IR 05000313/1988033

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-313/88-33 & 50-368/88-33 on 881002-07.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Responses O 10CFR50.62 Rule on Atws.Licensee Commits to Actions to Prevent low-temp Overpressure
ML20206A278
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/27/1988
From: Boardman J, Stetka T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206A275 List:
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR 50-313-88-33, 50-368-88-33, NUDOCS 8811150040
Download: ML20206A278 (6)


Text

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIO!1 IV NRC Inspection Report:

50-313/88-33 Operating Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/88-33 NPF-6 Dockets:

50-313 50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

ANO, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Cortducted: October 2-7, 1988

%

cfL,~ > -

17d/

Inspector:

\\[ ' /f////h c

/0 J. R. Boardman, Reactor Ir$pector Plant Date

'

Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety

\\

Ms

/ohhf Approved:

T.

F'. Stetka, Chief, Piant Systems Section Date'

Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Surranary Inspection Conductad October 2-7, 1988 (Report 50-313/368/88-33)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced inspection of licensee's responses to the 10 CFR 50.62 rule on Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS), licensee conditions as defined in Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) pressure transient comitments to actions to orevent low-temperature over A-46, and followup to previous inspection findings.

Results: Within the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8811150040 G81103 PDR ADOCK 05000313 O

PDC

.

_

,

-

..

,

.-

.

.

DETAILS

'1.

Persons Contacted AP&L-

  • S. M.'Quennoz, General Manager, Plant
  • R. Lane, Manager, Engineering (AN0)
  • H. Greene. Quality Assurance Superintendent
  • J. L. Taylor, Quality Control / Quality Engineering. Superintendent
  • S. McGregor, Engineering Services Superintendent
  • D. B. Lomax, Supervisor, Plant Licensing
  • P. Michalk, Licensing Specialist J

NRC

.

  • W. D. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
  • W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector Denotes those present at the exit meeting on October 7,1988.

.

2.

Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved Iten.(313/8411-03;368/8411-01): -The subject unresolved item dealt with apparent weaknesses in the licensee's maintenance program.

Requisite improvement has been identified as d

follows:

The NRR technical letter report forwarded by) letter dated February 26, o

1986, NRC (R. S. Lee) to AP&L (J. M. Griffin detailing the NRR site maintenance survey.

o The latest 5 ALP report for ANO, which was forwarded by NRC letter (50-313/368/87-41), dated September 16, 1988, The AP&L SALP Progress Report covering January 1987 through June o

1988, presented to NRC Region IV at a briefing on July 18, 1988.

Based on the data contained in the above referenced documents, this unresolved item is considered closed, i

!

(Closed) Unresolv(d Item (360/8720-01):

This unr solved item related to the apparent weakness of the licensee's program for root cause analysis.

At the time of the initial inspection, there were no overall site

,

procedures for perforri g root cause determinations.

At the time of this inspection, the licensee had issued Procedure 1000.104,

'

"Condition Reporting and Corrective Actions," Revision 1, effective

.

,

-r-

-

.,,w, rm.,,_.-nn

,, -,., - -..,.

_,,,, ~,, _. - - - - - - -,, - - - _, -

r-

-,

e,-~

- - -o w e

- -, - -,

.n,

.

,

.

.

.

!

May 29, 1988.

This procedure defines root cause and provides criteria for perfoming root cause analysis.

The licensee had also issued "Arkansas

Nuclear One Root Cause Determination & Corrective Action Desk Guide,"

'

Revision 0, dated July 20, 1988.

This procedure provides methodology for making root cause determinations.

These two docur.ents answer the NRC inspector's concerns that were the basis for this unresolved item.

'

(Closed) Violation (368/8708-01):

This violation was for a missing nut on safety-related seismic hanger designated 2HCB-15-H11.

The absence of this nut resulted in the hanger not being in its "as-built" design configuration.

The licensee's response to this violation stated that the hanger was immediately restored to its design configuration.

The response also stated that an engineering analysis indicated that the subject support remained operable with the missing nut.

Restoration of the nonconforming condition reported in the violation was accomplished by Jc, Order (J0)

00730705.

When the NRC inspector reviewed the J0 during this inspection, he noted the following additional information. The licensee had performed a design review and had replaced missing washers on other bolted joints in the same assembly, rather than simply correcting the identified nonconforming condition.

The generic corrective action aspect of this violation is considered c'.ased based on the following licensee programs:

o implementation of a long-term program for apdating the isometric drawings for Units 1 and 2.

This program is defined in the licensee's Procedure 1409.42, approved July 29, 1987, entitled

"Isometric Drawing Update." 1he program requires the performance of walkdowns of systems represented by isometric drawings and specifies that a comparison be performed of the drawing and the as-built condition.

Differences are corrected or resolved, o

implementation of a long-term program of safety system walkdowns.

This system was modeled after NRC Inspection Module 71710 which covers similar attributes.

,

(Closed) Violation (368/8713-01):

This violation dealt with the fact that the safety-related seismic support for Valve Operator 2CV-4921-1 was i

'

missing.

The licensee's response stated that documentation existed that the support had been installed.

No documentation existed concerning its removal that resulted initially it; the condition reported in this violation.

Correction i

'

of the discrepant condition was covered by JO 00732234 that was completed on April 10, 1987. This deficiency w3s covered by Report of Abnormal Condition (RAC) 2-87-047.

This RAC was not closed at the time of this t

,

.

,

f

- -- - - - -

_

,.-

,

, _,.,,, _., -. _ _, _,,. _,,,,, _ - _ -,, _ _,, _ _. _ _, _,.

_ _. _

_ _. _. _ - -.. _, _.., _,.. _ _, _ _, - _ _, - - -..,

,..

.

.

inspection; however, the licensee had complete <i the comitted corrective actiors.

The generic corrective action aspect of this violation is considered

'

closed based on the following:

o The est elishment of the isometric drawing update program discussed in f rm (368/8708-01).

o The licensee has made procedural changes to ensure that seismic supports removed during maintenance are reinstalled.

,

'

(Closed) Violation (313/8715-01):

This violation dealt with piping support

,

DH-60 for the decay heat vault, as shown on design drawing HCB-2-DH60. The

'

violation was that 3 of the a anchor bolts for this installation were not properly tightened.

The licensee's response confirmed the condition reported in the violation.

It further stated that documentation existed showing that the installation was verified on August 28, 1980, as being properly installed and in conformance with the latest approved design drawing.

There was no documentation availabla to support how the discrepant condition occurred.

The discrepant condition was corrected by JO 00733713 which was completed

,

on May 7, 1987

The generic aspects of this violation are considered closed based upon the licensee's isometric drawing update program discussed in itein (368/8708-01).

(Closed) Unresolved Item (8622-01):

This unresolved item dealt with two RACs, 2-86-121 and 2-86-122, which had been initiated by the licensee.

These RACs covered loose safety-related pipe supports.

This item was open

pending completion of repairs and determination of operability of the discrepant condition.

During this inspection, the licensee identified J0s 00715312 and 00715235 l

as correcting deficiencies relating to RAC 2-86-121. These.!Os were

!

completed on July 14 and July 21, 1986, respectively.

The RAC stated

that the hanger had remained oarable. This determination was based on

.

'

,

engineering calculation 86-E-0058-03.

'

as correcting (deficiencies covered by The licensee identified JO 00715301 PEARS)86-2348,86-2612, RAC 2-86-122.

Plant Engineering Action Requests i

and 86-2744 were identified as being applicable to this corrective action, The J3 was completed August 1, 1986.

Data in this RAC stated that

'

calculation 86-E-0058-03 showed that the two supports on 2CCB-49-1 were inoperable at the time they were ide,tified.

The NRC insoector noted I

that this RAC was still open.

Because the discrepant conditions had been corrected, this item is closed.

!

.

- _

. - _

.

_.

. _,

...

.

.

-_

-

__

...

.

.

(Closed) Open Item (368/8720-02):

This open item dealt with the significant backlog of PEARS. At that time, the backlog had existed for over 3 years.

During this inspection, the NRC inspector discussed this open item with app %priate site engineering personnel.

The backlog of PEARS had been reduced and were being analyzed. The majority of old PEARS were basically low priority PEARS which might never be worked.

Such PEARS are beir,g evaluated for cancellation.

Additional engineering personnel have been assigned to handle the scope of engineering responses which were covered by PEARS ut the time that this open item was generated.

This item is considered closed.

Closure is based on discussions witn licensee personnel, in conjunction with the data contained in licensee memoranda AN0-88-08011 and AN0-88-10613. "Arkansas Nuclear One Engineering Status _

t Scmarn" dated July 25 and October 3,1988, respectively.

,

(Closed) Violation (313/8805-01):

This violation dealt with the

,

installation in a seismic support of socket head capscrews which did not

,

meet plant design specifications.

The licensee response to this violation

stated that the installed capscrews were technically acceptable.

However, they would be replaced with capscrews meeting design requirements during

the fall 1988 AN0-1 refueling outage.

To prevent recurrence, the licensee's response stated that organizational and procedural changes had

,

been made to the plant modification process, since the time that these screws were installed.

Licensee documentation 2howed that the capscrews were replaced for Valve CV-1300 on September 5, 1988, in accordance with

JO 00765449. The capscrews for Valve CV-1301 were replaced on September 7, 1988, in accordance with JO 00765454 Based on the above information, this item is considered closed.

l (Closed) Unresolved item (313;368/8805-06): This item dealt with the possible installation of nonconforming grease in environmentally qualified

'

and other safety-related Reliance motors.

Specifically, licensee maintenance documentation identified that Chevron type SRI-2 grease, that

!

was brown in lieu of the normal greenish color, had been used to lubricate l

certain safety-related Reliance motors.

The qualification of j

safety-related Reliance motors is dependent upon lubrication with SRI-2 l

grease.

i During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed additional licensee i

documentation which provided the basis for closure of this unresolved item.

This documentation included the following:

i (

o Documentation from Chevron stated that the t aown grease was (

contaminated, but that the contamination was slight and would not

!

<

affect the properties of the SRI-2 grease.

o Paintenance documentation indiccted that the brown grease had been pu ged from the motors in which it was installed.

I

i

.

.

.

.

- _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

e...

.

..

.

.

3.

Review of Licensee's Compliance with the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATW5) Rule, 10 CFR 50.62, for ANO Units 1 and 2 (25020)

The NRC inspector discussed and reviewed with licensee personnel the documentation on the status of the licensee's iesponse to the ATWS rule

-

for ANO l' nits 1 and 2.

The last pertinent document for ANO Unit I was NRC letter dated September 21, 1988, from the NRR Project Manager to the Vice President, Nuclear Operations, Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L); Subject: NRC RESPONSE TO THE B&W OWNERS GROUP (TAC NOS. 40567 AND 62122).

This letter requested the licensee to promptly submit the pla.t specific conceptual design of the B&W Owners Group options.

NRC will review the design within 30 days and will approve or disapprove with comments.

Installatior of the required ATWS equipment should oe installed during the next refueling oatage. At the time of this inspection, the licensee was preparing a response to the NRC.

The last pertinent document for ANO Unit 2 was NRC letter dated January 11, 1988, from toe Director Project Directorate IV; Subject: NRC EVALUATION OF CEN-315 AND CEN-349.

The licensee stated that an exemption was being prepared in a:cordance with the guidance provided in the subject NRC letter.

Regional review will be continued upon receipt of the NRC safety evaluation of the licensee's design modifications that will accomplish compliance with the ATWS rule.

4.

Review of Licensee's Actions Taken to Implement Unresolved Safety

!ssue A-26:

Reactor Vessel Low-Pressure Transient Protection (LTOP)

for Pressurized Water Reactors (25019)

The NRC inspector began a review of documentation relating to LTOP for ANO Units 1 and 2.

This area will be subject to future inspections.

5.

Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on October 7,1988, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the catorial provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors during the inspection.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ -