IR 05000313/1990018

Insp Repts 50-313/90-18 & 50-368/90-18 on 900521-25.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Status of Emergency Preparedness Program, Including Changes to Emergency Plan & EPIP

ML20055D510
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	06/28/1990
From:	Powers D, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055D509	List: IR 05000313/1990018 ML20055D508
References
50-313-90-18, 50-368-90-18, NUDOCS 9007090036
Download: ML20055D510 (9)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC. Inspection Report: 50-313/90-18 Operating Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/90-18 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368

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Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)

P.O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: ArkansasNuclearOne(ANO)

Inspection At: ANO, Russellville, Arkansas

. Inspection Conducted: May 21-25,.1990

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-Inspector: &

Nemen M. Terc, Emergtncy Preparedness Analyst Date (Regional Team Leader) ,

-Approved: ' 4#

Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Date Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted May 21-25,1990 (Report 50-313/90-18; 50-368/90-18)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the operational status of-the. emergency preparedness program; including changes:to the emergency plan (EP) and.EP implementing procedures (EPIPs), and changes to emergency

'facil_ities, equipment,. instrumentation, and supplies. The inspection also

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included a review of thelorganization and management control, training of emergency response personnel, and independent audits of the emergency preparedness progra Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee was found to have appropriately processed changes to the EP and the EPIPs. A tour of the licensee's emergency response facilities and a review of.the licensee's organization and procedures revealed that the

. licensee is continuing its efforts to maintain a good quality progra '

Interviews conducted with a sample of emergency responders indicated that personnel were knowledgeable of their emergency duties. A review of the 9007090036 900629 .

PDR ADOCK 05000313 Q PDC F

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- licensee's audits of-the emergency preparedness program found that the licensee-has a good audit program that includes help from outside the AP&L organizatio :The. inspector concluded, based on the results of this inspection, that the operational status of the emergency preparedness program at ANO was well maintaine .

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DETAILS'

. Persons Contacted A.,N0

• D. Boyd, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist

• R. Edinton, Operations Manager, Unit 2

• G. King, Operations

• F. Van Buskirk,. Emergency Planning Supervisor

• L.' Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality -3

• E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support and Assessment j

• J. Yelverton', Director, Nuclear Operations

• R. Fenech, Plant Manager, Unit 2

• E. Force, Manager, Training and Emergency Planning

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• C, Warren, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie l Follow Up on-Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

i The inspector noted that there were no outstanding or open items pending

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from previous inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this program are ,

1 Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701-02.01)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's EP and.EPIPs and noted that since the

.last inspection,-two revisions were made to the EP. Revision 8 was dated January 22, 1990, and Revision 9 was made on March 9, 1990. The' inspector noted that prior to implementing-each revision, the licensee performed a ,

10 CFR 50.54(q) review to ensure that changes to the plan did not decrease the emergency response-readiness. These reviews were made usin Procedure 1062.03, " Licensing Document Maintenance," which implements-the '

j requirements for the preparation, review, approval, and implementation of'

,the EP. Instructions- for distributing the changes.to the EP are addressed 1

in Section 6.2.7 of this procedur ;

In addition to changes to the EP, the inspector noted that 43 changes were .!

made on EPIPs.since the last inspection. The inspector verified that !

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chan0es were submitted to NRC on a timely basis, in accordance with the requirements-of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Procedure changetw'ere checked for i consistency against other,related procedures, and changes were made

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.following the-guidance contained in Administrative Procedure 1000.006A,

" Procedure Review, Approval, and Revision Control," which governs the

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'4-issuance of new procedures and changes to all procedures, including EPIP When finalized, procedure changes were distributed to the users on a timely basis using mechanisms for document control described in Procedure 1000.004, " Procedural Program Requirements."

No violations or deviations were identified in this program are . Ersroency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies T82701-02.02)

The int; actor toured key emergency facilities and equipment to verify that they were adequately maintained and to determine if changes made since the '

last inspection were technically adequate, met NRC requirements, met licensee commitments, were appropriately incorporated into the EP and-EPIPs, and had no adverse affect on the licensee's emergency readines *

The inspector noted that emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies were in place and adequately maintained, and that no adverse changes were .

made to the same since the last inspection. The inspector noted, however, that the numbers, types, and ranges of personnel dosimeters in the technical support center (TSC) and emergenc/ operations center (EOF) did not appear to be consistent with the number of personnel expected-in these emergency centers during an accident and with the. detection

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capability cxpected. Upon bringing this matter to the licensee's attention, the licensee committed to evaluate the adequacy of the quantity and type-of dosimetry that were presently stored in emergency response i centers, and in particular in the TSC and E0F. - The inspector understood that this evaluation will take into consideration the protection derived from building structures; the habitability criteria for each emergency response center; and the number of. essential personnel as well as the-number of other persons, including offsite officials expected during real accident conditions. The licensee furthermore committed to change their 4 present dosimetry at emergency centers 'if the results -of this evaluation indicated such a change was necessary. ' This is an open item pending NRC ,

review of the licensee's evaluation (313/9018-01; 368/9018/01).

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No violations or deviations were identified in this program are . Organization and Management Control (82701-02.03)

The inspector reviewed the structure of the emergency planning and the emergency response organizations to determine if changes to either organization were properly incorporated into the EP and EPIPs and did not-adversely affect'the licensee's emergency response readines The inspector determined that the structural hierarchy and the reporting of the licensee's organization chain remained invariant. However, the inspector noted that the title manager of training who supervises the ,

emergency planning ~ group was changed to manager of training *and emergency *

planning. Furthermore, the inspector determined that two new emergency ,

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b -5-planning coordinator (EPC) positions were added. Another favorable change to the licensee's emergency planning organization is that the present _

organization requires the holders of each of the six EPC positions also to be qualified as instru; tors in emergency preparednes The inspector noted that the licensee added one position, an assistant to the radiological environmental assessment manager (REAM), in response to a finding'in the 1989 NRC exercise report. That report found that the actual number of staff and manner of staff response to'the scenario during the annual exercise was not consistent with the structure of the emergency response organization. The addition of the assistant to the REAM eliminated that organizational inconsistency. In. addition, the inspector noted that the' licensee deleted a nonlicensed operator position-from Table B-1 of the EP, after approval had been obtained from NR No violations or deviations were identified in this program are . Training (82701-02.04)

The inspector reviewed the training of emergency responders-at ANO and interviewed emergency responders to verify that the training program was established and maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15); to determine whether amount of, and type of, training and retraining received by emergency responders was adequate; and whether key decision makers were proficient in the performance of their duties and responsibilities during a simulated accident scenari In order to accomplish the above, the inspector interviewed instructors and other members of the emergency planning staff, and reviewed a sample-of training re:ords consisting primarily of records of persons interviewed. The inspector determined that specialized emergency preparedness training had been conducted for emergency responders, lesson plans were in place, and tests were given commensurate with the materials presented.- In addition, the inspectors noted that part of the training. consisted of practical, hands-on application .

In addition,.the inspector verified that changes to the program since the last inspection were incorporated into the training program and that key emergency responders were aware of such changes, understood them, and had beer properly trained to implement the Furthermore, the inspector verified that authorities and responsibilities i were clearly delineated for assessing accident conditions and making protective action recommendations (PARS), and determined that key decision makers from the control room were capable of implementing timely onsite

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and offsite corrective actions. The inspector tested the licensee's ability to understand the relationships between plant conditions and possibleons}tegndoffsiteconsequence ,

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Additionally, in order to verify that emergency responders were proficient in the performance of their emergency duties, the inspector conducted

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2-hour interviews with four teams. Each team was composed'of the shift supervisor (SS) and shift technical assistant (STA). Each interview consisted of two parts. During the first part of each interview, the inspector presented five or six questions pertaining to the emergency responders' duties and responsibilities during emergencies, and inquire about their understanding of basic emergency preparedness concept During the second half of each interview, the inspector, with the assistance of a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO), presented an accident scenario to assess the ability of key emergency. responders to detect and classify emergencies, perform notifications, protect plant personnel, do dose assessment, and make PARS in order to protect the health and safety of the publi The interviews were performed on an "open bonk" basis, with guidelines established before the interview to clarify the materials presented to the interviewees, and their expected response. Prior to the interviews, the inspector verified that the scenario was adequate by requesting the scenario to be reviewed by a certified licensee examiner in NRC Region I In addition, the inspector ensured that the scenario was plant-specific by using the assistance of an AP&L instructor who was a senior licensed operator. The purpose of the scenario that was presented was to establish a situation wherein the licensee's staff would be. required to perform emergency response functions. The inspection did not, though, evaluate the control room staff's ability to mitigate the accident's impact on plant hardware. During each of the interviews, at least one licensee representative from the emergency planning department was present in addition to the aforementioned instructo The scenario presented during walkthroughs was as follows:

Initial Conditions For 90 days, Unit 2 had been connected to grid and at 100_ percent powe The core was approaching end of life. Unit'l was also at 100 percent power and could not provide any electrical' support to Unit 2. One of three' positive displacement pumps (CCP-2P36A) was unavailable due to needed repair. It was expected that the repair would take 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to complet There was heavy personnel traffic-on 354' elevation going into the

, maintenance facility at 7:30 . Event 1 The control room staff heard an explosion followed by a loud roa Annunciators indicated: turbine trip, associated reactor trip, and turbine building fir .

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-7-Primary System Indications Reactor coolant system pressure rapidly dropped to 1250 psia. Reactor I

coolant temperature decreased to 440'F. Pressurizer level indicated 0 percent'(off scale low).

Safeguard Actuations -

l The high pressure safety injection flow automatically initiated.

I There was an emergency feedwater system actuatio Both main steam isolation valves indicated ope Miscellaneous Indications l

L Security personnel reported. large amounts of steam in the turbine building. (If the SS sent an auxiliary operator to investigate, the auxiliary operator reported that the 354' elevation was not accessible due to steam). The control room staff also received reports of multiple personnel injuries-in .the area of the main, feedwater regulating. valve (These injured personnel were unable to isolate the steam leak.)

[ NOTE: The SS had to decide whether to continue feeding one or both steam i generators to cooldown or to activate the emergency core cooling L . system once-through-cooling, which meant using a 3-inch line on the i l top of the pressurizer as a cooling path. This, however, then resulted in

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dumping large quantities.of steam and water into the reactor containment building. If operators continued to' feed steam generators they eventually lost control of cooldown rate.]- .l

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Containment pressure reached 24 psia, reactor coolant system temperature !

was-increasing, and the containment area monitor (2RY-892501 m 02) was '

reading 800 R/h. There was:an increase in measured' activity by the j l .speciil particulate iodine noble gas detection syste The results of the interviews were as follows: j

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'All four teams interviewed performed well when answering the questions during the first part of the intervie During~the walkthroughs, the teams took necessary actions, such as determining emergency classification, and making prompt notifications and PARS in !

l order to protect the health and safety of the public. The last three teams demonstrated that they were immediately responsiv'e to protecting the health and safety of the emergency workers injured in the turbine building by the steam leak. The first team interviewed !

failed to make the mental connection between the plant conditions and !

the hazards to personnel in the turbine building. This failure l

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appeared to be due, in part, to an artifice of the interview, which was that the first team interviewed received no assistance from a

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-SRO. This situation of not having an SRO forced the SS to-be overly occupied with two simultaneous tasks: (1) responding to the demands of the emergency pertaining to detection, classifications, and notifications, and (2) following emergency operating procedure This latter task would be, in a real situation, performed by the SR During' subsequent walkthroughs, a licensed SRO, who was also an instructor performed the role of SR During the walkthroughs there was a consistent delay of about 10 minutes between the declaration of the site area emergency (SAE)

and the actual mandate to consider site personnel evacuation action The reason for this delay appeared to be that the format of Procedure'1903.11. " Emergency Class Notification / Response," created a delay between the SAE declaration and the step in the emergency coordinator's checklist which prompts the initiation of the evacuation of nonessential-personnel. Upon bringing this finding to the licensee's attention, the licensee committed to review and revise a- the procedure to ensure that the delay does not occur. This is considered.to be an open item pending further NRC review of the revised procedure (313/9018-02; 368/9018-02).

No violations or deviations were identified in this program are .. Independent Audits (82701-02.05)

The inspector examined independent and internal audit reports for the

~11censee's emergency preparedness program since the last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), and to determine whether the' licensee's commitments and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner. The inspector also examined the licensee's audit program to determine if it had a corrective action system for deficiencies and weaknesses identified during drills and exercises, and to ascertain whether appropriate corrective' actions were implemented in a timely manner. The inspector held discussions with the quality assurance staff and examined independent and internal audit reports for the licensee's emergency preparedness program since the last inspectio 'The inspector also examined the licensee's audit program to determine whether appropriate means existed to record and. follow up on each item until corrective actions were complete The inspector reviewed the two quality assurance audits (i.e., for the calendar years 1989 and 1990) performed since the last inspection of the operational status of the emergency preparedness program, to verify that they met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The independent reviews were performed in accordance'with Procedure QAP-13, " Emergency Planning,"

during the periods April 28 through October 17, 1989, and April 3 to May 17, 1990. The 1989 audit involved 250 man-hoors and the 1990 audit 3 involved 200 man-hours' by certified auditors ari.: 2 supervisor of emergency planning from,another nuclear, power facility. 1M reviews included'a

, surveillance of the 1989 and 1990 annual exercise: The audits also covered: the status of emergency planning actior -acking, EPIPs, emergency facilities, training of emergency resp aders, interviews with

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. selected emergency planning personnel and with members of the emergency response organization, and interfaces with the state and local government The inspector noted that internal audits performed by the quality assurance department were becoming more performance oriented in contrast to previous audits, which only focused on a programmatic review of the-emergency preparedness program. The auditors stated that the licensee intends to observe more drills in the future and strive towards focusing audits on performance in addition to complianc The-inspector noted that the scope and depth of the audits appeared to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), and that the use of additional emergency preparedness expertise outside of the licensee's orgcnization enhanced the quality of the audit No violations cr. deviations were identified in this program are . Exit Interview-The inspector met with the resident inspector and licensee representatives-denoted in paragraph 1, above, on May 25, 1990, and summarized the scope

, and findings of the inspection as presented in this report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector during the inspection, i

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