ML20206S488
| ML20206S488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206S476 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-99-07, 50-313-99-7, 50-368-99-07, 50-368-99-7, NUDOCS 9905210145 | |
| Download: ML20206S488 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1999007
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ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
50-313
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50-368
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License Nos.:
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Report No.:
50-313/99-07
50-368/99-07
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
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Location:
Junction of Hwy. 64W and Hwy. 333 South
Russellville, Arkansas
Dates:
April 26-30,1999
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Inspector (s):
D. Schaefer, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch
Approved By:
Gail M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Attachment:
Supplemental Information
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9905210145 990514
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ADOCK 05000313
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspect;on Report No. 50-313;-368/99-07
This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas
inspected included access authorization; alarm stations; communications; protected area
access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles; assessment aids; security program plans
and procedures; security event logs; management support; staffing levels; security program
audits; and miscellaneous security and safeguards issues.
Plant Sucoort
Performance in the physical security area was very good, and performance in the access
authorization area was excellent. An effective access authorization program was established to
grant individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas. The security alarm stations
were redundant and well protected. The security radio and telephone communication systems
were reliable. An effective program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was
maintained. Assessment aids provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
Changes to security plans were reported within the required time frame and properly
implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). A very good program for reporting security
events was in place. Senior management support for the security organization was very good.
The audits of the security program, the access authorization program, and the fitness-for-duty
program were conducted at the required intervals and were performance based (Sections S1.1,
S1.2, S1.3, S1.4, S2.1, S3.1, S3.2, S6.1, S6.2, S7.1).
On-shift staffing of security armed response personnel was in accordance with the minimum
requirements of the industrial security plan. However, an inspection followup item was
identified involving the difference between the number of armed responders committed to in the
industrial security plan and the additional number of armed response personnel used during the
1994 OSRE. During the OSRE, the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to defend
against the design basis threat (Section S6.2).
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ReDort Details
IV. Plant SuDDort
S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
St.1
Access Authorization
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The Access Authorization Program was inspected to determine compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, the security plan, and Regulatory Guide 5.66. The
areas inspected included the Review of background investigation files for individuals
presently granted unescorted access. The inspector reviewed records and conducted
interviews to determine the adequacy of the program. The inspector also reviewed
information concerning the licensee's verification of identify, employment history,
educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service, and the character
and reputation of the applicants before granting individuals unescorted access to
protected and vital areas. Seven background investigation files were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Background investigation screening files were complete and thorough. The licensee
had accepted the access authorization program of six (self-screening) contractors. The
inspector verified through a review of records that each of these self-screening
contractors had been audited within the previous 12 months.
c.
Conclusions
Performance in the access authorization area was excellent. An effective access
authorization program was established to grant individuals unescorted access to
protected and vital areas.
S1.2 Alarm Stations
a.
inspection Scope (81700)
The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the
security plan. The areas inspected included the requirements and capabilities of the
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alarm stations, redundancy and diversity of stations, protection of the alarm stations,
and systems security.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspector verified the redundancy and diversity of the alarm stations. Action by one
alarm station operator could not reduce the effectiveness of the security systems without
the knowledge of the other alarm station operators. The central alarm station and
secondary alarm station were bullet resistant. The inspector questioned the station
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operators and determined that they were properly trained and knowledgeable of
assigned duties,
c.
Conclusions
The security alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Alarm station operators
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were alert and well trained.
S1.3 Communications
a.
Inspection Scoce (81700)
The communication capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the
requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the operability of radio
and telephone systems, and the capability to effectively communicate with the local law
enforcement agencies through both of the systems.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspector verified that the licensee had adequate radio and telephone systems
capable of meeting all communication requirements of the security organization. The
licensee maintained an adequate number of portable radios and batteries for use by
members of the security organization.
c.
Conclusions
The security radio and telephone communication systems were reliable. An adequate
number of portable radios were available for members of the security organization.
S1.4
Protected Area Access Control of Personnel. Packaaes. and Vehicles
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The access control program for personnel, packages, and vehicles was inspected to
determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Through observations at the main guard station and the vehicle sallyport, the inspector
determined that the licensee properly controlled access of personnel, packages, and
vehicles to the protected area. The protected area access control equipment was
inspected and found to be functional and well maintained. The inspector also observed
use of the X-ray machine and package and material searches. The operators were
efficient and well trained. (Note: During the inspection, the secondary guard station
was closed.)
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c.
Conclusions
An effective program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained.
Equipment operators were efficient and well trained.
S2
Status of Security Facilities and Eauipment
S2.1
Assessment Aids
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspector reviewed the assessment aids to determine compliance with the physical
security plan. The areas inspected included the closed-circuit television monitors
located in the alarm stations,
b.
Observations and Findinas
Through observation, the inspector determined that the closed-circuit television cameras
were positioned to ensure proper coverage of the perimeter alarm zones, and that the
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overall assessment aids system was effective. The cameras produced a very good .
resolution. Through interviews, the inspector determined that prompt maintenance
support was provided to ensure that system problems were corrected in a timely
manner. The licensee has approved the installation of a video capture system. When
installed, this system should enhance the licensee's ability to immediately identify the
cause of perimeter security alarms.
c.
Conclusions
Assessment aids provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
S3
Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
S3.1
Security Proaram Plans and Procedures
a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
The physical security plan and the implementing procedures were inspected to
determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical
security plan. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the Operational Safeguards
Response Evaluation (OSRE) report dated December 6,1994.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspector determined that previous plan changes were submitted to the NRC within
the required time frame, and the changes did not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.
The inspector reviewed four implementing procedures for adequacy, verified that the
licensee maintained an effective management system for the development and
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administration of procedures, and verified that changes to the procedures did not reduce
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the effectiveness of the security program.
c.
ConclusiorLs
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Changes to security plans were reported within the required time frame and properly
implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p). Implementing procedures met the
performance requirements in the physical security plan.
S3.2
Security Event Loas
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
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The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),10 CFR 26.73, and the
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physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the safeguards event togs from August 1,1998, through
April 15,1999. The records were available for review and maintained for the time
required by regulations. The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the
regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The inspector also
reviewed three security incident reports. The logs and supporting reports were accurate
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and neat. The licensee's records included trending and analysis of events,
c.
Conclusions
A very good program for reporting security events was in place. The security staff was
correctly reporting security events.
S6
Security Organization and Administration
S6.1
Manaaement Suocort
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The effectiveness and adequacy of management support were inspected to determine
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the degree of management support for the physical security program.
b.
Observations and Findinas
By discussions with security force personnel, the inspector determined that the security
program received very good support from senior management as demonstrated by good
morale of the security organization, continued timely repair of security equipment, and
scheduled improvements to security equipment. The inspector determined that the
security program was implemented by a trained and qualified security staff. All
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members of the security organization had a clear understanding of assigned duties and
responsibilities.
c.
Conclusions
Senior management support for the security organization was very good. The security
program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff.
S6.2 Staffina Levels
a.
Insoection Scoce (81700)
The staffing level of the security organization was evaluated to determine compliance
with the requirements of the physical security plan. Additionally, the inspector reviewed
the OSRE report dated December 6,1994.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Based on discussions with security supervisors and reviews of security shift personnel
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rosters, the inspector determined that the minimum number of on-duty armed security
response personnel met the requirements of the physical security plan. However, a
concern was identified regarding the difference between the number of armed
responders committed to in the physical security plan and the additional number of
armed response personnel used during the 1994 OSRE.
The following regulations apply to this concern:
10 CFR 73.55(a) (general performance requirements) requires, in part, that
licensee physical protection systems be designed to protect against the design
basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).
To meet the 10 CFR 73.55 design basis threat, Section 1.4.2 of the licensee's
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industrial security plan identified, in part, that the security force was comprised of
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X armed security (response) personnel (specific number is safeguards
information) per shift. This number is in addition to the security shift
commander, and the personnel manning the central and secondary alarm
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stations.
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Section 7 of the licensee's industrial security plan, Revision 38, required, in part,
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that Entergy Operations, Inc., was prepared to meet the Commission's
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requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(a).
Section 9 of the licensee's industrial security plan, Revision 38, stated, in part,
that the security program met "the general performance requirements stated in
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From October 31 to November 3,1994, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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(NRR) performed an OSRE at the Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 facilities dated
December 6,1994. The primary purpose of the OSRE was to evaluate the licensee's
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ability to respond to the external threat portion of the design basis threat as required by
10 CFR 73.55(a). During the OSRE, the NRC observed four licensee contingency
exercises, in all four exercises, security personnel, armed with contingency weapons,
responded to interdict the adversaries. During the OSRE, the licensee elected to utilize
four additional (X+4) armed security response personnel per shift. This was four more
armed response personnel than required by the industrial security plan. The licensee's
overall protective strategy was based on its total number of armed response personnel
(X+4) positioned at specific locations inside the protected area.
During the inspection, the inspector discussed with the licensee, the difference between
the number of armed response personnel required by the security plan (X armed
personnel) and the number of armed response personnel utilized during the OSRE (X+4
armed personnel). Based on the results of the OSRE, the licensee demonstrated it
could respond to a design basis threat with X+4 armed response personnel. However,
since the industrial security plan only required X armed response personnel, the
licensee could reduce its numbers and still remain in compliance, even though the cbility
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to respond to a design basis threat with only X armed respoi.se personnel has not been
verified. It is imp 6rtant to note that following the OSRE, the licensee has continued to
maintain an on-d6ty shift strength of X+4 armed response personnel.
During the exit meeting on April 30,1999, the inspector discussed the difference
between the industrial security plan and the number of armed response officers
employed during the 1994 OSRE. In response, the licensee's Vice President,
Operations, stated that a change to the industrial security plan was not planned because
of the upcoming renewal (reorganization) efforts and attendance at an upcoming OSRE
public meeting at NRC headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, on May 5,1999. This
concern will be reviewed during a subsequent security inspection (IFl 50-313;
-368/9907-01).
c.
Conclusions
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On-shift staffing of security armed response personnel was in accordance with the
minimum requirements of the industrial security plan. An i, U Oc' ion foliostup iten, was
identified involving the difference between the number of aim 6U .c sponders committed
to in tho industrial security plan and the addition;l number of armed response personnel
used during the 1994 OSRE. During the OSRE, the licensee successfully demonstrated
its ability to defend against he design basis threat.
S7
Quelity Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
S7.1
Security Proaram Audits
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
The audits of the security program were reviewed to determine compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical security plan.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspector verified that security program, access authorization, and fitness-for-duty
audits were conducted at the required intervals. The inspector reviewed the nine audit
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and surveillance reports listed in the attachment. The inspector interviewed audit
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personnel and confirmed that they were independent of plant security management and
plant security management supervision.
The inspector determined that the audits of the security plan, contingency plan, access
authorization program, and fitness-for-duty program were performance based.
c.
Conclusions
The audits of the security program, the access authorization program, and the
fitness-for duty program were conducted at the required intervals and were performance
based.
S8
Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (92700 and 92904)
S8.1
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 98-S02-00: Uncontrolled Weapon inside the Protected
Area
in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(d) and Paragraph l(a)(3) of Appendix G to
10 CFR Part 73, the licensee reported to the NRC that during the conduct of a security
drill, the thumb-snap on the holster of a security officer participating in the drill became
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unfastened and allowed the handgun to become dislodged and fall to the turbine
building floor. An individual from the operations department discovered the weapon and
notified security officers in the area. The weapon was immediately retrieved, and the
drill was terminated so that accountability of all officers and weapons could be made.
The weapon was unattended for approximately 3 minutes. The weapon was found in
good condition with all ammunition accounted for.
The licensee's investigation and root cause analysis determined that the holster and
snaps were in good condition and that the officer had failed to self-check to insure that
the weapon remained secure in the holster. Prior to the drill, the security officer had
been sitting in a chair when drill conditions required response to a preassigned position.
It was determined the thumb-break snap on the holster became unfastened when it
brushed against the arm of the chair.
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The licensee's corrective actions included briefing all security officers on the situation
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and reminding them of weapon retention techniques. Additionally, the licensee's predrill
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notification sign-off sheet has been revised to add a reminder for all personnel to check
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weapons and holsters when responding to a drill or an event.
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S8.2 (Closed) Licensee investication Report: False Neaative BI:nd Amphetamine Specimen
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in accordance with 10 CFR Part 26, Appendix A, Subpart B,2.8(e)(4), the licensee's
February 25,1999, letter reported to the NRC that its HHS-certified laboratory,
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Northwest Technologies, Inc., (NWT) had identified a blind " positive" urine specimen as
being " negative."
The licensee's investigation determined that on January 20,1999, as part of its routine
blind performance drug testing program, a spiked sample certified as " positive" for
amphetamine was introduced into the testing program. The licensee's on-site test
determined that the blind specimen was " positive" for amphetamines. On
January 22,1999, NWT notified the licensee that a blind sample from the same certified
lot had tested " negative." The licensee requested that NWT investigate its incorrect
identification of a blind quality control drug sample.
On January 27,1999, NWT reported to the licensee that initial (immunoassay)
screening for a 5-drug panel determined that the blind specimen was " negative" for all
drugs tested. However, NWT had identified the presence of amphetamines just
beneath the cutoff level of 1000 ng/ml. In response to its failure to identify the blind
sample as " positive," NWT an llyzed the specimen by GC/MS (Gas
Chromatography / Mass Spectroscopy) and determined that it contained 236 ng/ml of
amphetamine and 900 ng/mi of methamphetamine, a sufficient ccqcentration to produce
a " positive" screening result.
Additionally, NWT reported that they had previously introduced the substance periodate
in their screening reagent in order to minimize the number of false negative results due
to the presence of over-the-counter amphetamines-like compounds. NWT rescreened
the blind specimen by immunoassay using reagents which did not contain periodate and
identified the specimen as " positive" for amphetamines. The screening value was just
over the cutoff level.
NWT reported to the licensee that effective February 1,1999, the amphetamine
screening procedure had been changed at the laboratory and that periodate was no
longer being used. The licensee's subsequent blind (positive) specimens have
confirmed the accuracy of NWT's revised screening procedure.
S8.3 Information Notice 98-35: Threat Assessments and Consideration of Heiahtened
Physical Protection Measures
Information Notice 98-35 dated September 4,1998, was issued to inform licensees of
factors considered by the NRC when assessing threats and disseminating that
information to the licensees. Additionally, the Notice advised licensees about additional
physical protection measures that should be considered for specific threat conditions.
The notice discussed threat levels and appropriate response levels in an effort to avoid
any future misunderstandings conceming NRC threat advisories and to facilitate an
appropriate and comparable level of physical protection response throughout the
nuclear industry.
During this inspection, the licensee stated they had received the Notice and had
reviewed it for applicability. The licensee had incorporated this notice into Security
Procedure 1043.042, " Response to Contingencies."
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S8.4
Information Notice 99-08: Urine Specimen Adulteration
Information Notice 99-08: " Urine Specimen Adulteration," dated March 26,1999, was
issued to remind licensees of a recent attempt by an employee at a nuclear power plant
(Arkansas Nuclear One) to circumvent fimess-for-duty (FFD) testing. During preaccess
FFD testing, a contract employee unsuccessfully attempted to adulterate a urine
specimen with a commercially available substance containing pyridium chlorochromate.
This licensee now requires its contracted HHS-certified laboratory to test for adulterants
in all specimens that it forwards for confirmation. This information notice also reminded
licensees of 10 CFR 26.24 which requires, in part, that chemical testing programs
provide a means to deter and detect substance abuse.
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During this inspection, the licensee stated it had recently received the Notice and
recognized that it discussed corrective action for an event that had occurred at Arkansas
Nuclear One. The licensee stated that the corrective actions identified in this Notice
remain in effect at Arkansas Nuclear One.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
XI
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection on April 30,1999. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented.
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. Hutchinson, Vice President, Operations
C. Anderson, General Manager, Plant Operations
G. Ashley, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Bement, Plant Manager, Unit 2
H. Cooper, Manager, Corporate Security
D. Denton, Director, Plant Support
T. Dietrich, Manager, Maintenance
M. Higgins, Supervisor, Security Operations
W. James, Manager, Outages, Planning and Scheduling
D. James, Manager, Nuclear Safety
K. Jeffery, Coordinator, Security Compliance
J. Kowaleski, Acting Plant Manager Unit 1
R. Lane, Director, Design Engineering
T. Morrison, Superintendent, Modifications
S. Pyle, Licensing Specialist
R. Sears, Senior Lead Security Coordinator, Corporate Security
K. Tate, Supervisor, Security Access Authorization
J. Vandergrift, Director, Nuclear Safety
P. Weaver, Auditor, Quality Assurance
H. Williams, Jr., Superintendent, Plant Security
Contractors
E. Gray, Security Shift Commander
K. Hubbard, Project Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation
J. Mills, Director, Nuclear Operations, The Wackenhut Corporation
R. Roach, Security Shift Commander, The Wackenhut Corporation
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NRC
K. Weaver, Resident inspector
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events at Power Reactor
Facilities
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Follow-up - Plant Support
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LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
ltems Coened
50-313;-368/9907-01 IFl
Number of Armed Response Officers
items Closed
50-313;-368/98-S02 LER
Uncontrolled Weapon inside Protected Area
50-313;-368
False Negative Blind Amphetamine Specimen
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Safeguards Event Log from August 1,1998, through April 15,1999, and analysis data
Background investigation records for seven individuals granted unescorted access
authorization
Three security incident reports
Licensee Audits and Surveillance Reports
Quality Assurance Surveillance SR 022-99, " Security - Entry Control," dated April 13,1999
Quality Assurance Surveillance SR 018-99, " Plant Access terminations," dated March 29,1999
Quality Assurance Audit, OAP-23-99;"ANO Security Program," dated March 2,1999
Quality Assurance Surveillance, AR 034-98, " Security Safeguards Information/ Personnel,"
dated January 27,1999
Entergy audit of Career Check dated November 30,1998
Quality Assurance Audit OAP 7-98," Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization," dated
August 31,1998
Entergy audit of Choice Point dated August 20,1998.
Quality Assurance Audit OAP 10-98, " Corrective Action Audit," dated July 13,1998
Quality Assurance Surveillance SR 017-98, " Badge Terminations," dated July 7,1998
Industry Audit Reports of Self Screenino Contractors
NEl audit report of ABB Engineering dated April 21,1998
NEl audit report of Framatome dated September 21,1998
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' NEl audit report of General Electric dated August 27,1998
NEl audit report of INPO dated February 1998
' NEl audit report of Numanco dated July 1998
NEl audit report of Westinghouse dated August 1998
Security Procedures
Arkansas Nuclear One Procedure 1000.019. " Station Security Requirements," Revision 31
Arkansas Nuclear One Procedure 1043.002, " Access Control," Revision 52
Arkansas Nuclear One Procedure 1043.003, " Guard Screening, Responsibilities and Duties,"
Revision 30
Arkansas Nuclear One Procedure 1043.042, " Response to Contingencies," Revision 1
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