
Command and control of the emergency response was formally transferred to the
TSC when the SD arrived and was satisfied that his TSC directors ' were ready.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . The staff anticipated ~and prepared f,e future needs and actions in an efficient manner.
This was clearly demonstrated by early preparation for non-essential personnel evacuation, the shutdown of Unit 2 to provide a makeup source of water for Unit 1, if needed, the procurement of pumps for recirculating water from the' reactor building floor, and the preparation of relief shift staffing for long term manning in the ERFs.
Good control was demonstrated by the SD throughout the exercise, and noise levels in the TSC were acceptable.
Effective briefings and.
updates of information were periodically conducted in-the TSC.
l The new TSC physical layout and use of written memos proved very effective in improving internal communications and organization.
The use of the new Public Address (PA) system by the SD during updates and briefings was effective.
This PA system was designed to allow patching into the TSC and the adjacent OSC.
TSC personnel adequately referred to checklists, logs, notification forms, and applicable procedures.
Communications, including the information flow to off-site response facilities, were adequate.
l The dose assessment team adequately demonstrated their ability to provide dose projections based on effluent readings and field readings through the use of the dose assessment computer.
During the early part of the TSC operations, the 50 sent for and received from his office a set of hand drawn reactor plant diagrams.
These diagrams were to be used to determine the elevation of the leak. The diagrams were not approved and their accuracy was - uncertain.
The SD throughout the exercise kept a record by jotting down notes on various pieces of paper.
It was understood that the SD's formal log keeping was assigned to another individual and this log appeared adequate in respect to major events.
However, the formal log did not contain all the notes, reminders, and thoughts of the SD.
At the recovery phase of the exercise, there was adequate discussion among the TSC directors regarding the recovery actions and formulation of a prioritized list of recovery items.
Recovery / re-entry procedures, QEP 610 and QEP 620, were not utilized.
Discussion and coordination with the E0F was minimally demonstrated.
It appeared that the TSC was rushing to formulate a list of recovery items.
In the future, exercise sce1arios should allow adequate time to really demonstrate the effectiveness of recovery /re-entry procedures.
This concern is referred to in Paragraph 5e.
l Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program ' was adequate; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
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During exercises the emergency organization should rel'y on '
- information provided in the ERFs, rather than having access to
.E informal notes and drawings.
Therefore, deficiencies and/or . inadequate information'are discovered during the exercises and can'then be corrected.
In order to better facilitate the reconstruction of events'and
the decision-making process, a' bound book-should be provided for'the'SD to keep his notes organized.
c.
02erational Support Center (OSC) and In-Plant Teams The Operational Support Center is located in the sa.ne building as the TSC. -This OSC/TSC building is a separate structure away from.
the main reactor building.
The OSC is separated from the TSC by a small_ corridor..The remote location of the OSC away from the CR, did not hinder the control of dispatching-in plant support teams by ' the CR.
The organization and operation of the OSC was effective.
The OSC was expeditiously activated, manned and placed.into operation after the Alert declaration.
The OSC Director was knowledgeable of his duties.
Throughout the exercise he prnvided periodic briefings to the OSC staff, maintained adequate control of the OSC,.and satisfactorily directed OSC operations.
However, at times the OSC Director was overwhelmed with tasks, with no other designated group leaders to assist him.
Per Procedure QEP 190-1, the OSC Director can select personnel to assist'him.
The positions-are designated as Radiation Chemistry Leader, Operations Leader, Maintenance Leader and a Communications Leader.
The responsibilities are clearly described in the procedure.
Radiological control practices were adequately demonstrated during the exercise.
Habitability surveys were conducted periodically.
Once the OSC was operational, an organized entry system to the OSC/TSC building was established.
A separate frisking station entry scheme with step-off pads and anti-contamination. clothing receptacles was utilized.
Also, a RCT along with a Security Guard was stationed at the entry point to control exit and entry.
A plant status and events status board was adequately used.
However, there was only one board for all information, including i the 4 plant team tracking.
At times, the board was very cluttered ! and disorganized.
Related information was not grouped, so that a person had to search'the entire board to find a specific type of information.
Communications between the OSC, in plant teams, CR and TSC were-adequate.
The communications equipment in general was adequate although two radio failures caused the OSC Director to utilizs the plant telephone.
However, with only one plant phone in the OSC, not counting the dedicated line to the CR, a second plant phone may be beneficial.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ -_ - _ ___ . l Assignment of personnel to in plant teams was accomplished in a timely manner.
Adequate instructions and briefings were provided to the teams.
Relevant in plant radiation level data was posted and updated.
For example, ARM data was periodically received from the CR and posted in the OSC.
Also, plant survey maps were adequately , organized and placed on a wall for reviewing.
This information was ! I adequately utilized to provide radiation exposure restrictions and low dose routes for plant entries, thus demonstrating good ALARA practices.
The organization of the In plant Team Tracking Board, using magnetic , name plates, was well utilized.
The organization of the manpower l pool divided into specific work groups (RAD / CHEM, Operations, and i Maintenance) was very good.
In plant team tracking was adequately accomplished, through the use of their OSC task assignment checklist i form and the tracking board.
The OSC kept the CR adequately informed of the locations and assignments of applicable in plant teams.
Teams were dispatched and their tasks accomplished in a timely manner with the following exception.
One team was dispatched at 0835 a.m. to investigate the RWCU for any problems or damage.
As the team responded to the plant's assembly alarm, they never arrived at the the RWCU room area.
This resulted in the issuance of a contingency message on the initial RWCU problem at 0915 a.m.
At 0950 a.m. a report was sent to the CR that another team was enroute to the RWCU area to assess the damage.
This team was the fire brigade from the OSC.
The fire brigade team consisted of six men, including only one RCT with a Radr. tion Survey meter.
It took approximately 40 minutes to organize the team and dispatch them to the scene.
Once they were dispatched, the team delayed outside the OSC/TSC building.
They checked their radios three or four times until they determined one radio was not operational.
They returned to the OSC to get another radio.
When the radio problem was corrected, they then discussed where they would set up their staging area.
Finally, when they were enroute to the scene, they stopped at the normal RAD / CHEM area inside the plant to collect and don the anti-contamination clothing.
Then once again they had to stop inside the plant to don the fire fighting turn down gear and SCBAs.
It took approximately one hour for the fire brigade to assemble at their selected staging area.
This is definitely an unduly delay in dispatching a fire brigade.
Damage control and assessment evaluation teams such as the fire brigade should respond quickly to provide valuable decision making information regarding plant systems damage and combat the emergency condition.
This untimely dispatching and responsiveness by two assessment teams will be tracked as an Open Item (No. 50-254/87012-01 and No. 50-265/87012-01).
In addition to the Open Item, the following items should be considered for improvement:
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!: ' ' . OSC status boards should be better organized and spacious.
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.The OSC Director should~ follow the procedurally allowed option of appointing qualified staff to assist him with his many management duties.
The licensee should review the need for an additional plant
telephone communication line in the OSC to enhance backup communications ability, d.' High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS)' The High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS) team consisted of three ' RCTs.
One was designated as the supervisor and the other two conducted the mechanics of collecting the samples.
Although, procedures were followed during the course of sampling, a system of initials or checks to sign off each step as they are accomplished was not' incorporated.
The HRSS team was. originally dispatched early in the exercise from 'the RAD / CHEM office by the RAD / CHEM Supervisor to initially set up the equipment for future RCS samples.
Once the OSC was established, control and dispatching of the HRSS team was from the OSC.
Sampling of both diluted RCS liquid and containment air samples were executed.
For both samples, the use of procedures, radiation monitoring and exposure control'were adequately demonstrated.
The samples were collected, packaged, labeled, transported to the laboratory, and analyzed in a adequately controlled and timely manner.
Both the normal counting room in the plant and the-back-up counting room in the OSC/TSC building were properly posted as' required; adequately supplied with equipment to handle, store and shield HRSS samples; and adequately organized.
There were some exceptions to the good radiological control practices.
For example, when the containment air sample was ready to be transported, the three men HRSS team separated.
Each individual left separately to the counting room.
There were only two survey meters.
Therefore, one man-left without a radiation survey meter.
Also, there was no demonstration of the use and capability of communication equipment and protective gear in taking an HRSS sample.
Granted that the scenario conditions did not warrant the use of full anti-contamination clothing or SCBAs, but such gear should at least have been taken along as a precautionary measure especially at the early stage of the accident when the accident conditions were still progressing.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate.
However, the following items should be considered for improvement:
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-incorporate an initials or check system.
This would assist the operator in following his procedure and possibly preclude him from missing a step.
The capability to collect and transport an HRSS sample ~under.
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adverse radiological. conditions should be an objective of the next annual exercise.
l e.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) The E0F was fully staffed, briefed on plant status and in overall command and control of the licensee's response at 11:15 a.m., or one hour following the decision to activate.
The decision to activate ' ' the EOF was made at 10:15 a.m.
E0F personnel were repositioned about 20 minutes away.
The controller released minimal staffing personnel immediately and the rest of the EOF staff ten minutes later.
Staff began to arrive at the E0F by 10:30 a.m.
However, prior'to assuming overall command and control the EOF staff should have been more thoroughly briefed on plant conditions and TSC activities regarding plant accident litigations.
During the exercise, communications between the TSC and the E0F were not always concise.
This information led the Manager Emergency Operations.(ME0) to make misleading statements to offsite personnel.
When he realized that the information was misleading he placed a conference call to inform the offsite agencies and NRC of the error.
After the third need to clarify information in this manner, the ME0 addressed the problem with the Station Director in the TSC and there were no further problems.
The ME0 managed his E0F staff effectively.
The NARS Communicator also acted as an assistant to the MEO.- This position is not a part of the E0F staff; however, during the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) Field Exercise (FEE-2) and this exercise the ME0 has used this type of staff member to assist in his log keeping and checklist maintenance.
These exercise clearly demonstrated the necessity of the position.
The Technical Support Manager and the Advisory Support Manager managed their staffs effectively.
Informative briefings were conducted at frequent intervals.
Both staffs followed their procedures and informed their managers of changing information.
The managers, in turn, were then able to adequately inform the ME0 and assist him in the overall management of licensee response.
EOF staff correctly decided the radiological status of the plant along with field team survey results would be the driving force to reclassification as a General Emergency.
In response to this decision the Advisory Support staff effectively monitored plant.
parameters, field team survey results and weather data.
Dose projections were performed according to procedures.
The Advisory
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. Support staff prepared, transmitted and documented hourly plant status updates to offsite agencies.
The Technical Support staff adequately addressed plant operational and maintenance problems.
! Status boards were adequately maintained and utilized throughout the exercise.
Log keeping was adequate and checklists were utilized effectively throughout the exercise.
Clerical support was evident
throughout the exercise.
Access. control was adequately maintained during the exercise by security personnel.
The Security Director responded to a request by the ME0 to investigate the possibility of sabotage following the notification of an explosion.
Information received throughout the exercise led to the posting of a guard near an unidentified boat found on plant property and also posting a guard near the Condensate Storage Tank due to information received during the exercise.
After several discussions with his management staff, the ME0 decided to ask for a volunteer to enter the Drywell area to close the open RWCU valve and thus end the release of radioactive water into the RWCU room.
The Technical Support staff requested Dresden Station's staff to walk down their system in order to obtain a good referral of time required in this radiation area.
While this request was being addressed, the Health Physics Director followed his procedures to obtain approval from the Corporate Medical Director to allow a volunteer to receive an exposure which would exceed 10 CFR Part 20 regulations in order to bring the plant into a safe condition.
A Response Cell located in the Corporate Command Center was a " positive influence on staff performance in this utility only exercise.
This cell was staffed by personnel who functioned in different roles during the exercise.
They played roles of State Governors, NRC personnel and members of the public.
A sense of I realism was maintained and emergency organization personnel were . able to adequately demonstrate their notification, coordination and { laision capabilities as required by exercise objectives.
i I Following the issuance of the message indicating a time jump, the E0F staff developed prioritized lists of items which would need to be addressed in one week.
The ME0 reviewed the lists.
However,
discussions between E0F or TSC staffs were not allowed by the scenario.
The message ending the exercise did not allow time for EOF staff to demonstrate recovery procedures.
Recovery procederes were not implemented by the staff; therefore, the objective of demonstrating recovery and reentry was only partially demonstrated j during this exercise.
- Together with the findings associated in TSC Paragraph 5b, an adequate demonstration of recovery procedures will be required in the next exercise.
This will be tracked as an Open Item.
(No. 50-254/87012-02; No. 50-265/87012-02).
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Scenario and Controller Problems During the exercise, there were problems evident in the scenario and controller actions.
On several occasions, the operators were prevented by exercise controllers from taking actions they believed l would place the plant in the safest condition.
In some instances these blocks delayed specified actions delineated in the Technical Specifications and procedural steps, for example: (1) Operators realized that besides being in a Notification of Unusual Event j (NUE), due to high I-131 concentration, plant conditions also placed them in a Technical Specification violation which required them to shutdown.
They were prevented from taking their actions.
In fact the scenario had them increase reactor power due to requests from the load dispatcher.
(2) The operators, per Procedure QGA 300-1, recognized that on a high temperature alarm in the Reactor Water Clean Up Room (RWCU), it whs necessary to isolate the RWCU system.
However, RWCU isolation was blocked initially, but allowed to occur later in order to support the scenario.
The operators were quick to recognize their appropriate actions.
However, the scenario unduly limited the operators from following established plant procedures and Technical Specifications.
At approximately 0930 a.m., the 50 wanted to declare a Site Area Emergency (SAE) based on EAL No. 4, " Unplanned Explosion".
However, this decision was blocked by the controllers in order to support the scenario time line.
It appears that the scenario did not support their appropriate decision.
It was not recognized by the scenario development group that EAL 4 could apply.
During utility-only exercises, where the constraints due to offsite agencies' participation are not imposed, scenarios should be developed to permit greater " free play", or at least flexible enough to allow appropriate corrective action.
This allows licensee and . NRC evaluators an opportunity to see, more clearly, how effectively /j the emergency organization functions during abnormal reactor plant events.
Furthermore, at the recovery phase of the exercise, scenarios should allow for adequate time to fully demonstrate the , recovery /re-entry procedures, o f It was apparent that the TSC and E0F staffs were rushing to-formulate only the prioritized lists to allow for the termination of the exercise.
Discussions between EOF and TSC staffs was not conducted, in fact, it was not allowed by the scenario.
The message ending th,e exercise was issued much too early to allow an effective demonstration of recovery procedures.
The aforementioned problems point out the potential need for greater involvement by plant operations personnel in the scenario development process.
Also, careful review and attention to procedures and Technical Specifications should be enhanced during
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e scenario preparation ar.d during the exercise to ensure adequate conformity with established plant procedures.
In addiction, the need is apparent for controllers to be aware of plant corrective actions.
6.
Exit Interview On July 16, 1987, the NRC inspectors held an exit interview with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee was asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments: 1.
Scope of Participation 2.
Exercise Objectives 3.
Scenario Narrative Summary , > ,fi , f
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' ' . July 14,1987 - -
SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION - Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Quad Cities Station c( exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the EOF as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe ef ficient operation of the Station and other CECO nuclear generating stations.
Activation of the TSC and other on-site participants will be conducted on a real time basis during the daytime hours. The shift on duty will receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingly.
The Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Recovery Group will be repositioned close to the Quad Cities Station EOF to permit use of Recovery Group personnel from distant locations.
The Corporate Command Center and JPIC will not be activated.
The Quad Cities Station, July 14, 1987 Exercise, is a daytime event to test the integrated capability of the Commonwealth Edison emergency , preparedness plan and to assure adequate resources to verify the capability to respond to a simulated emergency.
l l Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact c l with contractors, whose assistance would be required by the simulated l accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged ' specifically for the exercise.
O Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the exercise. Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the company.
1 O (3118A/7/kam)
I% QUAD. CITIES EXERCISE , , ' .g' . July 14, 1987 ' OBJECTIVES ' ' ! i PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: demonstrate the capability to implement the Connonwealth Edison Generating Station's. Emergency. Plan in cooperat An with the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the Quad Cities Station.
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES 1)., Incident Assessment and Classification ' a.
Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to 'determir,e which Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been reached.
and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with' GSEP.
(Control Room, TSC, and EOF-) . 2) Notification, and Consnunication a.
Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations via NARS within 15 minutes of classification.
(Control Room, TSC and EOF.)
, b.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC within one hour of the initial incident occurunce.
(Control Room, TSC or EOF.)
O c.
De-nstrate the capabimy to contact organizations that wooid normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this; exercise (i.e., Sargent & Lundy, General Electric, INP0.)
(TSC drw! EOF.)
' , d.
Demonstrate the ability to notify' state agencies with hourly plant status followup information.
(TSC and EDF) 3) Radiological Assessment J a.
Demonstrate the capability to calculate offsite dose i projections.
(TSC and EOF) b.
Demonstr:tc the capability of Environmental Field Teams to conduct field radiation. surveys, collect air, liquid, veget Ation
and soit ;ariiplas when needed.
(Environs Team.)
s & i (3118A/5/kam) - _ _ _. _. _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ E
- _ _ QUAD CITIES EXERCISE l ' '
July 14,1987 . OBJECTIVES qk/ 3) Radiological Assessment (cont'd) Demonstrate the capability to conduct in-plant radiation c.
protection activities.
(OSC/ Health Physics Teams.)
d.
Demonstrate the ability to collect and conduct analysis of air and liquid samples on-site via HRSS.
(OSC/ Rad. Chem.)
Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations with e.
radiological survey information, trend this information, and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions utilizing procedure E024 and table 6.3.1 and figure 6.3-1.
(TSC and EOF) 4) Emergency Facility Manning Demonstrate the ability to activate the emergency organization a.
and staf f the nuclear station Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures.
(Control Room, TSC, EOF and OSC/ General Plant.)
b.
Demonstrate the capability to provide timely and accurate on-site personnel accountability in accordance with procedures.
, (TSC) 5) Emeraency Direction and Control Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage the emergency a.
organizations in the implementation of the GSEP.
(TSC and EOF) 6) Recovery and Reentry Demonstrate the capability of the emergency response personnel e a.
to identify requirements, programs, policies governing damage assessments and implementation of procedures for recovery and reentry.
(TSC and EOF) , O (3118A/6/kam) l
L _ l
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. ' ' QUA0 CITIES EXERCISE JULY 14, 1987 {} NARRATIVE SUMMARY Initial Conditions (prior to T=0) T=0=(0730) Unit One was operating normally at high power (830 MWe, 2509 MWth), on the 100% flow control line with 98 M1b/hr TOTAL CORE FLOW.
At 0700 a tube rupture in the 1 A1 Feedwcter Heater caused a heater high level and a heater string isolation from full power.
Total core flow was reduced by 24% to 74 M1b/hr core flow, three control rod arrays were fully inserted in the correct sequence.
Unit power was reduced to 630 MWe with the LP heater bypass valve re-closed following the loss of the heater string. A RETs sample has been requested.
The system status is RED.
The load dispatcher has requested an immediate return to maximum power allowed by the plant conditions. A qualified nuclear engineer is present and has given instructions to the unit operator for returning the unit to about 85% power.
All required plant systems are operating.
Unit Two is at high power (805 MWe, 2450 MWth) and controlling load in EGC.
All required plant systems are operating normally.
The load dispatcher has ordered the unit off EGC and taken to full power.
O Unusual Event T=35 to T=105 (0805-0915) U While returning Unit One to maximum allowable power level (85% based on turbihe load limitations and with one L.P. heater string OOS), of f gas activity level increases.
RETS sample results indicate coolant activity level greater than 5 uci/cc I-131.
This is an Unusual Event per EAL 16 loss of fission product barrier.
Off gas level continues to increase whereby reactor building ventilation high radiation alarm occurs but stabilizes below the isolation trip setpoint.
RWCU suction line circumferential break occurs between outboard isolation valve and drywell penetration.
RWCU system undergoes distinct transients.
Reactor feed flow / steam flow mis-match hides the coolant loss inrough the RWCU j line break.
No auto scram occurs because reactor water level remains f airly Stahic an't at about normal level during transient. Various RWCU amenciatcrs vcW...a loss of RWCU system but second heat excranger rown high ;4 e a.- a e vnnel e not actuate.
Reactor building ventilation high radict'.ca icycl trip actuates whereby the vent system is isolated and Standby Gas Treatment System starts.
Steam " explosion" in RWCU heat exchanger room blows heat exchanger room door off its hinges and latch, hurls it across the floor into the 1 A 250 VDC panel.
As a result of the steam explosion and collision with the door, a welding cart in f ront of the door was upended, spilling out its two argon gas bottles.
The head is broken off each bottle, propelling the bottle as a missile, one into the 19-1/19-6 MCC and one bottle into the RPS rack.
An j (q automatic reactor scram occurs.
Losses of several select AC and DC loads j j occur due to MCC damage f rom fire and collision.
RWCU system will not j manually isolate due to inboard isolation valve limitorque failure where the valve stays in the full open position.
Closed light for the M0-1279-5 valve is absent.
(3119A/3/kam)
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i c .. ' ' QUAD CITIES EXERCISE JULY 14, 1987 Oa Alert T=110 to T=160 (0920-1020) l An upgrading to Alert per EAL 16, loss of primary containment integrity due to I inability to : lose RWCU inboard isclation valve. A forced cooldown of unit ensues, depressurizing through the turbine bypass valves.
Fire brigade organizes but unable to effectively combat fire due to steam and reactor coolant leakage.
The fire is an Alert per EAL 5, fire af fecting Tech Spec related eauipment.
Site Area Emeroency T=170 to T=390 (1020-1400) Reports from the scene indicate significant pipe break and the confirmation of leakage in excess of 500 gpm through RWCU line rupture.
This is a Site Area Emergency per EAL 14, leakage in excess of 500 gpm of primary coolant and circumferential break of Reactor coolant recirculation line.
Actions are taken to de-inert drywell to allow entry to manually close 1-1279-5 valve and isolate RWCU system. ECCS system alarms and malfunctions occur due to fire in local panels.
Gaseous effluent release occurs due to standby gas charcoal beds being saturated with resultant carry over of iodine.
Operations continue for de-inerting drywell and entry to manually close RWCU suction inboard isolation.
Entry to RWCU heat exchanger room reveals jet impingement damage to catwalk, shield wall and surrounding pipes and hangers.
bq Easy access to the ruptured pipe is not possible due to high radiation, high rate of reactor coolant leakage and in room equipment damage and displacement due to jet force of coolant leakage.
Radwaste repor's inability to continue processing water from reactor building t sump pumping. A request for assistance on handling and processing excess contaminated water is initiated where maintenance begins on restoration of damaged electrical panels.e ' instrument racks.
Recovery T=390 to T=420 (1400-1430) Drywell has been de-inerted and entry is accomplished.
RWCU inboard isolation is manually closed and reactor coolant leakage is stoped ihe release from the R~ actor Building declines rapidly ac Reettor Build e abnerbre activity dilutts, decays and is treated by standby gas.
l l . l O l l (3119A/4/kam)
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