IR 05000313/1986026
| ML20215E907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1986 |
| From: | Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215E877 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-86-26, 50-368-86-27, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8610160019 | |
| Download: ML20215E907 (15) | |
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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO?.ISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/86-26 Licenses: DRP-51 50-368/86-27 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)
P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas
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Inspection Conducted: August 1-31 1986
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Inspectors:
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9//o/86 W.~D. JojwJ6n, Senior Resident Reactor Dhte'
InspectoV (pars. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,.13)
9O Sh C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor.
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Inspector (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12)
Approved:
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4 D. R. Huntei,; Chief, Reactor Date /
Projects Section B, Reactor Projects Branch 8610160019 861006 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G
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-2-Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted August 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-26)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, possible design or procedural inadequacies related to the makeup pump room coolers, service water valve degradation, and followup of onsite events.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Inspection Summary
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i Inspection Conducted August 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-368/86-27)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on a previously,1dentified item, followup on a Licensee Event Report, service water valve degradation, environmental qualification of cable splices, followup on IE Bulletin 85-03,
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condensate storage tank construction, followup of onsite events, and = integrated engineering safeguards test.
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Results: Within the 11 areas inspected, 3 apparent violations'were~ identified.
(failure to properly respond to an annunciator alarm, failure to have adequate
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controls over the erection of scaffolds, and failure to mainta1n. seismic pipe '
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supports in the design configuration; paragraph 4).
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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- J. Levine, Director of Site Nuclear Operations'
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R. Ashcraft,. Electrical Maintenance Supervisor,
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B. Baker, Operations Manager X
- C. Bean, Quality Control Supervisor
- P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer
- M. Chisum, Senior Reactor Operator A. Cox, Operations Technical Support Supervisor G. D'Aunoy, Operations Technical Support
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- E. Ewing, General-Manager Technical Support B. Garrison, Operations Technical Support
- L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor D. Harrison, Mechanical Engineer
- G. Helmick, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor H. Hollis, Security Coordinator
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- D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager
- D. Howard, Special Projects Manager L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality
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H. Jones, Field Construction Manager P. Jones, Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent J. Lamb, Safety and Fire Protection Coordinator
- R. Lane, Engineering Manager
- D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor B. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance Engineer
- J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager J. Merryfield, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor B. Nichols, Operations Technical Support V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- S. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations R. Rispoli, Fire Protection Specialist P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer
- R. Rust, Senior Reactor Operator
.C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent R. Simmons, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor
- J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent L. Taylor, Special Projects Coordinator R. Taylor, Consultant (Wyle)
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J. Tisch, Shift Maintenance Supervisor R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent.
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D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor
B. West,' Instrumentation and' Controls Supervisor
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R. Wewers', Work Control. Center Manager
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G. Woerner, Engineer G. Wrightam, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor l
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S. Yancy, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
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C. Zimmerman,-Operations Technical' Support
- Present at' exit' interview.
'The inspectors.also conta'cted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.'
Followup on a Previously Identified Item (Unit 2)
(Closed) Violation (368/8602-01):
Inservice Testing of. Emergency
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Feedwater Pumps 2P7A and 2P78.
The NRC inspector reviewed revised licensee Procedure 2106.06,.
Supplements I and II, the monthly 2P7A and 2P7B emergency feedwater pump.
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surveillance t'ests (Revision 18 dated 7/1/86).
The inservice test part of
the procedure was found to be in accord with the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWP-3000.
Specifically, a flow rate for the pump is specified,-
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differential pressure;is recorded, and then compared to appropriate l~
acceptance criteria.
This item-is closed.
3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Unit 2)
i Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, LER 86-006-00 was reviewed to determine that i'
reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was
accomplished, and corrective' action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
.This LER reported a reactor. protective system-(RPS) actuation on April 21, 1986, with the plant in Mode 3 operation.'-The NRC inspector reviewed
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Report of Abnormal Conditions (RAC) 2-86064 and Job Order (J0)'711681..
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i This JO was used to replace the malfunctioning RPS channelC': bypass-relay.
During refueling outage 2RS, the licensee investigated and
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i corrected the noise problem in the channel 'A' logarithmic excore nuclear-i instrumentation.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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14.
Operational Safety Verification (Units l'a'd 2)
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The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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' logs, and conducted discussions with control ~ room operators.. The
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inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records,. verified proper return to service of affected components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for 3;
equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance
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-with the station security plan.
The inspectcrs verified implementation of
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l radiation protection controls during observation of plant activities.
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.'The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant i
equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
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excessive vibration.
The inspectors ~also observed plant housekeeping and
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-cleanliness conditions during the tours.
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' The NRC inspectors walked down the Unit 1 battery and switchgear emergency.
cooling systems. The walkdown was performed using Procedure.1104.27 and
Orawing M-221.
No lineup discrepancies.were identifled. -Several typographical errors were noted on the lineup sheets of Procedure 1104.27, and four instrument isolation valves were not shown on-Drawing M-221.
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- These minor discrepancies were identified to the licensee for correction.
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During a' plant tour on August 13, 1986, the NRC. inspector noticed a
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cooling water expansion tank low level alarm on the local alarm panel, for
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the Unit 2, Number'1 emergency diesel generator.
This alarm was in solid and there was no. diesel generator trouble alarm.in the control room, i
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level indicator for;the expansion tank indicated less than five percent.
indicating that the alarm had been acknowledged at the local panel.
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When the NRC inspector brought this condition to the attention of Unit 2 operations personnel at about.1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br />, operators;went to the diesel generator room and found two heat exchanger drain valves partially open, j
draining the diesel generator cooling water system to a floor' drain. They
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shut these valves and filled the cooling water system and the expansion-
tank.
Licensee personnel prepared a Report of Abnormal Condition
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(RAC 2-86236), and noted that the alarm had been acknowledged at about
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l noen on August 13, 1986.
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l 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires =that measures.shal'1 be.'
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failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified-and corrected..
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Section 8.7.1 of Operations Administrative. Procedure 1015.01, " Conduct"of-
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Operation," requires that. conditions which result in actuation ~of the,
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annunicator system should be promptly investigated andscorrective action i
i taken to clear the alarm.
The licensee's failt,re to respond to the low i-level-alarm on the cooling water expansion tank for the Unit:2,-Numoer 1 -
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emergency diesel generator-is an apparent violation.
(368/8627-01) ' ^
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During a plant tour on August 27, 1986, the NRC inspector noted that a
scaffold was erected west of the Unit 2, Number 1 emergency diesel
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generator.
This scaffold was wired to the diesel fuel oil supply.line to-the-day tank for the Number 1 diesel generator.
This line, shown on Isometric Drawing 2HBD-103-3, R,evision 4, is seismic class I. This
- situation'is similar to one noted in May 1986, and reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-368/86-15.
The licensee's failure to have adequate controls over the erection of scaffolds in the vicinity of safety-related
equipment is an apparent violation.
(368/8627-02)
The NRC inspector found that room cleanliness was generally satisfactory
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l-in both unit's auxiliary buildings.
Two exceptions to this observation l.
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were_in the'~ Unit 2 upper north piping penetration room and the Unit 2 emergency feedwater pump (2P7A) room.
Although no direct adverse impact on plant safety was observed, the NRC inspector expressed a~ concern that post-maintenance room cleanup did not appear to have been adequate in these rooms.
Apparently tools and debris had accumulated during the course of several jobs.
The licensee issued job orders to clean the rooms.
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The NRC inspector noted the following problems while touring the Unit 2 lower. south piping penetration room and informed the licensee:
2CV-5103, a high pressure injection isolation valve for hot leg-
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i injection, was missing the yoke mounted position indication plate.
Job Request 765637 was issued to evaluate and correct this discrepancy.
On'2TE-5095, the' shutdown cooling header. temperature' sensor,.the
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plastic part of the conax cable cover was pulled several inches from
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During the course'of the inspection, the NRC inspector found the following seismic support deficiencies:
Pipe support 2-CCB-70-H19 had one anchor bolt without a nut.
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support is for the JA' train 3-inch hot leg injection line of the HPSI system.
Report of Abnormal Conditions (RAC) 2-86-354 was issued
to correct this discrepancy.
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Pipe support 2-CCB-13-H8 had one anchor bolt in which the nut had no
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contact on the washer.
This support is for HPSI sys_ tem injection valve 2CV-5035 motor operator.
RAC 2-86-432.was issued to correct'
this discrepancy.
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Similar deficiencies have been found before, ~most recently as documented i
under Open Item 368/8622-01.
The NRC inspector.found that the licensee-
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has no ongoing program to identify seismic s'upport deficiencies-to ensure
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that the supports are maintained as depicted in the design drawings. The'
J need for such a program is apparent.
Failure to maintain controlxof the-
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configuration of the supports noted above is an, apparent' violation.
(368/8627-03)
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The NRC inspector reviewed the Unit 1 log book 'for jumper and' lifted' leads
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Numerous. outstanding log sheets-older than 6 months were found; the oldest had been issued.in"1980..The; Unit 2 log book was found to be similar.
The NRC inspector reviewed the governing licensee Procedure 1000.28, " Jumper and-Lifted Lead Control," Revision 6,
- Change 1, of May 9, 1985.
The procedure requires temporary modifications
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installed for greater than 3 months to be reviewed quarterly by the Plant
- Safety. Committee (PSC) and the operations staff "to determine continued l
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. applicability and whether the' modification should be made. permanent.".The,
NRC inspector' discussed the issue of temporary modifications with the licensee and expresscd concern that the reviews required byL'
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. Procedure 1000.28 had apparently not been effective in clearing the bac.klog
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In response, the licensee acknowledged.the concern and stated that the backlog problem had been recognized several months earli'r. 'The PSC had appointed a committee to study the problem and e
make recommendations. -'At the time of this inspection, the committee's work had not yet been completed. The licensee stated'that actions to clear the.
current backlog of temporary modifications and establish a means to prevent future backlogs would be completed for both units by the end of 1986.
This item is designated as'an open item for tracking purposes.
(313/8626-01)
(368/8627-04)
-Other minor discrepancies were identified by the NRC inspectors during plant tours.. These items were identified to.the licensee and prompt-corrective action was taken. These items include:
An improperly mounted emergency light above 2CV-1050-
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An open. terminal box on 2CV-1001
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A missing gear-housing cover on 2MS-40A
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A locking device on battery disconnect switch 2052 which was not
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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that selected facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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- 5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2')
-The NRC inspectors. observed the Technical Specification required surveillance testing listed below and verified that-testing was performed _
in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and i
restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results
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conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, test l
results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the
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test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The NRC inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Monthly test of channel ' A' of the emergency feedwater initiation and
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control system (Procedure 1304.145) (JO 716871)
Weekly fire water pump test (Procedure 1104.32, Supplement VIII)
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-8-Monthly test of diesel fire pump (Procedure'1104.32, Supplement II)
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Steam driven emergency feedwater pump test (Procedure'1106.06,
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Supplement II)
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Battery and switchgear emergency cooling system test
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(Procedure 1104.27, Attachment 2)
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Emergency diesel generator test (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement II)
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Flow test of fire water system (Procedure 1104.32, J0 717071)
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Diesel driven fire pump (P6B) capacity test (Procedure 1104.32,
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Supplement X)
Diesel driven fire pump overspeed trip test (Procedure 1104.32,
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Supplement XI)
Unit 1 service water pump 'A' (P4A) test to evaluate pump degradation
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and service water header cross connect valve leakage (Procedure 1104.29, Supplement I)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry ccdes or standards; and in conforman e with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
- The following maintenance activities were observed:
Disassembly and inspection of 2CV-1000 (JO 717336)
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Repair of emergency feedwater initiation and control system
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channel 'B' maintenance bypass (JO 717880)
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-g-Preventive maintenance on emergency diesel generator starting air
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compressors C4A1 and C482 (JO 527949 and J0 527952).
Repair of exhaust manifold on Unit 2 emergency diesel ganerator
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(JO.718083)
Replacement of gaskets on scavenging air manifold on Unit 2 emergency
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diesel generatar (JO 718597)
Battery 2011 and associated DC control center D01-electrical ground
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. search and repair (J0'718502)
Packing replacement on 2CV-1074 and 2CV-1024 (JO 718521)
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Unit 2 service water pump 2P4A stuffing box adjustment
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(Procedure 2402.34, J0 718636)
Recirculation and filtering of the Unit 1 diesel fuel underground
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storage tank T57A (Work Plan 1409.25)
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Possible Design or Procedural Inadequacies Related to the Makeup Pump Room Coolers (Unit 1)
While using the PRISIM computer program, the NRC inspector noted that many core melt scenarios involve loss of high pressure injection pumps due to motor overheating following a loss of makeup pump room cooler VUC-78.
One makeup pump is normally operating for makeup to the reactor coolant-system and injection of water to the reactor coolant pump seals.
A second pump is started by the engineered safeguards actuation system based on low reactor coolant system pressure or high reactor building pressure.
In this mode, the makeup pumps are called high pressure injection' pumps.
There are three makeup pump room coolers. They are mounted above the three makeup pumps.
The makeup pumps are in separate rooms, but since the walls between them are only partial separation walls,-any, room cooler can provide adequate cooling for any one pump motor.
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In normal operation, one of the permissible lineups involves running the
'B' makeup pump and its associated room cooler, with'the 'A'
makeup pump in standby, and the 'C' makeup pump in engineered safeguards 4(ES) standby.
In this lineup, the 'B' room qooler (VUC-78) is supp]ied with service
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water from loop I (odd).
The' fan in VUC-78 is powered,from motor control center (MCC) B56.
This MCC may be powered from.either load' center 85 (odd) or B6 (even), but it is normally selected to B6.
This alignment makes the room cooler susc'eptible to failure due to many possible single failures in either of the safety system support trains.
In an accident situation, recovery from such a failure would depend upon operator action to recover the support system fault or start an available standby room cooler.
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'The NRC. inspector fEund that several plant procedures and design features
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of the-plant have an effect on the-likelihood of operator recovery
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. actions. Some of these are listed below:
The makeup pump-room cooler fans must be started locally from their
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'MCCs.
f There are no controls or status indications for the minkeup pump' room
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coolers in the control room.
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There is no makeup pump room temperature indication or, alarm in the
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Controlfroom.
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There'are no automatic start signals or interlocks associated with-
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the makeup pump room cooler fans.
Table 9-24 of the Final Safety Analysis Report indicates that two
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room coolers ars required when two pumps are operating.
Emergency Operating Procedure 1202.01 does not include steps to start
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a second room cooler upon Es actuation or when a second high pressure injection pump is manually started.
MakeuppumpmotorwindingtemperaturaisrecordedonTR6h01on
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panel-C-13 in the control room. There is an alarm at 260* motor temperature which is annunciated on window A-2 of annunciator
panel K08.
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Annunicator Response Procedure 1203.12G does'not mention room coolers-
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in the corrective action for the above alarm.
The NRC inspector discussed this issue with licensee ~ management.and asked -
that licensee personnel evaluate the need.to make design and/or-pro'cedurall changes to lessen the need for, or to increase the-likelihood of, operator-
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recovery actions during accident scenarios in:which makeup pumpiroom-
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cooling is a significant factor.
Based on preliminary calculations by an NRC contractor, JBF Associates, using input data for the PRISIM computer
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- program, some procedural or design changes in this area could Yeduce the overall core melt frequency of the plant by a factor of about two. This-issue will remain unresolved pending further review of the~adequtcy of the design of the makeup pump room coolers and the associated procedures.
.(313/8626-02)
8.
Service Water Valve Degradation (Units 1 and 2)
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Due to finding significant degradation of certain service water valve internals in Unit 2, the licensee established a plan to inspect all safety-significant service water valves which do not have internals composed of corrosion resistant materials. This inspection was performed during refueling outage 2R5 for Unit 2 and is expected to be performed during refueling outage IR7 for Unit.
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-11-The NDO inspector reviewed the scope of the Unit 2 inspection plan.
A numbu of safety-significant valves were identified which were not in the licensee's inspection pl'an.
Licensee re'v'iew of these valves determined that they we're of stainless steel construction or that they were not safety-significant.
Those not inspected due to a licensee determination of their not being safety significant were the service water valves serving room coolers 2VUC-2A, E, C, and D, room coolers 2VUC-19A and B, and hydrogen purge fans 2VSF-30 and 37.
Exhaust fans 2VEF-56A and B provide backup cooling to the switchgear rooms and exhaust fans 2VEF-63 and 64 provide backup cooling to the north electrical equipment room.
The hydrogen purge system is not required by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications, since the unit is equipped with electric hydrogen recombiners.
The NRC inspector will review the adequacy of switchgear and electrical equipment roon coolers and exhaust fans during a future inspection.
The NRC inspector observed the disassembly and inspection of service water valves 25W-20A and the repair of valves 25W-11B and 25W-12A.
The NRC inspectors also observed the replacement of valves 25W-13A, B, C, D, E,
-and F.
The licensee reassembled several service water valves without internals due to unavailability of parts.
These valves were room cooler isolation valves, used to isolate the room coolers in the event of a cooling coil leak. Temporary modification forms including evaluation per 10 CFR 50.59, were completed for these valves.
Restoration of these valves is-expected to be completed as parts become available.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Cable Splices (Unit 2)
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During this inspection period, the licensee fo'und that qualification could not be documented for certain cable splices in EQ applications-inside containment.
A list of all EQ splices and connections ~was prepared by the licensee and a walkdown inspection of approximately 700 splices and connections was conducted. The licensee identified 49 cable splices-
, manufactured by the AMP Corporation which could not be verified as qualified.
These splices were replaced by qualified splices manufactured by Raychem.
The NRC inspector observed the replacement of the splices associated with the containment penetration for 2PT-4601-1 and 2PT-5601-1.
These replacements were performed under.J0s 717507 and 717523 using Baychem instructions.
Quality control personnel also observed these
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replacements. The'NRC inspector was informed that eight Raychem splices
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were also replaced due to deficiencies identified during the walkdown.
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inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified during the NRC inspector's observations of splice replacement.
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NRC Inspection Report-50-313/86-21;50-368/86-22discussedtheinitial inspection effort related to IEB 85-03, " Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings.".During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors observed M0 VATS testing of 2CV-1026-2, 2CV-1074, and 2CV-1504.
Differential pressure testing was observed on 2CV-1025, 2CV-1037, 2CV-1035, and 2CV-5101. 'These activities were found to be conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The NRC inspectors also discussed M0 VATS testing findings and licensee corrective actions with licensee personnel.
This inspection effort will continue during the next inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Seismic Condensate Storage Tank (Q-CST) Construction Activities Observation (Unit 2)
During a tour of the Q-CST valve pit for Unit 2, the NRC inspector noted an installed non-Q valve, 2CV-7198 which had its bonnet and internals removed.
The valve body cavity was partially covered by cloth tape.
An accumulation of dirt and water was present in the bottom of the valve body.
Based on this observation, the NRC inspector expressed concern to the licensee regarding their cleanliness practices during installation of piping systems associated with the Q-CST.
For Q-systems, ANS1 N45.2.1-1973, Section 5, " Installation Cleaning" states, in part, that " openings shall be sealed at all times except when they must be unsealed to carry out necessary operations." The licensee subsequently began taking action to improve their cleanliness practices..A review of these actions and licensee requirements for cleanliness during installation remain to be completed by the NRC inspector.
Until these reviews are completed, this observation will be carried as an unresolved item.
(368/8627-05)
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Followup of Onsite Events (Units 1 and 2)
The purpose of this part of the inspection was to determine whether licensee corrective actions for the events discussed were adequate and to evaluate the licensee's compliance with reporting requirements under 10 CFR Part 50.72.
a.
Diesel Fuel Contamination Event summary:
On June 27, 1986, near the end of the 18 month post-maintenance 24-hour load test of the Number 2 diesel generator (DG) for Unit 2, the fuel strainer after the fuel day tank became clogged.
The diesel engine had to be secured due to high cylinder differential temperatures caused by fuel starvation.
Thus, the
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diesel failed the test. The licensee determined that the fuel
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' strainer had been clogged by a sludge material which was subsequently found accumulated as a thick layer adhered to the sides.and bottom of the day tank.
This sludge was also found. in, lessor amounts in the Number 1 DG day tank and in the two DG fuel undergroundistorage tanks.
All four tanks in Unit 2 were= subsequently drained and cleaned by water lancing.
Sludge and/or. fuel oil samples'from most storage tanks onsite were taken and sent off for analysis.
Additionally, the fuel in the two underground storage tanks and the common above ground storage tank was filtered to improve the aging factor of the fuel and to remove contaminants.
Concerning Unit 1, the licensee determined that significant sludge accumulation did not exist. This was based on a visual inspection of fuel samples taken from the bottom of each of the skid mounted day tanks on the two Unit 1 DGs. Only insignificant amounts of sediment were found.
No special sampling of the two Unit 1 underground storage tanks or filtering was done.
During these events, Unit 1 was operating at power and Unit 2 was in Mode 6 conducting refueling operations. The-licensee issued Report of Abnormal Conditions (RAC) 2-86-120 on June 30, 1986.
By July 3, 1986, an, " Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Contamination Action Plan," had been written and attached to the RAC.
This action plan was inclusive of both units and contained tasks for the following licensee organizations:
Operations
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Chemistry Mechanical Maintenance i
Plant Licensing Operations Experience Assessment Quality Assurance The NRC inspector found the action plan to be comprehensive and concluded that if carried out, it would provide adequate preventive and corrective action.
However, the NRC inspector found problems with the implementation of the plan:
(1) None of the original samples containing sludge were initially analyzed to determine the composition of the sludge.
This was necessary in order to determine the root cause of the problem.
The fact of the incomplete analysis was identified on August 11, 1986, when the NRC inspector asked the licensee for sample analysis results.
The action plan had stipulated sludge composition analysis. (Subsequent to NRC management discussions with the licensee, sludge analysis was performed on three-samples still available from Unit 2).
(2) Further actions to identify and correct possible fuel oil contamination and sludge accumulation in the Unit 1 storage and day tanks, as stipulated in the action plan, were delayed, apparently to avoid interfering with continued power operation.
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(Subsequent to NRC canagement discussions with the licensee, further fuel oil sainples from the bottom of the day tanks and from the normal sample points on the storage tanks were taken and analyzed, and storage tank recirculation through filters was accomplished.
This was to demonstrate that whatever the sludge accumulation in the storage tanks, it was insufficient to cause strainer clogging or to be transferred in significant quantities to the day tanks.)
(3) The licensee failed to recognize the reportability of the fuel oil contamination problem under 10 CFR Part 50.72, section (b)(2)(i) or (b)(2)(iii)(D) until August 27, 1986. The licensee is preparing a LER on this incident.
The NRC resident inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's actions related to diesel fuel oil in conjunction with review of this LER.
b.
Potential Litroduction of Incorrect Lubricating Oil to the Unit 1 Emergency Feedwater Pump P7A Turbine K-3 Event summary:
During maintenance on K-3 on May 7, 1986, maintenance personnel noted that the job order specified an incorrect oil for the turbine, thus raising the possibility of-the wrong oil having previously been put into the turbine.
The licensee issued RAC 1-86-093 to investigate this problem.
It was determined that incorrect oil had not been used in K-3.
It was determined that when K-3 had been replaced with a new Terry turbine in 1984, the licensee's lubricating oil manual and maintenance procedure had not been updated to' reflect the oil specification for-the new turbine.
This was the apparent cause of the error in the Unit 1 job order.
The NRC inspector reviewed the following to verify that they had been updated to specify the correct lubricating oil for K-3.,
Unit 1 Lube Oil Manual
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Procedure 1402.59, "K-3 Emergency Feedwater Turbine > Disassembly,
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Inspection, and Reassembly"
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Procedure 1106.06,"EmergencyFeedwaterPumpdperation" ~
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Concerning reportability, in that improper oil had not been put in K-3, the licensee correctly determined that a 10 CFR Part 50.72 report was not required
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Findings concerning the licensee's efforts.to incorporate existing and new manufacturer's recommendations into their maintenance program have been identified previously as a violation in.NRC Inspection Report 50-368/86-18.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.'. Integrated Engineering Safeguards Test (Unit 2).
-The NRC inspector verified:that Procedure 2305.01, " Integrated Engineering Safeguards Test," had been properly approved to cover one of the more complex surveillance tests required by Technical Specifications.
Prior to the performance of this test, the NRC inspector raised questions with the licensee concerning whether the procedure would fully demonstrate
fcompliance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.c.12.
Procedure 2305.01
was revised prior to the test to resolve the NRC inspector's concerns.
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The NRC inspector verified that a qualified crew of adequate numbers was-available to perform the test. All test prerequisites were verified to be
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completed and the special test equipment involved was verified to be in
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current calibration. The current revision of the test procedure was available to test personnel.
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The actual test was performed just after the end of this inspection period.
The. remaining inspection effort related to this test will be discussed in the inspection report for-the-next inspection period.
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No violations or deviations were identified.'
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14.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is* required in
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order to ascertain whether.or not the items are acceptable, violations, o'r.'
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deviations.
The following unresolved items vt i discussedin'thisireport:
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Paragraph Item
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Subject 1
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i 7-313/8626-02 Makeup.pumproomcoo5ers",,
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l 11-368/8627-05 Cleanliness during
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installation 15.
Exit Interview i
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The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director,JSite Nuclear
Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of this i
inspection.
At this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection.and the findings.
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