IR 05000313/1988032
| ML20206K132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1988 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Haag R, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206K110 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-88-32, NUDOCS 8811290278 | |
| Download: ML20206K132 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM ISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report: 50-313/88-32-Licenses: DPR-51
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50-368/88-32 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
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Facility Name: ArkansasNuclearOne(ANO), Units 1and2 I
Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted:
September 16 through October 23 1988 Inspectors:
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W. D. Johnsg Senior Resident Reactor Date Inspector V k (- lb T ll 5ltf R. C. Haag, Resident Reactor Inspector Dat'e '
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///h/85 Approved:
_D. D.Whamberlain. Chief. Reactor Project Date Section A, Division of Reactor Projects
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Inspection Sumary Inspection Conducted September 16 through October 23, 1988 (Report 50-313/88-32; 50-368/88-32)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including maintenance, i
surveillanc.e, operational safety verification, followup on licensee event reports, and followup of events.
Results: Excellent performance was noted in the surveillance test and fuel handling activities which were observed.
In the design change area, one example indicated a need for more thorough consideration during the design phase of accessibility of newly installed equipment for maintenance and repair.
t The event involving the introduction of resin into the reactor coolant system raised questions about procedure adequacy and operator training in the operation of the Unit 1 spent fuel purification system. However, the licensee's response to the event was well coordinated and responsible.
One violation was identified. This violation, discussed in paragraph 3, points
out a lack of adequate controls over the use of safety-related components as
temporary supports for other components. This was considered to be an area in which suitable controls had not been established for an activity affecting
quality.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J..Levine, Executive Director, AND Site Operations B. Baker, Modifications Manager T. Baker, Technical' Support Manager E. Bickel, Health Physics Superi1tendent M. Bolanis, Health Physics Specialist B. Converse, Operations Assessment Superintendent
- A. Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent
- M. Durst, Project Engineering Superintendent E. Ewing, General Manager, Plant Support H. Greene, Quality Assurance Superintendent L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent D. Howard, Licensing Manager
- L. Humphrey, General Manager Nuclear Quality G. Jones, General Manager, Design Engineering G. Kendrick, I&C Maintenance Superintendent R. Lane, Engineering Manager
- D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor
- A. McGregor, Engineering Services Superintendent J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager B. Michalk, Mechanical Engineer
- P. Michalk, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent D. Provencher, Quality Assurance Fspervisor
- S. Quennoz, General Manager P. Rehm, Maintenance Engineer C. Shively, Plant Engineer Superintendent M. Smith, Reactor Engineering Superintendent
- S. Smith, Modifications Installation Superintendent C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor
- J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent L. Taylor, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist J. Teeter, Operations Technical Support A. Todd, Project Engineer M. Wood, Maintenance Coordinator J. Vandergrift, Operations Hanager R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Operations Technical Support Supervisor
- Present at exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including
operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
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Plant Status (Units 1 and 2)
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Unit 1 was in a refueling and maintenance outage (1R8) throughout the inspection period. Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period except for September 16-17.
During this time power was reduced to 72 percent following a dropped control element assembly.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance'with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards; and in conformance with the Technical Specifications.
The following items were con' ?dered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation'were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, radio'iogical controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of cutstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The following maintenance activities were observed:
Replacement of motor gear key in Limitorque operators for feedwater
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isolation Valves CV-2630 and CV-2680.
(Procedure 1403.163 and Job Orders 756232 and 756242). The original keys were replaced with special Type 4140 steel keys in response to IE Notice 81-08 and a recommendation from Limitorque that expanded the scope of IE Notice 81-08. During disassembly the motor shaft keyway on both operators was found to be distorted and out of tolerance. Both motors were refurbished to correct the condition of the shaft keyway.
At the completion of refuelira outage IR8 all Unit 1 Limitorque operators, Sizes SMB-3 and -4, will have the special Type 4140 steel keys installed while nine operators in Unit 2 still regt. ire key change out. The associated nine valves are nonsafety-ntiated, and the licensee plans to install the special Type 4140 ste#1 keys in the operators during the next refueling outage.
Preventive maintenance on the emergency diesel generator 4160 volt output breaker (Procedure 1412.008, Job Order 767589).
T'e scope of
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the work involved inspecting, cleaning, lubricating, and testing the breake.
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Repair of the body to bonnet leakage on decay heat suction isolation
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Valve CV-1051 (Procedure 1402.177, Job Order 766112).
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the valve repair was the replacement of the disc and lapping the
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valve seats.
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Replacement of service water return header piping for the No. 1
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emergency diesel generator on Unit 1 (Design Change Package 87-1014).
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On September 23, 1988, while observing this modification, the NRC
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inspector noted that there was no tag-out in effect for the No. 1 emergency diesel generator. At the time, the emergency diesel generator was not required to be operable due to the plant being in a
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refueling shutdown condition. The service water return piping had i
been disconnected from the engine jacket cooling water heat txchanger and service water supply t? the engine was isolated. An in,dvertent engine start and subsequent operation without service water vailable
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could cause equipment damage. Operations personnel informed the NRC inspector that an inadvertent engine start was being prevented by
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l positioning a control room switch for the engine to the lock out
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position. This switch was in the lock out position, but no hold card
was attached. Section 1 of Administrative Procedure 1000.27, "Hold and Caution Card Control," states, in part, "The control mechanisms
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established in this procedure shall be used to ensure that equipment is not inadvertently powered or operated which, as a result, would
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limit or restriction." After discussions with the NRC inspector, L
licensee personnel tagged out the engine on September 23, 1988, with
Hold Card No. 88-1-1133.
Since ne imediate damage to the engine would occur upon an inadvertent start and noting that a control room alarm would annunciate if the engine jacket cooling water temperature
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I reached its alann setpoint, the licensee had judged that a hold card was not required. While the NRC inspector considered that a hold t
card was prudent, the hold and caution card procedure was not violated.
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ReplacelugsonRelay42X-3723terminalwires(JobOrder 767962). The f
HRC inspector noted that a quality control inspector was observing
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Replacement of carbon steel service water piping and valves with stainless steel (Design Change Package 87-1013).
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The 18-month inspection of No.1 emergency diesel generator (Job I
Order 761573, Procedure 1402.066).
During maintenance on the diesel,
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the licensee found radial cracks in 15 of the 80 exhaust valve spring f
seats. Corrective action for this problem included replacement of
all spring seats and hydraulic lash adjuster assemblies, dye l
j penetrant testing of new spring seats, and visual inspection of the spring seats on No. 2 emergency diesel generator. No cracks were
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identified in the spring seats for No. 2 emergency diesel generator.
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In addition, the licensee sent the cracked seats to c metallurgical
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testing facility for determination of the cracking mechanism.
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-6-Results from this inspection were not received by the licensee prior prior to the end of the inspection period. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee actions in this area.
Assembly of N-9000 reactor coolant pump seal (Job Order 764997)
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Modification of Unit 1 No. 2 emergency diesel generator muffler
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supports (Job Order 76721, Design Change Package 88-1071)
Disassembly of P78, a Unit 1 emergency feedwater pump, for
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installation of mechanical seals (Job Order 759543, Design Change Package 83-1109).
Chilled water pump replacement to increase chilled water flow to the
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reactor building coolers to reduce Unit i reactor building
temperature (Job Order 765004, Design Change Package 88-1012).
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Installation of additional diagnostic instrumentation for safety
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systems (Design Change Package 86-1006), The NRC inspector noted that the location and orientation of certain pressure transmitters installed under this design change would make future maintenance and surveillance on the transmitters difficuit. These pressure transmitters will sense pressure on the makeup pump sud. ion and s
discharge piping. The design evaluation included with the design l
change package included consideration of accessibli s h.Nr l
maintenance and repair.
The NRC inspector discussed this with ti.e
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grineral manager of design engineering. He indicated that he is seeking to find ways to obtain more input from the maintenance department during the engineering phase of a design change.
Reinstallation of reactor building cooler Fan V5F-1A
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(Procedure 1403.008, Job Order 763786)
I Installation of a new hanger for docay heat suction 88-1052)pipinglocatedin
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the reactor building (Design Change Package
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Pressure testing the housing seal on core flood tank level
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Transmitter LT-2416 (Job Order 761568).
During the recent Unit 2 refueling outage, the licensee discovered Rosemount transmitters with the electrical housing rotated with respect to the sensor module.
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response to this condition, the licensee performed a (4 psi pressure I
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decay test on the applicable Unit 2 and selected Unit 1 anvironmentally qualified Rosemount transmitters. This test verified the seal integr ty betwe en the electrical housing and the sensor
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module. The remaining uransmitters in Unit 1, with the exception of six hot leg level transmitters, have been successfully tested.
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I licensee will test the remaining transmitters during the current refueling outage.
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M0 VATS motor load unit test on operators for core flood tink outlet
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Yalve CV-2419 and quench tank discharge Valve CV-1053 (Procedures 1403.169 and 1403.038, Job Orders 757935 and 757745).
'lignment of encraency feedwater Pump P-7A (Procedure 1402.009, Job
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Order 753543). The i,;:mp rotating assembly was removed from the pump casing to allow modification and installation of mechanical seals per Design Change Package 83-1109.
Reconnection of electrical leads on Limitorque operator for service
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water Valve CV-2216 to letdown heat Exchanger E-29A (Procedure 1403.160, Job Order 769485).
In addition to the electrical leads connected to the operator terminal strip, the NRC inspector observed the installation of Okonite splices on the motor leads.
The electrical schematic in the work package was properly reviewed by the electricians to ensure correct connection of electrical leads.
Installation of tube sleeves in Unit 1 Steam Generator A
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(Procedure 1402.151)
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Cleaning and coating of the service water 18-inch return line to the
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emergency cooling pond (Design Change Package 87D-1041 and Procedure 1409.126). To increase flow capacity and reduce future corrosion, the licensee contracted to have the corrosion prnducts removed from the service water return line by grit blasting and then have an epoxy coating applied to the line. The NRC inspectors observed portions of the set up and grit blasting of the piping and the epoxy coating of the pipe. Also observed was the chemical cleaning of the pipe which was required when the grit blasting failed to remove all the corrosion products.
The 18-month inspection of No. 2 emergency diesel generator
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(Procedure 1402.066, Job Order 761574). The NRC inspector observed various activities associated with the maintenance and initial startup of the diesel. These included adjustment of the exhaust valve clearance and fuel injector timing, slow speed and load sequence operations, and replacement of the exciter crushes.
The replacement of the brushes was required when the generator was initially loaded and two of the brushes were damaged.
Inspections revealed no additional damage to the generator and following replacement of the brushes the generator was successfully loaded to 2750 Kw.
Installation of service water flow elements for decay heat removal
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heat exchangers (Design Change Package 86-1009). This modification involved removing a three foot section of 12-inch carbon steel piping in both service water return lines from the decay heat exchangers and the installation of stainless steel spool pieces with isolable taps
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for attaching temporary flow measuring elements. The NRC inspector observed the work site af ter a section of pipe had been removed and found one end of the service water piping temporarily supported by overhead pipes. Workers had attached a chain fall to a makeup pump 6-inch suction line from the borated water storage tank and to a 4-inch nonsafety-related pipe and attached the chain fall to the free end of the service water pipe.
The nearest hanger for the 12-inch.iervice water pipe was approximately 8 feet from the free end. The sufety-related pipe had a hanger approximately 4 feet from the point where the c.hain fall was attached. The temporary support configuration had not received engineering review or approval.
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The installation plan for Design Change Package 86-1009 provided only
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general instructions to temporarily support the 12-inch headers during construction to ensure that local hangers would not be overstressed. The construction work package which provided actual
instructions for the craf t to accomplish the modification only
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required temporary supporting of the piping prior to cutting to ansure that the existing hangers would not be overstressed. Based on
these observations and discussions with licensee personnel, the NRC inspector concluded that the licensee's controls on the erection of temporary supports in the vicinity of safety-related items were
inadequate.
This is an apparcot violation of Criterion II and Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
(313;368/8832-01)
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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed the Technical Specification required surveillance testing listed below and verified that testing was performed i
in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal
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and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test
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results conforred with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that test results were reviewed by personnel other than the
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individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during (
the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The NRC intoector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Calibration of emergency feedwater flow transmitter (Procedure 1403.005, Job Order 761663)
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Quarterly measurement of the s ecific gravity for cells in Station
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Battery 006 (Procedure 1307.06. The specific gravity check was one of the measurements performed following the battery discharge test
and the subsequent recharging to verify battery operabilit,.
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Manual actuation ar.d visua! ir.spection of the reactor vesse? internal
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ventvalves(Procedure 1306.008).
Each valve was initially inspected
to verify that the valve was not in an open position, then manually opened to verify that the opening force was less than 400 pounds.
' lith the valves in the opt.. position a remote visual inspection was
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performed to identify any surface irregularities.
The NRC inspector observed this sequence of inspections for two of the vent valves.
The NRC inspector also observed the subsequent engineering inspection and evaluation of a surface irregularity on Vent Valve No. 4.
The indication was determined to be a surface scratch based on the second remote vis';al inspection which provided greater clarity than the video recording of the initial inspection.
Monthly test of 2P-4A, a Unit 2 service water pump
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(Procedure 2104.03, Supplement 1A).
Monthly test of 2P-89C, a Unit 2 high pressure safety injection pump
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(Procedure 2104.39, Supplement 3).
Monthly test of 2P-60.'4, a Unit 2 low pro,sure safety injection pump
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(Procedure 2104.40, Supplement 1).
Monthly test of 2VEF-388, a Unit P. penetration room ventilation
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system blower (Procedure 2104.43, SupplementII).
Monthly test of the Unit 2 No. 2 emergancy diesel generator
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(Procedure 2104.36). Additional licensee perscnnel were present during this test to make observations and take photographs to provide input to the corrective plan action to prevent exhaust header # ires.
During this test there were no flames, but exhaust smoke leaked from
several flanges and insulation on tne south exhaust header smoldered.
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lhe NRC resident inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's corrective actions to prevent exhaust heaoer fires.
Quarterly surveillence on Unit 1 Station Battery D07 prior to the
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performance discharge test (Procedure 1307.08).
Calibration of core flood tank Level Transmitter LT-2416
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(Procedure 1304.010, Job Order 761665).
During the calibration, the transmitter did not properly respond to the input test signal. Job I
Order 754295.as inithted to replace the transmitter.
No violations or otviations were identified.
5.
Oper_ational Safety Verification (71707) (Units 1 and 2)
'he hRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The NRC inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records and verified proper return to service of affected
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components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for
3 equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security alan was being implemented in accordance I
with the station security plan. T1e NRC inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of
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I plant activities, i
The NRC inspeccors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant
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equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
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excessive vibration. The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping i
and cleanliness conditions during the tours, i
During a plant tour on October 4,1988, the NRC inspector noted a material
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discrepancy on 2F-2688, the duplex fuel oil fi?ter on the Alnit 2 No. 2
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This duplex filter has an operating handle to allow switching fuel filters while the engine is running. The two pins
which should be installed on this filter to prevent handle rotation in the wrong direction were missing. The pins on the corresponding filter on the No.1 emergency diesel generator were in place. Job Order 768932 was prepared to replace the missing pins on 2F-2688.
The NRC inspector observed the removal of several fuel assemblies from the reactor core and their transfer to the spent fuel pool. The activities observed were well coordinated with adequate communications be'. ween the fuel handling bridge operator, the spent fuel pool bridge operator, and the control room. The corrective action associated with the failure of the Jpender to lif t up was well planned with proper attention given to safety concerns. The NRC inspector also observed fuel loading of several fuel asfemblies into the reactor core. Again the activities were well coordinated.
Good technique and patience were demonstrated during the placement of fuel assemblies that exhibited difficulty while lowering into position in the core.
The housekeeping problems identified during previous refueling outages had been corrected and the level of cleanliness appeared to be good. Refueling was completed satisfactorily with no mishandling having occurred.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
Wo violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (92700) (Units 1 and 2)
The purpose of this part of the inspection was to detemine whether the licensee had taken the corrective actions stated in the I.ER and whether the response to each event was adequate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions, and comitments.
The following LLRs were reviewed:
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(Closed)LER 313/86-002-01:
Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 design change review resulting in a design deficiency in the emergency feedwater system.
The licensee's revised 10 CFR :,0.59 review program has been implemented. This program has provided training and certification of personnel who perform the reviews.
Recent evaluations perfonned under this program are markedly better than those performed earlier, b.
(Closed)LER 368/86-012-01:
Pressurizer code safety valves l
discovered with low setpoints.
The licensee and its contractors performs.d extensive investigations and evaluations of this event, but failed to conclusively identify l
the root cause.
Piping analysis indicated that a contributing cause may have been high external loads applief to 2PSV-4633 by restrained thennal expansion. A design change was rerformed during the last
refueling outage (2R6) to reduce this loading.
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(Closed)LER 368/87-003-01:
Pressurizer heater rupture resulting in
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reactoi coolant pressure boundary leakage.
Permanent repairs to the pressurizer were completed during the last refueling outage (2R6).
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(Closed)LER 368/87-006-02:
Defective pressurizer heater seal weld resulting in a reactor coolant pressure boundary leak.
The licensee determined that the root cause of this event was the failure of the inspectors to pertarm adequate nondestructive examinations of the seal welds to identify the defective welds. As a result of this event, the licensee has increased its luality
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assurance and quality control oversight of contractor work.
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(Closed) LER 368/88-011-00: Reactor coolant system leak caused by failure of a reactor coolant pump seal cavity pressure sensing line, j
As discussed in tiRC Inspection Report 50-313;368/88-25, the licensee cocpleted an extensive review of this event and performed design
chenges prior to plant startup. The f1RC inspector reviewed Condition Report 2-88-137 and an engineering evaluation of Af40-2 reactor coolant pump seal system piping ud tubing failures. The licensee is
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continuing to evaluate the use of an improved reactor coolant pump seal design.
An improved seal design is to be installed on all four
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reactor coolant pumps on Att0-1 during *h current refueling outage i
This new design uses flexible hoses for connecting sensing l
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lines to tha seal cartridge.
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(Closed)LER 313/86-006-00: Boric acid corrosion of carbon steel high pressure injection nozzle and reactor coolant system cold leg piping.
This LER was previously reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-313;368/87-39. One item remained to be completed after that review. This was the performance of a detailed stress analysis for the repaired nozzle to further qualify extended operation.
Calculation 860-1116-02 was a three dimensional finite element stress analysis performed by a contractor and approved by the licensee on October 11, 1988.
The result of the calculation was that the repaired nozzle was qualified for the remaining plant life as required by ANSI-831.7, 1969 Edition.
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Followup on Previously Identified items (92701) (Units 1 and 2)
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(Closed)OpenItem 313/8721-04; 368/8721-04: Annual evaluation of r
licensed operators.
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The NRC inspector had questioned the licensee's practice of having a licensed operator's supervisor perform the operator's annual evaluation in cases in which the supervisor was not licensed.
The
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licensee has issued Revision 9 of Procedure 1963.63, "Operations Training Program." This procedure requires that the annual
evaluation be an operational examination ce,nducted on the simulator.
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Personnel conducting the operational examination are required to be
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licensed senior operators or persons who have successfully completed l
the education and training programs required for a senior operator's
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license. This item is closed.
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'Jnresolved Item 313/8632-02; 368/8632-02:
Limit switch compartment f
space heaters on motor operated valves were normally energized.
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The licensee has added Report SE-870116-1 to its environmental
qualification files. This report, "Evaluation of the Effects of i
Continuously Energized Space Heuters in Limitorque Motorized Valve
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i Actuators Installed in Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2." was prepared by Schneider Engineers. The report concluded that the (
actuators would remain operable following a design basis event.
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order to lengthen the qualified life of the components, the licensee j
disconnected *,he fuses for the space heaters. Work Plan 1409.30 l
accomplished this for Unit 1 in October 1987, and Work Plan 2409.123 accomplished this for Unit 2 in March 1988. This item is cloted.
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Followup of Events (93702) (Unit 1)
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The licensee found resin in the reactor vessel lower head region on
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September 30, 1988, during a reactor vessel debris inspection after all l
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fuel had been removed from the vessel.
Condition Report 1-38-2M was
initiated to document the problem and to coordinate cort ;ctive actions.
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-13-A series of system flushes was performed under Work Plan 1409.149 to retrove resin from the decay heat removal system and associated piping.
Sr.nr flushes used a filtered flowpath and others flushed any resin in the piping into the reactor vessel.
Resin was removed from the reactor vessel asing a temporary system taking a suctio1 from the lower head region and transferring the resin to a container located in the refueling canal.
After these cleanup activities, only a small amount of resin was believed to remain in the reactor vessel.
At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was preparing a startup plan to monitor reactor coolant system chemistry and maintain established limits as the remaining resin decomposes during system heatup.
Other actions underway included determination of the cause of the incident and determination of necessary
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actions tn prevent recurrence.
The source of the resin was bellet d to be the spent fuel purification demineralizer.
The licensee obtained an evalcation of the effects of having resin in the reactor coolant system fron. Babcock & Wilcox.
This evaluation included recommendations for establishing limits on the concentration of sulfur in the reactor coolant system and for monitoring and cleanup during heatup.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The licensee's actions in l
response to this incident were considered to be well coordinated and
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responsible.
The NRC inspectors will monitor the licensee's chemistry
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control during plant heatup at the end of the current refueling outage.
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The NRC inspectors also will review the licensee's root cause determination and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
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Exit Interview l
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The NRC inspectors met with Mr. S. M. Quennoz, General Manager, and other
members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspection.
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the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.
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