ML20153H246
| ML20153H246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153H237 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-98-07, 50-313-98-7, 50-368-98-07, 50-368-98-7, NUDOCS 9809300363 | |
| Download: ML20153H246 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1998007
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ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
50-313;50-368
License Nos.:
Report No.:
50-313/98-07;50-368/98-07-
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclesr One, Units 1 and 2
Location:
1448 S. R. 333
Russellville, Arkansas 72801
Dates:
August 2 through September 12,1998
Inspectors:
K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector
S. Burton, Resident inspector
K. Weaver, Resident Inspector
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Approved By:
Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Project Branch C
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Division of Reactor Projects
ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9809300363 980925
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ADOCK 05000313
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-313/98-07; 50-368/98-07
This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,
maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
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Operations
Good housekeeping practices and component material condition was noted in the Unit 1
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Train A reactor building spray pump room. The system valve lineup was in accordance
with the procedure. Components in the field were properly identified and labeled as
denoted on Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&lD) M-236 and in
Procedure 1104.005 (Section O2.1).
Unit 2 Train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) was aligned and maintained in
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accordance with station procedures. No material deficiencies were noted that had the
potential to impact system operation (Section O2.2).
Maintenance
Units 1 and 2 maintenance activities were performed professionally by qualified workers
knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment. Technicians
demonstrated good as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) practices during the
activities observed (Section M1.1).
Units 1 and 2 surveillance activities were performed in accordance with approved
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procedures by knowledgeable personnel who demonstrated good communication,
self-checking, and peer-checking skills. Good system engineering involvement was
observed during surveillance activities (Section M1.2).
Knowledgeable, qualified technicians performed 4160 volt circuit breaker maintenance
on Unit 2 using approved procedures (Section M1.3).
Unit 2 Technical Specifications were entered when a technician interrupted power to
reactor vessel level monitoring system (RVLMS) Channel 1 by utilizing an uncontrolled
power strip located inside the system cabinet which also powered system comoonents.
The licensee missed an opportunity to prevent the loss of RVLMS Channel 1 power
when they initiated system specific corrective actions for a similar event that occurred in
1996 (Section M1.4).
' Enaineerina
Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they identified
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water discharging from the shared Units 1 and 2 emergency cooling pond spillway when
the water level was below the top of the dam. The licensee promptly investigated the
condition and found it to be normal for the water level (Section E1.1).
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- Plant Support
- Two deficient air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were left in service when Units 1
and 2 radiation protection technicians failed to review radiation work permits to identify
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deficient inservice lodine sample holders. A review of the operating and radiological
' conditions relevant to the inservice sample holder indicated that an unmonitored release
to the work space had not occurred (Section R1.2).
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Report Details
Symmary of Plant Status
Unit 1
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Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On August 8,1998, for approximately
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, and on September 11 for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, power was reduced to 85 percent for
monthly turbine valve testing. On August 15, power was reduced to 95 percent for
approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to support circulating water bay cleaning at the intake structure. The unit
was operating at 100 percent power at the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On August 8, power was reduced to
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95 percent for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to support quarterly turbine valve testing. The unit was
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operating at 100 percent power at the end of the inspection period.
1. Operations
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Conduct of Operations
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General Comments (7170Z}
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The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with
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Technical Specifications, conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis
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Report, and shift manning. Inspectors also observed the effectiveness of
communications, management oversight, proper system configuration and configuration
control, housekeeping, and operator performance during routine plant operations and
surveillances.
The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions were
generally well controlled, deliberate, and performed according to procedures. Shift
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turnover briefs were cornprehensive. Housekeeping was generally good and
discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety systems were found to be properly
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aligned. Specific cvents and noteworthy observations are detailed below.
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O2.1
Unit 1 - Enaineered Safety Feature Walkdown of Train A Reactor Buildino Sorav System
a.
insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the accessible portion of the Unit 1
Train A reactor building spray system.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1104.005, Revision 37, " Reactor Building Spray
System Operation," and P&lD M-236, Sheet 1, Revision 85," Reactor Building Spray and
Core Flooding Systems." The inspectors verified that the Procedure 1104.005 valve
lineup matched P&lD M-236 for the Train A reactor building spray system. The
inspectors walked down the Train A reactor building spray system using
Procedure 1104.005 and P&lD M-236. The inspectors founct components in the field
were properly labeled, identified, and accurately denoted on P&lD M-236 and that the
valve lineup was in accordance with Procedure 1104.005 and P&lD M-236. The
inspectors also verified locked valves required by Procedure 1104.005 and found no
deficiencies.
The inspectors found that good housekeeping practices were being maintained in the
reactor building spray pump room. No equipment conditions that might degrade system
performance were identified during the walkdown.
c.
Conclusions
Good housekeeping practices and component material condition was noted in the Unit 1
Train A reactor building spray pump room. The system valve lineup was in accordance
with the procedure. Components in the field were properly identified and labeled as
denoted on P&lD M-236 and in Procedure 1104.005.
02.2 Unit 2 - Enaineered Safety Feature Walkdown of EDG
a.
Insocction Scoce (71707)
The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2
EDGs. Walkdowns included a review of valve and electricallineups for the EDGs and'
supporting equipment.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed Procedure 2104.036, Revision 42, " Emergency Diesel
Generator Operation;" Unit 2 Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.0; Technical
Specifications; Regulatory Guide 1.108; and Piping Drawing M-2217, Revision 52,
" Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System."
The inspectors found that the accessible system mechanical and electrical components
were aligned in accordance with procedures. Component labeling was verified and no
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discrepancies were noted. Housekeeping practices and component material condition
was satisfactory.
c.
Conclusions
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Unit 2 Train A EDG was aligned and maintained in accordance with station procedures.
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No material deficiencies were noted that had the potential to impact system operation.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700,92901)
O8.1
(Closed) Inspection Followup Items (IFI) 50-313/9701-01. " Administrative Control of
Containment Penetration Vent and Drain Line Valves"
The inspectors initiated this IFl during the closure of Violation 50-313/9407-01 to provide
further review of the licensee administrative controls for vents and drains that penetrate
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the reactor building. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 1015.034, Revision 4,
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" Containment Penetration Administrative Control," and Procedure 1015.041, Revision 6,
" Unit 1 Containment Penetration Administrative Control," and concluded that the
licensee had implemented permanent administrative controls for vent and drain line
valves on piping that penetrate the reactor building.
08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-368/9509-01. " Lack of Temporary Modification for Connectina
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Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanoer Service Water Drains"
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The licensee had cross-connected the service water side of the shutdown cooling heat
exchangers through the service water drain valves using a configuration that did not
conform with approved drawings, without considering the system a temporary
modification. The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions
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described in the licensee's letter dated February 6,1996, and found them to be
adequate and complete.
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11. Maintenance
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Conduct of Maintenance
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M1.1 General Comments
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inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 - Job Order (JO) 00960109," Perform Diagnostic Testing of Emergency
Feed Water Pump to Steam Generator B Discharge Isolation Valve CV-2620,"
performed on September 1.
Unit 1 - JO 00981234, " Inspect, Clean, Lubricate, Megger Motor, Check for
Leakage of Valve, and Lubricate Valve Stem for Valve CV-2620," performed on
September 1.
Unit 2 - JO 00972810, Procedure 1412.001, Revision 9, " Preventative
Maintenance or Limitorque SB/SMB Motor Operators," performed on
September 1.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The activities that the inspectors observed were conducted professionally and
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thoroughly. Work was performed according to procedures. The workers were
knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment. The inspectors noted
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that the workers properly stopped work when problems were encountered with the
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diagnostic equipment. On one occasion, technicians promptly identified a faulty
equipment cable and replaced the cable prior to proceeding with the work. The
inspectors observed maintenance supervisory involvement during these activities.
Maintenance personnel involved demonstrated good ALARA practices and radiation
worker knowledge.
c.
Conclusions
Units 1 and 2 maintenance activities were performed professionally by qualified workers
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knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and diagnostic equipment. Technicians
demonstrated good ALARA practices during the activities observed.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities
a.
Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
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Unit 1 - Procedure 1304.128, Revision 12, "RPS-D/CRD Breaker Trip Test,"
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performed on August 4.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1304. 208, Revision 3," Unit 1 EFIC Channel D Monthly Test,
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SG Pressure Greater Than 750 PSIG," performed on August 4.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1607.017, Revision 5, " Sampling the Borated Water Storage
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Tank," performed on August 26.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1605.005, Revision 5," Determination of Boron," performed on
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August 26.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1104.036, Revision 42, " Emergency Diesel Generator
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Operations," Supplement 2,"DG2 Monthly Test," performed on August 31.
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Unit 2 - Procedure 2104.036, Revision 42, "Emerger,cy Diesel Generator
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Operations," Supplement 2A, "2DG2 Monthly Test (Slow Start)," performed on
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August 5.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found that surveillance activities were performed in accordance with
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approved procedures by knowledgeable personnel using calibrated test equipment.
Licensee personnel demonstrated good communications, self-checking, and
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peer-checking techniques. System engineering personnel observed system
performance during the surveillance testing and demonstrated good attention to detail
when monitoring for abnormal conditions. During interviews with the system engineers
involved in the observed surveillances, the inspectors found them knowledgeable of
deficiencies associated with their assigned system and that they had verified that the
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deficiencies would not impact system operability. The equipment performed as required
and data met the required acceptance criteria.
c.
Conclusions
Units 1 and 2 surveillance activities were performed in accordance with approved
procedures by knowledgeable personnel who demonstrated good communication,
self-checking, and peer-checking skills. Good system engineering involvement was
observed during surveillance activities.
M1.3 Unit 2 - 4160 Volt Breaker Maintenance
a.
Inspection Scoce (62707)
On August 26,1998, the inspectors observed 4160 volt breaker maintenance performed
on Breaker 2A310, the " Vital Busses 2A3 and 2A4, cross tie breaker" for Unit 2.
Maintenance was performed in accordance with Procedure 1416.040, Revision 2,
"Magna-Blast Circuit Breaker Maintenance," and JO 00979698.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedure, interviewed technicians, and
monitored the maintenance activity. Technicians were knowledgeable of the design and
operation of the breaker. When the work area was left unattended, technicians secured
the breaker and equipment carts to ensure immobility during a seismic event. Proper
controls of cleaning fluids and combustibles were otaserved. Procedural compliance,
place keeping, and required signatures on the data sheet were accomplished as the
tasks and steps were performed,
c.
Conclusions
Knowledgeable, qualified technicians performed 4160 volt circuit breaker maintenance
on Unit 2 using approved procedures.
M1.4 Unit 2 - Loss of Power to the RVLMS
a.
Inspection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors reviewed conditions relating to a loss of power to Unit 2 RVLMS
Channel 1 that rendered the channel inoperable on August 31,1998.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
On August 31, while performing routine cleaning and inspection of the RVLMS cabinet
performed under JO 00979045, " Vibration and Loose Parts Monitoring Panel,
Cabinets 2C19 and 2C3888-1/2 Clean and Inspect / a technician plugged a vacuum
cleaner into a power strip mounted in the cabinet. The power strip was designed to
provide electricity to the RVLMS control power supply modules and not intended to
supply externalloads. The load, resulting from the operation of the vacuum cleaner,
was sufficient to cause the power supply protective fuse to blow. This resulted in a loss
of control power to RVLMS Channel 1 and entry into Technical Specification 3.3.3.6.
There are two channels of RVLMS. Each channelis powered from separate
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safety-related busses. The RVLMS system is utilized as an indication of reactor vessel
water level during postaccident conditions and provides no automatic functions. During
the loss of Channel 1 RVLMS, Channel 2 was available for indication in the unlikely
event of an accident. Additionally, the loss of one channel of RVLMS has no impact on
routine power operations.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report 2-1998-0340 for this event, related Condition
Reports 2-1997-0132 and C-1996-0227, interviewed the licensee, and observed the
configuration in the affected cabinet. The power strip located within the cabinet did not
have any protective covers or warning labels that would prevent a technician from
plugging a nonsafety-related component into the supply. The work instructions did not
contain cautions to preclude the event from occurring. The licensee indicated that the
technician was not aware that the strip was intended only for use as a system power
supply. The inspectors interviewed the maintenance supervisors who estimated that as
many as 30 cabinets contained various receptacles and that a similar configuration to
the RVLMS power strip existed in a minimum of five locations.
The inspectors determined that Condition Reports 2-1997-0132 and C-1996-0227
identified similar occurrences. Specifically, C 1996-0227, dated September 11,1996,
identified a loss of the safety parameter display system power when a worker plugged a
heat gun into an electrical outlet supplied from the same source as the system. The
inspectors concluded that the licensee missed an opportunity to prevent the loss of
RVLMS when they did not recognize that the condition associated with Condition
Report C-1996-0227 was more extensive and potentially affected other systems.
Although these problems had no safety significance, they represent weak corrective
action.
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Conclusions
Unit 2 Technical Specifications were entered when a technician interrupted power to
RVLMS Channel 1 by using an uncontrolled power strip located inside the system
cabinet that also powered system components. The licensee missed an opportunity to
prevent the loss of RVLMS Channel 1 power when they initiated system specific
corrective actions for a similar event that occurred in 1996. The problems had no safety
significance, but they represent isolated examples of weak corrective action.
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M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance issues
M8.1 (Closed ) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-313/96-010. "inadeauate Procedyre Revision
Resulted in Not Havina Tested the Reactor Protection System Hiah Temperature Trio
Function as Reauired by TSs"
The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions described in the
licensee's letter dated December 19,1996, and found them to be adequate and
complete. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified, and corrected violation is being treated
as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-368/96-005-01. " Surveillance Testina of Plant Protection System and
Postaccident Monitorina instrumentation"
The inspectors verified the immediate and long-term corrective actions described in the
licensee's letter dated January 30,1997, and found them to be adequate and complete.
This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a
noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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E1
Conduct of Engineering
E1.1
Units 1 and 2 - Ooerability of Emeraency (
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a.
Inspection Scone (37551)
The licensee identified a possible deficiency associated with the emergency cooling
pond which serves as the ultimate heat sink for Units 1 and 2. The inspectors observed
the condition and reviewed the operability and system design with engineering
personnel.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On August 24,1998, while making preparations for chemical treatment of the
emergency cooling pond, the licensee lowered level to the top of the overflow spillway to
prevent chemicals from entering Lake Dardannell. Chemistry technicians noticed that a
small amount (less than 2 gpm) of water continued to seep from the seams in the
concrete erosion barriers that overlay the spillway. The technicians properly questioned
this and submitted Condition Report CR-C-98-0212 which documented their concern.
The inspectors observed the condition and reviewed the licensee's operability
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assessment of the water seeping from the emergency cooling pond concrete erosion
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blocks. The construction of the spillway consists of clay underlayer, a permeable
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overlay that minimizes erosion of the clay and allows water to penetrate, solidifying the
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clay layer, concrete erosion blocks on top of the overlayment, and finally a plastic
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tarpaulin type covering over the concrete that provides additional erosion protection
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when water flows over the cor crete. The inspectors reviewed the configuration of the
spillway, the lake level, and the location and amount of water seepage and concluded
that the licensee's operability determination accurately reflected the condition. Although
the level of water in the pond was slightly below the top of the concrete, the licensee
concluded that, because the pond level was above the bottom of the concrete blocks, a
tortuous flow path between the blocks existed that allowed water to migrate through the
joints between the blocks and over the spillway.
c.
Conclusions
Chemistry technicians demonstrated a good questioning attitude when they identified
water discharging from the shared Units 1 and 2 emergency cooling pond spillway when
the water level was below the top of the dam. The licensee promptly investigated the
condition and found it to be normal for the water level.
IV. Plant Support
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Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1. General Comments (71750)
During routine tours of the pi.snt and observations of plant activities, the inspectors
found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, areas were
properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practices.
R1.2 Units 1 and 2 - Radiation Monitorina at Reactor Coolant Samole Sink
a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
On August 26,1998, the inspectors observed chemistry technician radiological practices
while establishing valve lineup in preparation for performance of Procedure 1607,
Revision 13, " Reactor. Coolant Sampling System."
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed radiological practice conducted per Radiation Work
Permit 98-008 when technicians were aligning the reactor coolant sampling systern in
preparation for performing of Procedure 1607.001. Technicians demonstrated good
contamination control practices. The sample sink was configured with an exhaust hood
that is maintained under negative pressure to preclude radioactive gasses and particles
from entering the work space. Air samplers were prestaged at the sample sink in
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accordance with Radiation Work Permit 98-008 to provide monitoring for lodine and
particulate during sample activities.
The inspectors noted that air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were configured such
that air could bypass the charcoal cartridge due to a missing gasket in the sample head.
This condition would lessen the efficiency of the sample cartridge, possibly yielding
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inaccurate samples. The licensee took actions at that time to remove deficient
cartridges from service. The inspectors questioned the chemistry technicians about the
deficiency identified during the week before. Technicians were aware of the problem
and indicated that they had been informed that health physics had removed all of the
deficient holders. The inspectors asked the technicians to check the holders located at
the Units 1 and 2 sample sinks and noted that both were missing gaskets and o-rings.
Upon noting the problem, plant staff promptly replaced the defective sample holders.
The inspectors discussed the condition with the health physics department. Health
physics indicated that they had failed to cross-reference radiological work permits to
prestaged sample holders and had only removed deficient sample holders located at the
controlled access and in spares. Subsequently, health physics reviewed radiation work
permits and other potential locations fcr sample holders and found that the two holders
in the chemistry lab were the only oversights.
The licensee determined that no negative fuel performance trends or positive iodine
samples had occurred subsequent to both units' refueling outage. They noted that the
installed ventilation maintained the sample sink at a negative pressure and that iodine
sample cartridge bypass flow was minimal. Based upon this information, the licensee
concluded that no unmonitored releases to the work space at the reactor coolant system
sample station had occurred. The failure to priorly identify these two sample holders as
defective did not result in an unmonitored release and did not constitute a safety issue.
c.
Conclusions
Two deficient air sampling charcoal cartridge holders were left in service when Units 1
and 2 radiation protection technicians failed to review radiation work permits to identify
deficient inservice iodine sample holders. A review of the operating and radiological
conditions relevant to the inservice sample holder indicated that an unmonitored release
to the work space had not occurred.
S1
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1
Conduct of Security (71750)
During this period, the inspectors observed personnel and package access, personnel
searches, and applications of temporary lighting in areas where >quipment,
components, and truck trailers were stored. The inspectors' review of security
measures and operations periodically throughout the inspection period indicated that
they were properly implemented.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
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Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection on September 15,1998. The licensee acknowledged
the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee
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B. Allen, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager
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C. Anderson, General Plant Manager
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G. Ashley, Licensing Supervisor
B. Bamant, Unit 2 Plant Manager.
B. Beard, Unit 2 Electrical Superintendent
bR. Carter, Maintenance Superintendent
M. Chisum, Unit 2 System Engineering Manager
M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist
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P. Harris, Unit 1 Operations
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B. Haylock, Unit 1 Electrical Maintenance
D. James, Acting Director, Nuclear Safety
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J. Kowalewski, Unit 1 System Engineering Manager
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R. Lane, Design Engineering Director
~ J. Vandergrift, Nuclear Safety Director
R. Walters, Unit 1 Assistant Operations Manager
H. Williams, Plant Security Superintendent
C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Plant Manager
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
iP 61726:
' Surveillance Observations
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
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IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports
IP 92901:
Followup - Operations
IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
ITEMS CLOSED
50-368/9509-01
Lack of Temporary Modification for Connecting Shutdown
Cooling Heat Exchanger Service Water Drains
(Section 08.2)
50-313/96-005-01
LER
Surveillance Testing of Plant Protection System and
Postaccident Monitoring instrumentation (Section M8.2)
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50-368/96-010
LER
Inadequate Procedure Revision Resulted in Not Having
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Tested the Reactor Protection System High Temperature
Trip Function as Required by Technical Specifications
(Section M8.1)
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50-313/9701-01
IFl
Administrative Control of Containment Penetration Vent
and Drain Line Valves (Section. 08.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
as low as is reasonably achievable
IFl
inspection followup item
JO
job order
LER
licensee e /ent report
P&lD
piping and instrumentation diagram
RVLMS
reactor vessel level monitoring system
C-