IR 05000313/1998009
| ML20198K848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198K823 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-98-09, 50-313-98-9, 50-368-98-09, 50-368-98-9, NUDOCS 9812310174 | |
| Download: ML20198K848 (15) | |
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ENCLOSURE 1
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- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
'50-313;50-368 License Nos.:
Report No.:
50-313/98-09,50-368/98-09 l
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
i Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2.
Location:
1448 S. R. 333 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Dates:
October 25 through December 5,1998
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i Inspectors:
K. Kennedy, Senior Resident inspector
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S. Burton, Resident inspector R. Bywater, Reactor inspector J. Hanna, Resident inspector K. Weaver, Resident inspector i
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Approved by:
Charles S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects
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i Attachment:
Supplemental Information i
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t 9812310174 981221 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G
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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-313/98-09,50-368/98-09 This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations Unit 2 operators demonstrated good preparation for placing a new battery charger in
service. Operators and an electrician promptly identified and corrected an alignment
problem with a switch inside of the charger (Section 01.2).
Following a failure of the Channel D excore upper detector, the licensee properly
evaluated the long term impact of operating the plant with the affected Unit 2 plant protection system trips bypassed (Section O2.1).
Maintenance Unit 1 maintenance personnel performed well during the performance of preventive
maintenance on 4160 volt Magne-Blast circuit breakers. Personnel demonstrated a thorough understanding of breaker operation and were knowledgeable of previous industry problems experienced with these breakers (Section M1.1).
Unit 2 operators and instrumentation and control technicians performed well during the
performance of plant protection system testing. In response to a previous failure of the Channel D excore upper detector, they used increased caution and sensitivity (Section M1.3).
The licensee took appropriate action to address Unit 2 equipment problems, including
the failure of the Unit 2 Channel D excore upper detector and small leaks in the Unit 2 service water piping. These conditions did not impact the ability of the systems to perform their safety functions and did not result in a significant impact on the day-to-day operation of the plant. In both cases, engineering provided good support in evaluating the condition for operability and the impact on long-term plant operation (Section M2.1).
Enaineerina The licensee's engineering staff provided good support to other organizations in
evaluating plant problems, including the failure of the Unit 2 Channel D excore upper j
detector and unit service water system piping leaks (Sections 02.1 and M2.1)
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Reactor engineers and maintenance personnel performed well during the receipt of new
fuel for Unit 2. The prejob brief was thorough, in depth, and included lessons learned from previous activities. Inspection and movement of the fuel was conducted by knowledgeable, experienced personnel and included supervisory oversight. The licensee established effective housekeeping and foreign material controls during the activity (Section E1.1).
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L Plant Suocort
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During the performance of swipe surveys associated with new fuel receipt inspection,
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l health physics technicians demonstrated goed as low as reasonably
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achievable (ALARA) practices and were knowledgeable of radiological requirements (Section R4.1).
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The licensee responded appropriately to the identification of an unattended security-j weapon within the plant (Sect!on S1.1),
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On November 13,1998, power was reduced to 85 percent for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to perform turbine valve testing.
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Unit 2 operated at 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors observed various aspects of plant operations, including compliance with Technical Specifications, conformance with plant procedures and the Safety Analysis Report, and shift manning. Inspectors also observed the effectiveness of communications, management oversight, proper system configuration and configuration control, housekeeping, and operator performance during routine plant operations and surveillances.
The conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Evolutions were generally well controlled, deliberate, and performed according to procedures. Shift turnover briefs were comprehensive. Housekeeping was generally good and discrepancies were promptly corrected. Safety systems were found to be properly aligned. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed below.
01.2 Unit 2 Placement of Batterv Charaer 2D328 in Service a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
On December 2, the inspectors observed Unit 2 operators place Battery Charger 2D32B in service. This was the first time that Battery Charger 2D32B was to be placed in service since it was installed as part of a modification to install new battery chargers.
The inspectors attended a crew brief in the control room prior to the evolution and observed as operators placed the battery charger in service in the plant.
b.
Observations and Findinas Since the evolution was performed after normal working hours, the shift superintendent called in an electrician prior to placing the battery charger in service. The shift superintendent stated that if a problem developed during the evolution and operators were unable to align a battery charger to the battery, Technical Specification 3.8.2.3 required actions to be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to demonstrate that the associated battery bank was operable. The electrician was needed onsite to perform these actions,
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if required.
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The inspectors observed a briefing conducted by the control room supervisor prior to the evolution. The briefing included a discussion of responsibilities, communications, required entries into Technical Specifications, and timing of required actions in the event that a battery charger could not be aligned to the battery bank. Prior to securing Battery Charger 2D32 and placing Battery Charger 2D32B in service, the auxiliary operator walked down the procedures to familiarize himself with the steps involved, Charger 2D32 was secured and Charger 2D32B was placed in service in accordance with Procedure 2107.004, Revision 16. "DC Electrical System Operation," Attachment E,
" Securing 2D32 and Placing 2D328 in Service." A licensed reactor operator assisted the operator and provided peer checking of the steps. Procedure 2107.004 contained a step to verify that all of the local alarms were clear with the exception of the " Charger in Lower Current Limit" alarm. The operators identified that they had not received the expec'ed alarm and reported this to the control room. This alarm indicates that the battery charger current is limited to 200 amps, as determined by a current limit setting switch located in the battery charger cabinet. The 200 amp limit was established pending installation of a 400 amp output breaker scheduled for Refueling Outage 2R13.
The electrician present during the e..ation questioned the position of the current limit switch and suspected that it was in the incorrect position. The cabinet was opened and the switch was found to be in the incorrect position. After consulting with engineering, it was determined that the switch could be repositioned while the battery charger was in service, and it was placed in the proper position.
The licensee determined that the completed sections of Work Plan 2409.590, Revision 0, "New Green Train Battery Charger Testing," used to test the battery charger j
prior to placing it in service did not have a step to place the current limit switch in the
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lower limit position. A later section of the test procedure did have a step to place the current limit switch in the lower position; he en his section was not scheduled to be performed until the installation of Battery charger D32A was completed. As a result, the battery charger was turned over to operations with the switch in the incorrect position. The inspectors determined that this was a weakness with the test procedure.
They also determined that the step in Procedure 2107.004 to verify receipt of an alarm after placing the battery charger in service provided sufficient instructions to verify the proper alignment of the battery charger, including the current limit switch, prior to j
operators exiting the applicable Technical Specifications. In addition, the knowledge of
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the electrician enabled the licensee to quickly identify and correct the problem. As a result of finding the current limit switch in the incorrect position, the licensee initiated Condition Report 2-1998-0454 to enter the error into their corrective action program.
The inspectors also noted that a change to Procedure 2107.004, issued on December 3, included a step to verify that the current limit setting switch was in the lower position.
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Conclusions Unit 2 operators demonstrated very good preparation for placing a new battery charger in service. Operators and an electrician promptly identified and corrected an alignment problem with a switch inside of the charger.
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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O2.1 Unit 2 - Failure of Channel D Excore Uooer Detector
a..
Insoection Scope (71707)
l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions as a result of the failure of the Channel D excore upper detector.
b.
Observations and Findinas l
While performing a surveillance on November 3, the Channel D excore upper detector (
failed. Operators declared the detector inoperable and remained in Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, that they had previously entered to perform the surveillance.
l Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 allowed power operation to continue, provided the l
inoperable channel was placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Plant l
staff had previously bypassed the affected functions during the performance of the surveillance. The Technical Specification stated that the desirability of leaving the channel in bypass for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> will be reviewed by the plant safety committee and that the channel shall be returned to an operable status following the l
next cold shutdown. This condition was reviewed by the plant safety committee and determined to be acceptable for plant operation until Refueling Outage 2R13, scheduled to begin January 8,1999. The licensee evaluated the impact of the condition on the ability to perform other plant activities, including surveillances and various operating procedures. Procedures were changed, as necessary, to account for the condition and
precautionary measures were identified for plant protection system testing activities.
l The licensee also assessed the risk of performing plant protection system surveillance
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testing on the remaining channels, which would require placing Channel D in a tripped condition. The licensee found a slight increase in the probability that a reactor trip could occur during the time that the channel was in a tripped condition, but determined that i
the smallincrease was acceptable. The licensee planned to correct the condition during Refueling Outage 2R13.
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The inspectors determined that the licensee responded appropriately to the failure of the
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upper detector and took actions consistent with the applicable Technical Specifications.
As described in Section M1,3 of this report, the licensee demonstrated good awareness and caution while performing plant protection system testing, c.
Conclusions Following a failure of the Channel D excore upper detector, the licensee properly evaluated the long term impact of operating the plant with the affected Unit 2 plant
j protection system trips bypassed.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
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08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9609-01: Clearance of Hold Card Prior to Completion of l
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The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated March 31,1997. One of the licensee's corrective actions to avoid further violations was to evaluate the hold card process to determine if additional controls were i
needed. Tha licensee identified additional changes to improve the hold card process.
As the lic.Mt,ee progressed in defining and implementing these revisions, additional errors associated with the implementation of the hold card process occurred. NRC l
Inspection Report 50-313/98-04; 50-368/98-04 documented a violation l
(VIO 50-313/9804-01) associated with the improper clearance of a hold card and summarized other hold card errors that had occurred. In their response letter to Violation 50-313/9804-01, dated July 2,1998, the licensee acknowledged that previously identified corrective actions to improve operator work practices related to improper clearance of hoM cards had not eliminated human pe formance errors and
identified additionallong-term actions to prevent recurrence. Irivaction of the
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licensee's corrective actions will be conducted during the closeout of l
Violation 50-313/9804-01.
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08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-368/9703-01: Inocerability of One Train of Emeraency Feedwater The inspectors verified that the corrective actions described in Licensee Event Report 50-368/97-002, submitted on March 6,1997, were reasonable and complete. No problems were identified.
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II. Maintenance
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l M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Unit 1 - Circuit Breaker Maintenance l
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a.
Insoection Scope (62707)
On December 1, the inspectors observed circuit breaker maintenance performed under Job Order 00984472 and Procedure 1416.040, Revision 3,"Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Maintenance."
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Observations and Findinas l
During the preventive maintenance on the Makeup /High Pressure Injection Pump A l
4160 volt Magne-Blast circuit breaker, the technicians demonstrated good familiarity l
with past problems at ANO with these types of breakers. The technicians also knew the procedure for performing the breaker maintenance, and demonstrated thorough understanding of the breaker operation. They performed the maintenance in
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accordance with the job order and procedures and properly returned all equipment to
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service.
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Conclusions Unit 1 maintenance personnel performed well during the performance of preventive maintenance on 4160 volt Magne-Blast circuit breakers. Personnel demonstrated a thorough understanding of breaker operation and were knowledgeable of previous industry problems experienced with these breakers.
M1.2 General Comments on Surveillance Activities i
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
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Unit 2 - Procedure 2304.100, Revision 27, " Unit 2 High Linear and High Log
i Power Levels Excore Safety Channel A," performed on November 12.
Unit 2 - Job Order 00984962, " Perform Quarterly Hydrogen Purge System
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Analyzer Calibration for 2C-1288," conducted on November 30.
Unit 2 - Job Order 00984795, " Diverse Emergency Feedwater Actuation System
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Calibration," performed on December 1.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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Knowledgeable plant staff performed the surveillances according to procedures. They used calibrated test equipment and demonstrated awareness of procedure requirements and industrial safety requirements.
M1.3 Unit 2 - Excore Safety Channel Testina a.
Insoection Scope (61726)
On November 12, the inspectors observed technicians perform testing in accordance with Procedure 2304.100, Revision 27," Unit 2 High Linear and High Log Power Levels Excore Safety Channel A."
b.
Observations and Findigs On November 3, the Channel D excore upper detector failed. As a result, operators placed Channel D in bypass for the remainder of Cycle 13. Surveillances of other channels of the plant protection system would require the plant staff to place Channel D in the tripped condition while they bypassed the tested channel. In this configuration, a failure either of the two remaining channels would cause a reactor trip. As a result of an evaluation, the licensee determined that they could perform required maintenance without imposing unacceptable risk due to the failure of Channel D.
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On November 12, the inspectors observed workers perform Procedure 2304.100. The procedure required placing Channel D in a tripped condition and bypassing Channel A.
Instrumentation and control technicians used increased caution and sensitivity during the performance of the surveillance as well as good three-part communications. The
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participated in the job briefing and completion of the surveillance. The technicians
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i successfully performed the surveillance with no abnormalities and properly restored
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. Excore Safety Channel D to the bypass condition.
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Conclusions
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. Unit 2 operators and instrumentation and control technicians performed well during the j
performance of plant protection system testing. In response to a previous failura of the
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Channel D excore upper detector, they used increased caution and sensitivity.
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M2-Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Unit 2 - Material Condition issues
a.
Inspection Scoce (37551. 62707. 71707)
- During this inspection period, inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions in response to several problems related to the material condition of plant equipment. The failure of the Channel D excore upper detector was previously discussed in Section O2.1 of this report. in addition, the licensee identified a pinhole leak in the service water system supply line to Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A.
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Observations and Findinos l
On November 24, operators discovered a pin hole lea.k in service water piping that
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supplies Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P 7A. The leak was estimated to be less than l
3 drops per hour. The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action i
program by initiating Condition Report 2-1998-0442. Plant staff performed an ultrasonic examination and determined that the pipe wall thickness in the area of the leak exceeded the required minimum wall thickness for structural integrity. The inspectors reviewed the operability determination and engineering evaluation of the effect the 'he condition had on the structural integrity of the pipe, the flooding analysis, the performance of the service water system, environmental qualification of equipment in the area, spray hazards, and service water inventory. Based on the results of this engineering evaluation, the licensee concluded that the service water piping and system remained operable.
The licensee suspected microbiologically induced corrosion caused this leak. Plant staff has previously identified leaks in the service water piping that were caused by this type i
of corrosion. Currently, two additional small leaks exist in the Unit 2 service water piping i
apparently caused by the same mechanism. Workers had temporarily repaired the
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leaks, located in Loops 1 and 2 service water return headers from the spent fuel pool I
heat exchanger, using soft patches. The licensee submitted letters to the NRC dated July 13,1998, and October 22,1998, that requested temporary relief from the ASME
Code requirements. This request was submitted consistent with the guidelines
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i 7-contained in Generic Letter 90-05, " Guidance for Performing Temporary Noncode Repair of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 Piping" to permit noncode repairs to the service water piping. The licensee conducted periodic inspections of thesc '9aks as described in their letters.
The licensee planned to replace the piping affected by the leaks discussed above during Refueling Outage 2R13 scheduled to begin January 8,1999.
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Conclusions The licensee took appropriate action to address Unit 2 equipment problems, including
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the failure of the Unit 2 Channel D excore upper detector and small leaks in the Unit 2
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service water piping. These conditions did not impact the ability of the systems to
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perform their safety functions and did not result in a significant impact on the day-to-day
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operation of the plant. In both cases, engineering provided good support in evaluating the condition for operability and the impact on long-term plant operation.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9621-05: Inadeauate Maintenance Procedures and Maintenance Practices Associated With Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Valves l
The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated October 7,1996, to be reasonable and complete. No problems were ident"ed.
M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-368/9701-02: Failure to Follow instrumentation and Control Procedure The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter,
dated May 28,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No problems were identified.
M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9702-01:50-368/9702-01: Failure to Test Safetv-Related Accumulators The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated June 18,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No problems were identified.
M8.4 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9802-03: Failure to Remove Jumpers From Reactor i
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Protection System Channel C The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated April 8,1998, to be reasonable and complete. No problems were identified.
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-8-l 111. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Unit 2 - New Fuel Receipt a.
Insoection Scope (37551. 62707)
On November 30 through December 3, the inspectors observed licensse activities associated with the receipt of new fuel for the Unit 2 Refueling Dutage 2R13. The j
inspectors observed prejob briefings, fuel receipt inspections, and interviewed engineering and maintenance personnel, b.
Observations and Findinos Reactor engineers conducted an in-depth, thorough, prejob briefing with the maintenance staff. During the job briefing, maintenance and reactor engineering personnel demonstrated a questioning attitude and provided insightful observations and lessons learned from past performances of this evolution. Reactor engineering and maintenance supervisors, as well as the vendor representative, were present during the work, answering questions and providing additional instructions and insights.
Maintenance workers involved with moving the new fuel assemblies had extensive experience and knowledge regarding operation of New Fuel Crane 2L-35, including crane movement paths.
During new fuel receipt inspection activities on December 2, the crane experienced a problem. As the workers removed New Fuel Assembly AKS 418 from the shipping container using Crane 2L-35, the fuel assembly unexpectedly lowered approximately 3 inches. In response to this inadvertent movement, reactor engineering personnel immediately halted all fuel movement activities. The workers returned the new fuel
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assembly to the container and initiated an extensive investigation end troubleshooting of the crane. The licensee conducted extensive inspections and did not identify any mechanical or electrical problems. Plant staff could not recreate the problem.
Reactor ergineering supervisors allowed work to continue after the investigation and evaluation, but they required additional workers to watch the crane cable and drum during all s;bsequent new fuel movement activities. No further problems were experienced.
Inspectors noted good housekeeping and foreign material control during the new fuel receipt. As an additional precaution for foreign material control, reactor engineering required that workers tape all polyurethane coverings to the new fuel assemblies prior to permitting movement around the spent fuel pool.
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Conclusions Reactor engineers and maintenance personnel performed well during the receipt o' new fuel for Unit 2. The prejob brief was thorough, in-depth, and included lessons learned
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from previous activnoa. Inspection and movement of the fuel was conducted by knowledgeable, experienced personnel, and included supervisory oversight. The licensee established effective housekeeping and foreign material controls during the activity.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-313/9609-02: Failure to Update Safety Analysis Report Due to inadeauate Desian Packaae Closecut The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated March 31,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No problems were identified.
E8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-368/9704-02: Failure to Perform Safety Evaluation The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated August 28,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No problems were identified.
IV. Plant Support R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance i
R4.1 Uni! 2 - New Fuel Receipt Radioloaical Protection Practices
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Insoection Scope (71750)
On December 1, the inspectors observed health physics control and oversight of new fuel receipt inspection activities. Activities observed included the swipe surveys of newly exposed surfaces.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors observed health physics technicians perform swipe surveys of the inside of the new fuel container lids prior to removal and of the surfaces of new fuel assemblies prior to removing their plastic covering. The technicians insured that they met the requirements of Procedure 2503.001, Revision 13," Fresh Fuel Inspection &
Storage." The inspectors noted that health physics personnel who performed the radiological surveys demonstrated good ALARA practices and were knowledgeable of Procedure 2503.001.
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Conclusions During the performance of swipe surveys associated with new fuel receipt inspection, health physics technicians demonstrated good ALARA practices and were knowledgeable of radiological requirement.
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-10-S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Unattended Security Weapon a.
Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances which led to an unattended security weapon within the plant and the licensee's response to this event.
b.
Observations and Findinas During a security drill conducted on November 24, a loaded firearm fell out of a security officer's holster as the officer responded to his post. The officer was unaware that the weapon had come out of the holster. Upon discovery of the weapon, the licensee terminated the drill and determined which officer was missing the weapon. All of the ammunition for the weapon was accounted for. Security personnel determined that the weapon was unattended for approximately 3 minutes before being discovered. The licensee reported this event to the NRC in accorda:i.ce with 10 CFR 73.71.
The licensee determined that when the security officer rose from a e'
' mspond to the security drill, the holster strap became unfastened and the hancgun came out of the holster as the officer responded to the security drill. Following the event, the licensee examined the holster and found the snaps on the retaining strap to be in good condition.
Security personnel inspected the retaining straps for all security officers and identified no discrepancies. Following the event, all security officer's were briefed on the incident and their responsibility to ensure that their weapon is secure at all times.
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Conclusions l
The licensee responded appropriately to the identification of an unattended security weapon within the plant.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee ma.nagement at the conclusion of the inspection on December 8,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented, The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ~
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-2-ATTACHMENT l-PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee C. Anderson, General Manager Plant Operations
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B. Bement, Unit 2 Plant Manager V. Bhardwaj, Unit 1 Electrical Superintendent J. Bradford, Unit 2 Instrumentation and Control Superintendent
R. Carter, Unit 1 Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
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M. Cooper, Licensing Specialist S. Cotton, Director Training /EP i
D. Denton, Director Support
P. Dietrich, Unit 1 Acting Plant Manager l-M. Frala, Chemistry R. Fuller, Manager Unit 1 Operations -
B. Gordon, Unit 2 Mechanical Superintendent T. Ivy, Unit 2 Senior Lead Engineer
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l D. James, Manager Nuclear Safety J. Jehlen, Unit 1 Acting instrument and Control Superintendent C. May, Mechanical Supervisor D. McKenney, Unit 1 System Engineering Supervisor J. McWilliams, Manager Modifications
- T. Russell, Manager Unit 2 Operations -
J. Smith, Jr., Manager Radiation Protection C. Turk, Manager Mechanical / Civil / Structural Engineering J. Vandergrift. Director Nuclear Safety
H. Williams, Superintendent Plant Security
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
- IP 37551:
Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations l
lP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
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IP 92700:
LER Review IP 92901:
Followup - Operations IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance l
lP. 92903:
Followup - Engineering
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e-3-ITEMS CLOSED Closed 50-313/9609-01 VIO Clearance of Hold Card Prior to Completion of Work (Section 08.1)
50-313/9609-02 VIO Failure to Updated Safety Analysis Report Due to inadequate Design Package Closeout (Section E8.1)
50-313/9621-05 VIO Inadequate Maintenance Procedures and l
EA 97-274 Maintenance Practices Associated with Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Valves (Section M8.1)
50-368/9701-02 VIO Failure to Follow Instrumentation and Control Procedure
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(Section M8.2)
50-313 368/9702-01 VIO Failure to Test Safety-Related Accumulators (Section M8.3)
50-368/9703-01 VIO Inoperability of One Train of Emergency Feedwater (Section 08.2)
50-368/9704-02 VIO Failure to Perform Safety Evaluation (Section E8.2)
50-313/9802-03 VIO Failure to Remove Jumpers from RPS Channel C (Section M8.4)
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