IR 05000313/1990028

Insp Rept 50-313/90-28 & 50-368/90-28 on 900827-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas inspected:post- Fire Safe Shutdown Capability Reverification & Assessment of Fire Protection/Prevention Programs

ML20059K393
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/12/1990
From:	Murphy M, Seidle W, Singh A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059K388	List: IR 05000313/1990028 ML20059K385
References
50-313-90-28, 50-368-90-28, NUDOCS 9009210281
Download: ML20059K393 (9)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

HRC Inspection Report: 50-313/90-28 Operating Licenses: DPR-51 -

50-368/90-28 NPF-6 ,

Dockets: 50-373 i 50-36 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In ,

P.O. Box 551 -i Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 i Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2  ;

Inspection At: ANO site, Russellville Arkansas  !

Inspection Conducted: August 27-31, 1990 l

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Inspectors: L-

. A. SingT, He4ctor Inspector, Test Progrcms 9 / '2 /fL Date

! Section, Division of Reactor Safety

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_, 9l/t/90 l M. E. Murphy,Oeactor Ins )ector, Test Programs Date '

! Section, Division of Reactor Safety  ;

Accompanying i i

Personnel: W. C. Seidle, Chief, Test Programs Section

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' Division of Reactor Safety (August 30-31,1990) .

Approved: _ 7 / /2 /1o et Test Programs section Date R.c.seidle,gatorSafety Division of Re t

Inspection Suneary -

_ Inspection Conducted Auoust 27-31. 1990 (Report 50-313/90-28: 50-368/90-28)

Areas Inspected:' Routine, announced-inspection of post-fire safe shutdown capability reverification and assessment of the fire protection / prevention program's compliance with the requirements of Appendix R to 10=CFR Part 5 >

90092102e31 900914 *

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Results: The inspectors. verified that the licensee has implemented an .

acceptable fire protection / prevention program.for Units 1-and 2. The overall ,

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fire protection / prevention program is considered to be a strength, especially in the area of the fire barrier penetration control program. . However, some weaknesses were identified in the area of the alternate safe shutdown procedure and operator training for Unit 2, and the emergency lighting for Units.1 and l

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DETAILS i i

.; PERSONS CONTACTED l AP&L

• D. Boyd, Licensing Specialist .i

• S. Cecil,Init 2, Shift Supervisor '

• R. Cooper, Unit 23 Shift Supervisor

• R. Edington, Operations Manager,-Unit 2

• R. A. Feniech, Plant Manager, Unit 2 1

• J. J. Fisicaro, Manager, Licensing 1

• L. W. Humphrey, General Manager, Quality Assurance l

• D. B. Lomax, Superintendent, Engineering Programs  :

• R. D. Rispoli, Fire Protection Supervisor, Engineering Programs J

• J. D. Vandergrift, Plant Manager, Unit I l

• J. W. Yelverton, Director, Operations l NRC P. Harrell, Project Engineer, DRP

• L. Smith, Resident Inspector, ANO

• C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector.-ANO 1 T. Alexion, Project Manager, NRR

The inspectors'also interviewed other AP&L personnel during the inspectio l

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting conducted on August 31, 1990 FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ITEMS (92701)-

(CLOSED)OpenItems(313/8819-01 368/8819-01): Fire alarm system for Units 1

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and 2 do not annunciate subsequent trouble alarms (reflash) after an initial alarm is silenced, in accordance with National Fire Protection Association 1 (NFPA)StandardNo. 720, 1975. The licensee issutd Design Changes 85-1085,for Unit 1 and 87-2068 for Unit 2 to bring the fire' alarm systems for both units in .

conformance with NFPA Standard No. 72.D. 197 .

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l The inspectors reviewed completed Design Changes 85-1085 for Unit I and 87-2068 1

for Unit 2. The f tre alarm systems for both unitt were found to be. in conformance with NFPA Stat.dard No. 72D, 1975. Both open items are' considered close (OPEN) Unresolved Item (368/8714-06)

This item remains open pending resolution botween the licenset ind the-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation .i concerning'the-problems identified in NRC Inspection. Report 50-313/87-14;

, 50-368/87-14,~ paragraphs 8.c and 10.b(1), concerning the methods of. control for' 4: j specific high/ low pressure inter: faces against. inadvertent activation by fitv .

-induced spurious signals,

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The licensee had taken no action on this item, but did commit to provide additional information and justification for their position regarding this item. This item remains ope ]

I ONSITE FOLLOWUP _0F LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERS) (UNITS 1 AND 2) (92700) !

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The' inspectors reviewed six LERs to verify that reporting requirements had been- ,

met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, '

generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complet The inspectors determined that unreviewed safety questions and violations of Technical Specifications, license conditions, or other regulatory requirements had been adequately describe As a result of this review, the following LERs were closed based upon the licensee's corrective actions and programs in place:

o (CLOSED)LER 313/89-025, " Failure To Perform Surveillance Of Fire Barriers Due To Personnel Error" o (CLOSED)LER 313/89 030, " inadequate Review Of The Code Associated With Fire Barriers Where the Potential Existed For The Spread Of Combustible i

Liquids Resulted In Nonfunctional Fire Barriers Between The Emergency j Diesel Generator Rooms" i

o (CLOSED)LER 313/90-004, " Degraded Fire Barrier Penetration As A Result Of Personnel Oversight And Procedural Inadequacy" o (CLOSED)LER 368/86-015, " Inadequate Procedure And Personnel Error Result

, in Technical Specifications Penetration Fire Carriers Not Being Surve111anced Within The Required Surveillance Interval"  ;

o (CLOSED)LER 368/89-025, " Personnel Error Resulted-In' Hot Properly l Identifying Technical Specification Fire Barriers Rendering The Fire

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Barrier Penetrations Inoperable Due To failure To Perform Surveillance Requirements Within The Appropriate Time Interval" o (CLOSED)LER 368/90-013. " Degraded Fire Barrier Penetration Caused By Personnel Error Associated With The Plant Hodification Process" FIRE PROTECTION / PREVENTION PROGRAM, UNITS 1 AND 2 (64704)

This part of the inspection was conducted to determine that the licensee had established and was implementing a program for fire protection and prevention 1 in conformance uith regulatory requirements. Technical Specifications, and industry guides and standard The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program manual and implementing administrative procedures. This review verified that the licensee had technically adequate procedures to implement the fire protection progra Procedural guidance was provided to control combustible material and reduce-

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fire hazards. Administrative procedures provided for maintenance and surveillances on fire suppression, detection, and support equipment. Personnel training, qualifications, and responsibilities were adequately provide Maintenance evolutions, which significantly increase fire risk, were properly - !

controlle The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the fire suppression water system and verified that it was operable, as required by the Technical Specification '

A tour of accessible areas of the plant was conducted to assess general area 1 conditions, work activities in : progress, and the vitual conditions of fire >

protection systems and equipment. Combustible materials and flammable and combustible liquid and gas usage were restricted or properly controlled in areas containing safety-related equipment and component Items checked included position of selected valves, fire barrier conditions, hose station hose houses, halon system lineups, fire lockers, and fire extinguishers for type, location, accessibility, and conditio There were no construction activities in process in the toured areas. Thara was some maintenance work and surveillance testing noted. General housekeeping conditions were found to be very goo ,

fire protection systems and equipment installed for protection of safety-related areas were found to be functional and tested in accordance with requirements--

specified in the Technical Specifications. Fire brigade equipment, incluaing t emergency breathing apparatus, was found to be stored and maintained properl ,

The licensee has experienced significant-problems in the past' few years with l fire barrier penetrations. The problems have involved identification of i l barrier seals from initial construction, degraded seals because of poor work performance, surveillance test inspection problems with. penetration seals and

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proper control of design changes that create or affect penetration seals. The licensee has initiated a major program to establish base-line fire barrier 1 penetration identification and to develop a computerized data base and control program called " Penetration Leg. This program involves an ongoing effort to l establish acceptance criteria, personnel training in the criteria, assignmen l i

! of inspection responsibilities within the various creft areas, and

! consolidation of the data base under the responsibility of the fire protection group, Improvements have already been made in the development, review, and control of design change Technical Specifications allow the samplin

, fire barrier penetration The licensee has chosen to do a complete i.e.,(g of L 100 percent)sampleonaninterimbasisuntilthepentrationlogdatabaseis- '

revalidated. This is scheduled to be completed in December 1991. This I computer program is considered to be a very useful maragement tool.and a l strength in.the fire protection / prevention progra The inspectors reviewed fire brigade training and drill records. The records were in order and confirmed that training and drills were being conducted at the specified interval l

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Quality assurance audits for the past 2 years were reviewed by the inspector These audits were identified as: QAP-19-88, dated August 18, 1988, and ,

QAP-19-89, dated October 9,1989, both entitled, " Quality Assurance Progra a Audit Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program." System and equipment alterations, tests, surveillances, maintenance, records, and overall program

procedures were addressed. Discrepancies identified were formally presented to i the affected organizations. Responses were tracked to close out, and actions taken were reviewed for adequac ) POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY (64150)

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The purpose of this part of the inspection was to deter =*ne whether the licensee has maintained the post-fire safe shutdunn capability that was verified during the initial validation inspection conducted from May 4-8, and  !

June 8-12,1987(NRC.InspectionReport 50-313/87-14). This inspection consisted of post-fire / alternate safe shutdown procedure review and walkdown,- .

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5.1 Post-Fire / Alternate Safe Shutdown Procedure (Unit 1)

i The licensee has provided an alternate safe shutdown capability independent of the control room and cable spreading room, in the event of a fire in the main  !

control room and/or cable spreading room, which results in evacuation'of the "

control room. The alternate shutdown was accomplished by procedural means, with actions performed at local shutdown stations or locally at the equipmen During a drill conducted on August 29, 1990, the licensee implemented Procedure 1203.02, Revision 7, " Alternate Shutdown," dated August 11, 1989.- In i accordance with the alternate shutdown procedure, a crew of five individuals  !

simulhted the.thutdown of the plant from outside the control roo >

The crew consisted of a shift supervisor, shift administrative assistant, shift senior reactor operator, and two other reactor operators. The shift supervisor was in charge of the normal operating shift and continued in that role upon

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entry into the procedur .1.1 Procedure Walkdown During Drill i

The licensee was requested by the inspectors to walkdown Alternate Shutdown Procedure 1203.02, Revision 7, using five individuals randomly selected by the r inspectors from the licensee's operating staff. Since the procedure is symptom  ?

oriented, the following initial r.onditions were given:

o Fire in the control room of sufficient size to require evacuation o Coincident loss of offsite power

, o Both standby diesel generators fail to auto start i Two inspectors accompanied the shift supervisor and the shift administrative-assistanttothetechnicalsupportcenter(TSC). Initial reactivity. control was provided manually by scraming the reactor just prior to evacuating the r

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control room. The shift supervisor directed the remainder of the-shutdown from the TSC by using the telephones to communicate with shif t personnel deployed-  !

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throughout the. plant. Monitoring of plant parameters was provided by either of '

l two redundant safety parameter display system (SPDS) terminals in the TSC. The L senior reactor operator and the_other reactor operators were also accompanied '

by the inspectors ~ The operators' actions were monitored from the TSC as they

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made their call-ins to the shift superviso The operators simulated plant shutdown from outside the control room. The procedure was halted at Step 10 of shift supervisor's Procedure Section A,-

, which demonstrated that a stable hot shutdown could be-achieved and e

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controlled rate cooldown was to be commenced. The drill demonstrated that the o>erators were knowledgeable of the procedure and of the plant. In addition to observing the operators' performance during the walkdown of the alternate safe i t'

shutdown procedure, operations technical support and operator training personnel were interviewed concerning operator training on this procedure. The [

training covered safe shutdown equipment, alternate shutdown procedure, and the '

fire protection program manual. This program included classroom instruction, -;

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walkdown, simulation; and hands on operating experience. The records reviewed indicated that a 2-year requalification cycle was being maintaine .2 Post-Fire / Alternate Sefe Shutdown Procedure (Unit 2)'

The licensee has provided alternate safe chutdown capability for a fire [

occurring in any of the following areas, which results in functional loss of control room instrumentation and controls and requires evacuation of the control room:

o Cable spreading room o Control room o Core protection' calculator room .

I o Healti physics office i o Upper south electrical penc ration room i o Control room printer room The simulated alternate safe shutdow', was accomplished by procedural means with actions performed at local shutdown stations or locally at the equipment. The i licensee implemented Procedure 2203.14, " Alternate Shutdown, Revision 8, dated

October 5, 1988, for safe shutdown ficm outside the control room. ~The '

alternate safe shutdown procedure required a crew of five individuals to shutdown the plant outside the control room. The crew consisted of a shift supervisor, a shif t administrative assistant, a shif t senior reactor operator, and two other reactor operators. The shift supervisor was in charge of the i norr 31 operating shift-and he continued in that role upon entry into the l procedur ,

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5.2.1 ProcidureWalkdownDuringDrill  :

The licensee was requested by-the inspectors to walkdown Alternate Shutdown +

Procedure 2203.14 Revision 8, using five individuals randomly selected by the ,

inspectors from the operating staff. Since the procedure is symptom oriented, !

the following initial conditions were presented: ,

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'o Fire in control room of sufficient size to require evacuation o Coincident loss of offsite power .

o Both emergency feedwater pumps fail to auto start >

Two inspectors accompanied the shift supervisor and the shif t administrative assistant to the TSC. Initial reactivity control was provided manually by *

scramming the reactor prior to evacuating the control room. The shift

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supervisor directed the remainder of the shutdown from the TSC using radios to -!

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connunicate with shift personnel deployed throughout the plan When the shift supervisor and accompaning inspectors arrived at the TSC the -i shift supervisor immedi:tely tried to brinC the Unit 2 SPDS on line. He was unable to do so as the system was down for maintenance. (This was not part of '

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the drill.) This required transferring to the Unit 1 SPDS as a backup in calling up the Unit 2 parameters. The shift supervisor attempted, for several *

i minutes, to call up the Unit 2 data display but was unsuccessful. This revealed that the shift supervisor apparently lacked familiarity with the

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procedure and equipment. However, with assistance,'the shift supervisor.was able to call up the Unit 2 parameters and the drill was continued. The senior i

reactnr operator and other operators were also accompanied by the inspectors.

l These operators' actions were monitored from the TSC as they made thair-call-ins to the shift supervisor. The crew simulated plant shutdown from i l outside the control roo ;

The procedure was stopped at Step 13 of shift supervisor procedure, Section 1, which demonstrated that stable hot standby natural circulation conditions could '

be achieved and controlled rate.of cooldown established. The crew demonstrated adequate training and familiarity with the procedure throughout the walkdown ,

with the exception of the shift supervisor's lack of familiarity with SPDS as stated abov *

During the drill, the inspectors.noted apparent procedural deficiencies, and these were identified to the licensee. The licensee took prompt corrective- i action to retrain the senior reactor operators on the SPDS. According to a licensee representative, some 17 out of 19 senior reactor operators on Unit 2 ,

were retrained prior to the exit meeting. The licensee has comitted to review its training program in the area of alternate safe shutdown and the procedural deficiencies in a timely manner. This was identified as a weakness in the

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licensee's safe shutdown procedures.

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5.3 Emergency 1.ighting System - Units 1 and 2 The inspectors examined the emergency lighting system required for safe shutdown. Section J of Appendix R requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes theret The licensee has installed all of the emergency lighting units required for the operation of safe shutdown equipment in the event of a fire that forces evacuation of the control roo During the alternate shutdown procedure walkdown.for both units, the inspectors observed adequate lightit; at work stations and at the equipment. However, emergency lighting in access routes to the components and controllers was poo At the exit the licensee comitted to reevaluate the emergency-lighting program for both units access areas in a timely manner. This was identified as a weakness in the licensee's fire protection progra . EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was held August 31, 1990, with personnel indicated in paragraph 1 of this report. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and findings were sumarized. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector i i-i i

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