IR 05000313/1990028
| ML20059K393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1990 |
| From: | Murphy M, Seidle W, Singh A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059K388 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-90-28, 50-368-90-28, NUDOCS 9009210281 | |
| Download: ML20059K393 (9) | |
Text
__
.
_
_
.
__
_
_
__
_
_ _ _ _. - _ _ - - - _ - -
,
,
..
.
i I
APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
HRC Inspection Report: 50-313/90-28 Operating Licenses: DPR-51
-
50-368/90-28 NPF-6
,
Dockets: 50-373 i
50-368.
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
,
P.O. Box 551-i Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 i
Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: ANO site, Russellville Arkansas
!
Inspection Conducted: August 27-31, 1990 l
Inspectors:
L-9 / '2 /fL
,
. A. SingT, He4ctor Inspector, Test Progrcms Date
!
Section, Division of Reactor Safety
9l/t/90
-
_,
l M. E. Murphy,Oeactor Ins )ector, Test Programs Date
'
!
Section, Division of Reactor Safety
Accompanying i
Personnel:
W. C. Seidle, Chief, Test Programs Section i
!
' Division of Reactor Safety (August 30-31,1990)
.
Approved:
_
7 / /2 /1o R.c.seidle,gatorSafety et Test Programs section Date Division of Re t
Inspection Suneary
-
_ Inspection Conducted Auoust 27-31. 1990 (Report 50-313/90-28: 50-368/90-28)
Areas Inspected:' Routine, announced-inspection of post-fire safe shutdown capability reverification and assessment of the fire protection / prevention program's compliance with the requirements of Appendix R to 10=CFR Part 50.
>
90092102e31 900914 PDR ADOCK 05000313 m
Q PDC y
y
,
,
.-
.
.
.
_
.- -
.
_
-
.
_.
. _..
...
.. _
_
,
. ' '.
,.
-
.
-2-
Results: The inspectors. verified that the licensee has implemented an
.
acceptable fire protection / prevention program.for Units 1-and 2.
The overall
,
fire protection / prevention program is considered to be a strength, especially
'
in the area of the fire barrier penetration control program.. However, some weaknesses were identified in the area of the alternate safe shutdown procedure and operator training for Unit 2, and the emergency lighting for Units.1 and 2.
l
.
t
<f
,
a b
+
V V
i-h
.
'I
..-
-
-
.
. - ~ -
..
. --
.
. - -
-
.
-.
....
.. -..
.
d
.,
,,
o
'
-
.
r-3-j i
!
)
DETAILS i
i
.;
1.
PERSONS CONTACTED l
- D. Boyd, Licensing Specialist
.i
- S. Cecil,Init 2, Shift Supervisor
'
- R. Cooper, Unit 2 Shift Supervisor
- R. Edington, Operations Manager,-Unit 2
- R. A. Feniech, Plant Manager, Unit 2
- J. J. Fisicaro, Manager, Licensing
- L. W. Humphrey, General Manager, Quality Assurance l
- D. B. Lomax, Superintendent, Engineering Programs
- R. D. Rispoli, Fire Protection Supervisor, Engineering Programs J
- J. D. Vandergrift, Plant Manager, Unit I l
- J. W. Yelverton, Director, Operations NRC P. Harrell, Project Engineer, DRP
- L. Smith, Resident Inspector, ANO
- C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector.-ANO
T. Alexion, Project Manager, NRR
The inspectors'also interviewed other AP&L personnel during the inspection.
l
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting conducted on August 31, 1990 2.
FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ITEMS (92701)-
(CLOSED)OpenItems(313/8819-01 368/8819-01):
Fire alarm system for Units 1
- ;
_
and 2 do not annunciate subsequent trouble alarms (reflash) after an initial alarm is silenced, in accordance with National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA)StandardNo. 720, 1975. The licensee issutd Design Changes 85-1085,for Unit 1 and 87-2068 for Unit 2 to bring the fire' alarm systems for both units in
.
conformance with NFPA Standard No. 72.D. 1975.
.
.
.
.
.
.
<
l The inspectors reviewed completed Design Changes 85-1085 for Unit I and 87-2068
for Unit 2.
The f tre alarm systems for both unitt were found to be. in conformance with NFPA Stat.dard No. 72D, 1975. Both open items are' considered closed.
(OPEN) Unresolved Item (368/8714-06): This item remains open pending resolution botween the licenset ind the-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
. i concerning'the-problems identified in NRC Inspection. Report 50-313/87-14; 50-368/87-14,~ paragraphs 8.c and 10.b(1), concerning the methods of. control for'
4:
j
,
specific high/ low pressure inter: faces against. inadvertent activation by fitv.
-induced spurious signals, d
.
-
.
-.
-
.
-
-
--.
-
- - - -.
.
. --
- -
. -
- --
.
_ _ _ _.
!
a
..
,
i j
.
-4-i The licensee had taken no action on this item, but did commit to provide additional information and justification for their position regarding this item. This item remains open.
]
I 3.
ONSITE FOLLOWUP _0F LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERS) (UNITS 1 AND 2)
(92700)
!
The' inspectors reviewed six LERs to verify that reporting requirements had been-
,
met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate,
'
generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.
The inspectors determined that unreviewed safety questions and violations of Technical Specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had been adequately described.
As a result of this review, the following LERs were closed based upon the licensee's corrective actions and programs in place:
o (CLOSED)LER 313/89-025, " Failure To Perform Surveillance Of Fire Barriers Due To Personnel Error" o
(CLOSED)LER 313/89 030, " inadequate Review Of The Code Associated With Fire Barriers Where the Potential Existed For The Spread Of Combustible Liquids Resulted In Nonfunctional Fire Barriers Between The Emergency i
j Diesel Generator Rooms" i
o (CLOSED)LER 313/90-004, " Degraded Fire Barrier Penetration As A Result Of Personnel Oversight And Procedural Inadequacy" o
(CLOSED)LER 368/86-015, " Inadequate Procedure And Personnel Error Result in Technical Specifications Penetration Fire Carriers Not Being
,
Surve111anced Within The Required Surveillance Interval"
o (CLOSED)LER 368/89-025, " Personnel Error Resulted-In' Hot Properly l
Identifying Technical Specification Fire Barriers Rendering The Fire
'
Barrier Penetrations Inoperable Due To failure To Perform Surveillance Requirements Within The Appropriate Time Interval" o
(CLOSED)LER 368/90-013. " Degraded Fire Barrier Penetration Caused By Personnel Error Associated With The Plant Hodification Process" 4.
FIRE PROTECTION / PREVENTION PROGRAM, UNITS 1 AND 2 (64704)
This part of the inspection was conducted to determine that the licensee had established and was implementing a program for fire protection and prevention
in conformance uith regulatory requirements. Technical Specifications, and industry guides and standards.
The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program manual and implementing administrative procedures. This review verified that the licensee had technically adequate procedures to implement the fire protection program.
Procedural guidance was provided to control combustible material and reduce-
,
i
.I
'
x
-.
-
-
--
-
-
-
-.
-.
-
-
--
-
-
-
..
,
-
,
i-5-
>
fire hazards. Administrative procedures provided for maintenance and surveillances on fire suppression, detection, and support equipment. Personnel training, qualifications, and responsibilities were adequately provided.
Maintenance evolutions, which significantly increase fire risk, were properly -
!
controlled.
The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the fire suppression water system and verified that it was operable, as required by the Technical Specifications.
'
A tour of accessible areas of the plant was conducted to assess general area
conditions, work activities in : progress, and the vitual conditions of fire
>
protection systems and equipment. Combustible materials and flammable and combustible liquid and gas usage were restricted or properly controlled in areas containing safety-related equipment and components.
Items checked included position of selected valves, fire barrier conditions, hose stations.
-
hose houses, halon system lineups, fire lockers, and fire extinguishers for type, location, accessibility, and condition.
There were no construction activities in process in the toured areas. Thara was some maintenance work and surveillance testing noted. General housekeeping conditions were found to be very good.
,
fire protection systems and equipment installed for protection of safety-related
areas were found to be functional and tested in accordance with requirements--
specified in the Technical Specifications. Fire brigade equipment, incluaing t
emergency breathing apparatus, was found to be stored and maintained properly.
,
The licensee has experienced significant-problems in the past' few years with l
fire barrier penetrations. The problems have involved identification of l
barrier seals from initial construction, degraded seals because of poor work performance, surveillance test inspection problems with. penetration seals and
proper control of design changes that create or affect penetration seals. The
'
licensee has initiated a major program to establish base-line fire barrier penetration identification and to develop a computerized data base and control l
program called " Penetration Leg.
This program involves an ongoing effort to establish acceptance criteria, personnel training in the criteria, assignment.
!
of inspection responsibilities within the various creft areas, and
!
consolidation of the data base under the responsibility of the fire protection j.
group, Improvements have already been made in the development, review, and control of design changes.
The licensee has chosen to do a complete (g of Technical Specifications allow the samplin fire barrier penetrations.
i.e.,
,
L 100 percent)sampleonaninterimbasisuntilthepentrationlogdatabaseis-
'
revalidated. This is scheduled to be completed in December 1991. This computer program is considered to be a very useful maragement tool.and a strength in.the fire protection / prevention program.
The inspectors reviewed fire brigade training and drill records. The records were in order and confirmed that training and drills were being conducted at the specified intervals.
.
'
,
. -
--
--
-
-
.-
-
-.__-.-
--
.
_
'
.,
,-
L-6-
)
i
Quality assurance audits for the past 2 years were reviewed by the inspectors.
These audits were identified as: QAP-19-88, dated August 18, 1988, and
,
QAP-19-89, dated October 9,1989, both entitled, " Quality Assurance Program.
a Audit Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program." System and equipment alterations, tests, surveillances, maintenance, records, and overall program procedures were addressed. Discrepancies identified were formally presented to i
the affected organizations. Responses were tracked to close out, and actions taken were reviewed for adequacy.
)
5.
POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY (64150)
'
The purpose of this part of the inspection was to deter =*ne whether the licensee has maintained the post-fire safe shutdunn capability that was verified during the initial validation inspection conducted from May 4-8, and
!
June 8-12,1987(NRC.InspectionReport 50-313/87-14). This inspection consisted of post-fire / alternate safe shutdown procedure review and walkdown,-
.
training, and emergency lighting.-
t 5.1 Post-Fire / Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure (Unit 1)
-)
,
i The licensee has provided an alternate safe shutdown capability independent of the control room and cable spreading room, in the event of a fire in the main
!
control room and/or cable spreading room, which results in evacuation'of the
"
control room. The alternate shutdown was accomplished by procedural means, with actions performed at local shutdown stations or locally at the equipment.
During a drill conducted on August 29, 1990, the licensee implemented Procedure 1203.02, Revision 7, " Alternate Shutdown," dated August 11, 1989.-
In i
accordance with the alternate shutdown procedure, a crew of five individuals
!
simulhted the.thutdown of the plant from outside the control room.
>
The crew consisted of a shift supervisor, shift administrative assistant, shift senior reactor operator, and two other reactor operators. The shift supervisor was in charge of the normal operating shift and continued in that role upon entry into the procedure.
-
5.1.1 Procedure Walkdown During Drill i
The licensee was requested by the inspectors to walkdown Alternate Shutdown Procedure 1203.02, Revision 7, using five individuals randomly selected by the r
inspectors from the licensee's operating staff. Since the procedure is symptom
?
oriented, the following initial r.onditions were given:
o Fire in the control room of sufficient size to require evacuation o
Coincident loss of offsite power o
Both standby diesel generators fail to auto start i
,
Two inspectors accompanied the shift supervisor and the shift administrative-assistanttothetechnicalsupportcenter(TSC).
Initial reactivity. control was provided manually by scraming the reactor just prior to evacuating the r
I
- -.
_
_
- _ _
-
,
_
--
-.
. _. _..
.
_
.-
._.
.
_
_
___._.
.
_
_ _
._...
..
..
j
.
l-7-
!
.
l t
,
control room. The shift supervisor directed the remainder of the-shutdown from the TSC by using the telephones to communicate with shif t personnel deployed-
!
throughout the. plant. Monitoring of plant parameters was provided by either of
'
,
two redundant safety parameter display system (SPDS) terminals in the TSC. The l
L senior reactor operator and the_other reactor operators were also accompanied
'
by the inspectors ~
The operators' actions were monitored from the TSC as they
.
made their call-ins to the shift supervisor.
The operators simulated plant shutdown from outside the control room. The procedure was halted at Step 10 of shift supervisor's Procedure Section A,-
which demonstrated that a stable hot shutdown could be-achieved and e
,
!
controlled rate cooldown was to be commenced. The drill demonstrated that the o>erators were knowledgeable of the procedure and of the plant.
In addition to observing the operators' performance during the walkdown of the alternate safe i t shutdown procedure, operations technical support and operator training
'
personnel were interviewed concerning operator training on this procedure. The
[
training covered safe shutdown equipment, alternate shutdown procedure, and the
'
fire protection program manual. This program included classroom instruction,
- ;
walkdown, simulation; and hands on operating experience. The records reviewed
~
indicated that a 2-year requalification cycle was being maintained.
5.2 Post-Fire / Alternate Sefe Shutdown Procedure (Unit 2)'
The licensee has provided alternate safe chutdown capability for a fire
[
occurring in any of the following areas, which results in functional loss of control room instrumentation and controls and requires evacuation of the control room:
o Cable spreading room o
Control room o
Core protection' calculator room
.
I o
Healti physics office i
o Upper south electrical penc ration room i
o Control room printer room The simulated alternate safe shutdow', was accomplished by procedural means with actions performed at local shutdown stations or locally at the equipment. The i
licensee implemented Procedure 2203.14, " Alternate Shutdown, Revision 8, dated October 5, 1988, for safe shutdown ficm outside the control room. ~The
'
alternate safe shutdown procedure required a crew of five individuals to shutdown the plant outside the control room. The crew consisted of a shift supervisor, a shif t administrative assistant, a shif t senior reactor operator, and two other reactor operators. The shift supervisor was in charge of the i
norr 31 operating shift-and he continued in that role upon entry into the l
procedure.
,
P c
,y-
a e..-,,-+
a,,,,
en..
,
,
y
-
g
_
__._
_
_ _. - _ _ _ _ __ _
_ _
_
,
j
.
,..
.
i
.
,
i
,
,
5.2.1 ProcidureWalkdownDuringDrill
The licensee was requested by-the inspectors to walkdown Alternate Shutdown
+
Procedure 2203.14 Revision 8, using five individuals randomly selected by the
,
inspectors from the operating staff. Since the procedure is symptom oriented,
!
the following initial conditions were presented:
,
'
' o Fire in control room of sufficient size to require evacuation o
Coincident loss of offsite power
.
o Both emergency feedwater pumps fail to auto start
>
Two inspectors accompanied the shift supervisor and the shif t administrative assistant to the TSC.
Initial reactivity control was provided manually by
scramming the reactor prior to evacuating the control room. The shift supervisor directed the remainder of the shutdown from the TSC using radios to
- !
,
'
connunicate with shift personnel deployed throughout the plant.
When the shift supervisor and accompaning inspectors arrived at the TSC the-i shift supervisor immedi:tely tried to brinC the Unit 2 SPDS on line. He was unable to do so as the system was down for maintenance.
(This was not part of
,
the drill.) This required transferring to the Unit 1 SPDS as a backup in
'
calling up the Unit 2 parameters. The shift supervisor attempted, for several
i minutes, to call up the Unit 2 data display but was unsuccessful. This revealed that the shift supervisor apparently lacked familiarity with the procedure and equipment. However, with assistance,'the shift supervisor.was
,
able to call up the Unit 2 parameters and the drill was continued. The senior reactnr operator and other operators were also accompanied by the inspectors.
i These operators' actions were monitored from the TSC as they made thair-l call-ins to the shift supervisor. The crew simulated plant shutdown from i
l outside the control room.
The procedure was stopped at Step 13 of shift supervisor procedure, Section 1,
which demonstrated that stable hot standby natural circulation conditions could
'
be achieved and controlled rate.of cooldown established. The crew demonstrated adequate training and familiarity with the procedure throughout the walkdown
,
with the exception of the shift supervisor's lack of familiarity with SPDS as stated above.
- During the drill, the inspectors.noted apparent procedural deficiencies, and these were identified to the licensee. The licensee took prompt corrective-i action to retrain the senior reactor operators on the SPDS. According to a licensee representative, some 17 out of 19 senior reactor operators on Unit 2
,
were retrained prior to the exit meeting. The licensee has comitted to review its training program in the area of alternate safe shutdown and the procedural deficiencies in a timely manner. This was identified as a weakness in the licensee's safe shutdown procedures.
-
-
a D
%-
.
w
.
r
e e
.-e*
,r_
.r w
+
.
,..,
.
-9-
,
o l
5.3 Emergency 1.ighting System - Units 1 and 2 The inspectors examined the emergency lighting system required for safe shutdown. Section J of Appendix R requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto..
-
The licensee has installed all of the emergency lighting units required for the operation of safe shutdown equipment in the event of a fire that forces evacuation of the control room.
During the alternate shutdown procedure walkdown.for both units, the inspectors observed adequate lightit; at work stations and at the equipment. However, emergency lighting in access routes to the components and controllers was poor.
At the exit the licensee comitted to reevaluate the emergency-lighting program for both units access areas in a timely manner. This was identified as a weakness in the licensee's fire protection program.
6.
EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was held August 31, 1990, with personnel indicated in paragraph 1 of this report. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and findings were sumarized. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
i i
- i i
I
'
'
.3 I
__
,