IR 05000313/1990030

Insp Repts 50-313/90-30 & 50-368/90-30 on 900905-1016. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Event Followup,Operational Safety Verification,Mod Installation, Surveillance,Maint & Review of Previous Insp Findings

ML20216K012
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	11/07/1990
From:	Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216K003	List: IR 05000313/1990030 ML20216K000 ML20216K007
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-313-90-30, 50-368-90-30, EA-87-227, NUDOCS 9011200010
Download: ML20216K012 (14)

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APPENDIX _B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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s Inspection Report: 50 .;13/90-30 Operating Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/90-30 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368 i Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

s Route 3, Box 137G Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted

September 5 through October 16, 1990 Inspectors: C. C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector Project Section A Division of Reactor Projects

. L. J. Smith, Resident Inspector Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects P. H. Harrell, Project Engineer Project Section A, Division of Reactor Projects Approved: N' ! 8-- 7- f#

T~ T ~ Westerman, Chief, Project Section A Date Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary

_In_spection Conducted September 5 through October 16, 1990 (Report 50-313/90-30:

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50 338/90-30)

Areas Inspected; Onsite event followup, operational safety verification,

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modification installation, surveillance, maintenance, and review of orevious inspection finding Results:

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Two instances of weak reviews of safety analysis resulted in one violation and one unresolved item. The instarices are: (1) The safety analysis for

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Temporary Modification 90-1-029 allowed six pressurizer heaters to be

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_ energized with the pressurizer drained (Section 3.2). This inadequate technical review, required by the Technical Specifications (TS), was in 9011200010 901113 PDR ADOCK 05000313 Q PDC

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-2-violation of NRC reouirements (Violation 313/9030-01); and (2) equipment misoperation and .ubsequent failure during resin dewatering activities resulted in a large portion of the Unit I auxiliary building becoming contaminated (Section3.4). This is considered an unresolved item pending a review of the licensee's safety evaluation for performing dewate,4ng activities (Unresolved Item 313/9030-02).

• Operator response to the energizing of one group of pressurizer heaters with the pressurizer drained was rapid and effective, limiting the total event time to approximately 6 minutes (Section 3.2).

• Preparations leading up to the Unit 1 outage were very good. Information flow between work groups was continuous, expectations were promulgated early and well undr:rstood, work scope and time lines were well developed, and material needs were met well in advance of the outage start (Section 4).

Unit 1 continued to experience problems with leaking waste gas decay tanks. Releases to date are believed to be within limits; however, repeated failure of the waste gas decay tanks to hold gas is considered to be a weakness (Section 3.5).

Unit 2 initiated a plant engineering action request to correct a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&lD) after a pressure transient caused by an incorrect P&lD; however, a condition report was not initiated until after discussions with the inspector. The piping involved was technically nensafety-related and, therefore, outside the required scope of the condition reporting system. Managemsit dir respond promptly to initiate a condition report (Section 4.1).

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3 t DETAILS PERSONS CONTACTED H. Carns, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• J. Yelverton, Director, Nuclear Operations

• D. Boyd, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist M. Chisum, Unit 2 Assistant Operations Manager K. Coates, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager A. Cox, Unit 1 Assistant Plant Manager M. Durst, hodification Engineering Superintendent R. Edington, Unit 2 Operations Manager

• R. Fenech, Uiit 2 Plant Manager J. Fisicaro, Licensing Manager

• L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality A. Jacobs, Supervisor, Surveillance Testing J. Jacks, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist -

• G. Jones, General Manager, Engineering

• R. King, Plant Licensing Supervisor D. Mims, Unit 2 System Engineering Superintendent

• D. Moss, Radiation Protection and Radwaste Manager J. Mueller, Unit 1 Maintenance Manager

• R. Sessoms, Plant Manager, Central

• D. Snellings, Health Physics Technical Assistant

• J. Vandergrift, Unit 1 Plant Manager

• H. Williams, Security Manager C; Zimmerman, Unit 1 Operations Manager  ;

• Present at exit intervie The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, engineers, technicians, and administrative personne . PLANT STATUS (UNITS 1 and 2)

Unit 1 operated at 80 percent power until. Refueling Outage IR9 was initiated on October 1, 199 Unit 2 operated at 100 percent power during this inspection period, with the exception of a planned power descent to 70 percent power on September 28, 1990, and a subsequent unplanned trip on September 28, 1990. Unit 2 returned to full power on September 30, 1990, afterthetrip(Section3.3). ONSITE EVENT FOLLOWUP (UNITS 1 and 2) (93702, 62703, 71707)

3.1 Unit 1 - Declaration Of a Notice of Unusual Event (NOVE) Due to Chlorine Das-Release At approximately 1:25 p.m. (CDT) on October 16, 1990, the licensee declared a 1 NOVE due to a release of chlorine gas. At approximately 1 p.m., subcontractors l

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-4-were dismantling an abandoned sewage treatment facility located just outside the protected area at the southwest corner of the sit They were loading chlorination equipment onto a truck for disposal. The chlorine cylinder storage building was loaded onto the truck. Two cylinders were removed from the storage building and placed on the ground. The chlorinator building was loaded next. During this time, the chemistry supervisor observed the loaded truck and asked that it be investigated. Upon ex. mining the chlorination building, a cylinder was noted installed on a chlorinator. In an attempt to disconnect the cylinder, a leak occurred. Apparently the bottle isolation valve was not fully shut as assume The chlorine cylinder was now loose and off the chlorinator connection. The chlorination building was then lifted off the truck and set on the ground south of the truck. At this time the chlorinator building doors came open releasing chlorine and exposing the ,

leaking cylinde The prevailing winds blew the chlorine gas across the southwest corner of the i site. Personnel in the plume path were immediately relocated away from the plum Three individuals were taken to the local hospital in Russellville, Arkansas, in per sonal vehicles. One individual experienced respiratory concern and the other two experienced respiratory discomfort. All three individuals were released from the hospital the same da At the time of the event, both control rooms were isolated due to ongoing maintenance on the ventilation systems. No indication of chlorine gas was detected in the vicinity of the control room. Self-contained breathing j apparatuses were available in the control rooms for operations personnel had their use been necessar At approximately 2:10 p.m., the chlorine leak was stopped when the tubing was reconnected to the gas bottle. The NOVE was terminated at approximately 3:10 The licensee's decision to enter into a NOUE appeared to be conservative and was effective in focusing management and technical resources on the even Although the leak was isolated at 2:10 p.m., licensee management chose to remain in a heightened response posture until thera was additional assurance that no further leakage was possibl Local and state officials and the NRC were notified by the licensee of the even .2 Unit 1 - Energizing Six Pressurizer Heater Elements When the Pressurizer Was Drained On October 10, 1990, six pressurizer heater elements were inadvertently energized for approximately 6 minutes. Temporary Modification 90-1-029 used spare breakers off of pressurizer heater Breaker 7244 to power decontamination equipment-in the reactor building. The power leads were lifted for the other !

af fected heater control groups to protect them from inadvertent energizing as !

part of the temporary modification. The installation was incorrect. As a !

result, during pressurizer level instrument testing, the low-level interlock

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.$ j was cleared and six heater elements were energize Operations noticed the heaters cycling in the control room. They were able to terminate the event within approximately 6 minute Unit 1 TS 6.5.1.6.d states that the plant safety committee shall be responsible for " Review of all proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety." Review of Temporary Modification 90-1-029 did not identify that control panel Switch HS-1007A controlled pressurizer heaters RUB-14 and -15. Failure to perform an adequate safety review is a violation of NRC requirements (313/9030-01).

The licensee electrically tested the six heater elements. The elements passed meggar and coil resistance tests. The licensee's preliminary evaluation indicated that mechanical damage was unlikely due to the short time, the bundle location, and the cold condition of the pressurizer. Further licensee evaluation is in process. The pressurizer vendor has evaluated the sequence of events and has preliininarily determined that, based on the duration, heat *

input, and location of the heaters in the bundle, the pressure boundary suffered no detrimental effect .3 Unit 2 - Reactor Trip Unit 2 tripped on September 28, 1990, during a planned power descent to 70 percent power. A condenser circulating water discharge valve (2CV-1215)

lost its motor pinion gear key. As a result, the valve did not close when the associated pump was deenergize Flow from the remaining pump recirculated and

'did not provide adequate cooling to the condenser. The turbine tripped on loss of condenser vacuum and the operator manually tripped the reacto Plant response during the transient was as designed, with no equipment malfunctions. The failure of the motor pinion gear key to function as designed has been attributed to inadequate maintenance. The key was replaced during the last Unit 2 refueling outage, in the fall of 198 Key replacement was performed due to material concerns and, during replacement, the key was not .

staked which allowed it-to vibrate out of place. The other discharge valves were inspected and the keys were found to be properly stake Although a mechanical failure led to the trip, the licensee's root cause analysis determined that performance by operations personnel was a primary contributor to the event. The preevolution briefing of the sequence to be followed during the removal of the circulating pump did_not address previous failures of circulating water valves and expected response should a valve not operate properly. Time delays built into the pump circuitry would have allowed operator action to prevent the trip had the operator clearly understood the -

circuitry prior to initiation of the evolutio The licenset is still formulating long-term actions to be taken as a result of this event. These actions will be reviewed as part of the review of the event report being issued by the license ..

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6-3.4 Unit 1 - Resin Spill During transfer cask dewatering activities on October 5 and 6, 1990, contaminated resin fines were released from a transfer cask. A high efficiency particulate absorption filter vent valve was misaligned closed and, as a result, the transfer cask was overpressurized approximately 2-3 psig. This blew the resin out of the dewatering head. Contamination was drawn into the auxiliary building and the turbine building by the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system and a breeze into the train bay. The licensee conucted surveys outside the buildings and detected no evidence of a release of radioactive material to the environment as a result of this event. Large areas of the Unit I auxiliary and turbine buildings were contaminated with various levels of loose contamination in excess of 200,000 dpm. The highest large-area smear was taken from the floor by the spent fuel pool and indicated 30 mrad. The licensee's response to the event was good. Extensive surveys were conducted in a timely manner and contaminated areas were isolated and posted. Personnel contaminations as a result of this event were minimal and no ingestion of radioactive material resulted. The licensee quickly began a decontamination effort to return the affected areas to uncontrolled acces The inspector requested a copy of the safety evaluation for conducting dewatering activities in the t ain bay. This has not yet been provided by the licensee. This item will be triod as Unresolved Item 313/9030-02, 3.5 Unit 1 - Failure to Hold Gas in Waste Gas Decay Tank T-18A Unit 1 continued to experience problems with leaking waste gas decay tanks. A discharge valve on Waste Gas Decay Tank T-18A leaked excessively which led to ,

an unplanned release on October 2, 1990. Waste gas decay tanks are normally '

designed to be airtight in order to allow waste gas to decay for 30 days prior to release. However, the discharge valves have leaked excessively on a recurring basi During normal operation (i.e., no failed fuel present), Unit I can operate without using the tanks as designed and still meet all release limits even if

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the discharge valves are leaking excessively. Further, the licensee has l calculated a discharge valve leak rate that would lead to acceptable release l limits even in the most conservative case, (i.e., failed fuel). Maintenance

! has been given this criteria and the valve is temporarily considered repaired if these leak rate limits can be met.

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l This is a long-term problem which is recognized by the licensee and is being l evaluated on Condition Report (CR) 1-90-0404. Similar problems with the other waste gas decay tanks have been previously reported in the licensee's condition reporting syste Releases to date are believed to be within limits; however, operational l problems could develop if Unit 1 experienced a leaking fuel assembly and the waste gas decay tank dinharge valves leaked excessively again. The inspector '

will continue to monitor this area as part of routine inspection activitie !

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3.6 Unit 1 - Failure of Control Rod Inner Mast Cable During disassembly of the control rod mast located on the refueling bridge, the inner mast cable failed. As a result, the 1600 pound inner mast assembly fell approximately 17.5 feet into the transfer canal and the grapple pierced the l transfer canal liner in two places. The holes were approximately 1/2 inch in I diameter. At the time of the failure, there was approximately 1 foot of water in the transfer canal. Although the liner was punctured, no leakage through the liner was detected. The transfer canal was drained prior to removal of the control rod inner mast. This, plus the small head of water above the punctures, most likely attributed to the lack of leakage. The licensee has completed repairs to the liner by welding a patch over the affected are The licensee's root cause analysis is still in process. The control rod l handling mechanism was being removed because it is no longer being used;

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therefore, repairs to this assembly were not necessary.

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The cable on the fuel handling mast has been replaced as a precautionary I measure since it had experienced essentially the sanie environment as the control rod mast cabl The inspector will continue to follow this item to evaluate the root cause analysis and associated corrective action as Inspector Followup Item 313/9030-03.

, 3.7 Unit 2 - Leaking Safety Injection Tank Discharge Check Valve (2SI-13A)

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l The licensee discovered a leaking safety injection tank discharge check valve on September 3, 1990. The valve was leaking past the seal through weepholes and out holes drilled for the valve cover bolt The licensee opted for a strongback and cap design for the Furmanite clamp.

l The first clamp did not fit well and initial attempts to seal the clamp with a lead gasket were unsuccessful. The second clamp fit well and the leak was

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I stopped on September 9, 1990. The Furmanite repair of this type is not reversible so the licensee plans to replace the valve during the next outage.

l' Prior to installation of the clamps, the licensee performed seismic i calculations to ensure that the added weight of the clamp and Furmanite material was acceptabl .8 Unit 9 - Leaking Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Check Valve (2FW-5A)

D0~82256)

On September 10, 1990, an increase in leakage into the containment sump was identified and verified through operations review of humidity and sump fill rates. A containment entry was made and the leakage was pinpointed to be originating from the hinge pin cover on feedwater check Valve 2FW-5A. The leak was stopped via a Furmanite repair on September 11, 199 r 1

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-8-The opposite hinge pin cover had leaked approximately 2 months ago. The i initial hinge pin repair had taken over 50 containment entrie The licensee I was able to complete the most recent repair in approximately 10 entries using lessons learned from the previous repair activitie l The licensee verified that contractor training records provided the necessary i training prior to contractor containment entry. Overall, licensee performance ;

during this evolution was goo .9 Unit 1 - Defective 2 1/2-Inch Stainless Steel Piping Detected During Fabrication During prefabrication for piping replacement activities during the upcoming Unit 1 outage, a welder identified defective 2 1/2-inch stainless steel,

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Class 1, Schedule 160 piping. The piping was purchased and supplied under the

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requirements of the ASME Code for Class 1. A reactive inspection was '

dispatched from Region IV to foll w this issue. The results of that inspection will be documented by NRC Inspection Report 50-313; 368/90-41, 3.10 Unit 1 - Reactor Building Purge

L In preparation for' refueling Unit 1, a reactor building purge was performe l Prior to performing the purge, the licensee performed a calculation to determine vent time limits necessary to ensure that the release was within the

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site boundary activity limits. Approximately 5 to 40 minutes into the first 4 l release, the radiological dose assessment computer (RDAC) indicated gretter l I

than 1 time the maximum parmissible concentration (MPC) and the licensee halted l l the purge, i l

l Licensee evaluation of evailable data determined that the RDAC indication wts L inaccurate. The software used by the RDAC is modeled based on the release

! constituents which would be expected curing design basis accident condition When corrected for the actual constituents, the activity at the site boundary l was estimated to have been 0.3 MpC, which is well within limits.

The second purge was initiated. Results were as expected. However, the RCAC

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lost communication with the super particulate, iodine, and noble gas (SPING)

l monitors for approximately 11 minutes. Each SPING has a local memory and the l lost data was retrieved and evaluated. At no time during the purge were regulatory or administrative limits exceeded. Because the total release is analyzed prior to release commencement, there was no reason to stop the release l

in progres . OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION / MODIFICATION INSTALLATION REVIEW (UNITS 1 XND 2) (71707. 60705)

The inspectors routinely toured the facility during normal and backshift hours to assess general plant and equipment conditions, housekeeping, and adherence to fire protection, security, and radiological control measure Ongoing work

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activities were monitored to verify that they were being conducted in accordance with approved administrative and technical procedures and that

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. propor communications with the control room staff had been established. The inspectors observed valve, instrument, and electrical equipment lineups in the field to ensure that they were consistent with system operability requirements and operating procedure During tours of the control rooms, the inspectors verified proper staffing, access control, and operator attentiveness. Adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operation were evaluated. The inspectors examined equipment lineup and ope ~ ability, instrument traces, and status of control room annunciators. Various cc'itrol room logs and other available licensee documentation were reviewt The inspector noted that, despite good overall performance thus far during the Unit 1 outage by the health physics department, a high incidence of personnel contamination events (PCE) continued to occur. The licensee is aggressively trying to reduce the numbor of PCEs but, to date, has been unsuccessfu The inspector attended numerous planning sessions held by licensee personnel prior-to the beginning of the Unit 1 outage. Broad scope management status meetings, as well as detailed working level meetings, were routinely attended to evaluate the adequacy of licensee planning efforts. With few exceptions, the inspector noted that personnel had an excellent understanding of upcoming outage activities under their purview. Management involvement at all levels was good. Although design work for some modifications was not yet completed at the start of the outage, the planning process for the affected jobs was ongoing. The inspector concluded that the overall level of planning was goo .1 Unit 2 - Pressurizer Pressure Spike On September 12, 1990, two second-stage reheat valves were inadvertently closed. Operations was tagging out an instrument air line when the valves went shu This caused one moisture separator reheater (MSR) to be removed from o

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service, consequently, the reactor coolant system (RCS) saw a load reduction which caused a pressurizer pressure spike to 2275 psig. The pressurizer sprays actuated as designed to maintain RCS pressure. Operations responded quickly and was able to reopen the reheat valves within 2 minutes, i

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The event was ,taused by an ncorrect P&lD which did not show the instrument air supply line to the MSR valves coming off the line that was isolated. Removal of the air supply ellowed the rehe t valves to go closed. The licensee initiated a plant endneering action cenuest at the time to correct the P&I The inspector asked the licensee whether or not a condition report should have been written. The licensee believed that a report should have been initiated and took the necessary steps to initiate one. The piping involved was technically nonsafety-related, and therefore, outside the scope of the condition reporting procedure. However, through system interactions, a minor pressure transient was experienced in the reactor coolant system.

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Operations managers from both units used this example to train operations personnel in the importance of initiating condition reports for operational transient .2 Unit 1 - RCS Draindown and Reduced Inventory Operation The Unit 1 operations staff was observed during the draining of the RCS for the B once-through steam generator (OTSG). The control room staff closely monitored the control room level instrumentation throughout the evolution. The control room indication was confirmed by local cold leg level readings taken with a tygon hose. All instrumentation had been calibrated to within 6 inches and tracked within 2 inches. Operations adhered to an administrative lower limit which was 6 inches above the 371-foot 2-inch limi Because of a computer error related to the data sampling frequencies of the integrated cont ol system and the safety parameter display system, i Monitors 1196 and 1198 indicated 368.5 feet for a.few seconds; however, actual level was 371 feet 11 3/4 inches. The indicators corrected themselves during the next automatic level sample. Except for this abnormality, instrumentation tracked within approximately 2 inches throughout the evolutio The staff exhibited good control and a thorough understanding of the evolution in progres The inspectors closely monitored licensee measures to control work that could potentially jeopardize decay heat removal during reduced inventory operation The inspector found that all levels of licensee management were acutely aware of facility vulnerabilities and that work was very tightly controlled during the first draindown windo .3 Unit 2 - Reset of Inverter s

The operations staff was observed while resetting an inverter that had shifted to its alternate source. Operators were dispatched to transfer the inverter e back to the normal alternating-current power supply after it had transferred to

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the direct-current suppl A portion of Instruction 2107.003, Supplement 3, was used to accomplish this evolution. The operators were observed by the inspector to have the necessary skill to successfully use this instruction and the instruction provided adequate guidance to complete the tas However, Supplement 7 to Instruction 2107.003 was written specifically to perform this evolutio Although the incorrect procedure was used to perform the task, all steps required by Supplement 7 were performed. Interviews with the licensee management indicated that, in the future, operations personnel would use the proper supplement. In this case, the procedure was similar and the evolution satisfactorily performe . o ,

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~11-J MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATION (UNITS 1 AND 2) (61726)

The inspectors observed the TS-reautred surveillance testing on the various components listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results conformed with TS and procedure i requirements, test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual '

directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:

" Monthly Surveillance Test of the Electric Fire Pump," Procedure 1104.32, JO 823933

" Monthly Surveillance Test of Diesel Generator 1," Procedure 1104.36, JO 823934

" Monthly Surveillance Test of Service Water Pump P-4A," Procedure 1104.29 JO 823938

" Weekly Reactor Coolant Gross Activity Determination," Procedure 2607.001, JO 824343 5.1 Unit 1 - Main Steam Safety Valve Testing The inspector reviewed the-results of testing conducted on the main steam safety valves (MSSV). Test results showed that as-found data for 11 of 16 valves was outsice the il percent acceptance criteria on the initial lif However, when the combination of valve lift pressures were considered, only 2 of the 16 valves failed to meet the acceptance criteria. TS 3.4. requires that 14 of 16 MSSVs be operabl Therefore, the as-found condition meets this criteri Setpoint drif t on large safety valves is a generic industry problem and in place test results at ANO are typical of industry result The licensee has been trending valve performance and, to date, has not identified any indication of age or use-related degradation. The licensee is currently evaluating its practice of insitu testing, as opposcd to having a contractor rebuild and test the valves at a test facilit For the immediate future, the licensee will continue to test in place after the valves have been returned from the Contracto The inspector believes that the licensee's evaluation of the relief valve r setpoint drift problem was thorough and accurat .2 Unit 2 - Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators During discussions with Unit 2 management, they indicated that the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators were not being manually started from all locations

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-12-during surveillance testing. Unit 2 management has indicated that they intend to revise the applicable surveillance instructions to ensure that all portions of the diesel generator control circuitry are tested. Current TS do not require manual starting from all location . MONTHLY MAINTENANCE OBSERVATION (UNITS 1 and 2) (62703)

Maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with the T The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, j functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning '

components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed:

Unit 2 emergency feedwater pump turbine (EFPT) overspeed tappet replacement, JO 0822509. Work was initially started on the EFPT using a controlled work procedure and a generic Terry Turbine drawing which did I not conform to the field installation. Involved employees were aware of the differences between the field installation and the generic drawin They indicated that an engineering evaluation was to take place prior to completing the last quality control sign off. This practice was brought to the attention of licensee management for their investigation. This issue will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 368/9030-0 *

Motor-operated valve actuation testing on the Unit I service water sluice gates, JO 815088. The work was performed prior to the Unit I shutdown to reduce outage scope, and the controls and preplanning necessary to prevent TS conflicts were good. All as-found tests met acceptance criteria and no ,

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Unit 1 Diesel Generator B overhaul and air system replacement modifications, JO 702596. The inspector noted that the lead technician for the overhaul was extremely knowledgeable of all ongoing activitie All work was progressing in accordance with schedule and procedure i requirement l l

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-13- REVIEW OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92701)  ; (Closed) Apparent Violation 313/8729-01: Failure to Report a Condition Outside the Design Basis This item was issued as an apparent violation pending the results of an enforcement conferenc ;

On March 14, 1988, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition I of Civil Penalty (EA-87-227) that addressed the related technical issue of the ,

- failure to take adesuate corrective action for elevated containment temperature The N!!C letter did not fornially issue a Notice of Violation for failure to report a condition outside the design basis, which was an inherent

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part of the violation that was cited; therefore, this item is considered closed for record purpose .2 (Closed) Open Item 313/8802-02; 368/8802-02: Control Room Habitability This item. involved the' review of submittals by the licensee regarding control room habitabilit l This issue is currently being resolved between the NRC and the licensee in accordance with the requirements stated in NUREG-0737 for Three Mile 1'

Island (TMI) Item III.D.3.4. This open item is considered closed as resolution of the issue will be completed.when TMI Item III.D.3.4 is close ,

- 7.3 (Closed) Violation 313/8914-02 and Apparent Violation 313/8848-02:

Effluent Release Exceeded TS Limits ,

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This aprarent. violation' involved a release that exceeded the limits specified #

in'the TS. The apparent violation was first identified in NRC Inspection Report- 50-313/88-48; however, the actual Notice of Violation was not issued until NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-1 To address the corrective' actions-that would be taken to resolve this issue, the licensee issued Licensee Event Report (LER) 313/88-007. The LER was close in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-14; 50-368/89-14 therefore, this violation and the associated apparent violation are considered closed as the corrective actions taken by the licensee have been verified to be adequat .4 (Closed) Unresolved Item 313/9016-01; 368/9016-01: Missed Surveillance Tests i This item involved the licensee missing surveillance tests, l In a letter dated August 29,- 1990, NRC stated that this issue had been changed from an unresolved item to a noncited violation. Since no action or response is required by the= licensee, this item is considered close I

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7.5 (Closed) Ap>arent Violation 313/8841-03: 368/8841-03: Failure to Inform Workers of ladiological Protection Requirements This apparent violation was issued as Violation 313/8848-03; 368/8848-03 and was previously closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/89-36; 50-368/88-3 Based on the previously reviewed corrective actions, this item is considered #

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! EXIT INTERVIEW The inspectors met with members of the Entergy Operations staff, on Octob'er 16, 1990, at the end of the inspectio The list of attendees is provided in paragraph 1 of this inspection report. At this meeting, the inspectors -

summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings. The licensee did not

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identify, as proprietary, any of the material _ provided to, or reviewed by, the ,

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