IR 05000313/1998005
| ML20236Q616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Q606 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-98-05, 50-313-98-5, 50-368-98-05, 50-368-98-5, NUDOCS 9807200366 | |
| Download: ML20236Q616 (15) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR GCGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
50-313;50-368 License Nos.:
Report No.:
50-313/98-05;50-368/98-05 l
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location:
1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Dates:
May 10 through June 20,1998 inspectors:
K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector S. Burton, Resident inspector J. Melfi, Resident inspector Approved by:
Elmo E. Co!! ins, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT:
SupplementalInformation
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9807200366 980716 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-313/98-05; 50-368/98-05 This routina announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Ooerations Insufficient monitoring of plant system response and steam generator water levels by
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operators resulted in an unexpected automatic actuation of the Unit 2 emergency feedwater system during a plant shutdown (Section 01.2).
Unit 2 operators demonstrated good monitoring and control while performing a reactor
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coolant system cooldown to facilitate repairs to an emergency feedwater drain line. Plant mode changes were closely monitored and properly logged (Section 01.3).
Unit 2 operators performed well during the evolution to bring the Unit 2 reactor critical.
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The approach to criticality was deliberate and well controlled (Section 01.4).
Unit 1 operators responded in accordance with procedures to lowering condenser
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vacuum (Section 01.5).
Maintenance Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well. Unit 1 instrumentation and
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control technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude in verifying the proper location of a potentiometer which was informally labeled (Section M1.3).
The material condition of safety-related equipment on both units was generally very
good. However, both units experienced problems with the material condition of plant equipt lent, predominantly secondary plant equipment, which complicated the routine operation of the plant (Section M2).
Plant Sucoort Access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areac were properly
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posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices. Personnel and package access, personnel searches, and applications of temporary lighting in areas where equipment, components, and truck trailers were stored were properly implemented (Sections R1.1 and S1.1).
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period, Unit 1 was conducting a plant startup following completion of Refueling Outage 1R14 The reactor was in hot standby with reactor power less than 2 percent. Operators achieved 100 percent reactor power on May 18. On June 5, power was reduced to 85 percent for turbine valve testing and returned to 100 percent the same day.
On June 6, operators reduced power to 94 percent in response to lowering main condenser vacuum. The lowering condenser vacuum occurred due to an equipment malfunction while operators shifted condenser vacuum pumps. Vacuum was stabilized and power returned to 100 percent the same day. On June 8, power was reduced to 95 percent to secure a circulating water pump for scheduled maintenance. Power was returned to 100 percent the same day.
Operators lowered power to 98 percent on June 15 to secure a circulating water pump for scheduled maintenance. Power was returned to 100 percent the same day and remained there through the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2 At the beginning of the inspection period, Unit 2 was at 100 percent power. Power was reduced to 95 percent on May 16 to conduct main turbine control valve testing and was retumed to 100 percent on the same day. On May 20, operators shut down the reactor and entered Mode 3 in response to a large main condenser tube leak. Following completion of repairs, the reactor was restarted on May 23 and 100 percent power was reached on May 25. On June 7, reactor power was reduced to 69 percent to repair a small main condenser tube leak. Power was returned to 100 percent on June 8 and remained there though the end of the inspection period.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operat5ns, including compliance with Technical Specifications (TSs); conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis Report; shift manning; communications; management oversight; proper system configuration and configuration control; housekeeping; and operator performance during routine plant operations, the conduct of surveillance, and plant power changes.
The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions such as
surveillance and plant power changes were generally well controlled, deliberate, and performed according to procedures. Shift turnover briefs were comprehensive.
Housekeeping was generally good and discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety I
systems were found to be properly aligned. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed below.
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l-2-01.2 Unit 2 - Plant Shutdown Due to Condenser Tube Leak a.
Insoection Scoce (93702)
On May 20, Unit 2 operators conducted an unplanned shutdown due to a large main condenser tube leak. Following the shutdown, operators received an unexpected automatic actuation of the emergency feedwater system due to low levelin both steam generators. The inspectors observed operator actions in the control room during the shutdown and in recovering from an automatic actuation of the emergency feedwater system. The inspectors interviewed operators and reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation for the event.
b.
Observations and Findinos On May 20 at 4:30 a.m., operators received a control room annunciator indicating that sodium levels in the secondary system were increasing. Operators diagnosed the problem as a large main condenser tube leak, increased steam generator blowdown flow, and began reducing reactor power. As operators reduced power, secondary sodium concentrations increased to the point where a plant shutdown was required.
Operators performed a plant shutdown in accordance with Procedure 2102.004, Revision 25, " Power Operation." Power was reduced to less than 20 percent and operators initiated a manual reactor trip at 8:07 a.m.
During the performance of Procedure 2202.001, Revision 3," Standard Post Trip Actions," operators verified that the steam generators were available based on at least one steam generator having a level between 10 and 90 percent with feedwater available.
At this step in the procedure, an operator reported that steam generator levels were greater than 50 percent, feedwater was available, and that the main feedwater was in reactor trip override (RTO). RTO is a mode of the feedwater control system that is initiated upon a reactor trip. When the feedwater control system is in the RTO mode, the feedwater pumps decrease to a predetermined minimum speed (3030 rpm), the main feedwater regulating valves shut, and the feedwater regulating valve bypass valves I
receive a 1.3 percent demand signal. The RTO feature is designed to limit the possibility I
of overcooling the reactor coolant system after a reactor trip by limiting the posttrip feedwater flow rate. Prior to the installation of a digital feedwater control system in Refueling Outage 2R12 (May 1997), the feedwater control system was an analog system. The shutdown on May 20 was only the second shutdown since the digital feedwater control system was instatied. Based on the response of the previous analog feedwater control system during plant shutdowns, operators expected that RTO would
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slowly raise the steam generator levels to 60 percent. Although operators verified that the feedwater control system was in the RTO mode, they did not verify that the system was responding as expected, that is, slowly raising steam generator levels to approximately 60 percent. In fact, there was little or no actual feedwater flow to the j
steam generators because the pump discharge pressure was not high enough to provide
sufficient flow.
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l Following completion of the standard posttrip actions at 8:12 a.m., operators transitioned back to Procedure 2102.004 to continue with the plant shutdown. Operators began steps to align and start the auxiliary feedwater system to supply feedwater to the steam generators. Other actions associated with the shutdown were also taking place.
Operators comp'eted the standard posttrip actions at 8:12 a.m.' During the next 17 minutes, steam generator levels slowly decreased to 23 percent, the setpoint for the automatic initiation of the emergency feedwater system. At one point, a reactor operator noticed that steam generator levels were at 38 percent and slowly decreasing and communicated this information to the control room supervisor. Following the event, the i
control room supervisor did not recall the reactor operator's report. The reactor operator was aware that steps were being taken to place the auxiliary feedwater system in i
service. The next time the operator monitored steam generator levels, levels were at
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27 percent. At this point, the operator ensured that the control room supervisor was j
aware of steam generator levels. The auxiliary feedwater pump was started but not soon
enough to prevent the automatic initiation of emergency feedwater.
At approximately 8:29 a.m., the emergency feedwater system automatically actuated due to a low level condition in Steam Generator A. Steam Generator B reached 23 percent at approximately 8:31 a.m. Operators established control of steam generator levels, shifted feedwater flow from the emergency feedwater system to the auxiliary feedwater system, and secured the emergency feedwater pumps.
As a result of the automatic initiation of an engineered safety feature, the licensee reported the event to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (Event 34265) and 10 CFR 50.73 (Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-368/98-002).
The licensee determined the root cause of the event to be that the operating crew did not adequately respond to lowering steam generator levels to ensure that levels were being maintained. A contributing cause was that the feedwater control system did not function
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as expected in that it did not provide sufficient feedwater flow to slowly raise steam generator levels following the reactor trip. The licensee identified that, during a plant shutdown on February 21,1998, an operator took manual control of the feedwater
control system to maintain steam generator levels when he recognized that RTO was not functioning as expected. Although this was communicated to a system engineer, it was i
not communicated to other operating crews. Engineering personnel planned to evaluate the RTO deficiency and correct it with a modification to be performed in the next refueling outage, however, this was not being formally tracked by the licensee.
The inspectors concluded that a number of weaknesses were revealed as a result of this I
event.
The operating crew did not monitor steam generator levels sufficiently to identify
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that the feedwater control system was not performing as expected and that steam generator levels were decreasing; l
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-4-Once an operator identified that steam generator levels were decreasing, he did
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not adequately communicate this information to the control room supervisor; Although an operator had previously identified that RTO did not function as
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expected and informed system engineering personnel, the information was not communicated to others in the operations department.
The operating crew understood that the feedwater control system would maintain steam generator levels in the RTO mode based on past experience with the analog system and their previous training. The inspectors questioned how the simulator responded to a similar reactor shutdown scenario. The licensee found that for a power reduction and reactor trip from less than 20 percent power, the feedwater control system did not provide sufficient feedwater flow to the steam generators to raise or maintain levels.
Following shutdown of the plant, the licensee began activities to inspect and repair the condenser. Inspection of the main condenser tubes revealed one tube with significant leakage and two others with minor leakage. The leaking tubes were plugged and the plant was restarted on May 23.
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Conclusions Insufficient monitoring of plant system response and steam generator water levels by operators resulted in an unexpected automatic actuation of the Unit 2 emergency feedwater system during a plant shutdown.
01.3 Unit 2 - Plant Cooldown to Reoair Emeraency Feedwater System Leak a.
Insoection Scoce (71707)
On May 21, during a walkdown inside containment, the licensee discovered a leak from a crack in the piping upstream of emergency feedwater header drain Valve 2EFW-1037.
Since the cracked section of piping could not be isolated from the emergency feedwater header, the licensee conducted a plant cooldown to approximately 220*F to facilitate repairs. The inspectors observed portions of the plant cooldown.
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Observations and Findinas Operators conducted the plant cooldown in accordance with Procedures 2102.004, j
i Revision 25, " Power Operations," and 2102.010, Revision 31, " Plant Cooldown." Prior to the evolution, the operating crew discussed the necessity to monitor reactor coolant temperature, properly control cooldown, and provide close scrutiny of system conditions to ensure that the plant was not inadvertently cooled to less than 200*F. The plant was L
in Mode 3 with reactor coolant temperature at 330*F when cooldown recommenced.
Operators properly logged the change to Mode 4 when the reactor coolant temperature decreased less than 300*F. Cooldown continued until pressure in both steam generators was less than 20 psig, which corresponded to a reactor coolant temperature
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l-5-of approximately 220*F. Cooldown was secured at this temperature to facilitate the repair of the emergency feedwater system leak. Operators closely monitored and maintained system parameters to prevent an undesired cooldown and inadvertent mode change to Mode 5.
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Conclusions I
Unit 2 operators demonstrated good monitoring and control while performing a reactor coolant system cooldown to facilitate repairs to an emergency feedwater drain line Plant mode changes were closely monitored and properly logged.
l 01.4 Unit 2 - Reactor Startuo a.
Lrtsoection Scoce (71707)
On May 23, the inspectors observed Unit 2 operators perform a reactor startup following the completion of main condenser tube and emergency feedwater system repairs.
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Observations and Findinos Operators performed the reactor startup in accordance with Procedures 2102.016, Revision 5, " Reactor Startup," and 2102.004, Revision 25, " Power Operation." The approach to criticality was well controlled and deliberate. The inspectors observed very good control and oversight of the startup by the control room supervisor and shift superintendent. Operators remained focused on the startup at all times, maintaining a professional atmosphere in the control room and controlling personnel access to the control room. Operators demonstrated very good self checking and peer-checking techniques and communications were effective. During the approach to criticality, the reactor operator and control room supervisor were not assigned any other duties.
Before withdrawing control rods, operators verified that the reactor was shut down by the required amount and calculated the estimated critical position. During the withdrawal of control rods, reactor engineers were present in the control room to monitor the approach to criticality. Criticality was achieved at 1:50 p.m. on May 23.
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Conclusions l
Unit 2 operators performed well during the startup of the Unit 2 reactor. The approach to
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j criticality was deliberate and well controlled.
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-6-01.5 Unit 1 - Main C_ondenser Vacuum Transient a.
Insoection Scooe (71707)
On June 6, Unit 1 operators experienced decreasing condenser vacuum after starting condenser vacuum Pump C-5B and securing Pump C-5A. The inspectors reviewed the transient and the operator's response to the lowering vacuum event, operator logs, and plant parameters and interviewed operators.
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Observations and Findinas On June 6, Unit 1 operators started condenser vacuum Pump C-5B and secured Pump C-5A to perform weekly oil level checks. Upon securing Pump C-5A, condenser vacuum began to rapidly decrease. Operators entered Procedure 1203.016, Revision 9,
Loss of Condenser Vacuum," and reduced turbine load. Operators observed that the condenser vacuum indications on the two vacuum indications were reading differently.
The lowest readings observed by operators was approximately 23 inches Hg on one channel and 26.5 inches Hg on the other. When condenser vacuum reaches l
24.5 inches Hg, as sensed by a third pressure tap, the main turbine automatically trips.
Although Procedure 1203.016 directs operators to verify that the turbine has tripped if
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vacuum is less than 24.5 inches Hg, the operators made the decision not to manually trip
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the turbine. This was based on several factors, including the disparity between the two vacuum indications and lack of other expected annunciators for a low vacuum condition.
The inspectors' review of the data indicated that condenser vacuum decreased below j
24.5 inches Hg on one indication channel for a short period of time, approximately I
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3 minutes, before it recovered. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was evaluating the cause of the event. The licensee considered that the inlet valve for Pump C-5A did not automatically close when the pump was secured, creating a path for air flow into the condenser. During the transient, the problem corrected itself and vacuum was restored. The licensee could not duplicate the problem and found that the j
valve worked properly during subsequent operations. Calibration of the condenser
vacuum transmitters after the transient revealed that they were reading low by approximately 1-inch Eg.
As a result of the Iowaring vacuum and resultant decrease in turbine output, the integrated control system responded to maintain turbine output constant, resulting in an increass in reactor power to approximately 102 percent. Although operators took action to reduce turbine load, reactor power remained above 100 percent for approximately 7 minutes. Operators then reduced reactor power to 94 percent. Following the transient, operations management promulgated instructions to operators on actions to take to more quickly reduce reactor power in the event of similar transients.
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Conclusions Unit 1 operators responded in accordance with procedures to a lowering condenser vacuum.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700,92901)
08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9705-01. "Temocrary Periodic Insoection of Borated Water Storaae Tank Cover Not Performed" The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter dated October 16,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
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08.2 (Closed) LER 50-368/98-002. " Automatic Actuation of Emeroency Feedwater on Low Steam Generator Water Level Durino Shutdown Due to inadeauate Self-Checkina by Control Room Ooerations Personnel" This event is discussed in Section 01.2 of this report. No new issues were revealed by the LER.
11. MaintenanG#
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.
Insoection Scooe (62707)
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:
j Unit 2 - Job Order 00972233, " Sample and Change Sodium Hydroxide Pump and
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Gear Oil," peiformed on May 28,1998.
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Observations and Findinas i
The inspectors found the work performed in this activity to be professional and thorough.
Work was performed according to procedures and the workers were knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Maintenance supervisory involvement was observed on this activity.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities a.
Insoection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
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Unit 1 - Procedure 1304.038, Revision 39, " Unit 1 Reactor Protection System
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Channel B Test," observed on June 3.
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-8-Uriit 1 - Procedure 1106.006, Revision 58, " Emergency Feedwater Pump
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Operation," Supplement 12, " Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (P7A)
Quarterly," performed on June 9.
Unit 2 - Procedure 2104.005, Revision 38, " Containment Spray," Supplement 4,
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"2P-136A Quarterly Test," performed on May 28.
Unit 2 - Procedure 2104.036, Revision 42, " Emergency Diesel Generator
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Operations," Supplement 2A, "2DG2 Monthly Test (Slow Start)," performed on June 10.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found these surveillance activities to be professional and thorough.
Operators performed according to procedures and ware knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. As applicable, presurveillance briefs were held and operations supervisory
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involvement was observed on these activities.
The inspectors observed a reac'v operator trainee perform the Unit 1 emergency feedwater pump test under the direction of an reactor operator. The trainee followed the procedure and appeared knowledgeable on the task and controls.
During the performance of Procedure 1304.038, Revision 39, " Unit 1 Reactor Protection System Channel B Test," observed on June 3, instrumentation and control technicians properly documented a reading that was out of tolerance and discussed the reading with their supervisor. The technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they
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discovered that a potentiometer that needed adjustment was not clearly labeled.
Although the potentiometer was identified with markings on the instrument drawer, there i
l was no permanent label. Before continuing on with the surveillance, the technicians verified the location of the potentiometer using the appropriate technical manual.
i M1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well. Unit 1 instrumentation and control technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude in verifying the proper location of a potentiometer which was informally labeled.
l M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment a.
Insoection Scoce (71707. 62707.93702)
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The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the units based on plant tours, review of condition reports, and inspection of plant operations and transients.
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Observations and Findinas During this inspection period, the material condition of safety-related equipment on both units was generally very good. However, both units experienced problems with the material condition of plant equipment, predominantly secondary plant equipment, which complicated the routine operation of the plant.
On May 10 with Unit 1 at approximately 2 percent power, Condensate Pump P-2A catastrophically failed. Operators heard loud noises from the pump and observed sparks and material coming from the pump. Operators secured the pump and observed that the
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pump shaft and motor rotor had shifted approximately 6 inches in the downward direction. At the time of the failure, the licensee was conducting a plant startup following completion of Refueling Outage 1R14. Two condensate pumps were operating and Pump P-2A had been operating for approximately 30 minutes. The licensee removed
the pump and motor. Inspection of the pump revealed that the eighth stage pump casing had completely separated at two locations and smaller cracks existed on other stages.
In addition, the upper section of the pump shaft was sheared and the motor had sustained damage. At the conclusion of this inspection period, the licensee was continuing with repair of the pump motor, replacement of the pump, and evaluating the cause of the pump failure. Condensate Pump P-2A had been refurbished during Refueling Outage 1R14.
On June 6, Unit 1 operators experienced decreasing condenser vacuum after starting condenser vacuum Pump C-5B and securing Pump C-5A (See Section 01.5). Operators lowered turbine load to maintain vacuum and decrease reactor power, which had increased to approximately 102 percent as a result of the transient. The licensee determined that a valve or combination of valves associated with Pump C-5A failed to l
automatically close when the pump was secured, but the cause had not been determined by the end of the inspection period.
On May 20, Unit 2 operators conducted an unplanned shutdown of Unit 2 due to a large main condenser tube leak (Section 01.2). On June 7, operators reduced power to 69 percent to repair a smaller tube leak. The licensee plans to replace the main condenser tubes during the next refueling outage scheduled to begin in January 1999.
On May 21, the licensee discovered a leak from a crack in the socket weld that connects a 3/4-inch drain line to the Unit 2 emergency feedwater header (Section 01.3). Since the leak was not able to be isolated from the emergency feedwater header, the licensee had to perform a plant cooldown and enter Mode 4. The licensee repaired the leak and returned to power operation on May 23. Subsequent metallurgical analysis revealed that l
the crack resulted from fatigue caused by high cycle, low stress intensity vibratory loadings.
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Conclusiom The material condition of safety-related equipment on both units was generally very good. However, both units experienced problems with the material condition of secondary plant equipment, including failure of a condensate pump, malfunctional condensed vacuum pumps, and development of a large condenser tube leak. These problems complicated routine operation of the facility.
III. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700,92903)
E8.1 (Closed) LER 50-313/96-002-01 " Surveillance Tests Reauired by TSs Were incomotete Because All Combinations of Reactor Protection System Channel Trio Relav Contacts Were Not Tested Due to Procedure Deficiencies" On March 8,1996, while performing reviews associated with Generic Letter 96-01,
" Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits," the licensee discovered that reactor protection trip relay logic circuits had not been tested in all possible combinations as required by TSs. The licensee submitted LER 50-313/96-002 on April 5,1996. While conducting additional Generic Letter 96-01 reviews for Unit 2, on May 19,1997, the licensee discovered that all contacts in the actuation logic circuitry for the recirculation actuation signal were not being verified by the surveillance tests. The licensee submitted a supplement to their original LER to report these findings on June 18,1997 (LER 50-313/96-002-01). The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions described in these LERs and found them to be adequate and complete. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-313/9805-01; 50-368/9805-01).
E8.2 (Closed) f ER 50-368/96-002. " Surveillance Tests of Recirculation Actuation SianalEulb Buttons Were Not Performed as Reauired by TSs Due to inadeauate Testina Procedures that Resulted from Poortv Defined Manaaement Expectations Reaardina Implementation of Oriainal TSs" On April 9,1996, while evaluating a proposed change to TS Table 4.3-2 which states that a " Channel Functional Test of the Reeveulation (RAS) Manual (trip buttons)" be performed at least once per 18 months, the licensee discovered that the test had never been included in station surveillance procedures. The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions described in LER 50-368/96-002 dated May 9,1996, and found them to be adequate and complete. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-368/9805-02).
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-11-r E8.3 (Closed) Unit 2 - Violation 50-368/9703-04. " Placement of a Fuel Assembiv in a Soent Fuel Pool Location Prohibited by TS" The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letters dated July 1 and December 18,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)
During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Conduct of Security (71750)
The inspectors reviewed security measures and operations periodically throughout the inspection period and noted that they were properly implemented. Included were observations of personnel and package access, personnel searches, and applications of temporary lighting in areas where equipment, components, and truck trailers were stored.
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V. Management Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection resuits to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 25,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspecto7s asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee C. Anderson, Unit 2 Plant Manager G. Ashley, Licensing Supervisor M. Chisum, Manager, Unit 2 System Engineering M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist D. Denton, Director, Support P. Dietrich, Manager, Unit 1 Maintenance R. Edington, Plant Operations General Manager D. James, Acting Director, Nuclear Safety R. Lane, Director, Design Engineering T. Russell, Unit 2 Operations Manager D. Wagner, Quality Assurance Supervisor H. Williams, Superintendent, Plant Security J. Windham, Modifications Supervisor C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Plant Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP 92903:
Fo!!owup - Engineering IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened 50-313,368/9805-01 NCV Surveillance Tests Required by TSs Were incomplete Because All Combinations of Reactor Protection System Channel Trip Relay Contacts Were Not Tested Due to Procedure Deficiencies (Section E8.1)
50-368/9805-02 NCV Surveillance Tests of Recirculation Actuation Signal Push Buttons Were Not Performed as Required by TSs Due to inadequate Testing Procedures that Resulted from Poorly l
Defined Management Expectations Regarding implementation of Original TSs (Section E8.2)
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-2-Closed 50-313/96-002-01 LER Surveillance Tests Required by TSs Were incomplete Because All Combinations of Reactor Protection System Channel Trip Relay Contacts Were Not Tested Due to Procedure Deficiencies (Section E8.1)
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50-368/96-002 LER Surveillance Tests of Recirculation Actuation Signal Push Buttons Were Not Performed as Required by TSs Due to l
Inadequate Testing Procedures that Resulted from Poorly I
Defined Management Expectations Regarding implementation of Original TSs (Section E8.2)
5 % 68/9703-04 VIO Placement of a Fuel Assembly in a Spent Fuel Pool Location Prohibited by TS (Section E8.3)
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50-313/9705-01 VJO Temporary Periodic inspection of Borated Water Storage Tank Cover Not Performed (Section 08.1)
50-368/98-002 LER Automatic Actuation of Emergency Feedwater on Low j
Steam Generator Water Level During Shutdown Due to
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Inadequate Self-Checking By Control Room Operations Personnel (Section 08.2).
l 50-313;368/9805-01 NCV Surveillance Tests Required by TSs Were incomplete Because All Combinations of Reactor Protection System Channel Trip Relay Contacts Were Not Tested Due to Procedure Deficiencies (Section E8.1)
50-368/9805-02 NCV Surveillance Tests of Recirculation Actuation Signal Push Buttons Were Not Performed as Required by TSs Due to Inadequate Testing Procedures that Resulted from Poorly Defined Management Expectations Regarding implementation of Original TSs (Section E8.2)
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