IR 05000313/1997005
| ML20198H963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198H946 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-97-05, 50-313-97-5, 50-368-97-05, 50-368-97-5, NUDOCS 9709230051 | |
| Download: ML20198H963 (22) | |
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ENCLOSURE.2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos:
50 313; 50-368 License Nos:
50-313/97-05;50-368/97-05 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location:
1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Dates:
July 20 through August 30,1997 Inspectors:
K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector J. Melfi, Resident inspector S. Burton, Resident inspector i
Approved By:
Elmo E. Collins, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental information 9709230051 970916 gDR ADOCK 05000313 PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50 313/97-05, 50-368/97-05 Onerations Unit 1 operators were cautious when attempting online feedwater heater repairs
that could have resulted in a plant trip. Shif t supervision demonstrated conservative decision making when electing to remove the generator from operation rather than attempt feedwater heater repairs with a small margin to the main turbine vacuum trip set point (Section 01.2).
The inspectors found that the number of temporary alterations for both units
was low and the majority of temporary alterations were less than 18 months old. The inspectors also found some weaknesses in the licensee's administrative controls on temporary alterations concerning extension requests. The inspectors identified that the system engineers failed to implement a periodic inspection of a borated water storage tank (BWST)
foreign material exclusion (FME) cover (Section 01.3).
Maintenance Computer technicians performed a Unit 2 core protection calculator (CPC) and
control element assembly calculator calibration in accordance with approved procedures, and took appropriate actions when they identified degraded conditions.
The inspectors found the technicians to be knowledgeable when questioned about procedures, requirements, and system operating theory (Section M1.3).
Replacement of a Unit 2 control rod drive monitoring control system power supply
was conducted in accordance with approved job order (JO). Technicians demonstrated peer-checking techniques, three way communications, and maintenance practices in accordance with licensee guidelines. Technicians were aggressive when establishing control of the work environment (Section M1.4),
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's instructions were adequate to install a
lube oil pump with the correct part. The inspectors also concluded that the receipt inspection process should not have identified this gear as an incorrect part (Section M8.1).
Enaineerina The inspectors determined that several f actors included in the licensee's computer
program for the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakrate were accurate. The inspectors also identified a minor error in the vendor calculation for the conversion f actors. The procedural value for the reactor buildino sump fill rate conversion
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-2-factor is not known to be accurate and will be resolved in a future inspection (Section E1.1).
Plant Support
The licensee aggressively monitored zebra mussel growth and evaluated the impact
on the ultimate heat sink. Reasonable corrective actions have been identified for assessing and combating zebra mussel activity. Chemistry personnel were knowledgeable about zebra mussel activity, life cycle, and the impact of mussels on system operability (Section R1.2).
Health physics technicians demonstrated good as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA) practices when supporting a Unit 2 chemical volume control system resin transfer. Personnel performing and supporting the evolution followed applicable radiological work permit and procedural requireinents. Health physics management monitoring of related activities was good (Section R1.3).
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Beoort D_e_ta_1.hi Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 95 percent power for cleaning of the condenser circulating and service water bays. On July 20,1997, upon comr. inion of intake inspections and cleaning, power was further reduced to 10 percent to " pair feedwater heater tube leaks and turbine lobe and seal oil pumps (see Section 01.2).
Operators connected the turbine to the grid, commenced power escalation on July 22, and reached approximately 97 percent power on July 23. Power remained at 97 percent while cleaning and inspection of circulating and service water bays was completed. On July 24 when circulating water pumps were restored, operators raised power to 100 percent.
Power remained at 100 percent through the remainder of the inspection period with the exception that power was reduced on August 22 to 85 percent for approximately 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to support turbine stop and governor valve testing and circulating water bay cleaning. Power was restored to 100 percent at 1 a.m. on August 23.
Unit 2 began the inspection at 100 percent and remained there through the end of the reporting period.
1. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with Technical Specifications (TSs); conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis Report; shift manning; communications; management oversight; proper system configuration and configuration control; housekeeping; and operator performance during routine plaat operations, the conduct of surveillances, and plant power changes The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions such as surveillances and plant power changes were well controlled, delibert.e, and performed according to procedures. Shift turnover briefs were comprehensiva.
Housekeeping was generally good and discrepancies were promptly correctad.
Safety systems were found to be properly aligned. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed below.
01.2 Urut 1 - Power Reduction to Reoair of Feedwater Heater Leak and Turbine Lube and Seal Oil Pumos a.
Insoection Scoce (717071 On July 20,1997, Unit 1 reduced power to accommodate repairs of Feedwater Heater E-5A, the Temporary Turbine Lube Oil Pump P-19T, Turbine Lube Oil Pump P-20, and the Air Side Generator Hydrogen Seal Oil Pump P-24. The l
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-2-inspectors observed and monitored the activities due to the potential for the maintenance to result in a low vacuum turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip.
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Observations and Findinas On July 19, while reducing power from 100 to 80 percent, the licensee received Feedwater Heater E SA high level 'larms and determined that the transient had ruptured some tubes in the heater. The licensee decided to plug the leaky tubes online if possible. To facilitate an online repair, it would be necessary to i';olate the associated heater string and attempt to vent the tube side of the associated heater.
The difficulty with an online repair is that air enters the condenser through the ruptured tubes and degrades condenser vacuum Attempts made at different power levels to vent the heater resulted in a degrading vacuum condition and were aborted. Reactor power was subsequently reduced to approximately 10 percent and the turbine generator removed from service with main steam entering the condenser through the turbine bypass valves. With the turbine removed from service, the condenser air removal system could maintain vacuum while venting the feedwater heater and the heater repaired.
The inspectors observed the attempts to vent Feedwater Heater E-5A with the turbine online and the licensee's control of the activity. Operators were cautious when opening the vent valve at the different power levels, ensuring that condenser vacuum stabilized above the pre-established limit set by shift supervision. The only j
point where it would have been acceptable to ao online repair was at dO percent power where condenser vacuum stabilized at approximately 25 inches. Shift supervision determined this to be ineufficient margin to the condenser vacuum turbine trip set point of 24.5 inches to allow for the feedwater heater manway to be removed. The inspectors believed this to be a conservative decision because equilibrium conditions in the heater had ber,t established presenting an opportunity to proceed with the maintenance. With a 0.5 inch margin from the turbine trip cet point, shift supervision elected to take the turbine offline rather than remove the heater manway and potentially lose vacuum that could trip the turbine and subsequently the reactor. Three-vsay communications and proper procedural usage were observed during power changes and repair activities. Operators and technicians held open discussions with management when presenting repair options and alternatives.
After securing the turbine, additional secondary side equipment problems developed
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when the temporary Turbine Lube Oil Pump P-19T failed to develop sufficient discharge head and the Generator Air Side Hydrogen Seal Oil Pump P-24 had an unacceptable seal leak. Due to these two events, the licensee opted to remain at reduced power and repair both pumps. The licensee also elected to modify the impeller to the other Turbine Lube Oil Pump P-20. Turbine Oil Pump P-19T, which was installed when the normal pump lost its impeller, was restored to the original configuration. Turbine Oil Pump P-20 was removed and the impeller modified with
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t-3-a set screw to minimize the possibility of its impeller separating from the shaft, Upon completion of the repairs, power was restored to 100 percent.
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Conclusions Unit 1 operations were cautious when attempting online feedwater heater repairs that could have resulted in a plant trip. Shif t supervision demonstrated conservative decision making when electing to remove the generator from operation rather than attempt feedwater heater repairs when condenser vacuum stabilized with a small margin to the main turbine vacuum trip set point.
01.3 Units 1 and 2 - Review of Temocrarv Alterations a.
Inspection Scoce (71707. 92901)
Temporary alterations are modifications to plant equipment that would normally be a design change if intended to be permanent. Each temporary alteration is reviewed, logged, and tracked by the licensee. The inspectors audited the active temporary alterations for both units to assess the number and age of temporary alterations and the licensee's controls on the temporary alteration process. Licensee Procedure 1000.028, " Control of Temporary Alterations," describes the licensee's controls for temporary alterations.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the number of temporary alterations was low with 19 total temporary alterations,11 on Unit 1,6 on Unit 2, and 2 common temporary alterations. Only 4 of the temporary alterations were older than 18 months. The log of temporary alterations was kept up to date, and the licensee has performed monthly reviews of temporary alterations to identify any that have exceeded an expiration date.
The inspectors found weaknesses in the licensee's control of temperary alterations.
One weakness concerns the timeliness of temporary alteration extensions. The licensee instalis temporary alterations with an expiration date; and if the temporary alteration is expected to be in place past that date, an extension request is initiated.
The inspectors identified that the extension request for Temporary Alteration 95-1-044 had an extension request initiated one day (October 21,1996) af ter the temporary alteratian had expired. The licensee initiated Condition e
Report (CR) 1-97-0219 on this item. The licensca was one day late in initiating this extension request on a nonsafety-related temporary alteration and the inspectors did not identify any other late extension requests. A subsequent temporary alteration extension request was initiated properly The inspectors also reviewed historical extension requests to determine when final plant manager approval was granted and determined that approximately 50 percent
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of the extension requests were formally approved af ter the expiration date. All the plant extension requests reviewed were approved within 30 days of the expiration date.
The inspectors also walked down selected temporary alterations, and found a discrepancy with the Temporary Alteration 1-97-001. This temporary alteratior installed a FME cover on the BWST vacuum relief valve flarge. The BWST vacuum relief valve had been removed, and a blank flange _ installed 3 inches _ above the pipe flange which was surrounded by screen wrap. The screen wrap was secured with wire ties to ensure debris did not enter the BWST and provides sufficient ventilation area to prevent tank damage on a rapid BWST draindown. Temporary Alteration 1-97-001 required a system engineering inspection every 90 2 30 days to look for adverse carbon steel rusting. The inspectors noted that all the wire tie downs were rusted, one v>as broken, but the installation was still substantially intact. On August 13,1997, the inspectors requested to see the last system engineering inspection and the licensee stated that they had not performed an inspection, although the FME cover had been installed since February 18,1997.
Further discussion with the licensee revealed that no formal or informal method had been established by system engineering to inspect the cover. System engineers had not accessed the area to perform this inspection. The cognizant system engineer had changed twice since installation of this temporary alteration package and the current system engineer did not know of this surveillance requiremont. The licensee initiated CR 1 97-0222 on this ; tem. Following the inspectors identification, the licensee modified the 18-month surveillance taek on the vacuum relief valve to be a quarterly inspection by system engineering.
Following a temporary alteration installation, Procedure 1000.028, Revision 19, Step 6.13.2.A, (applicable at the ti:ne) required an independer.t verifier to " verify that all requirements and specialinstructions for installation in the Temporary Alteration Package are met." The temporary alteration package had special instructions for periodic postinstallation inspections which were not tracked to ensure that they were completed. This is a violation of the temporary alteration package process (50 313/9705-01).
The inspectors and the licensee identified loose vm m.m M E iasket under the FME cover with no work in progress. The licensee avestigated end determined that these tools and gasket were required by the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of Temporary Alteration 1 97-001 as prestaged equipment. The licensee subsequently put the tools in a box and identified the box as not to be removed from the area, c.
Conclusions The inspectors found that the number of temporary alterations for both units was low, and the majority of temporary alterations was less than 18 months old. The inspectors also identified weaknesses in the licensee's administrative controls on temporary alterations concerning extension requests. One procedure violation was
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identified, concerning the f ailure by system engineering to implement a periodic inspection of a BWST FME cover.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
08.1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scope (61726. 92.10_1J The inspectors observcd all or portions of the following operational surveillances activities:
Procedure 2104.017, Revision 9, " Spent Resin Transfer," dated August 7,
1997.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1105.009, Revision 13, "CRD System Operating
Procedure," Supplement 2, " Exercising CRDMs Above Cold Shutdown,"
performed on August 1.
Unit 1 - Procedure 1103.013, Revision 16, "RCS Leak Detection,"
Supplement 1, "RCS Leak Rate Determination when RCS Losses are not Being Returned to the RCS," performed on August 28.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found these activities to be professional and thorough, performed in accordance with procedures, and the operators were knowledgeable on their assigned tasks. When applicable, appropriate radiological work permits were followed. The inspectors observed supervisory involvement in the activities.
08.2 (Closed) Lir ensee Event Report (LER) 50-368/95-003. " Automatic Reactor Trio on Axial Shane Index Durina Startuo Due to inadeauate Monitorina and Action to Maintain Excore Power Below the Core" This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/95-07;50-368/95-07 and was the subject of a noncited violation. No nsw issues were revealed by the LER.
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08.3 (Closed) LER 50 368/95 007 " Manual Valves Not Beina Secured in the Closed Position Due to an Error in the Procedure Chance Manaaement Process that Did Not Comolv with a Technical Specification Reauirement for Containment intearity" On November 6,1995, prior to the startup following refueling outage, containment integrity was verified which included a check of locked manual valves. On November 8, local leak rate testing was performed and, due to a procedural inadequacy, eight valves were left closed but unlocked. The plant entered and I
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remained above Mode 4 on November 14. On November 22, a nonlicensed operator discovered that these valves were in this configuration and immediately corrected the condition by verifying the valves closed and subsequently locking them. TS 3.6.1.1 requires the valves to be closed and locked above Mode 5. As a result, the licensee issued LER 50 368/95-007. Corrective actions identified in the LER were reviewed and found to be adequete and complete. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.D.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-368/9705-02).
08.4 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9606-01 " Reactor Vessel Perturbation Durina Reduced Inventory" a.
inspection Scope (92901)
During a RCS drain down near the RCS reduced inventory level, efforts to perform a localleak rate test on a letdown piping penetration affected the indicated levelin the reactor vessel. This event occurred due to the RCS piping configuration on Unit 1, where the suction of the reactor cCant pump is approximately 30 feet above the bottom of the steam generators, -r i the reactor coolant pump is slightly above the cold legs enterirg the reactor vessel. This event occurred while draining down the tube side steam generators, which created a loop seal between the reactor vessel and the steam generators.
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Observations and Findinas The licensee acknowledged this violation and took corrective actions at the time to ensure that they restored accurate indicated level promptly. The inaccurate indication occurred due to the introduction of air into one RCS intermediate leg from a concurrent localleak rate test on the letdown line penetration. This air could not be vented at a sufficient rate through the available vent (reactor coolant pump seats) and slightly pressurized the RCS. The pressurized air moved some vater into
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the RCS cold leg that affected indicated level by severalinches. Due to the RCS piping configuration, additional ventilation paths were open after the water n oved into the reactor vessel, stopping the indicated level rise. Operators quickly stc9 ped the introduction of air into the RCS, and indicated level dropped to the correct level.
The licensee reviewed the event with operators from both units and the licensee committed to revise procedures prior to the next scheduled refueling outage to assure that controls are in place to preve,nt similar occurrences in the future.
08.5 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9606-02. "Hvdroaen Burn Durina RCS Weldina Activity" a,
losnection Scone (92901)
This violation concerned a hydrogen burn during welding on the pressurizer relief valve tailpipe. Licensee controls during welding were not adequately implerrented i
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to prevent ignition of hydrogen in the relief valve tailpipe. The inspectors reviewed the licensee corrective actions on this event.
b.
O_b_servations and Findinas During welding activities on the common relief valve tailpipe to the quench tank, the tailpipe shook and made noise as a welder completed a second welding pass on the pipe. Following the noise, the contract welder decided to complete the third welding pass and then exited the area.
Licensee investigation found a temporary FME cover (taped bag) over the disconnected tailpipe blown off. The licensee concluded that the welding caused a hydrogen burn that shook the pipe, created the noise, and blew ths temporary cover off the pipe. The licensee stopped all welding activities and inspected the systems for damage. No damage was found. The licensee sampled the air in the common tailpipe and found hydrogen in concentrations near the lower explosive limit of 4 percent. Hydrogen was introduced into the quench tank water during the RCS cooldown when the electromatic relief valve was opened. The hydrogen was believed to have come from the quench tank's water and collected in the tailpipes.
The licensee acknowledged the violation and concluded the root cause was inadequate implementation of their welding controls for ignition sources. The licensee reviewed this event with welding personnel and strengthened relevant procedures, This event was also included in the contractor welder training that the licensee conducts. The licensee also intends to review this incident during preoutage briefings before the next Unit 1 outage.
08.6 (Closed) LER 50 313/96-001. Revision O. " Reactor Buildina Purae Charcoal Filte2 Analysis not Completed Prior to initial irradiated Fuel Movement as a Result of a Misinterpretation of Technical Specification Surveillance Reouirements" On February 13,1996, the licensee identified that TS requirements were r;ot met during a September 1993 refueling outage. Unit 1 TSs require that filter sample analyses be performed prior to initialirradiated fuel handling operations in the reactor building. The licensee initiated this LER for moving fuel before the carbon sample test results were received, and the tested radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency was slightly less than TS requirements.
The licensee wrote a CR on this event at the time, but believed that TS was met considering the guidance contained in Generic Letter 83-13. " Clarification of
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Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorber Units in Standard Technical Specification on ESF Cleanup Systems." Subsequent review of this event by the licensee identified that the Unit 1 TSs were not met.
The inspectors assessed the slightly less than required removal efficiency as having a negligible safety significance since the safety analysis evaluation for a fuel
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-8-handling accident gives a thyroid dose of 0.920 rem at the exclusion distance which is below the 25 rem allowed. The test results, slightly less than requirements, should not have resulted in a significantly higher dose.
The licensee initiated procedure changes to ensure that charcoal sample analysis
results are received prior to initialirradiated fuel movement begins. Further, the licensee intends to submit improved standard TSs, which is reflective of the guidance contained in Generic Letter 8313.
This licensee-identified and corrected, nonrepeHtive violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-368/9705-03).
11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1 General Comments a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 - JO 00966439 and JO 00966445, " Circulating and Service Water
Bay Cleaning and Inspection," on July 23,1997.
Unit 1 - JO 00966916, " Calibrate P2-1270, P-36C Oil Pressure Switch," on
July 29.
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Unit 1 - JO 00959971, Procedure 1412.216, Revision 1, " Unit 1 (Y11, Y13,
Y15, Y22, Y24, and Y25) Inverter Inspection, Test, and Maintenance
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Instructions," on July 31.
Unit 1 - JO 00954687, " Preventive Maintenance on Control Valve 4400," on
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Unit 2 - Procedure 2312.046, Revision 2. " Core Protection Calculator
Channel and CEAC '2' Test Reload Data Block," and related JO 00966742 and JO OO965960, on August 5.
- Unit ? JO 00961420, " Containment Spray Pump Seal Cooler 12 Month
Clean and Inspect," on August 7.
Unit 2 - JO 00967585 " Replace Control Element Drive Monitoring Control
System Power Supply," on August 25.
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Qb_pervations and Findinas The inspectors found the work performed in these activities to be professional and thorough. All work was performed in accordance with procedures and the workers were knowledgeable on their assigned tasks. Proper control of lif ted leads was observed and independent verification of procedural steps was performed as required, in addition, see the specific discussions of maintenance observed under Sections M1.3 through M1.4, below.
M1.2 General Comments en Survgillance Activities a.
Inspection Scone (61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
Unit 1 - Procedure 1104.002, Revision 49, " Makeup & Purificat,an System
Operation," Supplement 5, "HPl Pump P-36C Test," performed on July 30, 1997, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the surveillance activities were performed according to the licensee's procedures by knowledgeable workers. Personnel demonstrated good technical knowledge of the components being tested.
M1.3 Unit 2 - CPC Channel and Control Element Assembiv Calculator (CEAC) Test a.
Inspection Scone (61726)
The inspectors observed Unit 2 CPC and CEAC surveillance.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed portions of Procedure 2312.046, Revision 2, " Core Protection Calculator Channel and CEAC '2' Test Reload Data Block," performed by the computer support department. Technicians performed the test using calibrated instruments and approved procedures. A degradation of the normal power supply cooling f an was discovered and properly documented as Job Request 926932 and CR 2-97-0487. The f an developed an abnormal noise when its power was secured and restored during performance of the surveillance. Technicians followed procedural requirements and stopped work, initiated a job request, assessed that the degradation did not impact further performance of the surveillance, notified the con *rol room and their supervision, and completed the test. Troubleshooting of CEA cor' outer analog to digital input cards per JO 00965960 was performed in
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operability requirements with the tecanicians and found them to be knowledgeat.e.
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Conclusions Computer technicians performed calibration of the Unit 2 CPC and CEAC in accordance with approved procedures using calibrated instruments. Techricians took appropriate actions when degraded conditions were identified. The inspectors found the technicians to be knowledgeable when questioned about procedures, requirements, and system operating theory.
M 1.4 Unit 2 - Reolace Co trol Eternent Drive Monitorino Control System (CEDMCS) Power Supolv a.
insoection Scone (627071
'he inspectors observed the replacement of a failed CEDMCS power supply.
Replacement of the power supply in the energized CEDMCS logic cabinets created a high potential for a loss of the second power supply which could result in a plant trip. The inspecters observed the evolution and evaluated communications, contingency actions, and maintenance practices, j
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Observations and Findinas On August 25,1997, the control room investigated a CEDMCS cabinet trouble and
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determined tha cause to be a failed CEDMCS logic power supply. The CEDMCS has two electrica'ly parallel logic power supplies. With one power supply failed, the cabinets were powered by the remaining power supply. Although the system remained aparable, this degraded condition was undesirable because a failure of the remaining power supply would result in the loss of alllogic power and application of high voltage power to the control rod gripper coils. The coils were designed for intermittent operatior with high voltages applied. Coil degradation and subsequent failure could occur in as little as 15 minutes with high voltage continuously applied.
The licensee elected to replace the power supply with the logic energized to minimize the time spent in this condition and avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown.
Repairs were conducted on August 26, under JO 00967585, " Replacement of CEDMCS Power Supply."
The inspectors observed the replacement of the power supply. Job prebriefings conducted between maintenance and operations departments established contingencies for temporary connection of the new power supply in the event of a f ailure of the inservice power supply during the evolution. Requirements for tripping the plant were outlined during the evolution prebriefing. Maintenance supervision was present during the activity and established constant communications with the control room. Technicians established precautions for working in the vicinity of
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energized equipment. Peer checking was observed throughout the process.
Three-way communications was observed during critical task such as the recording and verification of wire numbers during wire removal and restoration. Technicians dernonstrated good control of the work environment when they returned from mounting the new power supply at the work bench by re-establishing a quiet work area. Restoration of the work area to premaintenance conditions was thorough.
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ConClusiqr]}
Replacement of a Unit 2 control rod drive monitoring control system power supply was conducted in accordance with approved JO. Technicians demonstrated peer checking techniques, three way communications, and maintenance practices which were in accordance with licensee guidelines. Technicians were aggressive when establishing control of the work environment.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M 8.1 (Closed) Inspector Followuo item (IFI) 50 368/9703-03, "EDG Lube Oil Pumn E ilure" a.
Inspectiori Scone (92902)
The inspectors review the licensee actions following an EDG lube oil pump catastrophic failure during a postmaintenance test and a 24-hour endurance run.
The lube oil pump drive gear was severely damaged and the shaft of the flexible drive unit (connected to the drive gear) was broken. The licensee had replaced the lube oil pump due to a crack on the pump suction flange. Subsequent licensee followup of the event revealed that there was an improper gear on the replacement
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pump, which was slightly larger and had two additional teeth. The IFl was to determine if the licensee's receipt inspection process should have found this defective part, and how this larger gear was placed onto the replacement pump.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the JO instructions that installed the lube oil pump and concluded that the instructions were adequate. The lube oil pump failed since it had an inappropriate part on it. The inspectors did not identify a receipt inspection requirement for this gear, since it came as part of an assembled component from the Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, which was a qualified supplier. The licensee verified that the other nuclear plant did not modify the lube oil pump since they received it from Fairbanks-Morris. The licensee notified other utilities and the diesel generator owners group of this problem. There were no other incorrect gears found on spare tube oil pumps.
Subsequent discussions with the vendor identified that the larger gear was supplied with lube oil pumps that are on nonturbo charged engines. Apparently, the vendor
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's instructions were adequate to instali a lube oil pump with the correct part. The inspectors also concluded that the receipt inspection process should not have identified this gear as an incorrect part. No other incorrect parts were found in the industry and the vendor is considering a Part 21 report on this item.
Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Unit 1 - RCS Leak Detection a.
Insoer tion Scone (37551. 71707)
The inspectors observed the licensee perform the surveillance required by TS 3.1.6 and reviewed the adequacy of Surveillance Procedure 1103.013, "RCS Leak Detection."
The leak detection systems are described in Safety Analysis Report, Section 4.2.3.8, which includes three diverse methods for RCS leak detection.
These methods are an RCS inventory balance, reactor building sump level, and reactor building radiation monitoring. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the inventory balance and reactor building sump level to assess the adequacy of the procedure, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the licensee perform this surveillance and reviewed selected historical data to determine the leakrate. The licensee performed the leakrate according to the procedure and leakrates were within the requirements of TS 11.6. The licensee relies on the inventory balance as a method to qualifying RCS leakrate and uses the reactor building sump level as a check on the inventory balance.
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the inventory balance method. The licensee usually uses the plant computer and a Plant Computer Program LKRT1 to calculate the leakrates. The inspectors verified that the conversion factors for the pressurizer level change and makeup level change were accurate in the procedure.
The licensee also has three other factors in the procedure and the Plant Computer Program LKRT1, which are RCS average temperature, reactor power and reactor i
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-13-power squared. The reactor vendor gives these f actors based on their calculation of how these factors could change the coolant mass in the reactor system. This proprietary calculation (B&W 32-1233523-01, ANO-1 Leak Detection Coefficients)
was done for another power plant and extrapolated to Unit 1. After reviewing this calculation, the inspectors identified that RCS volumes noted in a comparison table were incorrect. The licensee initiated CR 197-0220 on this item. Subsequent review revealed that the correct RCS vokmes were used in the calculation and this vendor revised the comparison table.
The inspectors questioned the basis for the conversion factor for the RCS sump and the licensee could not find a basis for the conversion factor (26.6 gallons / percent indicated level) in the procedure. The licensee attempted to recreate the level conversion f actor. Af ter reviewing the appropriate Civil Engineering Drawings C-97, C-111, and C-112, the licensee calculated a conversion f actor of approximately 31.1 gallons / percent indicated level, which is approximately 17 percent higher than the value in the procedure. The licensee initiated CR 1-97-0244 on August 28, 1997, on this item and at the conclusion of the reporting period was attempting to determine how ine original factor was included in the procedure. Some licensee personnel recall that this value was determined by a test when known water volumes were added to the sump.
The licensee uses the reactor building sump fill rate as a trend on RCS leakage and as a comparison for the inventory balance. The insp3ctors concluded that either the procedure was inadequate due to an incorrect value for sump fill rate or the civil engineering drawings are inaccurate since they contain the incorrect dimensions.
This issue is identified as an Unresolved item 50-313/9705-04 until verification of the conversion factor or the sump dimensions are verifico, c.
Cor lusions The inspectors determined that several of the factors included in the licensee's computer program for the RCS leakrate were accurate. The inspectors also identified a minor error in the vendor calculation for the conversion factors. The procedural value for the reactor building sump fill rate conversion factor is not known to be accurate and will be resolved in a future inspection.
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-14-IV. Plant Supp_ ort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R 1.1 General Comments (71750)
During routine tours of the plant and observations of plant activities, the inspectors found that access doors to locked high radiation areas were properly locked, afeas were properly posted, and personnel demonstrated proper radic!ogical work practices.
R1,2 Unit 1 -Inspection and Cleanina of Service Water and Circulatina Water Bavs a.
insoection Scone (71750)
On July 23,1997, the licensee completed cleaning and inspection activities associated with Circulating Waters B and C and Service Water Bays A and C which were conducted to evaluate zebra mussel growth and the ability for divers to clean t6: bays. Due to the impact of zebra mussels on ultimate heat sink availability, the inspectors observed the maintenance and reviewed the licensee's findings and conclusions, b.
Observations and Findinas inspection and cleaning of the Unit 1 service and circulating water bays was conducted in conjunction with JOs 00966439 and 00966445. Service Water Bay B is protected with an antifouling paint and the service water bays are protected from zebra mussel growth by a chemicalinjection system. The uncoated Circulating Water Bay C showed virtually no growth in the 2 weeks since it was last cleaned. The licensee determined that the small amount of debris collected posed no threat of rendering service water inoperable. The previous cleaning was performed by divers in low visibility conditions. Due to the amount of dead mussels left by the divers in the bays during the last cleaning, future cleanings will be performed by inhouse maintenance with the bays drained.
in the 13 weeks since the last cleaning. Circulating Water Bay B developed growth on uncoated areas, such as pump casing bolts and areas where the coating was damaged. The associated Service Water Bay A had collected a measurable amount of dead mussels in the low flow areas. The accumulati?n in these areas was sufficient to warrant changing the cleaning frequency to 6 weeks.
The licensee intends to monitor the growth activity of the zebra mussels and clean at 6 week intervals during periods of high growth, adjusting cleaning frequency during other periods as determined by the monitoring program. Other corrective activities included developing a design package to redesign or install self cleaning service water pump strainers, staging equipment necessary to f acilitate cleaning of
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L strainers, evaluating modifications to service water bay flow geometry, trending strainer performance and bay fouling rates, developing procedural guidance which will minimize the impact of filling or shif ting service water configurations, evaluating the impact of zebra mussels on other systems interfacing with the service water bays, and installation of additional antifouling coatings in the circulating and service water bays.
The IMensee also inspected the area between the trash grates and the traveling
screens. Since last cleaned during Refueling Outage 1R13 in October 1996 Jach circulating water bay's intake area yielded approximately 1 cubic yard of dead mussels and debris. The licensee considered this normal. Additionally, the growth (
of mussals on the grates was minimal and the muscles did not bridge any of the grates, intake water flow was not impeded by the volume of debris or growth of mussels on the grates. The inspectors inquired about the potential for the mussels to affect proper closure of the service water sluice gates. This was of particular
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interest because a malfunction of the gates has the potential to render the system inoperable, The licensee reviewed this area and concluded that the growth was minimal and would not cause the gates to malfunction. The licensee supported their conclusions with multiple pictures and inprocess management observations
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during the inspection process. When questioned by the inspectors, chemistry
personnel were knowledgeable about zebra mussel activity, life cycle, and the j
impact of mussels on system operability, c.
Conclusions The licensee rggressively monitored zebra mussel growth and evaluated the impact j
on the ultimate heat sink Reasonable corrective actions have been identified for
assessing and combating zebra mussel activity. Chemistry personnel were
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knowledgeable about zebra mussel activity, life cycle, and the impact of mussels on
system operability.
R1.3 Unit 2 - Health Physics Coveraae of Soent Resin Transfer l
a.
Inspection Scope (717501 i
I On August 7,1997, health physics supported the transfer of resin from the Unit 2 chemical volume and control system to radwaste vendor's transfer skid. The inspectors reviewed the coverage, radiation work permits (RWP), and health physics practices during the resin transfer.
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Observations and9 dings
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Health physics technicians and operators transferred resin from the chemical volume I
and control system to the radwaste vendor. The transfer was conducted under RWP 97-033 and Procedure 2104.017, Revision 9, " Spent Resin Transfer." The inspectors verified that personnel performing the work were logged in on the correct
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- 16-RWP and task. Health physics technicians were knowledgeable of system flow paths and the potential for radiation levels along flow path to change during the resin transfer. Radiation postings and precautions taken by technicians coincided to the area, vhere radiation levels varied during the transfer evolution. Technicians demonstioted good ALARA practices when they temporarily extended the contamination boundary at the entrance to the high radiation area to allow personnel tc remain in low dose areas while they awaited re entry. The inspectors observed the proper use of anticontamination clothing when traversing contamination area boundaries. Rediation survey instruments w.sre calibrated and the technicians were aware of tht calibration dates without having to refer to the instruments. Good management oversight of activities was observed by the inspectors when health physics management monitored work performence as part of a program to do daily monitoring of activities, c.
Conclusions Health physics technicians demonstrated good ALARA practices when supporting a Unit 2 chemical volume control system resin transfer. Personnel performing and supporting the evolution followed applicable RWP and procedural requirements.
Health physics management monitoring of related activities was good, i
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEME_NTAL INFORM ATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensea 8. Allen, Maintenance Manager, Unit 2 C. Anderson, Plant Manager, Unit 2 G. Ashley, Licensing Supervisor B. Bement, Radiation Protection /Radwaste Manager M. Chisum, Instrumentation and Control Superintendent, Unit 2 T. Chilcoat. Oversight Specialist - Corporate M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist P. Dietrich, Maintenance Manager, Unit 1 D. Denton, Support Director R. Edington, General Manager B. Gordon, System Engineering Supervisor, Unit 2 R. Hutchinson, Vice President, Nuclear Operations R. Lane, Director, Design Engineering M. Little, Operations, Unit l B. McKelvy, Chemistry Superintendent J. McWilliams, Modifications Manager D. Mims, Director, Licensing T. Russell, Operations Manager, Unit 2 R. Rust, Shift Superintendent Operations, Unit 2 G. Sullins, System Engineering Supervisor, Unit 1 J. Vandergrif t, Director, Quality H. Williams, Plant Security Superintendent C, Zimmerman, Plant Manager, Unit 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Observations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations IP 92902: Followup Maintenance ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened 50-313/9705-01 VIO Temporary Periodic inspection of BWST Cover Not Performed (Section 01.3)
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-2-i 50 308/9705 02 NCV LER 95 007, " Manual Valves Not Locked Closed as Required,"
(Section 08.3)
50 313/9705 03 NCV LER 96 001, " Charcoal Analysis Not Completed Prior to Fuel Movement," (Section 08.6)
50 313/9705 04 URI Reactor Building Su,,p Conversion Factor Not Accurate (Section E1,1)
l C.1212d 50 368/95-003 LER Automatic Reactor Trip on Axial Shape Index During Startup Due to inadequate Monitoring and Action to Maintain Excore Power Below the Core (Section 08.2)
50 368/S, 07 LER Manual Valves Not Deing Secured in the Closed Position Due to an Error in the Procedure Change Management Process that Did Not Comply with a TS Requirement for Containment Integrity (Section 08.3)
50 313/9606 01 VIO Reactor Vessel Perturbation During Reduced Inven*ory (Section 08.4)
50 313/9606 02 VIO Hydrogen Burn During RCS Welding Activity (Section 08.5)
50 313/96 001 LER Reactor Building Purge Charcoal Filter Analysis not Completed
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Prior to Initialirradiated Fuel Movement as a Result of a Misinterpretation of TS Surveillance Requirements (Section 08.6)
50-368/9703 03 IFl EDG Lube Oil Pump Failure (Section M8.1)
50 368/9705-02 NCV LER 95 007, " Manual Valves Not Locked Closed as Required,"
(Section 08.3)
50 313/9705-03 NCV LER 96 001,_" Charcoal AnalyEis Not Completed Prior to Fuel Movement," (Section 08.6)
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e 3-LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA as low as reasonably achievable BWST borated water storage tank CEAC control element assembly calculator CEDMCS contre' element drive monitoring control system CPC core protection calculator CR condition report FME foreign material exclusion IFl inspector followup item JO job order PDR public document room RCS reactor coolant system RWP radiation work permit TS Technical Specification
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