IR 05000313/1998010
| ML20203D605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203D597 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-98-10, 50-368-98-10, NUDOCS 9902160262 | |
| Download: ML20203D605 (17) | |
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ENCLOSURE I
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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. Docket Nos.:
50-313-l 50-368 i
License Nos.:
DPR-51 NPF-6 Report No.:
50-313/98-10 50-368/98-10 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Junction of Hwy 64W and Hwy. 333 South Russellville, Arkansas 72801 l
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Dates:
December 6,1998, through January 16,1999 -
Inspectors:
K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector
J. Hanna, Resident inspector l
C. Paulk, Reactor inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector
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- Approved By:
Charles S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C
l Division of Reactor Projects
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ATTACHMENT:
Supplementalinformation (
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.i 9902160262 990209 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G
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- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-313/98-10; 50-368/98-10
' This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectior6.
Operations Unit 1 operators responded well to indications of degraded circulating water flow caused
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by a large influx of fish into the intake structure. Operators manually tripped the reactor -
on two occasions and took appropriate actions following the trips. - The licensee's
- corrective actions were comprehensive and significantly improved the performance of the intake structure traveling screens (Section 01.2).
Unit 1 operators demonstratad good communications, procedural adherence, and '
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command and control during the reactor startup following completion of corrective actions for the shad run problem (Section 01.3).-
Unit Raperators demonstrated good command and control during a plant shutdown as
evident by peer checking, attention to detail, and thorough briefings (Section O1.4).
Unit 2 operators demonstrated good communications and control of the work evolutions
when placing the shutdown cooling system in service to remove decay heat from the reactor coolant system (Section O1.5).
Unit 2 operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications, and control
wrN draining the reactor coolant system and conducting midloop operations (Saction 01.6).
During a tour of the switchyard, an operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude
and took prompt action when the inspector identified that unauthorized vehicles were present in the switchyard (Section O1.7).
Overall, the licensee established good controls for planned work in the switchyard. In
one instance, however, switchyard controls were not effectively implemented. While Unit 2 was in reduced inventory, personnel troubleshooting the Startup Transformer 3 voltage regulator were not briefed on the controls established for work in the switchyard.
In addition, control room personnel did not know of vehicles in the switchyard ascociated with the troubleshooting (Section 01.7).
Maintenance Modifications to a Unit 2 high pressure safety injection valve were performed in
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accordance with procedure, and personnel demonstrated proper radiation work
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-3-The testing of the Unit 2 main steam safety valves was well coordinated and performed
in accordar'ce with the test procedure. Four of the ten safety valves lifted at a pressure l
above their required setpoint. The licensee was evaluating the failure of the four safety valves to determine the root cause of the failures and the appropriate corrective actions j
(Section M1.4).
Enaineerina l
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Engineering documentation for two plant modifications was accurate, preserved the l
design basis, and contained clear instructions (Sections E1.1).
I Plant Suocort l
During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors
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found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were l
properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices (Section R1.1).
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Obvious errors in an ALARA review checklist revealed weaknesses in the preparation
and review of the checklist (Section R1.3).
The inspectors periodically reviewed security measures and operations throughout the
inspection period and noted that they were properly implemented (Section F1.1).
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 began the insoection period at 100 percent power. Power was reduced to 85 percent on December 11,1998, for turbine govemor valve testing and returned to full power on December 12. 'On December 25, operators manually tripped the reactor in response to a large influx of fish at the intake structure that obstructed water flow to the &culating water pumps.
After completing minor repairs and modifications to the traveling sc.2 ens, operators restarted the plant on December 27. On December 28, operators manually. ripped the reactor at 12 percent power in response to another large influx of fish at the :ntake canal that damaged
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some traveling screens. Fol'cwing the completion of repairs and modifications, operators restarted the plant on January 5 and reached 100 percent power on January 7,1999. The plant was operated at 100 percent power through the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On December 14,1998, operators began lowering reactor power in small increments as part of the planned coastdown to Refueling Outage 2R13. On January 8,1999, with the reactor at 75 percent power, operators commenced a plant shutdown to begin the refueling outage. The reactor shutdown was completed at 12:04 a.m. on January 9. The plant remained shut down through the end of the inspection period.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
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The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with
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Technical Specifications, conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis Report, and shift manning. Inspectors also observed the effectiveness of communications, management oversight, proper system configuration and configuration j
control, housekeeping, and operator performance during routine plant operations and i
surveillances.
The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions were well controlled, deliberate, and performed according to procedures. Shift turnover briefs were comprehensive. Housekmping was generally good and discrepancies were
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promptly corrected. Safety systems were properly aligned. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed below.
01.2 Unit 1 - Plant Shutdowns Due to Dearaded Circulatina Water System Flow Caused by Larae influx of Fish (Shad) at the intake Structure a.
Insoection Scope (71707.93702)
On December 25 and 28,1998, Unit 1 operators manually tripped the reactor due to degraded circulating water flow caused by a large influx of fish at the intake structure, l
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5-The inspectors reviewed the operators' response to these events, performance of plant equipment, and the licensee's corrective actions.
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Observations and Findinas On December 25,1998, the unit was at 100 percent power when operators identified degraded circulating water system flow caused by a large influx of fish (chad) at the plant's intake structure. The large quantity of fish that accumulated on the traveling screens resulted in a high differential pressure across the screens. Operators began a rapid reduction of reactor power. At approximately 75 percent power, with a loss of circulating water flow imminent due to the accumulation of fish at the intake structure and resulting damage to traveling screens, Unit 1 operators manually tripped the reactor.
During the colder months of the year, as the temperature of the lake decreases, the shad become incapacitated and are unable to swim against the current caused by the suction of the circulating water pumps. The licensee had experienced previous problems with the accumulation of shad at the intake structure, trut not of the rnagnitudo seen on December 25.
The inspectors responded to the Unit 1 control room following notification of the manual trip. The plant was stable and operators were carrying out posttrip actions. Main condenser vacuum was maintained throughout the transient, main feedwater pumps remained running, and two circulating pumps were restarted within 27 minutes of the plant shutdown. Following the manual trip, Loop B Feedwater Startup Control Valve CV-2673 failed to properly control levelin the steam generator. As a result, operators supplied feedwater to Steam Generator B using the emergency feedwater system. Technicians later determined that oil in the valve positioner caused the valve failure and they corrected the problem.
On December 27, the inspectors attended the Plant Safaty Review Committee meeting conducted to review Posttransient Preliminary Review Report PTPRR-12-25-98. The members reviewed and approved the required actions to be completed prior to reactor restart. To minimize the potential for future plant transients due to an excessive influx of fish, the licensee modified the intake structure traveling screens to increase their fish removal capabiliiy and modified operating procedures to reduce circulating water flow through the traveling screens during periods of high fish concentration.
Licensee management approved a plant restart after completion of the corrective actions identified in Posttransient Review Report PTPRR12-25-98. The inspectors observed operators commence the plant startup and take the reactor critical at 10:30 p.m. on December 27. On December 28 at 8 a.m., with reactor power at approximately 12 percent, operators experienced another large influx of fish at the intake structure that exceeded the removal capabilities of the traveling screens.
Following several unsuccessful attempts to clear the high differeNh' pressure across the screens by starting and stopping circulating water pumps, operators manually tripped the reactor. The operators responded to the influx of fish at the intake structure
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. in a rapid, focused, and professional manner. Operations management and supervisor
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' personnel were in the control room during the events observing operator response and providing direction as needed.
Licensee management decided to keep the reactor shut down until they had completed corrective actions to prevent future plant transients due to the influx of fish. The.
planned actions included a thorough review of the event and evaluation and repair of the damage to the intake structure. Prior to restarting the plant, the damage to the traveling screens was repaired and additional corrective actions were irnplemented, including the
replacement of traveling screen motors with higher speed motors and performing
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additional modifications to certain traveling screens to increase their fish removal capability. The operation of the. circulating water system was modified to reduce the :
' flow-through system and thus reduce the velocity of the water into the intake structure.
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Additional corrective actions included installation of equipment in the intake canal to remove fish before they reach the intake structure. With the reduced circulating water flow and the improvements to the traveling screens,- the licensee verified that the corrective actions were effective at coping with a large influx of fish. Management approval was given to restart the plant on January 5. Following the plant startup, the licensee placed a stationary barge and nets in the lake at the mouth of the intake canal '
to prevent fish from getting in the intake canal.
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Conclusions Unit 1 operators responded well to indications of degraded circulating water flow caused
- by a large influx of fish into the intake structure.' Operators manually tripped the reactor on two occasions and took appropriate trtions following the trips..The licensee's corrective actions were comprehensive and significantly improved the performance of the intake structure traveling screens.
O1.3 Unit 1 - Startuo and Criticality a.
Inspection Scot 3 (71707)
On January 5, the inspectors observed Unit 1 operators perform a reactor startup following the completion of corrective actions for the plant shutdown on December 28 (See Section O1.2).
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Observations and Findinas Prior to startup, the inspectors reviewed licensee identified items that needed to be resolved prior to criticality. The inspectors found that the licensee had resolved these issues.
Operators conducted the reactor startup in accordance with Procedure 1102.002, Revision 65, Plant Startup." The licensee conducted a prejob brief prior to commencing -
the startup. The operators followed the procedure and monitored the plant response
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-7-and indications during the approach to criticality. Operators used proper three-part communication and reactor engineers performed 1/M plots to determine the control rod position where the reactor would become critical.
Opeiators withdrew control rods and criticality was achieved on January 5. The estimated critical position calculated by reactor engineering accurately predicted the rod height when the reactor became critical. The inspectors observed that the control room operators applied good command and controlin responding to alarms.
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Conclusions Unit 1 operators demonstrated good communications, procedural adherence, and command and control during a reactor startup.
01.4 Unit 2 - Plant Shutdown
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Insoection Scope (71707)
On January 8 and 9, Unit 2 operators shut down the reactor to begin Refueling
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l Outage 2R13. The inspectors observed the reactor shutdown from 75 percent power and portions of the plant cooldown.
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Observations and Findinoa
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The inspectors observed shutdown activities, commencing with the shutdown briefing and ending with the mode change to hot standby. The shift briefing was thorough and j
included discussions of: Individual duties; procedural precautions and limitations; l
Technical Specification requirements; maintaining questioning attitudes; communications; and lessons learned from previous shutdowns.
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The shutdown was conducted in accordance with Procedure 2102.010, Revision 31,
" Plant Cooldown." Three-part communication and peer checkhg were consistently l
applied during the evolution. Power was reduced and components removed from service in accordance with applicable system procedures. There were no significant equipment deficiencies during the shutdown and actions were initiated to correct the ones that did occur.
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Conclusions i
l Unit 2 operators demonstrated good command and control during a plant shutdown as
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evident by peer checking, attention to detai!, and thorough briefings (Section O1.4).
01.5 Unit 2 - Plant Cooldown and Transfer to Shutdown Coolina
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Insoection Scoce (71707. 61726)
On January 9, the inspectors observed Unit 2 operators place shutdown cooling in service in accordance with Procedure 2102.010, Revision 31," Plant Cooldown";
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Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed that operators adhered to procedures and maintained the reactor coolant system within the allowed pressure and temperature limits. Operators demonstrated good communications and control of the evolutions.
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Conclusions Unit 2 operators demonstrated good communications and control of the work evolutions i
when placing the shutdown cooling system in service to remove decay heat from the reactor coolant system.
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01.6 Unit 2 - Drainina of the Reactor Coolant System to Midloop Operation i
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Inspection Scope (71707)
On January 13, Unit 2 operators drained the reactor coolant system to establish midloop conditions to allow installation of the steam generator nozzle dams and subsequent steam generator tube inspections. Operators performed the reactor coolant system j
draindown in accordance with Procedure 2103.011, Revision 24, " Drain the Reactor Coolant System," and Procedure 1015.008, Revision 14, " Unit 2 Shutdown Cooling Control." The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for draining the RCS and operating in reduced inventory, attended the prejob briefing, and observed operators conduct the evolution.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors determined that the licensee's preparations for draining the reactor coolant system and operating in reduced inventory were very good. The prejob briefing was thorough and included a discussion of individual assignments, command and control of the activity, communications, limits and precautions, potential problems, terminations criteria, and lessons learned. Prior to performing the evolution, operators received simulator training on midloop operations. All required initial conditions were satisfied prior to commencing the draindown.
During the eve!ation, the procedure required operate:s to secure the draindown at predetermined levels to ensure the various reactor coolant system level indications were consistent. On one occasion, the draindown was secured and level indications were logged prior to allowing the reactor coolant system level to stabilize. The reactor operator identified this, waited for level to stabilize, and recorded the information. The insper tors noted that the procedure did not contain instructions to ensure that reactor coolant system level was stable prior to recording the indicated levels.
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Operators performed a time to boil and core uncovery estimate prior to draining reactor coolant system. The calculations were made using the decay heat load and the expected reactor coolant system level after draining to midloop.
The inspectors observed three operators (two in the control room and one located at the tygon tube level indicator inside containment) monitor reactor coolant system level indication during the draining evolution. The operator at the tygon tube was in constant communications with the control room. The inspectors observed good control room operator procedural adherence, attention to detail, and caution with regar. to ongoing work activities.
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Conclusions
Unit 2 operators demonstrated good attention to detail, communications, and control
'while draining the reactor coolant system and conducting midloop operations.
01.7 Switchvard Controls l
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Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1015.033, Revision 1,"ANO Switchyard and Transformer Yard Controls," and toured the switchyard during midioop operation to verify controls were in place to ensure power source availability.
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Observations and Findinas in accordance with Procedure 1015.033, the licensee had performed plant impact statements for tL. work to be performed on Unit 2 Generator Output Breakers B5130 and B5134 during Refueling Outage 2R13. The inspectors reviewed the plant impact j
statements and found them to be thorough and comprehensive. The plant impact
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l statements provided detailed information for approved vehicle drive paths and specific requirements to be followed when Unit 2 was in reactor coolant system midioop operations.
The Unit 2 auxiliary operators conducted shiftly tours of the switchyard while these activities were. ungoing. On January 13, while Unit 2 was in reactor coolant system midloop operations, the inspectors conducted a tour of the switchyard with the auxiliary operator. The inspectors noted that areas had been cordoned off to indicate the i
approved vehicle drive path and the generator output breaker work area. These areas were roped off to protect equipment required for the offsite power sources. The inspectors noted that two vehicles were traveling inside the switchyard in areas that were not designated as approved vehicle imvel paths. The auxiliary operator interviewed a design engineer who had accompanied the individuals in the two vehicles to ascertain his knowledge of the appropriate vehicle drive paths and Unit 2 midloop condition. The design engineer responded that he and the two Entergy Arkansas personnel were sent to the switchyard to investigate a voltage alarm on the Startup Transformer 3 voltage regulator that had alarmed at the dispatchers office. The design engineer vras not aware that Unit 2 was in reduced inventory. The individual responded
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-10-that he thought the designated vehicle drive path was only for the personnel involved with the generator output breaker maintenance. The auxHiary operator immediately informed control room personnel of the two vehicies in the switchyard. The auxiliary operator conducted interviews with the personnel that remained inside the switchyard to ascertain their knowledge of the approved vehicle travel path. During these Kerviewr.
the auxiliary operator found that the workers involved with the generator output breaker maintenance had been throughly briefed on the special precautions and vehicle travel path information provided by the plant impact statements.
The inspectors interviewed the Unit 2 shift superintendent and found that the Unit 2 control room personnel had not been notified and were unaware of the vehicles in the switchyard. Furthermore, the Unit 2 shift superintendent indicated that, if a request for vehicle entry had been made, it would have been denied. The licensee stated that the personnel had obtained permission from the Unit 1 shif t superintender: to perform the investigation but no request for permission to drive vehic!es into the switchyard area was made. The licensee stated that the personnel were also directed to contact the Unit 2 control room. However, Unit 2 control room personnel were not informed. The licensee
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subsequently initiated Condition Report C-1999-024.
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Conclusions During a tour of the switchyarrl, an operator demonstrated a good questioning attitude and took prompt action when the inspector identified that unauthorized vehicles were present in the switchyard.
Overall, the licerisee established good controls for planned work in the switchyard. In one instance, however, switchyard controls were not effectively implemented. While Unit 2 was in reduced inventory, personnel troubleshooting the Startup Tansformer 3 voltage regulator were not briefed on the controls established for work in the switchyard.
In addition, control room personnel did not know of vehicles in the switchyard associated i
with the troubleshooting.
l 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintent.nce M1.1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed the fo,.owing mainter.ance activity:
Unit 2 - Job Order 00955383 and Procedure 1403.040, " Unit 1 and Unit 2 MOV
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Testing and Maintenance of Limitorque SMB-0 Thru 4 Actuators," performed on Jar.uary 15,1999.
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Observations and Findinas The activities that the inspectors observed were conducted professionally and
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' thoroughly. - Work was performed according to procedures. In addition, see the specific
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discussions of maintenance observed in Section M1.2.
M1.2 Unit 2 - Hiah Pressure Safety Iniection Valve Modification l
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Inspection Scope (62707)
- On January'6-9, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel install a modification to l
Valve 2SI-100. The modification work was performed in accordance with Job Orders 00980321 and 00980324 and installed an external equalizing pipe to connect the area in the valve body above the disc to the area in the body below the valve seat. The purpose of the modification was to reduce the differential pressure across the valve disc.
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Observations and Findinos
. The inspectors' observed activities as maintenance personnel prepared to disassemble the valve, High Pressure Safety injection Pump 2P-89C was removed from service and tagged out. The removal of Pump 2P-89C from service placed Unit 2 in a moderate risk
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category on their maintenance risk matrix but did not require entry into any Technical Specifications.
The inspectors noted that some preparations had been completed prior to the start of the work, including the erection of scaffolding. However, due to a communication error behveen maintenance personnei and radiation protection technicians, radiation i
protection controls had not been established to perform work on the contaminated -
system. Once this was identified, radic. tion protection technicians established proper.
postings and controls for disassembling the valve.
Maintenance personnel properly followed the work instructions of the job orders and demonstrated appropriate radiation work practices during the maintenance activity.
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Conclusions
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Modifications to a Unit 2 high pressure safety injection valve were performed in
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accordance with procedure and personne! demonstrated proper radiation work
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practices.
M1.3 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
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Inspection Scope (617261 The inspectors observed the following surveillance activity:
Unit 2 - Procedure 2104.004, Revision 26, " Shutdown Cooling System,"
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observed on January 9.
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Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found that this surveillance test was performed according to the
. procedures by knowledgeable operators and workers. In addition, see the specific discussion of surveillance activities observed in Section M1.4.
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M1.4 ' Unit 2 - Testina of Main Steam Safety Valves i
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Insoection Scope (01726L
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The inspectors observed the licensee test the Unit 2 main steam safety valves on
January 7 and 8. The testing was perforrned in accordance with Procedure 2306.006, Revision 11, " Unit 2 Main Steam Safety Valve Test."
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Observations and Findinas i
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The prejob brief for the main steam safety valve testing was comprehensive and included a discussion of the test procedure, precautions and limitations, individual.
responsibilities, communications, and actions to take in the event that a safety valve
. failed to reseat. The test was conducted in accordance with the procedure. The
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inspectors noted good coordination between maintenance, operations, and engineering personnel.
The licensee planned to test three safety valves. The scope of the test was expanded to all 10 safety valves due to the failure of some valves to lift within their required setpoint. A total of four valves lifted at a pressure above their required setprint. Upon discovery of an inoperable valve, maintenance personnel adjusted and retested the valve prior to testing the next valve.
At the conclusion of the inspection period, the licensee was evaluating the condition for root cause of the failures, reportability, and corrective actions.
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Conclusions The testing of the Unit 2 main steam safety valves was well coordinated and performed in accordance with the test procedure. Four of the ten safety valves lifted at a pressure above their required setpoint. The licensee was evaluating the failure of the four safety j
valves to determine the root cause of the failures and the appropriate corrective actions.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) insoection Followuo item 50-368/9801-05: Use of Conditional Probability to
~ Balance Availability and Reliability
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This item was opened during the Maintenance Rule baseline inspection because of the licensee's use of conditional probability, alone, to meet the requirements of i
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10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) to balance availability and reliability of the Unit 2 charging pumps.
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The item was subsequently evaluated by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
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. On July 7,1998, by memorandum to Mr. Arthur T. Howell, Ill, Director, Division of
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Reactor Safety, Region IV; and Ms. Elinor G. Adensam, Acting Director, Division of l
i-Reactor Projects lil/lV, NRR, comments were provided to Region IV on the use of i
- conditional probabilities to comply with 10 CFR 50.65, " Requirements for Monitoring the
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~ Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants"(the Maintenance Rule).
With respect to the licensee's comb' ining of values of different distributions, the l
' memorandum stated that "the concept of different statistical distributions in the
conditional probability (of success) model is acceptuale as long as the respective cumulative distribution functions, availability and reliability, are obtained independently."
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acceptance criteria. The memorandum noted that, on the basis of examples, this "is the very reason that we expect the licensees to establish performance criteria for reliability j
and availability separately, and monitor the SSC performance under these criteria."
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Therefore, the use of performance criteria based on conditional probability alone was
not acceptable.
j As a result of not having established independent availability and reliability performance j
measures, the licensee was not able to adequately demonstrate a balance of availability
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and reliability. This could have been considered an additional example of previously
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identified Violation 50-313/9801-03. However, the response to the previously cited violation for failure to demonstrate a balance of availability and reliability, provided in the licensee's June 22,1998, letter, adequately addressed this concern. Therefore, no
. additional action or response is required.
111. Enaineerina.
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Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Unit 2 - Emeraency Feedwater System Valve Modifications a.
Inspection Scoos (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Design Change Package 963523D202, "MOV Mod for 2CV-1026-2, 2CV-1036-2, 2CV-1037-1, 2CV-1038-2, 2CV-1035-1, and 2CV-1076-2." The purpose of the work was to eplace the actuators on six of the
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eight emergency feedwater isolation valves with upgraded motors.
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Observations and Findinas -
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The inspectors found that engineering documentation and design changes contained clear instructions which accomplished the desired objective. Plant engineers reviewed
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the package and determined that the modification did not involve an unreviewed safety question as described in 10 CFR 50.59.
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Conclusions Engineering documentation was accurate, preserved the design basis, and contained clear instructions.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92902)
E8.1 (Closed) Licenseo Event Report 50-368'96-004-01: Deficient Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the DC Electrical System Resulted in Unavailability of Some Automatic Functions of the Plant Protective System for Loss of Power Conditions With a Channel Bvoassed and Caused the Potential for Ooeration Outside of the Desion Basis of the Plant The inspectors verified the immediate corrective actions described in Licensee Event Report 50-368/96404-001, dated January 30,1997, and found them to be adequate and complete. The licensee evaluated long-term corrective actions and identified plant modifications that could be made to resolve the potential for operating outside of the i
design basis of the plant. The licensee determined that the proposed modification
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i involved an unreviewed safety question and submitted a letter dated June 30,1998, requesting NRC review and approval of the proposed change. In a letter to the NRC dated Novemoer 23,1998, the licensee provided additional information on the proposed plant modification and revised their original commitment to install necessary plant modifications during Refueling Outage 2R14. At the conclusion of this inspection j
period, the licensee's request was being reviewed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor l
Regulation. The licensee plans to maintain their administrative controls in effect l
pending approval and installation of the plant modifications.
IV. Plant SuDDOrt R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls l
R1.1 General Comments (71750)
During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices. The inspectors also observed routine surveys of the auxiliary building and found them to be
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satisfactory. Proper radiological protection controls were also observed by the inspectors during tours of the containment building and observation of maintenance and
surveillance activities.
R1.2 Unit 2 - Reactor Coolant Samplina a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
l On December 14,1998, the inspectors observed the sampling of the reactor coolant
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system. The procedure was performed by chemistry technicians in accordance with
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and 1042.003, Revision 13, "Radicchemistry Routine Surveillance Schedule and Tech.
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Spec. Reporting.'
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Observations and Findinas-l
- The technicians demonstrated good contamination control practices.; Examples of the'se methods included frequently changing gloves, wearing an additional pair in excess of-the requirements, and verifying radiation levels whenever entering the sample sink area.
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The technicians also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the procedure and the bases
l of the requirements when questioned on flushing volumes prior to sampling. The
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I technicians closely adhered to the procedures.
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Conclusions :
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L Chemistry technicians demonstrated good contamination control practices, familiarity
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with the procedures, and procedural adherence.
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l-R1.3 Unit 2 - ALARA Checklist Errors in Plant Chanae 974959P20. "ANO-2 2R13 Modifv HPSI 2SI-10A. B. and C Stop Check Valves" a.
Inspection Scooe f37551)
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The inspectors reviewed Plant Change 974959P201 associated with planned modifications to high pressure safety injection system stop check valves. The modification was to install an external equalizing pipe to connect the area in the valve body above the disc to the area in the body below the valve seat. The modification was being installed to reduce the differential pressure across the valve disc.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the plant change package contained required evaluations and documentation to support installation of the modifications to the check valves. Plant engineers reviewed the package and determined that the modification did not involve an j
p unreviewed safety question as described in 10 CFR 50.59.
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i The plant change package included Form 6010.0011 "ALARA Program Review Checklist." Although Part A of the form identified that the work would be performed on l_
contaminated components, the inspectora identified that Part B contained incorrect information regarding the radiological work conditions. Specifically, answers to several
~ questions on the review checklist stated that the system fluid was demineralized water, j
in fact, the fluid in the high pressure safety injection system is activated borated water.
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The licensee revised the checklist to account for the activated water and concluded that
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l the installation of the modification was not affected by the error. The error was made when portions of an ALARA program review checklist for a similar modification made to
t check valves in the emergency feedwater system were used in the checklist for the high l
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pressure safety injection system check valves. The emergency feedwater system is not a contaminated system. The inspectors noted that the licensee had several
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-16-opportunities to identify the error, including a specific review of the checklist by an ALARA reviewer. The licensee entered these errors into their corrective action program by initiating Condition Report 2-1999-0045.
c.
Conclusions Obvious errors in an ALARA review checklist for a Unit 2 plant modification revealed
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weakncases in the preparation and review of the checklist.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Conduct of Security - General (71750)
The inspectors periodically reviewed security measures and operations throughout the inspection period and noted that they were properly implemented. Included were observations of personnel and package access, review of watch station assignment and l
rotation, applications of temporary and low level security lighting, and perimeter
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walkdowns.
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l V. Manaaement Meetinas i
X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 20,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT-PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
C. Anderson, General Plant Manager B. Bement, Unit 2 Plant Manager l
R. Car 1er, Unit 1 Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent M. Chisum, Unit 2 System Engineering Manager -
l M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist :
l S. Cotton, Director Training /EP-
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D. Denton, Director Support
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S. DeYoung, Planning Supervisor.
C. Eubanks, Unit 2 Outage Manager R. Fuller, Unit 1 Operations Manager
D. James, Manager Nuclear Safety
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B. Pace, Unit 1 Operations Control Room Supervisor R. Partridge, Chemistry Superintendent W. Perks, Radiation Protection / Chemistry Manager J. Smith, Jr., Radiation Protection Manager J. Vandergrift, Nuclear Safety Director
'I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations.
IP 71707:
Plant Operations lP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
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IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance j
IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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l ITEMS CLOSED 50-368/9801-05 IFl Use of Conditional Probability to Balance Availability and Reliability (Section M8.1)
50-368/96-004-01
'LER Deficient Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the DC Electrical System Resulted in Unavailability of Some Automatic Functions of
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the Plant Protective System for Loss of Power Conditions With a Channel Bypassed and Caused the Potential for Operation Outside of the Design Basis of the Plant (Section E8.1)
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