IR 05000313/1998099
| ML20199L857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199K786 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-98-99, 50-368-98-99, NUDOCS 9802100045 | |
| Download: ML20199L857 (6) | |
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i SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
Report 50-313/98-99; 50 363/98-99
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a l BACKGROUND The' SALP Board conveneJ on January 7,1998, to assess the nuclear safety perfonnance of the Arkansas Nuclear One it.cility for the period of July 7,1996, through-January 3,193!L The Board Meeting was conducted in accordance with Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic
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Assessment of Licensee Performance." The board members ware T. P, Gwynn (Board
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Chairperson), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region IV; A. T. Howell, Director, Division of
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Reactor Safety, Region IV; and J. N Hannon, Director, Profset Directorate 1%1, Offica cf Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This assessment was reviewed and approved lay the Region IV-Administrator.
Functional Areas and Ratinos GVIICDt FIttuCMS Plant Operations
1 Maintenance
2 Engineering
1 Plant Support
1 ll PLANT OPERATIONS
i Overall performance in the Operations functional area remained superior. Management i
oversight and supervisory presence in the plant were effective, resulting in conservative decision-making and safe plant operations. An excellent safety focus and good questionire attitude were maintained throughout the Operations organization. Performance uf the operating crews during routine operations and their response to transients was generally superior.
Although the implementation of programs and procedures generally resulted in safe plant configurations, some human performance errors posed potential cha!1ertges to plant and personnel safety. Problem identification and resolution in the Operations area were strong, with a very effective self-assessment program.
Management's support and involvement, at all 8evels, in plant activines contributed significantly to the safe operatien of the facility. Management demonstrated a strong presence in the plant and a good questioning attitude. There were numerous examples of thorough followup and comprehensive corrective actions in response to plant and industry events.
The licensee's programs and procedures supported the safe operation of the plant, although some minor weaknesses were noted. Examples included the control of protective eyewear for operators qualified to use self-contained breathing epparatus and the procedure for deteimining emergency diesel generator operability during degraded fuel oil system conditions. A continuous improvement process was being effectively implemented to address identified procedure weaknesses. The quality of support programs was generally good and they were effectively implemented.
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m Performance of the operating c/ews during routine operations and their response to transients
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were generally 8 :nencr. The plant was operated in a conservative manner. The operators focused on safe"y queutioned dt.talis of plant conditions, und identified, pmperly diagr osed, and corrected condinons adverse to safe plant ooeration. Operator pv4rmance during routine, (
frequent, and infrequent evolutions demonstmtod conservatism a strong questioning attitude, close atention to deail, and excellent diagnostic sbils. Several superior operating practices were notud, includmg excellent self-and peer-checking as well as consistent;y applied three-way
communicoticos. Weaknesses were noted in the operators' implementation of cedain acpects of emergency preNiredness procedurn during an actual event.
Tre implementation of programs and procedures was generMiy offesetive in maintaining proper plant configurations. For example, cask loadi.:g activities for the Independent Spont Fuel Storage installation were performed well, in acccrdance with procadures, and included appropriate management oversight. However, some human performance errors pmsented potential challenges to plant and personnel safety. This was highlighted when a control room supentisor erroneously cleared a hold card on a 480-volt switchgear cubicle, which resulted in
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electricians unknowingly working in an energized cabinet. Management correctivo actions in response to this ever" were appropriate. There were additional examples of activities in which I
human performance could be improved.
' The Operations staff was knowledgeable and well t/ained. Of particular note was the
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performance of auxiliary operator watches by licensed control roem operators. This pract>e nad twc-fold benefit: it inaintained a high level of plant knowledge for the control room staff and contributed to the training of the nonlicensed operators.
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Problem identification and resolution in the operations area were strong. The thresho'd for initiation of a condition report was approp ately low. The Operations L'epartment effectively p
used the corrective action process to identify and correct deficient plant conditions. Quality assutance audits were performed properly. They typicatty had meaningful results and provided t
useful feedback to the operating r/.ganization. The Operations self-asse.ssmint program was
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k very effective.
The Plant Operations functional area was rated SALP Category 1.
111 WIAINTENANCE Overall performance in the maintenance functional crea improved to a superict level. Typically,
progranis and procedures were of gcod quality and ware wellimplemented. The overall conduct
of maintenance and surveillance activities was of high quality. A number ci enhancements contributed to a very good level of material condition; however, some challenges remained.
Self-assessment and quality verification activities were typically effective in identitying performance shortcomings and areas for improvement.
Prog ams were of generap high quality. For example, management established highly eFective y
refueirg outage controis, which rested in well-planned and weil-implemented outages.
Outage schedu)os appropriately accounted for shutdown risk considerations, and work
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-3-I performed resulted in reliable equipment performance during power operations. Some problems l
were noted, however, with the implementation of the inservice testing and the steam genemtor
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inservice inspection programs. For example, several valves were not included within the scope i
of the inservice testing program.
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Few maintenance errors were noted to have been caused by procedures, and some progress w9s made in enhancing the quality of maintenance pmcadures; however, only a few
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maintenance procedures had actually been upgraded during the assessment period.
l Additiona!!y, as a result of a:tions taken in response to NRC Generic Letter 96-01, the licensee identified several problems that resulted in inadcquately perforrned reactor protection system
j and plant protection system-related surveillances.
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l The overall conduct of maintenance and surveillance activities was of high quality. Observed j
maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well and in accordance with procedures, i
Maintenance craft were very knowledgeable, but a few potentially significant human errors were l-noted. For example, (1) a number of Unit 2 steam generator tubes were not plugged or sleeved before returning the plant to power operation because flaws requiring repair were not identified by eddy current testing analysts, and (2) an emergency feedwater system train was rendered inoperable, under certain system alignment conditions, for approximately one month because a pump suction pressure switch was not properly aligned following surveillance tetting The material condition of the plant was very good, as demonstrated by reliable plant operation
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E following respective refueling outages, particularly for Unit 2. Only one reactor trip (Unit 1),
which occurred early in the assessment period, was caused by a hardware problem. Corrective maintenance work backlogs were maintained at a low level. A number of major hardware s
enhancements, including a state-of-the-art turbine supervisory system and modifications to the intake structure to minirrize the effects of shad runs, were implemented. Although a number of extensive actions have Deen taken or planned, the units continued to experience steam generator, main condenser, and feedwater heater tube leaks. Additionally, some recurring or longstanding equipment problems, for example postaccident sampling system reliability problems and out-of-tolerance main steam safety valve lift setpoints, had not been fully resolved.
The Quality Assurance organization improved its effectiveness in identifying performance
issues, particularly in the surveillance area. Other assessments were effective in identifying areas for improvement.
The Maintenance functional area was rated SALP Category 1.
IV ENGINEERING Overall, performance in the Engineering functional area has been good. The Engineering organizations generally responded well to a variety of challenges that developed during the assessment period. These challenges included the need to evaluate design and licensing-basis information in response to NRC inquiries, supporting a major design inspection of Unit 1 safety systems, responding to issues related to dry-cask storage of spent nuclear fuel, and providing continued support to planned facility modifications and emerging technical issues. The number
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-4-and significance of problems identified in this area, however, resulted in a decline in the rating of Engineering performance from the previous assessment period.
- Management was usually effective in ensuring that Engineering was appropriately involved in resolving issues and that Engineering organizations dealt with issues in a manner appropriate for the associated safety significance. There were, however, instances in which management's involvement with and direction to the Engineering organizations were inadequate. The most notable example was the inservice inspections of the steam generators, which were not appropriately controlled and initially failed to identi'y tube defects that exceeded the Technical Specification plugag limits. This was particularly evident in Unit 1, Engineering programs and procedures usually produced designs of high quality and provided excellent support to the operation of the facility. The programs and procedures re19ted to the inservice inspections of the steam generators at ANO were a notable exception to this leve! of performance. Although many of the problems in the steam generator program were addressed by actions taken during this assessment period, this program deficiency was considered significant given the importance of the steam generator inspections in ensuring the integrity of the pressure boundary of the reactcr coolant system.
Engineering design packages were generally good and several commendable design efforts were completed during the assessment cycle. For example, following an outage that included installation of a digital feedwater control system, Unit 2 resumed operation without experiencing problems that are often associated with such plant modifications. In contrast, an inadequacy in a 1995 design modification that included the reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system contributed to a fire within the Unit 1 containment building at the end of an outage in October 1996. In addition, the NRC identified some discrepancies in engineering calculations, the updated final safety analysis reports, and other important eagineering documentation.
Engineering support for operations and maintenance activities continued to be strong.
Examples of strong engineering response to emerging issues affecting the operation of the facility were the actions taken following the rapid increase in the population of zebra mussels in the Dardanelle Reservoir and the diagnosis and resolution of pressure oscillations in the Unit 1 main feedwater discharge piping. There were, however, severallapses in performance during the assessment cycle that resulted in plant systems being operated in configurations that did not satisfy design requirements. Technical Specifications were violated when Engineering staff failed to follow procedures for the calculation of fuel assembly burnup and subsequently misplaced fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool. Other examples involved the failure to appropriately evaluate a modification to the vent piping on the Unit 1 borated water storage tank and a failure to incorporate into plant operating procedures vendor recommendations for restricting emergency feedwater flow to the Unit 1 steam generators in order to prevent tube damage from flow-induced vibration.
'Ine Engineering functional area was rated a SALP Category 2.
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-5-V PLANT SUPPORT Overall performance in tt'e Plant Support functional area was maintained at a superior level.
Performance in the radiological controls and security areas remained strong. While performance in the emergency preparedness area was very good, a slight decline was noted.
Fire protection capability remained strong; however, a number of implementation problems resulted in two oil soaked insulation fires and two hydrogen flammability events. Although the actual consequences of these events were minor, they were caused by design, programmatic, and human performance weaknesses. The level of plant housekeeping was usually good.
Audits and assessments were typically self-critical and performance based.
Radiological controls performance remained strong. Management oversight of radiation protecttan activities was very good Radiation protection personnel provided excellent support to plant activities. Proper contamination controls were maintained, and personnel responsible for Implementing the internal and external exposure controls were properly i nplemented. Radiation protection personnel responsible for the as low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) program were effectively involved with outage planning. An aggressive ALARA p;ogram maintained the 3-year person-rem average exposure less than the pressurized-water-reactor average exposure.
Training and qualification programs were effectively implemented in all radiological control areas, inc6 ing the training program for radiation protection contractor personnel. The technical expertise of the staff in all radiological control areas remained at a high level, There were a few performance problems; however, these performance shortcomings were isolated in nature.
The liquid and gaseous radioactive waste effluent and solid radioactive waste management p'ograms were effectively implemented. The volume and rativity of radioactive effluent wastes and solid radioactive wastes were reduced. Excellent radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring programs were maintained.
Emergency preparedness performance, although very good overall, declined slightly during the assessment period. Performance during the biennial exercise was very good, with no weaknesses identified. The scenario was sufficiently challenging to test emergcncy response capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. The critique process was effective in identifying areas for corrective action. However, performance during the emergency preparedness operational status verification irspectior. was mixed. Although facilities and equipment were sufficient and were effectively maintained, weaknesses were identified involving the failure to satisfactorily implement site evacuation procedures and the failure to perform correct fuel damage assessments. Dose assessment inforrration used to formulate protective action recommendations was not clearly understood by some shift superintendents.
Additionally, the licensee failed to notify the NRC of an emergency declaration during an actual event.
Performance in the Security area remained superior. Continued strong management support for security access authorization, and the fitness-for-duty programs was evident. A very good records and reports program was maintained and the security staff was correctly reporting security events. An excellent security training program remained in place. Effective testing and maintenance support minimized the posting of compensatory measures. Protected and vital
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-6-area barriers and detection systems were properly maintained, and vital area barriers effectively limited access to only authorized personnel. Access authorization program background investigations were completed in a comprehensive manner. The vehHe barrier system was consistent with the summary description presously submittea to the NRC and was capable or protecting required vital plant equipment.
Although the overall fire protection capability was strong, ano the fire brigade performance during actual fices was prompt and effective, a number of fire prevention implementation deficiencies were identified during the assessment period. As discussed in the Engineering functional area assessment,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, reactor coolant pump modification deficiencies were a significant contributor to the fire inside the Unit 1 containment building. Also, inadequate reporting of problems and poor lube oil cleanup contributea to this fire. A small Unit 2 main turbine casing insulation fire was caused by spilled lube oil or hydraulic fluid that was not completely cleaned up. Inadequate fire and explosion precautions resulted in a hydrogen bum while welding a Unit 1 pressurizer relief valve tailpipe, and a vacuum cleaner exploded due to hydrogen ignition when workers who were attempting to remove water from the Unit 1 hydrogen vent line failed to recognize the combustible hazard.
Housekeeping was generally maintained at a good level. Some areas of the plant were not as consistently maintained as other areas; however, the deficiencies were minor in nature and were promptly corrected once they were brought to the ahention of licensee management.
Effective line organization assessments and quality assurance audits were indicative of good management oversight. Program evaluations in the radiological controls area were self-critical and used both intemal and external resources to provide a comprehensive and balanf ed analysis of performance. The audits of the security program were generally good and were completed in a timely manner. However, the 1996 quality assurance audit of the emergency preparedness program lacked depth and identified few substantive performance issues.
The Plant Support functional area was rated SALP Category 1.
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