IR 05000313/1986022

Insp Repts 50-313/86-22 & 50-368/86-23 on 860701-31. Violations Noted:Svc Water Sys Alignment Procedure Inadequately Maintained & Radiological Posting Disobeyed

ML20206M877
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	08/20/1986
From:	Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206M866	List: ML20206M862 ML20206M870 ML20206M877
References
50-313-86-22, 50-368-86-23, NUDOCS 8608260006
Download: ML20206M877 (9)

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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONilSSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/86-22 Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/86-23 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313

.50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)

P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: July 1-31,.1986

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Inspectors: ///D f[i/ #6 W.D.Jpson,SeniorResident Dhte'

Reactor Inspector (pars. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8)

_f / lb C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor Date Inspector (pars. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)

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}p} 3 1. - 9i Approved: e f. R.Viunter, Reactor Projects Date '

Section B, Reactor Projects Branch

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-2-Inspectior Summary Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-22)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on an open item, and followup on a violatio Results: Within the five areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to adequately maintain the service water system alignment procedure, paragraph 4).

Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-368/86-23)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on a Licensee Event Report, and inservice hydrostatic test observatio Results: Within the five areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to obey a radiological posting, paragraph 4).

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-3-DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. Levine, Director of Site Nuclear Operations R. Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

• B. Baker, Operations Manager

• P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer A. Cox, Operations Technical Support Supervisor G. D'Aunoy, Operations Technical Support E. Ewing, General Manager Technical Support G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent H. Hollis, Security Coordinator D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager

• D. Howard, Manager, Special Projects

• L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality D. Johnson, Licensing Engineer

• H. Jones, Manager, Plant Modifications J. Lamb, Safety and Fire Protection Coordinator

• D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor

• R. Lane, Manager, Engineering B. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance Engineer J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager

• J. Orlicek, Field Engineering Supervisor V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent D. Provencher, Quality Engineering Supervisor

• S. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations

,P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent R. Simmons, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support Supervisor B. Terwilliger, Consultant R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

• D. Wagner, Assistant Health Physics Superintendent

• R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager

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G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor S. Yancy, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

• C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support

• Present at exit intervie The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personne . Followup on Previously Identified Items (Unit 1)

(Closed) Violation (313/8602-01): Failure to follow a quality control procedure in seismic support inspectio ,

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-The NRC inspector verified that the specific support deficiencies identified on support 3EFW-116-H20 had either been corrected or evaluated as being adequate by the licensee. Programatically, the licensee has established an independent QA/QC organization within the plant modifications group. Independent inspection of seismic support installation, including concrete expansion anchor bolts, is assigned to this organization. In the case identified by the violation, an independent inspection was not require Further licensee corrective actions for this item were also taken in response to open item (313/8602-03), and are described below. Based on the actions'noted above and the observations and reviews noted below, this item is close (Closed) Open Item (313/8602-03): Control of seismic support installatio The NRC inspector reviewed the following recently issued licensee supplemental instructions (sis):

. SI-C-2406-2, "Non-structural Baseplate and Penetration Grout"

. SI-C-2408-1, " Concrete Expansion Anchors" These sis clarify the requirements of the associated AP&L construction Technical Specifications (TSs), C-2406 and C-2408. The NRC inspector found that they provided adequate guidance to construction craftsmen to ensure compliance with the TS The NRC inspector witnessed anchor bolt . installation and inspection for DCP 84A-2022B, specifically the placement and torquing of anchor bolts for the 2011 battery rack baseplate The NRC inspector also inspected seismic support installations for the Unit 2 EFW suction piping from the seismically qualified condensate storage tank being built. No problems were note Based on these reviews, observations, and inspections, the NRC inspector concluded that the licensee's control of seismic support installation now appears to be adequate. This item is close . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Unit 2)

Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, the following event report was reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification Unit 2 LER No. 86-004-00 reported an automatic reactor trip due to an inadvertent trip of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) breake P" l

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-5-The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was a design flaw in the RCP breaker indicating circuit on panel 2C-80 (the remote shutdown panel). The design used a full voltage light bulb (125 Vdc) for the breaker indicating lamp, which was wired in series with the breaker trip solenoid. The resistance of the light bulb was used to limit current below that which would actuate the solenoid. In this instance, the replacement light bulb was shorted. When installed in the socket its low resistance allowed a current able to actuate the solenoi The licensee completed plant change No. 86-1733 which modified the indication _ circuits of all four RCP breakers at panel 2C-80. This new design installed a step down or ballast resistor integral to the lamp socket and switched to a lower voltage light bulb. Thus, even with a bulb short circuit, the trip solenoid will not have sufficient current to actuat The licensee was identifying similar circuits and evaluating the need for any modifications. This effort was two-fold: The operation departments for both units were tasked to identify the uses of all full voltage light bulbs in their respective plants, and a consultant had been contracted to perfoirm a review of breaker circuits used at ANO to identify similar circuit designs. This effort will take some time to complet '

Based on the above corrective actions, this event report is close No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

~ logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagcut records, verified proper return to service of affected components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activitie One problem was identified in this are During a routine tour of the Unit 2 reactor building, the NRC inspector observed two of four contract maintenance workers enter a posted airborne radiologically controlled area (reactor vessel head stud cleaning tent)

with no respiratory protection. The NRC inspector reported this observation to a health physics (HP) technician who verified that the posting was still authorized. The HP technician then directed the workers to remain outside the tent and notified the shift HP supervisor. The subsequuet licensee investigation (Radiological Safety Infraction / Condition '

Report) found that the airborne activity in the tent had been below the limit requiring respiratory protection. This was based on an air sample L

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-6-about an hour before the incident. However, the maintenance workers did not know the results of that sample at the time. Since they had just returned from a work break and the work had been secured in the tent for a ,

while, they assumed, based on previous experience with that job, that the area was safe. Licensee Procedure 1000.31, " Radiation Protection Manual,"

requires that all personnel comply with posted area entrance requirement This is an apparent violatio (368/8623-01)

The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tour It was noted that housekeeping in Unit 2 needed improvemen Licensee management had noted a similar concern and had initiated corrective actio The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 1 service water system. The walkdown was performed using Procedure 1104.29 and Drawings M-210, M-209, and M-221. No system alignment discrepancies were identified. The NRC inspectors noted that five valves (LO-8030A, SW-609A, SW-6098, SW-607A, and SW-607B) were listed in Attachment A,

" Valve Lineup _for SW and ACW Systems," of Revision 22 of Procedure 1104.29, but the valves were not installed in the plan These valves were not shown on system drawing The NRC inspector reviewed the latest valve lineup for this system in the Unit 1 control roo This valve lineup was performed in January 1985, using Revision 16 of Procedure 1104.29. .The operators had completed Form 1015.01B,

" Valve / Breaker Lineup Exception Sheet," and attached it to the completed valve lineup sheets. _This form listed the above five valves and several others as "Does not exist." The licensee's failure to correct the service water valve lineup list in a subsequent procedure revision is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6. (313/8622-01)

The NR'C inspector witnessed portions of the Unit 2 fuel reloading both from the reactor building refueling bridge and the spent fuel pool are No problems were note During a tour of the Unit 2 auxiliary building, upper south piping penetration room, the NRC inspector noted that the packing gland nuts were loose on valve 2BS-5614, the service air to 'B' train of the building spray system manual isolation. The licensee was informed, and the problem was corrected under Job Order 71604 These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that selected facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure . Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required quarterly surveillance testing on the Unit 1 high pressure injection pump P36C (Procedure 1104.02, Supplement III), and verified that testing was

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-7-performed in accordance with an adequate procedure, test instrumentation was< calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected componests were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

. Monthly test of charging pump 2P36A (Procedure 2104.02 Supplement 1)

. Reactor protection system channel 'B' monthly test (Procedure' 1304.38, J0 714862)

. Loop B hot leg temperature (RTD) response time testing (Unit 2)

(Procedure 4710.31)

. Quarterly source check of process radiation monitor RE-4830 (Procedure 1304.26, J0 716263)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed:

. Replacement of Potter-Brumfield MOR relay for 2SV-5021-1 (Work Plan 2409.05)

. Provision of new vent path for upper south piping penetration room for high energy line break (JO 714058) (DCP 85-D-1072)

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. Battery bank replacement (JO 714021)

. Battery charger repair (2031) (JO 715042)

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. Post-maintenance test of die'sel generator (JO 707883)

(Procedure 2306.05)

. Repair of valve 2CV-4921-1 (JO 708269) (Procedure 2402.103)

. Testing operation of valve 2CV-5650-2 using MOVATS (JO 711394)

(Procedure 1403.31)

. Unit 2 emergency diesel generator 'A', 18-month electrical preventive maintenance (Procedure 2403.07) (JO 708147)

. Heat shrink insulation installation on cable splices for 'B' steam generator temperature sensors (RTDs) (DCP 85-2039, Reactor trip /EFW actuation bypass) (JO 710164)

. Electrolyte recirculation of battery 2011 following service discharge (Procedure 2403.27) (JO 2403.27)

. Calibration of pressurizer pressure transmitter 2PT-4601-3 (Procedure 2304.43)

. Replacement of low pressure safety injection system flow transmitter pipe tap and isolation valve 2SI-5091A (DCP 85-2158) (JO 711112)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Hydrostatic Test Observation (Unit 2)

The purpose of this part of the inspection was to verify that the

~ licensee's inservice hydrostatic test procedures were adequate and that-the tests were being conducted in accordance with the procedures and i Section XI of the.ASME Cod The NRC inspector reviewed the followir.g procedures:

.2409.104 " Hydro $taticTestoftheLowPressureSafetyInjection (LPSI) System" 2409.91 " Hydrostatic Test of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF)

Pump Recircs and Train A ESF Suction Piping"

, It appeared that the procedures met the requirements of Articles IWB-5000 and IWC-5000 of Section XI of the ASME Code, and were adequate to perform the hydrostatic test The NRC inspector verified that the following items were considered:

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. correct determination of the required test pressure (especially at pipe class transition points)

. duration of test required

. correct test boundary identification and valve lineup

. proper location of test pressure gages (including accounting for elevation corrections where needed)

. establishment of boundary valve leakage drain paths for overpressure protection

. adequate test equipment (pump, relief valves, test gages, hoses, etc.)

. requirement for a QC inspector with an authorized nuclear inservice inspector (ANII) to perform final system walkdown at test pressure The NRC inspector reviewed the data for Procedure 2409.91 (LPSI). No problems were identifie The NRC_ inspector witnessed the performance of Procedure 2409.91, Section A, Refueling Water Tank recirculation header, Section C, 'A'

Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Pump Suctions, and Section D, ESF Pump recirculation pipin Several valves were noted to have minor packing

. leakage or seat leakage. These were identified for repair by the test engineer. No weld or piping leakage was observed. The NRC inspector concluded that these tests had been performed in accordance with the procedur No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear

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Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of this inspection. At this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the finding .

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