IR 05000313/1989002
| ML20246G413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1989 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Haag R, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246G400 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-89-02, 50-313-89-2, 50-368-89-02, 50-368-89-2, GL-88-17, NUDOCS 8903170399 | |
| Download: ML20246G413 (12) | |
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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-313/89-02 Licenses:
DPR-51 50-368/89-02 NPF-6 Dockets:
50-313 50-368
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Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2 l
Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: January 1-31, 1989 I
Inspectors:
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uw W.D.Jotpon,SeniorResidentReactor Da'te J
Inspector l
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_D9-89 i
R. C. Haag, Residght Reactor Inspector Date
ky'/Y hl 2,- f- @f d
il. ~V. - Aruar~ React ~or Inspector Date-Approved:
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2'2 7' N i
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D~~FVChamberlain, Chief, Reactor Project Date l
Section A, Division of Reactor Projects l
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i 8903170399 390309 hDR ADOCK 030003;3 PDC
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-2-Inspection Summary
_I_nspection Conducted January 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-313/89-02; 50-368/89-02)-
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Areas Inspected: ' Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status?
I followup on previously identified items,' followup on -licensee event ' reports,.
followup of. events, operational safety verification, monthly maintenance'
observation, and monthly surveillance observation.
Results: The Unit'1 trip-on January 20, 1989, Land the associated problems received significant attention from the NRC.- The initial _ followup _ inspection
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was performed by(the NRC inspector,then ' subsequently reviewed by an Augmented Inspection Team AIT)'and is documented in'NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-03; 50-368/89-03..-Items. associated with the' trip will be the subject of additional NRC inspection.
The timeliness of submitting required information. and the failure to report is -
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an area that resulted in two apparent violations.
The first apparent violation j
discussed in paragraph 3 involved the failureLto provide' responses to notices i
of violation within the required = time. The second apparent violation discussed-
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in paragraph 4 involved the;failureito comply with reporting requirements. The
-large number of-examples for these two violations indicates that increased
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management attention is needed when addressing these issues..
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted q
- J. Levine, Executive Director, AN0 Site Operations
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D. Bennett, Mechanical Engineer
A. Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent l
D. Crabtree, Engineering Services Supervisor i
B. Eaton, Manager,. Mechanical, Civil and Structural Design
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- E. Ewing, General Manager, Plant Support
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J. Gobell, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer H. Greene, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent
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C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering. Supervisor.
- D. Howard, Licensing Manager l
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- L. Humphrey, General Manager Nuclear Quality
- R. Lane, Engineering Manager
- D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor R. Lovett, Electrical. Maintenance Engineer
~*J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager 2. Michalk, Mechanical Engineer.
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- P. Michalk, Nuclear Safety and. Licensing 'pecialist V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- S. Quennoz, General-Manager C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor L. Taylor, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist
- J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent J. Vandergrift, Operations Manager
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- R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager..
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- Present at exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including L
operators, technicians, and administrative-personnel.
2.
Plant Status (Units 1 and 2)
Unit 1 operated at 100 percent power until January 20, 1989, when the reactor tripped because of_a turbine trip. Voltage fluctuations from the main generator initiated a generator lockout and the subsequent turbine
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trip. The unit remained shut down through the end of the inspection period
to investigate and correct equipment problems that were identified as a result of the trip.
Unit 2 operated at, or near, 80 percent power to investigate and correct L
main condenser tube leaks until January 6,~ 1989. The unit.was then shut down due to a crack in a weld for the reactor coolant pump seal-sensing line. After replacement of the reactor coolant pump seal, the unit -
returned to 100 percent power operation on January 17, 1989,'and remained at power though the end of the inspection period.
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Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
(92702)-
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During review of previously identified items, the NRC inspector noted delinquent responses to several;recent inspection reports. There were three examples in which the' licensee failed to submit 'a response.to a'
g notice of violation ~within the'specified time as required by 10 CFR-l Part 2.201.
An extension of the response time for the notice.of violation i
in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/88-29; 50-368/88-29 was' granted, however, the licensee's response failed to meet the' extended response date.
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NRC Inspection' Reports. 50-313/88-25; 50-368/88-25-and 50-313/88-26; 50-368/88-26, the licensee:did not; request an extension of the response
. time for the notices of violation. The:11censee's responses to both of a
these inspection ~ reports were } late;. All.three of the above inspection:
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reports were issued in the-last'4 months of 1988.
Failure to submit'
responses to the notices of violation within1the specified' time is an apparent violation (313; 368/8902-01).
'In addition, the NRC inspector noted that the licensee failed ~to submit a response within the time requested by NRC Inspection Report 50-313/88-17; 50-368/88-17.
This report..which dealt with emergency operating procedures, requested a response within 30 days defining the licensee's-position on disputed items and plans for corrective action.within 30 days.
An extension to the requested response date was discussed,and agreed upon -
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However, the-licensee's response.was still submitted after the agreed upon date.
l 4.
Followup on Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (Units 1.and 2)
(92700)
During a review of issued LERs and other reports, the NRC inspector identified the-following three examples in which the licensee failed to comply with applicable reporting requirements:.
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A review by the NRC inspector of LERs issued in 1988 identified that
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a significant number of LERs were not submitted to the NRL within
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30 days after the discovery of the event as required by-10 CFR Part 50.73. Unit 1 LER Nos. 50-313/88-001,-88-002, -88-004,-88-005, -88-008,-88-010. -88-012,-88-014, -88-016 and -88-021, and Unit 2 LERs Nos. 50-368/88-001,-88-004, -88-007,-88-013. -88-014,-88-016 and -88-021 were not issued within the 30 day' reporting..
requirement. A quality assurance audit performed by the licensee between September 2,1988, and October. 21,1988, identified'that four of five Unit 2 LERs reviewed during the audit exceeded the~ 30' day reporting requirement. The licensee had not responded to the audit finding at the conclusion of this inspection report period.
The failure to submit LERs within 30 days after the discovery of 'the events is an apparent violation of-the reporting requirements (313;368/8902-02).
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While reviewing the reporting requirements, the NRC inspector noted that the licensee was not reporting automatic actuation of the emergency control. room ventilation system.
A 4-hour notification
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and an LER are required by 10 CFR Part 50.72.and 10 CFR.Part 50.73 for any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety. Feature- (ESF).
Paragraph 1.2.2.2 of the Unit 2 safety analysis report defines the system to ensure control room habitability following a LOCA as an ESF system.
Unit.1 and Unit 2 control rooms share a common emergency air conditioning
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and ventilation system which receives actuation signals from radiation and chlorine detectors. An automatic actuation signal to the system-l will isolate the control room and start the ventilation system.
The licensee experienced automatic actuations of the emergency control room ventilation system on. July 24, September 24 and 27, October 22 and November 10 and 11,1988. These events were not reported to the NRC via 4-hour reports or LERs. The failure to report the automatic actuations of an ESF system is a second example of the violation in paragraph.4.a (313;368/8902-02).
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Unit 2TechnicalSpecification(TS)4.8.1.1.3'requiresthatall j
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diesel generator failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported to
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reportable occurrences.
Generic Letter No. 83-43 provided I
clarification of the effect 10 CFR Part 50.73' had on TS reporting requirements. Generic Letter No. 83-43 states, in part, "Some Technical Specifications currently require special reports or'other routine reporting of events in lieu of a licensee event report.. Such reports are still required, but the Technical Specification wording will need revision."
On the basis of the above, diesel generator. failures are a reportable event as required by TS. On March 8 and 10, 1988, and August 8, 1988, the licensee experienced failures of Unit;2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2K48, however, these events were not reported to the NRC-as required by TS. The failure to report diesel' generator. failures is a third example of the violation in paragraph.4.a (313;368/8802-02).
5.
FollowupofJvents(Units 1and2)'(93702)
L a.
On January 6, 1989 Unit 2 was. shut down because of.a.small leak from
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a cracked weld on the "C" reactor coolant pump pressure sensing line.<
The weld was located at the connection of the pressure sensing.line to the seal housing. While the licensee has experienced numerous leaks in the pressure sensing lines for the reactor coolant pumps, this particular location was not considered by the licensee as having historical problems.
Further inspection revealed that there were two cracks circumferential1y located'in the weld. The initial nondestructive examination of the weld was inconclusive in determining the failure mechanism of the weld.
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-6-The licensee replaced the pump seal which included the cracked weld.
The seal was shipped offsite for destructive testing of the cracked
weld in an attempt to determine the root cause of the weld failure.
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The results of this examination have not been received by the licensee.
Vibration measurements of the sensing line taken after the seal was replaced were in the anticipated range and provided no additional information in determination of the weld failure. The NRC inspector will review the licensee's action resulting from the destructive examination of the cracked weld during a. future inspection.
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The NRC inspector reviewed the action taken by the licensee in response to Generic Letter No. 88-17. " Loss of Decay Heat Removal,"
during the Unit 2 shutdown. To allow replacement of the reactor coolant pump seal, the unit entered a reduced reactor coolant system inventory condition. The generic letter provides a list of expeditious actions that should be implemented prior to operating in a reduced inventory condition. Six of the eight specified actions were applicable to the unit while at reduced inventory for the seal replacement.
Actions taken by the licensee included additional training, revisions to operating procedures, and additioaal log readings.
Based on the condition of the unit during the seal replacement, the licensee satisfactorily completed the recommended expeditious actions of Generic Letter No. 88-17.
b.
On January 20,1989, Unit 2 tripped from 100 percent power because of a lockout of the' main generator.
Several problems associated with equipment and systems not properly functioning after the trip complicated the posttrip recovery. Tne NRC inspector performed the initial followup inspection of the event, then on January 23, 1989, anAugmentedInspectionTeam(AIT)wasdispatchedtothesite. The main' area the AIT reviewed involved the back leakage through a high pressure injection. check valve, the contribution of other problems to the back leakage, and the consequences of the back leakage.
NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-03; 50-360/89-03 will document the inspection results of the AIT.
During a reactor building walkdown inspection following the trip, the licensee identified a nonisolable reactor coolant leak and declared a notification of unusual event (N0VE). The leak was located in a weld in a drain line for the reactor coolant cold leg piping. The f:0VE was cancelled the following day when the unit reached cold shutdown status.
The section of pipe containing the defective weld was replaced. The licensee's initial examination of the weld indicated that a weld workmanship defect during the weld fabrication caused deterioration of the weld and the subsequent leak.
Additional items associated with the trip that were reviewed by the NRC inspector are discussed in paragraph 7.
Additional inspection of problems associated with the trip will be performed in subsequent NRC inspection _____
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6.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
(71707)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable l
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators..The NRC
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inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, q
reviewed tag-out records and verified proper' return to service of affected components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for r
equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made spot checks to i
verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance i
with the station security plan. The NRC inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activities.
i The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,- fluid leaks, and excessive vibration. The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping
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and cleanliness conditions during the tours.
The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2 containment spray system to verify operability. The walkdown was conducted using the current revision of the valve lineup, Attachment A, to Procedure 2104,05, " Containment Spray System." Drawing M-2236, Sheets I l
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and 2, was reviewed during the preparation and conduct of the walkdown t
inspection. While no system misalignment or. operability items were identified, the NRC inspector identified some minor discrepancies for
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licensee corrective action.
These reviews and~ observations were conducted _to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under TS,
10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified, j
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
(62703)
Station maintenance activities for. the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides,
industry codes or standards, and in confonnance with the TS.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemente m
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Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority.is assigned to' safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:-
Preventive maintenance on low pressure safety injection pump
' Breaker 2A-305 (Job Order 776307)
Repair of exhaust header joints on Unit 2 Emergency Diesel.
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Generator 2K4B (Procedure 2306.005, Job Order 760020). Due to
continuing oil-leakage and fires at the exhaust joints, the licensee completely disassembled the exhaust headers (up to the turbocharger),
inspected the mating surfaces, and reassembled the joints with new gasket material. The use of high temperature sealant at several joints was the only additional measure taken during reassembly of the exhaust headers. During the postmaintenance run and the subsequent i
operability surveillance, the exhaust header joints appeared to be properly sealed with no oil leakage or fire observed. However, during the next run of the diesel generator (the monthly surveillance-performed on January 31,1988), oil leakage and a fire similar to previous occurrences were observed by the NRC inspector.
See paragraph 8 for additional information on the exhaust header fires.
As-found "MOVATs" testing of the "1B" main feedwater block
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Valve CV-2675 (Procedure 1403.040). Because this valve did not fully close after the reactor trip on January 20, 1989, the' licensee tested the valve to determine if any parameter. had changed since last the motor operated valve test. The torque and limit settings were consistent with the values used for the most recent test. The licensee has since changed the torque switch setting to provide a closing force sufficient to overcome an approximate 800 psi differential pressure across the valve versus the old setting of approximate 300 psi.
Testing (and setpoint adjustment of Unit 2 main steam safety relief l
valves Procedure 2306.006). During review of the data from the
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December 1,1988, reactor trip, the licensee found irregularities in-the data for the lifting'of two main steam safety relief valves. The l
setpoints for these valves were tested during the January 6-16, 1989, outage with one valve requiring adjustment to obtain the desired setpoint. The licensee stated that~a small drift of the setpoint for these valves is not unusual following extended power operation of the unit. The licensee treated the testing of these two valves and the out-of-tolerance condition of the setpoint the same as in the 18-month surveillance test. This required testing of an additional group of main steam safety relief valves. On the basis of the results of this test and the methodology use in the 18-month surveillance, the licensee has tested all the main steam safety relief valves.
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-9-Replacement of a bevel gear in the operators for service water cross
connect Valves 2CV-1421-2 and 2CV-1422-2.(Job: Orders 775959.and 775991). Based on investigation of Valve 2CV-1427-1 which failed to operate remotely, the. licensee-found a broken ' tooth on' a. bevel gear -
in'the valve operator and a similar condition.in Valve 2CV-1421-2.
All other similar operators were inspected:and no additional.
defective gears were found.. Because of the' unavailability of-replacement gears, the defective gears:were xinstalled and_ oriented in
~ the operators for Valves 2CV-1421-2 and 2CV-1422-2 to allow manual-operation of the' valves. The-licensee verified the' manual operation-of the valves.. Caution cards have been. hung near the handswitches
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for these valves to alert personnel;of.their' condition and that new gears have been ordered.- While;thefinnediate condition of valve
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operability has been. addressed, the licensee has not determined the root cause of the ~ broken' tooth on the gears..The NRC inspector. will review the" licensee's root'cause' determination and corrective' action during a future inspection.
f Preventive maintenance on motor' for Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P-60A (Job Order 77546).
Tightening of the fuel line fittings to the fuel. injectors on Emergency Diesel Generator 2K48-(Job Order 775792). ' Because of 'a previously identified minor leak from'a fuel. line fitting, the
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i licensee tightened or verified tight all the fuel. line fittings to all fuel injectors.
During the.postmaintenance run of the. diesel generator, no fuel line leaks were observed.
Replacement of Unit 1 emergency diesel generator air start pressure
Control Valve PCV-5238 (Job Order 773721).
Replacement of a stator. pole on the main-generator exciter '(Job
Order 776652).
Investigation by.the licensee of the Unit I turbine trip and reactor trip on January 20, 1989,' revealed a broken lead on a stator pole.
This caused the voltage fluctuations of the main.
generator and.the subsequent turbine trip.-
Troubleshooting the ~ synchronism-check relay for' Breaker H-15 (Job '
-Order 776995). This breaker can supply power to the H-1 6900 volt bus from a startup transformer.. Duringlthe: turbine trip;on s January 20, 1989, the breaker failed to close on a fast transfer'of-the power supplied to the bus. This resulted;in the "A" and "C"'
.1 reactor coolant pumps stopping after the trip. The licensee found problems with the mating of the contacts on'the synchroni_sm-check
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relay and replaced the relay.- However..the licensee' has-not yet R
determined that the synchronism-check relay was.the actual cause of
the breaker failing to close on a fast ~ transfer. The licensee'is; continuing to investigate this' item.
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Repair and modifications of high pressure safety injection check
Valves MU-34A-D.
Following the Unit 1 trip on January 20, 1989, the licensee discovered MU-348 did not reseat after a manually. initiated high pressure injection.- This condition allowed back flow through the valve. The check valves were disassembled and inspected. While inspecting the valve internals of MU-34B and C, the licensee observed excessive movement.at the hinge pin connection and a possible
interface' problem between the bushings that would allow the valve to
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remain open. The valve-vendor representative was on site providing j
technical assistance to the. licensee. The following repairs and modifications were performed on the valves:
The antirotation lugs on the disc were removed and a pin to prevent disc rotation was installed. The edges of the bushings were chamfered:to prevent possible binding.
A new hinge block, swing arm, and bushings with thicker collars were
installed.
The disc lockwire was bent to a different shape to prevent possible
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interference with the valve body, No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
(61726)
The NRC inspector observed the TS required surveillance testing ~on the
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various components listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was. calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any_ deficiencies identified during the testing were' properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The NRC inspector-witnessed portions of. the following test activities:
Monthly surveillance inspection of Unit 1 emergency diesel generators protective relaying starting interlock circuitry (Procedure 1307.003).
Annual surveillance testing of Unit 1 Emergency Feedwater Pump P7A.
(Procedure-1106.06, Supplement 2). This test was performed per the same requirements as the monthly surveillance, however, additional pump temperature, vibration and cooling water temperature measurements were taken.
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.1 Local leak rate testing of Unit 2 containment purge exhaust
- Valves 2CV-8291-1 and 2CV-8286-2 (Procedure'2304.022, Job Order 769396)~.
The test was performed to satisfy TS 4.6.3.1.4 which requires leak testing the containment purge supply and exhaust valves-
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prior to exceeding conditions'which require reactor building
integrity. The initial leak test of the exhaust valves. failed to
meet the leak' rate acceptance criteria.. Valve 2CV-8291-1.was manually assisted closed, then-the leak test was satisfactorily performed. "The NRC1 inspector was concerned that the licensee's -
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method of. testing the containment pur'ge valves may not' meet the Type C test requirements listedlin Appendix J of 10 CFR _50..
This positionasobtainedbynormaloperation(g.testedintheclosed concern was focused on the. valves not beini.e. with the valve operator).
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TS require that the containment purge valves' remain closed while in Modes 1 through 4.
By procedure, the'11censee requires that the
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purge valves be leaked tested prior to entering Mode 4 whenever_the unit has been in cold shutdown' status. After reviewing the TS, the safety analysis _ report, and other licensing documentation, the NRC inspector found no requirement to leak test the purge valves for Modes 5 or 6 conditions. On the basis of the above, the NRC inspector determined that the licensee is fulfilling the TS. requirements for leak testing containment purge valves.
Quarterly surveillance test of Unit 1,125 volt station Battery 007 (Procedure 1307.08, Job Order 776538).
Monthly test of Unit 1 digital subsystems of the engineered
safeguardsactuationsystem(Procedure 1304.045 and 1304.046, Job Orders 776542 and 776543).
Monthly test of Unit 2 Emergency) Diesel Generator 2K4B
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(Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 2. The NRC-inspector observed the H
monthly run of the diesel generator on January 3 and 31,1989.
During the initial portion of each run, oil and exhaust smoke was observed leaking from several exhaust header' joints. After approximately 5 minutes of-each run, a fire started at the south.
exhaust header transition joint. The fires continued for'
i approximately.3 to 4 minutes then burned out without operator action.
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While both of these fires occurred at the same joint,;the potential:
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for fires at-other joints exists based on oil _ leakage at the other joints.
The oil leakage and fire that occurred on January.31:is of particular concern to the NRC inspector since the exhaust header joints were_-
repaired during the Januar 6-16, 1989, outage (see paragraph 7 for a discussion of this repair)y On the basis of the results of the recent-
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monthly surveillance, the licensee has<not corrected the emergency diesel generator exhaust header fires. The licensee has stated that long term corrective action for the' header fires is being pursued with several-short-term corrective action items under review.
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s The NRC resident inspectors ~ will continue to monitor the monthly l
surveillance testing of the diesel. generators and licensee actions taken-to solve this problem.
During the. January 31, 1989, surveillance, onlyJone of the two air-accumulators was used to. provide air to start the' diesel generator.
-The start-time of.11.2 seconds was less than the minimum requirement-i
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of 15 seconds. The NRC inspector had earlier questioned the licensee-if either Unit 2 emergency diesel generator had been tested to verify that only one air supply would start the diesel within the_ TS time requirement.
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During an '18-month surveillance test of the: control room emergency air:
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conditioning system performed on January 18, 1989, the licensee discovered that one. train did not provide the minimum required air flow.of 8910 'cfm.
This occurred when testing Cooling Unit 2VUC-27B which had an air flow.of '
approximately 8100 cfm. E The licensee determined the discharge damper on the adjacent Cooling Unit'2VUC-27A was not fully closed and allowed a portion of the flow from 2VUC-27B to be bypassed from the normal discharge flow. The Discharge Damper 2BAA-8665 was adjusted and the flow test was perfonned successfully.
Upon reviewing this event, the NRC inspector learned that a: job. reg'uest
written on August 24,1988, had identified that the discharge damper for
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2VUC-27A did not shut properly, and requested repair of'the damper counterweight. However, no action resulted from this job request until the surveillance test proved the. air flow did not meet TS requirements.
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In this example, it is not obvious that the licensee should have related
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l-the damper failing to shut properly to the reduced air flow on-an adjacent l
cooling unit. However, this-example does indicate that a more indepth
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review of' reported deficiencies on safety-related systems may identify possible degradations to performance'~ requirements of safety-related systems.
No violations ~or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M.- Levine, Director, Site Nuclear-Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspection. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of =
the inspection and the findings.
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