IR 05000313/2021001
| ML21126A170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/2021 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2021001 | |
| Download: ML21126A170 (19) | |
Text
May 06, 2021
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2021001 AND 05000368/2021001
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. On April 8, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313 and 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2021001 and 05000368/2021001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0050
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021
Inspectors:
R. Alexander, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
N. Brown, Resident Inspector
R. Bywater, Senior Resident Inspector
T. DeBey, Resident Inspector
H. Freeman, Senior Project Engineer
S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Unit 2 Trip Due to Failure to Evaluate/Classify a Feedwater Control System Power Supply Component as Critical Equipment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000368/2021001-01 Open/Closed None 71153 The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to properly evaluate and classify the Unit 2 main feedwater control system power supply common filter assembly as critical equipment in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification, Revision 21. Specifically, the failure to identify the power supply common filter assembly as a critical component with a single point vulnerability led to the failure to perform preventive maintenance, mitigate, or remove the vulnerability, whose failure was the likely cause of the automatic reactor trip on December 10, 2020.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000368/2020-001-00 Loss of Feedwater Control System Power for Train 'A'
Feedwater that Resulted in Plant Trip 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power. On February 15, 2021, Unit 1 operators reduced power to 32 percent power at request of the grid operator to reduce station output.
Operators returned the unit to full power on February 18, 2021.
On March 14, 2021, Unit 1 was manually tripped from 99 percent power after a loss of voltage on bus A2 resulting from a continuity failure in a related potential transformer drawer. After repairs, operators restarted the reactor on March 17, placed the unit online on March 18, and raised power to 95 percent on March 21, 2021.
Unit 1 began an end-of-operating cycle power coastdown on March 29, 2021 and ended the inspection period at approximately 90 percent power.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power and remained at full power until January 10, 2021, when operators reduced power to 77 percent power to address a main feedwater pump B speed oscillation issue. After repairs, operators returned the unit to 90 percent power on January 12, 2021.
On January 13, 2021, Unit 2 operators reduced power to 86 percent power to complete repairs to address elevated condenser air in-leakage. After repairs, operators returned the unit to full power on January 14, 2021.
On January 26, 2021, Unit 2 operators performed a planned power reduction to 81 percent power to replace a backup power supply for the core operating limits supervisory system and perform main turbine control valve testing. Operators returned the unit to full power the same day without replacing the power supply after determining the observed core power distribution did not support removing the core operating limits supervisory system from service at the planned reduced power level.
On February 15, 2021, Unit 2 operators reduced power to 88 percent power at the request of the grid operator to reduce station output. Operators returned the unit to full power on February 17, 2021.
On March 4, 2021, Unit 2 operators reduced power to 65 percent power to replace the core operating limits supervisory system backup power supply. After completion of repairs, operators returned to unit to full power later that day and the unit remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 decay heat removal/low-pressure injection train B during maintenance on train A on January 7, 2021
- (2) Unit 2 FLEX reactor coolant/steam generator pump placement on March 23, 2021
- (3) Unit 2 containment spray train A during maintenance on loop 1 service water to containment cooler service water isolation valve maintenance on March 30, 2021
- (4) Unit 2 motor-driven emergency feedwater train during turbine-driven emergency feedwater train flow transmitter maintenance on March 11, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1 steam pipe room, Fire Zone 170-Z, on January 6, 2021
- (2) Unit 2 upper north electrical penetration room, Fire Zone 2183-J, on January 20, 2021
- (3) Unit 1 common feedwater pump room, Fire Zone 75-AA, on January 21, 2021
- (4) Common unit diesel fuel vaults, Fire Zone 1(2)B-ADD-DFV, on March 3, 2021
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on March 24, 2021.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a Unit 2 planned down power to 65 percent and a subsequent power increase on March 4, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 1 just-in-time training that was done in preparation for the unit operation at reduced Tavg on March 10, 2021.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 emergent work activities for the atmospheric dump valve isolation valve 2CV-1002 failure to stroke due to motor failure on January 22, 2021
- (2) Unit 1 emergent work activities for the emergency feedwater initiation and control Channel B failure due to freezing steam generator pressure sensing lines on February 15, 2021
- (3) Unit 1 emergent work activities for the emergency feedwater initiation and control Channel D failure due to power supply failure on February 19, 2021
- (4) Unit 1 common feedwater injection to steam generator B valve CV-2660B maintenance on March 23, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 operability determination for reactor building spray system after seat leakage through recirculation and test header isolation valve BS-2B was discovered during surveillance testing on February 3, 2021
- (2) Unit 1 operability determination for reactor building spray pump B suction pressure transmitter PT-2428 on February 5, 2021
- (3) Unit 1 operability determination for high-pressure injection pump P-36B on February 10, 2021
- (4) Unit 1 operability determination for emergency feedwater initiation and control channel B on February 19-22, 2021
- (5) Unit 1 operability determination for Unit 1 personnel airlock inner door seal on March 11, 2021
- (6) Unit 1 operability determination for service water pipe leak upstream of valve CV-3850, service water loop 1 to emergency feedwater supply valve on March 17, 2021
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) ANO-1 End of Cycle 29 Tavg Reduction Maneuver on March 11-17, 2021
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Common unit diesel-driven fire pump P-6B post-maintenance testing after engine failure and replacement of starter motor on February 27, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2 valve stroke surveillance for atmospheric dump isolation valve 2CV-1002 on January 26, 2021
- (2) Unit 1 valve stroke surveillance for service water sluice gates on February 3, 2021
- (3) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 1 monthly surveillance run on February 7, 2021
- (4) Alternate ac diesel generator quarterly run on February 9, 2021
71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise conducted on March 23, 2021. The exercise scenario simulated a reactor coolant pump malfunction causing fuel damage, a steam generator tube rupture associated with a stuck open safety-relief valve, and demonstrations of extensive damage mitigation strategies consistent with 10 CFR 50.155(b)(2).
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The licensee submitted a summary of emergency plan changes (Revision 46) to the NRC on December 2, 2020. The inspectors conducted a review of the changes from March 1 to March 31, 2021. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency planning drill involving a tornado event which damaged plant equipment on March 9, 2021.
71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation Scenario Review
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the proposed scenario for the biennial emergency plan exercise on March 23,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 03.12)===
- (1) Units 1 and 2 (July 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
EP02: ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 03.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) Units 1 and 2 (July 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
EP03: Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 03.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) Units 1 and 2 (July 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020)
71153 - Follow up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000368/2020-001-00, Loss of Feedwater Control System Power for Train A Feedwater that Resulted in Plant Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML21039A557). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report as Finding 05000368/2021001-01.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unit 2 Trip Due to Failure to Evaluate/Classify a Feedwater Control System Power Supply Component as Critical Equipment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green FIN 05000368/2021001-01 Open/Closed None 71153 The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to properly evaluate and classify the Unit 2 main feedwater control system power supply common filter assembly as critical equipment in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification, Revision 21. Specifically, the failure to identify the power supply common filter assembly as a critical component with a single point vulnerability led to the failure to perform preventive maintenance, mitigate, or remove the vulnerability, whose failure was the likely cause of the automatic reactor trip on December 10, 2020.
Description:
On December 10, 2020, while operating at full power, the ANO Unit 2 reactor experienced a loss of main feedwater flow through the A main feedwater train due to a complete loss of A main feedwater control system electrical power. That power loss prevented the expected system response and associated alarms and indications for a loss of main feedwater train from occurring. The A main feedwater pump turbine went to minimum speed, the A main feedwater control valve shut, and manual control of the A main feedwater train was not possible. While the licensed operators recognized there was a problem with the main feedwater system, the reactor automatically tripped on A low steam generator water level before they could take any action. Post-trip investigation showed that the A main feedwater control system had experienced a complete loss of power even though it had redundant power supplies. The failure of one power supply should not cause complete loss of system power. Initial troubleshooting did not identify the cause of the event. After cycling the input power switches to the power supplies, both supplies came on and provided voltage outputs that were within specifications. Some components of the individual power supplies in the A main feedwater control system were replaced (although they were not failed) and the reactor was returned to power.
The inspectors independently reviewed the event and questioned the licensee whether there was a downstream electrolytic capacitor that could have caused the loss of power. The licensee evaluated that potential and concluded that a capacitor in a filter assembly downstream of the redundant power supplies was the likely cause of the event. Since a functional failure of a capacitor in the filter assembly would cause a complete loss of power to the main feedwater control system, it would cause a plant trip. That vulnerability should have led to the capacitor filter assembly having been classified as a critical component in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification, Revision 21, Section 5.2, Step 4. Components classified as critical shall be included in the PM [preventive maintenance] program and have a Maintenance Strategy developed in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-335. Since the downstream filter capacitors had not been classified, there was no preventive maintenance strategy for them. In fact, the licensee could not find any evidence that any maintenance had ever been performed. That resulted in electrolytic capacitors that were more than 25 years old being in the system. Per the sites Operational Decision Making document for this event, the electrolytic capacitors should have changed out per our SPV [single point vulnerability] PM fleet strategy on a 6 year interval.
The engineering review for the power supply installation in 1995 failed to identify the vulnerability.
Corrective Actions: The A train main feedwater control system power supplies for Unit 2 were reset and preventive maintenance activities were performed. A voltage monitor was set up to provide detailed data for future analysis of any similar future events. An apparent cause analysis was performed, and classification reviews of other redundant power supply systems are being performed. The site has classified the filter assemblies as single point vulnerabilities per Procedure EN-DC-175 but the critical equipment classification has not yet been completed. Future activities are being planned to redesign the main feedwater control system power supplies so that the common filter assembly is removed. The licensee submitted Licensee Event Report LER 05000368/2020-001-00.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2020-03843 and associated Apparent Causal Analysis CR-ANO-2-2020-03913
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to properly evaluate and classify the main feedwater control system power supply common filter assembly as critical equipment in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification, Revision 21, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the failure to identify the power supply common filter assembly as a critical component with a single point vulnerability led to the failure to perform preventive maintenance, mitigate, or remove the vulnerability, whose failure was the likely cause of the automatic reactor trip on December 10, 2020.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the unrecognized single point vulnerability of the power supply filter assembly led to the vulnerability not being mitigated and caused a complete loss of electrical power to the A main feedwater control system that resulted in a plant trip.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a reactor trip AND the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: None. The original equipment classification error occurred when the power supplies were installed in 1995 and an additional missed opportunity to identify the issue occurred in 2015 when the system was reviewed during a site-wide Component Criticality Validation Sample Review was done as part of the ANO Comprehensive Recovery Plan. This missed opportunity was not considered to be reflective of present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On February 18, 2021, the inspectors presented the emergency exercise preliminary scenario review inspection results to Mr. J. Toben, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 8, 2021, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise inspection results to Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 8, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Sullivan, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS The inspectors reviewed a World Association of Nuclear Operators report during the inspection period.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2020-00824, 1-2020-01378, 1-2020-01509, 1-2020-01678,
1-2020-01945, 2-2021-00464
Drawings
M2210, Sheet 3
Service Water System
Drawings
M2236, Sheet 1
Containment Spray System
Procedures
OP-1104.004
Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure
2
OP-2106.006
Emergency Feedwater System Operations
104
Work Orders
WO 2894842, 52911085
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-00031, 1-2021-00345, 2-2020-03887, 2-2021-00142,
2-2021-00521, C-2020-02793, C-2021-00858
Drawings
Fire Zones Emergency Diesel Fuel Storage Vault
Drawings
El 368-0 and 372-0
Drawings
FP-2103, Sheet 1
El 368-0 and 372-0
Drawings
Fire Zones Emergency Diesel Fuel Storage Vault
Drawings
FZ-2027
Fire Zone Electrical Equipment Room
Fire Plans
U1 PreFire Plan
Fire Zone 1B-ADD-DFV, Fire Area L (Diesel Fuel Vault)
Fire Plans
U2 PreFire Plan
Fire Zone 2B-ADD-DFV, Fire Area L (Diesel Fuel Vault)
Fire Plans
U2 PreFire Plan
Fire Zone 2183-J, Fire Area B-3 (UNEPR)
Fire Plans
U2 PreFire Plan
Fire Zone 75-AA, Fire Area B (CFW)
Fire Plans
U2 PreFire Plan
Fire Zone 2091-BB, Fire Area B-3 (North Electrical
Equipment Room)
Miscellaneous
Fire Hazards Analysis
Miscellaneous
ASOTH-FP-
FBDRLS, Att. 1
Pre-Drill Brief FBDRL 2021-05
03/24/2021
Miscellaneous
ASOTH-FP-
FBDRLS, Att. 4
Fire Brigade Drill Evaluation Worksheet
03/24/2021
Procedures
ASOTH-FP-
FBDRLS
Instructors Guide for Fire Brigade Drills
9, 10
Procedures
Fire Brigade Drills
Procedures
Fire Brigade Drills
Work Orders
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2011-01426, 1-2011-01439, 1-2011-01441, 2-2021-00149,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
COLR-U2
Core Operating Limits Report for Cycle 28 (Unit 2)
71111.11Q Procedures
OP-1102.004
Power Operation (Unit 1)
71111.11Q Procedures
OP-1102.016
Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown (Unit 1)
71111.11Q Procedures
OP-1305.036
Unit 1 Power Range Linear Amp Calibration at Power
71111.11Q Procedures
OP-2102.004
Power Operation (Unit 2)
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-00263, 1-2021-00270, 1-2021-00300, 1-2021-00305,
1-2021-00572
Drawings
M204, Sheet 3
Emergency Feedwater
Drawings
M204, Sheet 7
Common Feedwater System
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Station Logs
2/14-
20/2021
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Station Logs
01/22/2021
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Station Logs
03/23/2021
Procedures
1105.005
Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control
Procedures
1304.101
Unit 1 EFIC Channel D Calibration
Procedures
1304.208
Unit 1 EFIC Channel D Monthly Test
Procedures
PRA Maintenance and Update
Procedures
Protected Equipment Postings
Procedures
On Line Risk Assessment
Work Orders
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2017-02434, 1-2020-02057, 1-2021-00201, 1-2021-00212,
1-2021-00214, 1-2021-00290, 1-2021-00300, 1-2021-00308,
1-2021-00318, 1-2021-00319, 1-2021-00321, 1-2021-00442,
1-2021-00492, 1-2021-00562, C-2021-00539
Drawings
M204, Sheet 3
Emergency Feedwater
Drawings
M210, Sheet 1
155
Drawings
M236, Sheet 1
P&ID Reactor Building Spray and Core Flooding Systems
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Station Logs
2/03/2021
Miscellaneous
00-E-0023-01
Unit 1 Appendix J Containment Maximum Allowable
Leakage Rate (La)
Procedures
1305.037
Unit 1 Reactor Building Access and Ventilation Leak Rate
Testing
Procedures
Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
OP-1104.002
Makeup and Purification System Operation
Procedures
OP-1104.005
Reactor Building Spray System Operation
Procedures
OP-1304.208
Unit 1 EFIC Channel D Monthly Test
Procedures
OP-3305.001
OPS System Alignment Tests
Work Orders
WO 557894, 5555551, 52918456-01,
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2011-01426, 1-2011-01439, 1-2011-01441
Miscellaneous
95-R-105-08
Generic End-of-Cycle Full Power Life Extension Maneuver
Report
09/13/2002
Miscellaneous
Cycle 29 COLR
Unit One Core Operating Limits Report
Cycle 29
Miscellaneous
ANO-1 Cycle 29 Core Reload Evaluation
10/17/2019
Miscellaneous
ANO-1 End of Cycle 29 Tavg Reduction Maneuver
2/21/2021
Miscellaneous
ER-ANO-2003-
0488
ANO-1 End of Cycle Tavg Reduction Maneuver
06/30/2003
Procedures
OP-1102.004
Power Operations
Work Orders
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-00356, C-2021-00557
Miscellaneous
EVAL 208820
Procurement Engineering Evaluation
2/26/2021
Procedures
OP-1104.032
Fire Protection Systems
Procedures
OP-1307.004
Diesel Fire Pump Engine (K-5) Biannual Surveillance
Work Orders
WO 556999, 558192
Calculations
CALC-V-2CV-
1002
MOV Torque Switch Setpoints for 2CV-1002
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2019-03844, 1-2019-00431, 1-2020-00962, 1-2020-01494,
1-2020-01618, 1-2020-01687, 1-2020-01807, 1-2020-01971,
2-2021-00060, 2-2021-00074, 2-2021-00113, C-2021-
00103, C-2021-00110, C-2021-00176
Engineering
Changes
Replace Motor for MOV 2CV-1002
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
Procedures
OP-1104.029
Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling Water
21
Procedures
OP-1104.036
Emergency Diesel Generator Operation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
OP-2104.037
Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations
Procedures
OP-2105.008
Steam Dump Bypass Control System Operations
Work Orders
WO 556225, 52915172, 52918456-01, 52923103
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2018-03990, 1-2018-04353, 1-2019-00231, 1-2019-04609,
2-2018-01741, 2-2020-01204, 2-2020-02928, 2-2020-02972,
C-2018-02800, C-2018-02810, C-2020-02577, C-2020-
2641, C-2020-03417, C-2021-00101, C-2021-0833, C-
21-0835, C-2021-0836, C-2021-0837, C-2021-0841, C-
21-0843, C-2021-0844, C-2021-0845, C-2021-0846, C-
21-0847, C-2021-0848, C-2021-0849, C-2021-0850, C-
21-0852, C-2021-0854, C-2021-0855, C-2021-0873
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
C-2021-00890, C-2021-00911
Miscellaneous
Arkansas Nuclear One, Yellow Team Site Drill Report,
August 21, 2019
09/19/2019
Miscellaneous
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), ERO Team Yellow Site Drill
Report, February 5, 2020
03/05/2020
Miscellaneous
ANO (Arkansas Nuclear One), ERO Green Team Site Drill
Report, November 11, 2020
2/03/2020
Miscellaneous
Arkansas Nuclear One, Blue Team Site Drill Report, May 15,
2019
06/12/2019
Miscellaneous
Arkansas Nuclear One, ERO Red Team Site Drill Report,
February 6, 2019
2/28/2019
Procedures
1903.010
Emergency Action Level Classification
Procedures
1903.011
Emergency Response/Notifications
57, 59
Procedures
1903.069
Equipment Important to Emergency Response
9, 10
Procedures
1903.080
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation
Procedures
1903.081
Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation
Procedures
1903.082
Operational Support Center (OSC) Activation
Procedures
1905.001
Emergency Radiological Controls
Procedures
Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Via the Virtual
Private Network (VPN)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Operations
Procedures
Technical Support Center (TSC) Operations
Procedures
Operations Support Center (OSC) Operations
Miscellaneous
2, 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screening,
Procedure/Document Number: ANO Emergency Plan,
Revision: 046
11/10/2020
Miscellaneous
3, 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) Evaluation;
Procedure/Document Number: ANO Emergency Plan;
Revision: 046
11/20/2020
Miscellaneous
0CAN122002
Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedure, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2; NRC
Docket Nos. 50-313, 50-368, and 72-13; Renewed Facility
Operating License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
2/02/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
C-2021-00670, C-2021-00686
Miscellaneous
21 Emergency Preparedness Scenario 21DR
2/16/2021
Miscellaneous
0CAN012102
Emergency Plan Full Participation - Exercise Drill Scenario;
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2; NRC Docket Nos. 50-
313, 50-368, and 72-13; Renewed Facility Operating License
01/20/2021
Procedures
1903.010
Emergency Action Level Classification
Procedures
1903.011
Emergency Response/Notifications
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2020-00547, 2-2020-02252, 2-2020-02381, 2-2020-03840,
2-2021-00243
71151
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Plant Data Server Power Trend
03/13/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ANO-1 and ANO-2 NRC Performance Indicator
Technique/Data Sheets - Initiating Events
Q1-2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ANO-1 and ANO-2 NRC Performance Indicator
Technique/Data Sheets - Initiating Events
Q2-2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ANO-1 and ANO-2 NRC Performance Indicator
Technique/Data Sheets - Initiating Events
Q3-2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ANO-1 and ANO-2 NRC Performance Indicator
Technique/Data Sheets - Initiating Events
Q4-2020
71151
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Station Log
11/01/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71151
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Station Log
2/10/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) Performance Indicator
(PI) Monthly Reports
07/2020 -
2/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
Select DEP PI Opportunity Assessment Packages (3Q/2020
- 4Q/2020)
07/2020 -
2/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ANO Emergency Response Organization Rosters (3Q/2020
- 4Q/2020)
09/30/2020,
2/31/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ANO ERO Qualification Records (3Q/2020 - 4Q/2020)
09/30/2020,
2/31/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
ADH Siren Verification Checklists (3Q/2020 and 4Q/2020)
07/2020 -
2/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
KLD TR -1208
ANO Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report
(Rev. 4)
09/25/2020
71151
Procedures
EN-FAP-EP-005
Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators
71151
Procedures
Regulatory Performance Indicator Process
71151
Procedures
OP-2203.053
Rapid Power Reduction
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-00457
Drawings
E1, Sheet 1
Station Single Line Diagram
Drawings
M231, Sheet 2
Makeup & Purification System
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Station Logs
03/14/2021
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Emergency Action Levels
Procedures
OP-1202.001
Procedures
OP-1203.012I
Annunciator K10 Corrective Action
Procedures
OP-1203.019
High Activity in Reactor Coolant
Procedures
OP-1416.002
U1 A2 Bus Switchgear Inspection
21