IR 05000313/1989005
| ML20248E352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1989 |
| From: | Ray Azua, Chamberlain D, Haag R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248E308 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-89-05, 50-313-89-5, 50-368-89-05, 50-368-89-5, NUDOCS 8904120218 | |
| Download: ML20248E352 (14) | |
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APPENDIX
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U. S.: NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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Inspection Repor't: '50-313/89-05 Licenses:
DPR-51-50-368/89-05 NPF-6 Dockets:
50-313
.50-368 Licensee:
A' kansas Power & Light Company.
r P. O.-Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203,
. Facility Na'me:. Arkansas Nuclear One'(AN0),1 Un_its' I and 2
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- Inspection At
- AN0 Site,-Russellville, Arkansas
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. Inspection Conducted:
February 1-28, 1989 Inspectors:
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3//3 f 8 9
.R. C. Haag ResideKt Inspector, Project Date
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Section A, Division of' Reactor Projects g'
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R. VY Azua, Reactor
.nspectore Test.
Da'te Programs Section, Division of Reactor
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Safety _
Approved:
F.z d a D. IK Chamberlain, Chi'ef Project Date Section A, Division of Reactor Projects
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e90412021e 890265 ADOCK0500g3 DR T
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-2-Inspection Summary l
Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1989 (Report 50-313/89-05; 50-368/89-05)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection including maintenance, followup li! events, operational' safety verification, surveillance, and allegation
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l followup.
Results: The effective use of condition reports to identify problems and deficiencies was noted during the inspection period.
However, based on the results of previous NRC inspections and items received during this inspection, the timeliness of corrective action for condition reports remains a concern with the NRC. This subject will receive additional review by subsequent NRC inspections.
An additional example to a previous violation, rigging from safety piping, was identified by the NRC inspector. This violation was not cited with a notice of violation due to the corrective action associated with the previous violation not having been completed at the time of the recent example.
Increased management attention may be appropriate to ensure the timely completion of corrective actions associated with a violation to prevent recurrence of the violation.
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o-3-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Levine, Executive Director, ANO Site Operations T. Baker, Technical Support Manager D. Bennett, Mechanical Engineer D. Converse, Operations Assessment Supervisor A. Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent D. Crabtree, Engineering Services Supervisor B. Eaton, Manager, Mechanical, Civil and Structural Design
- E. Ewing, General Manager, Plant Support B. Greeson, Design Engineering Supervisor
- H. Greene, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor D. Howard, Licensing Manager i
- R. Lane, Engineering Manager
- D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor R. Lovett, Electrical Maintenance Engineer
- J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager
- P. Michalk, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- S. Quennoz, General Manager C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor L. Taylor, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist
- J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
- J. Vanc'ergrift, Operations Manager
- R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager C. Zin nerman, Unit 1 Operations Technical Support Supervisor
- Present at exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
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2.
Plant Status (Units 1 and 2)
Unit I remained shutdown throughout the inspection period for maintenance and modification of items identified by the reactor trip on January 20, 1989, and subsequent licensee reviews.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and
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industry codes or standards, and in conformance with the Technical
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Specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed q
from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were i
maintained, activities were accomplished by qual 1fied personnel, parts and j
materials used were properly certified, radiological controls were l
implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were rev W ed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Troubleshooting the failure of Valve 2CV-5657-1 to open (Job Order 777506). While performing the monthly surveillance test of a sodium hydroxide pump, the sodium hydroxide tank outlet valve would not open remotely from the control room.
Inspections by the licensee
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revealed that a latch in the limit and torque switch had loosened and l
caused actuation of the torque switch which prevented opening of the
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valve. The latch was retightened and the valve was verified operable by testing the remote operation of the valve.
Based on no similar occurrences of Rototork valve operator failures, the licensee determined no additional action was required.
Replacement of bevel gears in the operators for service water cross connect Valves 2CV-1421-2 and 2CV-1422-2 (Job Orders 775959 and 775991). A new bevel gear was installed in each operator to replace the bevel gears which had broken teeth. The licensee's root cause determination identified overtorquing of the valve by manual operation as the cause of the broken teeth. The licensee committed to emphasize the proper operation of motor operated valves in future training for plant operators.
Repair of service water pump Check Valve 2SW-2C (Job Order 735353 and Plant Change 86-3351). The carbon steel internal parts were replaced with stainless steel parts. The NRC inspector noted the original carbon steel parts were not as severely corroded as the parts previously inspected in Valve 2SW-2A. The licensee has deferred the replacement of the parts in Valve 2SW-2B (the only remaining valve that has not been modified) until May of 1989 due to the requirement of lifting the associated pump to gain access to the check valve.
The scheduled repair date is appropriate based on the past performance and the limited inspection of the valve.
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-5-OverhaulofservicewaterPump2P-4C(Procedure 2402.034 and Job I
Order 771830). The pump shaft snap rings were severely corroded, however, not to the extent that would allow the impellers to slip down on the shaft. Therefore, the damage previously experienced on Pumps 2P-4A and -B did not exist on 2P-4C.
Based on the installation
of the new carbon steel snap rings being the same material type as the snap rings which exhibited accelerated corrosion, the licensee has initiated an 18-month overhaul schedule for the service water l
pumps.
f Replacement of elbows and tees in the B high pressure safef y injection (HPSI) line (Work Plan 1406.063 and Job Order 77,666).
These. fittings were replaced because the calculated stresses in the fittings exceeded ASME code allowable limits. The calculated stresses were obtained from a thermal stress analysis of the HPSI lines including the HPSI cross-connect lines.
This analysis was performed in response to the reactor coolant system backflow through one of the HPSI discharge line check valves following the plant trip on January 20, 1989.
The NRC inspector observed the final fit up of an elbow and tee in which chain falls were used to maintain the required position of the pipe. Two safety-related pipes, the decay heat discharge line and the penetration room ventilation line, were used as anchor points for the chain falls. When questioned by the NRC inspector, the mechanics stated that prior engineering approval had not been obtained for rigging from safety-related piping. After observation of the rigging by the NRC inspector, the licensee removed the rigging and performed an engineering review on the application of the rigging. This review
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determined that the safety-related piping had not been overstressed.
The licensee was informed that this condition was considered another example of a previous violation in which a safety-related pipe was used as a support.
In response to Violation 313/8832-01, the licensee changed Step 6.26.4 in Procedure 1025.003, " Conduct of Maintenance," to prohibit the use of safety-related piping to support rigging unless engineering approval is obtained. Retraining of personnel on this prohibition was planned, however, the training was not completed when the NRC inspector observed the rigging for the HPSI line. This additional example of an apparent violation of Criteria II and Criteria V of Appendix ~B to 10 CFR 50 will not be cited with a Notice of Violation based on the licensee committing to complete retraining of personnel by April 1989.
In addition to the items above, the licensee located a leak in the Unit 2
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refueling water tank (RWT). The leak stemmed from a pin hole in a circumferential weld at the top of the RWT, where the tank wall meets the top of the tank. A horizontal support beam attached to the RWT seemed to be the source of the weld failure.
It appeared that the support beam had been tack welded to the RWT, more specifically onto the weld on the tank.
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l-6-This created a condition in which the weld deteriorated and the RWT wall, in the vicinity of the pin hole, experienced heat damage.
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contamination of the soil around the RWT, but was unable to identify the
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location of the leak until now. Once the leak was identified, the RWT level was reduced to a point below the pin hole. This prevented any further leakage in this area. The RWT level was still above the requirements of the ANO, Unit 2, Technical Specifications.
The licensee removed the affected weld section in addition to a section of the RWT wall that experienced a degree of heat damage. Both were i
replaced.
Results from a PT test, performed on the circumferential weld, have not been received yet.
The licensee was concerned, also, with the contaminated soil surrounding the RWT. The weather at the site included some rainfall, so the licensee, in an effort to prevent any of the contaminated soil from washing out off the
'e, built a dyke in the area surrounding the RWT. The licensee has ammbled a task group to determine what course of action to take with regard to the contaminated soil. No final decision had been reached by February 28, 1989. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions in this area.
Finally, during postmaintenance testing of Emergency Feedwater (EFW)
Flow Indicator 2FI-0798A, the licensee reported a potential waterhammer occurrence. The flow indicator had recently been recalibrates and the licensee was attempting to measure the minimum recirculation flow for the J
"B" EFW pump. To establish the minimum recirculation flow, the licensee attemptet to close flush Valve 2CV-0714 while the pump was running. The
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waterhammer noise, which was heard in the control room, occurred when the flush valve attempted to close. The valve failed to fully close. A second attempt to close the valve with the EFW pump running resulted in a similar waterhammer noise.
During routine monthly pump surveillance, the flush valve is only operated when the EFW pump is idle. The normal valve lineup requires the flush valve to be closed.
I An EFW walkdown inspection following the water hammer occurrence revealed no visual damage to the piping or supports. During subsequent testing, the valve moved abruptly indicating that the valve may be sticking when it 1s cycled. The preliminary results of the licensee's review of this event indicated that the erratic movement of the valve, with flow through the l
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valve, may have caused the waterhammer noise. Due to isolation problems, the licensee has sche duled disassembly and repair of the flush valve for the next plant shutd'wn. The completion of repair to Valve 2CV-0714 and l
the licensee's root t.ause determination of the waterhammer noise is an
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openitem(368/8905-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Followup of Events (93702) (Units 1 and 2)
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Environmental Qualification of Target Rock Solenoid Valves The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's-actions resulting from the
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discovery of the expired environmental qualification for three
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solenoid operated valves. The original environmental qualification for these valves did not recognize that the valves are normally open and the solenoid is energized. ' Based on continuously energized,
solenoids,.the qualified life _ for these valves is 4.3 years. This-resulted in the qualified life' for Unit 2 hydrogen sample
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Valve 2SV-8273 expiring in 1984 and the qualified life for the Unit I air particular monitor Valves SV-7454 and SV-7456 expiring in 1986.
The licensee identified this error in the calculation of the qualified life during a review of.the generic environmental qualification for Target Rock solenoid valves. The Technical Specification, limiting condition for operation applicable to hydrogen ralyzers was ertered following the determination of the expired environmental qualification. The licensee replaced the expired parts on Valve 2SV-8273. Following further review of the environmental requirements for Valves SV-7454 and 7456, the licensee determined these valves are not required to be included in the environmental qualification program.
Based on the licensee's failure to incorporate all performance specifications, i.e., the continuously energized solenoid, into the environmental qualification of Valve 2SV-8273, this problem could be cited as a violation of NRC requirements. However, a Notice of Violation will not be issued for this violation based on the following criteria of Appendix C,Section V.4.(3) of 10 CFR Part 2:
The condition that resulted in a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.49
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was identified by the licensee.
This is a Severity Level IV violation.
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The licensee has determined that this condition is reportable
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per 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B).
The parts which had an expired qualified life were replaced.
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The licensee has verified no other Target Rock solenoid valves have a similar discrepant condition. Also, other solenoid operated valves were included in this review.
This violation could not reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous
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violation.
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b.
Followup of 10 CFR Part 21 Report On January 24, 1989, the licensee received a 10 CFR Part 21 report from ABB Power Distribution, Inc., that identified seismic concerns for Brown Boveri K-Line circuit breakers.
The report addressed circuit breakers manufactured prior to mid-1974 which did not have a rebound spring installed on the slow close bar.
Earlier seismic testing of K-Line circuit breakers by the vendor revealed that vibration could
occasionally cause repositioning of the slow close bar. This would prevent normal closing of the breaker. The addition of a rebound
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spring to the slow close bar prevents the bar from vibrating to this I
undesired position.
A total of 150 K-Line circuit breakers are in use at ANO with 19 breakers serving safety-related functions for Unit 1 and 20 safety-related breaker for Unit 2.
The licensee has committed to install rebound springs on all applicable Unit 1 circuit breakers prior to Unit I heatup. A review of breaker application in Unit 2 indicated that only four safety-related breakers, when in their normal position, would be required to be closed following any event included in the design basis of the plant. These breakers are associated with pressurizer heaters and hydrogen recombiners. The licensee has installed rebound springs on these four breakers.
During the next Unit 2 shutdown, the remaining springs will be installed.
The NRC inspector observed the installation of the rebound spring on Circuit Breaker B-521 per Work Plan 1407.a6. The postmaintenance testing required the breaker to be cycled to verify proper operation.
The breaker went to the closed position, however, immediately returned to the open pod tion.
Similar conditions existed with Breakers B-614 and B-721. The trip mechanism was replaced on Breaker B-521, then the breaker was successfully cycled. On i
l Breaker B-614 the trip mechanism internals were disassembled and cleared, then the breaker was successfully tested.
Further inspection of the trip mechanism.for Breaker B-521 revealed that a latch required cleaning prior to functioning properly. The existing l
preventive maintenance program for this type of breaker does require I
cleaning of the trip mechanism.
In addition, when testing Breakers B-712, B-713, and B-414, the licensee discovered these breakers closed slower than normal and raised the concern of the breaker not being completely closed.
Initial review did not indicate that the addition of the rebound springs contributed to any of these l
deficient conditions. The licensee initiated a condition report for each breaker listed above to investigate further corrective actions.
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The NRC inspector will followup on the licensee's root cause analysis and both the short-and long-term corrective actions. This matter will be tracked as an open item (313;368/8905-02)
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Decay Heat Pipe Support Damage During review of. recent condition reports, the NRC inspector noted -
- two condition reports that identified damage of two Unit 1 decay heat piping supports. These hangers are located on the _ decay heat. suction piping to the A and B decay heat pumps. The NRC inspector made the.
following observations 'when inspecting the hangers:
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. Hanger DH-122/126: A lug welded to the bottom of the pipe was
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completely sheared off and a lug at the top of the pipe was
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partially sheared. An area, with an approximate size of 5x6 inches, at the top of the pipe was dented approximately.
3/8 inch. Markings on the. hanger indicate the pipe moved vertically; approximately 1/2. inch.
Hanger DH-125: A heat shield welded to the top of the pipe was
dented approximately 1/2 inch. Markings'on the hanger indicate
'the pipe moved axially, approximately 1 inch.
At;the end of the inspection period,Lthe licensee had not determined
'the. event or mechanism which caused this damage.- In addition, the
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licensee had previously ~ identified a damaged hanger 'on the suction line from the borated water storage tank to "B" decay heat pump.
This-damage involved ' anchor bolts that were pulled loose from thel
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floor. 'The licensee attributed the root cause of this event to improper filling technique used after draining the line for maintenance of a check valve. A more~ detailed NRC review of these events, including the licensee's ' root cause analysis and corrective actions, was performed during an NRC inspection on March 7-10, 1989, and is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-09; 50-368/89-09.
d.
RCS Cold Leg Drain Line Weld Leak The licensee, following the Unit 1 Turbine trip on January '20,1989, discovered a weld leak while performing a walkdown of the reactor coolantsystem(RCS). The leak was located in a weld (FW34C-1) found on an elbow fitting on the RCS P328 cold leg drain line, upstream from the RBD-8 manual valve.
It was identified by the licensee to be a pin hole leak caused by a weld deffect (possibly cold lap) th'at could not be originally identified through PT testing. The' licensee assumed that the defective weld possibly deteriorated due to.line vibrations. The weld was ground down and inspected further.
The drain line was inspected and other welds were PT tested to see if any. other welds had a similar problem. This inspection was also l
repeated on the P32A cold leg drain line with no negative results.
l-The licensee is planning to perform some vibration tests on the P32B drain line to determine how susceptible the system is to
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vibration.
Finally, based on the weld inspection it was determined that the weld defect was caused by the welder, due to the difficult l'
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-10-l location of the weld. The weld was repaired and PT tested. No
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defects were noted following this repair work. The results of the l
weld inspection were documented in an AP&L internal i
memo No. CS-89-89, " Visual Examination of FW4C Line RBD-8", from
Mr. R. Re;"y, to Mr. R. Lane, dated February 3,1989.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The NRC inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, verified proper return to service of affected components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for
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equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The NRC inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activities.
The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibration. The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tours.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required surveillance testing on the various components listed below and verified testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The NRC inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Monthly test of Unit 2 Emergency) Diesel Generator 2K4A
i (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1 Monthly calibration of Excore Instrumentation Channel C (Procedure 2304.102, Job Order 777409). While perfonning the second
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L-11-j step on Page 14 of the surveillance procedure, the instrumentation and control technician noted an unusual sequence of the instructions.
Further review revealed that Page 13 was missing and the applicable steps'had not been completed. The surveillance was then stopped.
The technicians obtained the missing page then verified that the surveillance could be resumed. The NRC inspector suggested to the licensee's management that_ the process of providing surveillance procedures to the craft and the initial review of the procedures may need additional review to prevent recurrence of similar problems.
'However, based on previous surveillance tests observed by the NRC inspectors not=having_a problem with missing pages, this occurrence was not corsidered indicative of the surveillance program breakdown.
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. Monthly test of Unit 2 Emergency) Diesel Generator 2K48-(Procedure 2104.36, Supplement-2.
The NRC inspector observed similar conditions during the _ February 28, 1989-monthly diesel run
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as those observed during the previous two monthly runs. 011 and exhaust smoke was observed leaking from several exhaust header joints following initial start of the diesel. Then after approximately 5 minutes-of the run, the oil leakage started to burn at the south exhaust header transition joint. The fire lasted 7-8 minutes. This sequence of oil'and smoke leakage then fire at the flange is identical to the previous two. monthly _ runs.
Based on the repeatability of the leakage and fires, the licensee does not consider this a significant safety concern and the fires do not affect the performance of the diesel.
Additionally, the license noted that recent exhaust fires have been relatively small and burnt out without operator action. The NRC inspector also noted water dripping from the insulation covering the diesel exhaust line downstream of the muffler. The licensee submitted a job request to investigate and correct this condition.
The NRC inspector agrees that recent fires observed during the monthly surveillance runs do not pose a safety concern related to operation of the diesel. However due to the amount of oil leakage, the potential does exist for larger fires to start that could impact diesel operation. For short-term corrective action, the licensee.has ordered a new exhaust transition piece for installation in the south exhaust header. The licensee has committed to long-term action in an attempt to correct the oil leakage and subsequent' fires. No date for the corrective action has been set. The NRC inspector will continue to monitor the monthly surveillance testing of the diesel generator and licensee actions taken to address this problem.
Licensee actions to correct this problem will also be discussed at a management meeting to be held at the NRC Region IV office. The agenda and schedule for this management meeting with the licensee will be promulgated separately.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Allegation Followup (92701) (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC Vendor Inspection Branch received an anonymous allegation concerning the purchase of pressure transmitters for use on safety-related equipment, specif1cally, the purchase of pressure transmitters that are inadequately tested by the vendor.
The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures which control the procurement process:
Procedure 1000.10, " Control of Procurement," Revision 15
Procedure 1000.11, " Purchase Requisition Preparation and Control,"
Revision 24 Procedure 1032.006, " Procurement Technical Assistance," Revisions 10 and 11 The NRC inspector reviewed the following IEEE standards:
IEEE Standard 323-1978, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Station" IEEE Standard 323-1983, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE
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Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Station"
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Section 4.0 in AP&L Procedure 1032.006 provides the following definition:
Safety-related item ("Q") - a QA category applicable to a basic component.
i Safety significant - the term applied to parts which are classified as being necessary for a safety-related item to perform its intended safety function.
Nuclear grade - a procurement term used to describe items required for "Q" components, and identified as safety significant, built to codes and specifications unique to the nuclear industry, and for which special quality requirements apply.
Part 21 of 10 CFR is applicable.
Commercial grade - a procurement term used to describe items which are safety significant and meet the three elements contained in the definition of Section 21.3 in 10 CFR Part 21. A documented i
determination has been made that the commercial grade item is applicable to a specific "Q" category component and quality can be assured on completion of the dedication process. Title 10 CFR Part 21 is not applicable to the purchase of commercial grade items.
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-13-l Dedication - the process which specifies verification of the conditioning, inspection, testing, examination, and documentation requirements necessary to assure that a commercial grade item will perform its intended safety function.
Performance of the verification complete the dedication process and the item becomes subject to 10 CFR Part 21 requirements.
Baseline quality requirements (BQR) package - a BQR package documents
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the establishment of the technical / quality requirements necessary to purchase spare parts for component with a QA category of "Q."
All spare parts for "Q" components are procured to BQRs or procurement specifications which are established to maintain the design basis of the plant. Generally, items procured to procurement specifications are complete equipment or components. Another mechanism used to establish '
quality and technical requirements is the Plant Engineering Action Request (PEAR). This was the primary mechanism used prior to the introduction of BQR's and is still in use.
The allegation did not specify whether the concern was with the pressure-transmitters or with the purchase of spare parts.
In addition, neither the manufacture's name nor the time period in which the alleged purchases were made was specified. Based on the information provided, the NRC inspector reviewed AN0 purchasing documents for purchases made over a 5-year period, beginning with early 1984 and ending with the most recent purchase. These purchasing documents were for safety-related and nonsafety-related pressure transmitters.
The NRC inspector noted that three vendors, Fisher Porter, Foxboro, and Rosemount, were used to procure safety-and nonsafety-related pressure
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transmitters.
As stated above, there are two kinds of commercial equipment, one concerns the parts and equipment purchased under the "Q" program, for use in safety-related systems and the other deals with the commercial equipment that is not regulated by 10 CFR 21.
Bearing this in mind, the NRC inspector reviewed the purchase orders for the non Q commercial grade pressure transmitters to determine if they had been purchased to be installed in safety-related equipment. Upon completion of the review in this area, the NRC inspector did not find any discrepancy.
The NRC inspector, following the above determination, reviewed those purchase orders that were submitted under the plant "Q" program. As stated before, the NRC inspector reviewed the purchase orders that were submitted over the past 5 years. The NRC inspector noted during this review that the only purchases made from Foxboro and Fisher Porter, over the 5-year time period, were spare parts.
The spare parts addressed in the purchase orders ranged from commercial grade mounting screws, wires, etc., to commercial "Q" items such as detector coils and 0-rings which required Certificates of Compliance to the purchase orders.
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-14-The remaining purchase orders were for Rosemount pressure transmitters.
The majority of the purchase orders were for spare parts. The pressure transmitters that were purchased from Rosemount during this time were the 1153 and 1154 series. These are Rosemount's Class 1E pressure transmitters which were qualified to Rosemount's Qualification Report D8400102, Rev B.
The qualification program meets the testing requirements set forth in IEEE Standard 323-1979 and IEEE Standard 323-1983.
Some of the tests that were performed were seismic test, steam test, accident radiation exposure, postaccident aging, and postaccident radiation.
It must be noted that these tests are only performed on a sample of pressure transmitters to prove the soundness of that particular model design. These tests are not repeated for all pressure transmitters of that model. This is an accepted industry practice.
The NRC inspector reviewed all PEARS and BQRs that were generated for each Rosemount purchase order. and found that all orders required that the pressure transmitters meet Rosemount Qualification Report D8400102. The purchase orders also required that all pressure transmitters be hydrostatically tested and that wetted surfaces be cleaned to a level of less than 1 PPM chloride content.
The NRC inspector found that the hydrostatic test required by AP&L along with the requirement that the pressure transmitters meet the Rosemount Qualification Report D8400102 are sufficient requirements to determine adequacy of the Rosemount pressure transmitters for use on safety-related equipment.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC inspector could not substantiate the allegation.
8.
Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspection. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.
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