IR 05000313/1986040

Insp Repts 50-313/86-40 & 50-368/86-40 on 861201-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Maint,Surveillance,Followup on IE Bulletins & Followup on Allegation

ML20210D164
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	01/27/1987
From:	Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210D055	List: IR 05000313/1986040 ML20210D053
References
50-313-86-40, 50-368-86-40, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-004, IEB-86-1, IEB-86-2, IEB-86-3, IEB-86-4, NUDOCS 8702100027
Download: ML20210D164 (13)

Text

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, APPENDIX

, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ffi!SSION

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REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/86-40 Licenses: DRP-51 50-368/86-40 NPF-6

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0 *: Dockets: '50-313 50-368 Licensee: - Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)

P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: December 1-31, 1986 Inspectors: M/ M m- //a/P7 W. D. J gnson, Senior Resident Reactor Date Inspectbr l l2 Sl C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor Da'te Inspector Approved: fu e /C1/\ / 20 ~2

. ft. HLnter , Chief, Rhictor'

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Da'te PrSectSect(ionB,ReactorProjects Branch 8702100027 DR 870123 ADOCK 05000313 PDR

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m Inspection Summary InspectionConductedDekember 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-40)-

" Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on IE Bulletins, hydrogen recombiner-installation, and followup on an allegatio Results: Within the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted December-1-31, 1986 (Report 50-368/86-40)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced _ inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on IE Bulletins, and followup on an allegatio Results: Within-the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. Levine, Director of Site Nuclear Operations R. Ashcraft, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor B. Baker, Operations Manager C. Bean, QC Supervisor J. Benham, Planning and Scheduling Coordinator D. Bennett, Mechanical Engineer D. Bowlby, Bechtel Field Engineer-D. Brown, Quality Control Engineer B. Cameron, Bechtel Site Manager

• P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer A. Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent B. Durst, Project Engineering Superintendent E. Ewing, General Manager Technical Support B. Garrison, Operations Technical Support B. Godwin, Startup Engineer M. Goodson, Project Engineering Supervisor L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor T. Hensel, Bechtel Engineer K. Higgens, Bechtel Engineer H. Hollis, Security Superintendent G. Holt', Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

• D. Horton, Quality Assurance Superintendent

• D. Howard, Specials Projects Manager L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality H. Jones, Field Construction Manager P. Kearney, Project Engineer J. Lamb, Safety and Fire Protection Coordinator

• R. Lane, Engineering Manager

• D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor B. McCord, Quality Control Inspection Supervisor R. McKelvy, Bechtel Engineer J. McWilliams, Maintenance Mar,ager J. Meeker, Quality Control Engineer J. Orlicek, Field Engineering Supervisor G. Parks, Senior QC Inspector V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

• S. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations R. Rispoli, Fire Protection Specialist C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent S. Smith, Senior Engineer G. Storey, Safety and Fire Protection Coordinator M. Stroud, Project Engineering Supervisor C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support Supervisor

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• J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent R. Tucker,' Electrical Maintenance Superintendent J. Vidunas, S&W QC Inspector B. West, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager T. Windham, Bechtel Engineer C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support Supervisor

• Present at exit intervie The NRC inspectors also co1tacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personne . Followup on IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2)

IE Bulletin (IEB) 86-01, " Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps," was issued on May 23, 1986, to boiling water reactor facilitie This IEB is not applicable to AN IEB 86-04, " Defective Teletherapy Timer That May Not Terminate Treatment Dose," was issued on October 29, 1986, to licensed users of cobalt-60 teletherapy units. This IEB is not applicable to AN IEB 86-02, " Static 0 Ring Differential Pressure Switches," was issued on July 18, 1986, to power reactor facilitie This IEB requested licensees to determine whether or not they have Series 102 or 103 differential pressure switches supplied by SOR, Incorporated, installed as equipment important to safety. The licensee's response to this bulletin was dated July 3, 1986. This response stated that SOR Series 102 or 103 are not used at AN IEB 86-03, " Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line," was issued on October 8, 1986, to power reactor facilities. This IEB required licensees to determine whether their facilities have a single failure vulnerability in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS pumps that could cause a failure to more than one ECCS train. The licensee's response to this bulletin was dated November 21, 1986. This response discussed the recirculation configuration for the ANO-1 and ANO-2 ECCS pumps and concluded that the problem identified in IEB 86-03 did not exist at AN0-1 or ANO-2. The NRC inspector had previously reviewed this issue and agreed with the licensee's conclusio No violations or deviations were identifie These four IEBs are close . Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, l reviewed tagout records, verified proper return to service of affected

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\t componentA,andensuredthatmaintenance'requestshadbeen'nitiatedfor i -

equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors made spot checks to -

verify that the physical security plan.was being implemented in accordance a'

with the' station security plan. The. inspectors verified implementation of~

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_ , radiation protection controls-during observation of plant activitie .

The NRC inspectors toured accessible' areas of 7 the. units to observe plantL equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks a~nd excessive vibration. -The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping'and

. . cleanliness conditions ~during the to_ur .

The NRC inspectors walked down accessible portions of.the Unit 1 emergency core cooling functional sections of the decay heat removal and makeup systems. The walkdown was performed using Procedures 1104.02 and 1104;03- 1 and Drawings M-231 and M-232. Several minor deficiencies were-noted:

. Valve MU-1220A was missing its handwhee . Valve CV-1400 had a- packing . lea a

. Valve DH-1020E had a loose gland nut which appeared to have resulted:

in a packing lea . Valve DH-1B was 'found. in its required position with a lock and chain

. attached to its yoke and handwheel, but the handwheel was noti attached to the stem rendering the lock and chain potentially ineffective.in preventing unauthorized operation of the valve. This discrepancy was already identified by'the licensee. Due to the unit being in cold shutdown at the time of this walkdown, the valve was <

not required'to be locke '

. Leakage from one or two of the following groups of valves was detected: MU-1209 A, B, C, and D and MU-1228-A, B, C, and . Valve MU1210E was found with a small leak and a boric acid buildu An attached deficiency tag dated August ~4, 1984, indicated that this was an old proble The NRC inspector discussed the timeliness of correcting such leaks with the licensee. The licensee promptly issued job requests to correct these deficiencie These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that selected facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure .e

- No violations or deviations were identifie *

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. Monthly'Survei11anceObservation(Units 1and2)

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'The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required v surveillance testing on the Unit 2 emergency feedwater pump 2P7A

'(Procedure 2106.06, Supplement I, monthly test) and verified that testing was performed.in accordance with adequate procedures, test _ instrumentation

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was-calibrated, limiting conditions _for' operation were met, removal and-

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restoration of the affected components were accomplished,-test results

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were reviewed by personnel other than the. individual directing the test, and 'any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

. Plant protection system channel 'A' monthly test (Procedure 2304.37)

. Number'2 diesel for Unit 2 biweekly test (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 2) The NRC inspector noted that exhaust manifold oil leakage apparently caused by the procedurally required prelube

appeared _to be excessive. (This test was observed twice, at the beginning and end of the month).

. Area radiation monitoring system monthly test, Unit 2-(Procedure 2304.59)

. Number 2 diesel for Unit 1 monthly test (Procedure 1104.36, Supplement 2)

. Integrated engineered safety features test, odd channel, digital (Procedure 1305.06)

. 'A' high pressure injection pump 2P89A monthly test (Procedure 2104.39)

. Standby penetration room emergency ventilation system monthly test flow (Procedure 1104.42, Supplement 2)

. Number 1 diesel generator for Unit 2 test (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1)

. Operability Test of Unit 2, Number 1 diesel generator (Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 8)

No violations or-deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specification ,

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating ~the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to 1 ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance *

which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed:

. Hydrostatic test and walkdown of Design Change 83-1106, high pressure

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auxiliary pressurizer spray modification (JO 700218).

During the hydrostatic test, flow indicator 1235 was noted to be

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leaking severely as it was exposed to the system test pressure of 3825 psig. Subsequently, an operator prepared a job request and job order 725578 was issued to repair the leak. This flow indicator normally is exposed to normal primary makeup pump pressur ! . Inadequate core cooling monitoring / display system functional test and t

calibration (Procedure 1409.90, Section 7.2, integrated system performance test)

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. Differential pressure test using M0 VATS and P7B of emergency

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feedwater valve CV-2670 i

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. Repair of stator winding on Number 1 emergency diesel generator, Unit 1 (JO 723810)

. Shaft alignment of 'C' reactor coolant pump following seal replacement (JO 707071)

. Main feedwater flow venturi repair (JO 725082)

. Replacement of CV-3850 (JO 725209)

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No violations or deviations were identifie . H.ydrogen Recombiner Installation (Unit 1)

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During the refueling outage conducted in September through December

' of 1986, the licensee installed Design Change Package (DCP) 84-1069. This '

, DCP installed two hydrogen recombiners in the Unit I reactor building,

, installed power supply cabinets for the recombiners in electrical penetration

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rooms, and installed controls and indications for the recombiners in the i

control room. As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-313/86-38,

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the NRC inspector observed various stages of installation and testing of the hydrogen recombiners and associated equipmen During this inspection period, the NRC inspector reviewed the records associated with the installation and testing. The records reviewed included the following:

. DCP 84-1069 and related Field Change Notices. This package contained the design details for the installation, 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, calculations, drawings, environmental qualification data, and testing and calibration requirement . Control Work Packages (CWPs) 84-1069/719193-1 through 84-1069/719193-14. These packages contained detailed instructions, supervisory signatures, and quality control inspector signatures for various segments of the installatio . CWP 84-1069/722323-1

. Nonconformance Reports 86-120-1 and 86-129-1. These were appropriately resolved prior to completion of the installatio . Anchor Data Reports

. Material Tickets

. Cleaning and Coating Verification Records

. Penetration Seal Checklists

. Weld Packages

. Yellow lined electrical schematic drawings and connection diagrams

. Field Inspection Reports for termination screw torque

. Plant Engineering Action Requests

. Quality Control Inspection Records (QCIRs). There were one or more QCIRs for most of the individual CWP . ' Job Order 722314

. Job Order 721792

. Calibration and startup testing records One discrepancy was identified during the review of these records. One of I the items listed in the scope of Job Order 721792 was to perform an overload test of the new breakers installed in motor control centers for the hydrogen recombiners. At the time of the NRC inspector's review, this

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had not been performed. The implementation portion of. the' Job Order was complete, but had not yet been reviewed by AP&L supervision. The breakers .

were satisfactorily tested on December 12, 1986, after the NRC inspector discussed this omission with AP&L supervisors. The NRC inspector also discussed this matter with licensee managemen The NRC inspector also reviewed the following three procedures which had been developed or revised as a result of the hydrogen recombiner installation:

. 1104.31, " Containment Hydrogen Control," Revision 0, December 11, 1986

. 1104.33, " Reactor Building Ventilation," Revision 28, December 11, 1986

. 1202.01, " Emergency Operating Procedures," Revision 8, December 15, 1986 Procedure 1104.31 contains operating instructions and testing procedures for the hydrogen sampling system and the hydrogen recombiner Procedure 1202.01 requires that these systems be placed into operation in accordance with Procedure 1104.31 following a loss of coolant acciden This inspection effort also completes the NRC review of Three Mile Action Plan Item II.E.1.4.1. No . violations or deviations were identifie . Allegation 4-86-A-110 Followup (Units 1 and 2)

In October 1986, the NRC received telephone calls from or on the behalf of current or former contract Quality Control (QC) inspectors at ANO. The callers alleged, among other things, that QC inspectors were not provided

. with inspection procedures providing acceptance criteria and that QC i inspectors were instructed not to write nonconformance reports. The NRC l inspector did not perform a formal investigation of these allegations, but l

reviewed available records and procedures to help determine the validity l

of these allegation Inspection Procedures and Acceptance Criteria Quality Control Administrative Procedure 1004.18, " Modification, Installation and Test Inspection," was the licensee procedure which i described the QC program for planning and performing inspections, examinations and tests required for quality verification of i fabrication, installation, and testing for construction and i modification activities. It included instructions for preparing and I using ouality control instructions (QCIs) and quality control inspection records (QCIRs). These documents specified the following:

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. Which inspection activities were required

. .The inspection-criteria

. The inspection method to be used

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The QCIs were prepared by a QC engineer and reviewed and approved by the-QC engineering supervisor and the QC superintendent. There were 16 approved QCIslat the time of this inspection; and they covered inspection areas such as concrete expansion anchor inspection -

. (CA-1.00), electrical inspection (E-1.00), mechanical equipment inspection-(M-1.00),' and pipe support inspection (P-2.00). The NRC-

- inspector reviewed the approved QCIs and found that they contained:

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. General-instructions including purpose and scope

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. -Prerequisites including requirements to review the control work

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package (CWP) or job order, open nonconformance reports (NCRs),

', open reports of~ abnormal conditions (RACs), and the liste ,

procedures,. drawings, and specifications containing acceptance criteria

. In process inspection activities, including detailed inspection

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., requirements, inspection methods, and references to inspection criteriar

. Final inspection activities to assure that the completed work activity conforms to project requirements

. Review of supplementary records

. Review and documentation of exceptions

. Other items as required for specific types of inspections QCIRs were prepared by a QC inspector and'were reviewed and approved

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by a QC engineer. There was a standard QCIR form corresponding to

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each approved QCI. Prior to performance of a specific inspection activity the QCIR was prepared to identify the equipment being inspected, the scope and location of the work activity covered by the

! QCIR, and the inspection acceptance criteria. This form was then

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used during inspection activities to document completion of the j activities required by the QCI.

I' The QC inspection of penetration sealing and welding activities were j not documented on QCIRs. For these activities, the QC inspection was i recorded on special checklists contained in procedures specific to these activities.

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The procedures contained inspection requirements and acceptance criteria was included or referenced on the checklist ,.-.m e

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The NRC inspector reviewed a number of completed QCIRs in the course of the review of records relating to DCP 84-1069. These were found to have acceptance criteria references listed as required by Procedure 1004.18. These references were most often AP&L engineering specifications or drawings included in the DC :UseofNonconformanceReports'(NCRs)

The NRC inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures which .

address documentation of deficiencies:

1000.07 Deviations and Nonconformances 1004.01 Quality Control Program Implementation 1004.18 Modification, Installation and Test Inspection The purpose of this review was to assess the clarity of the written guidance available to personnel at ANO regarding the use of NCR Procedures 1000.07 and 1004.01 defined a deviation as, "A nonconformance or departure of a characteristic from specified requirements," and they defined a nonconformance as, "A deficiency in characteristic, documentation, or procedure which renders the quality of an item unacceptable or indeterminate."

Section 5.3 of Procedure 1000.07 stated that the originator of the NCR was responsible for identifying nonconforming conditions and reporting them to the cogniza6t supervisor using the NC Section 6.1 of this procedure stated that NCRs may be originated by personnel at all levels. It further states that any nonconformance which required approved disposition, pending disposition, or was of a magnitude that could affect control of quality or continued safe operation shall be documented on a NCR or RAC. It also stated that NCRs were not intended to be used where dispositions were authorized by approved procedures prior to final acceptanc Section 7.1 of Procedure 1004.18 contained a similar provision, stating, " Items which are discovered by in-process inspections during installation or testing to be potentially nonconforming as a result of normally expected variations in the construction process, but are correctable by further processing without deviating from the approved specifications and drawings, can be controlled and documented by the use of a Deficiency Notice and documented on the remarks column on the QCIR. A Quality Control Engineer will make the determination as to document a discrepancy on a NCR or a Deficiency Notice."

Section 6.17 of Procedure 1004.01 provided for documenting discrepancies found on job orders, DCPs, and associated documents on the J0/DCP Discrepancy List. Section 6.5.1 of this procedure stated,

"The QC Department shall use Fom 1004.010 and 1004.01F to report deviations and observations noted during surveillances or inspections." These forms were the " Quality Control Surveillance

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Findings" forms known as QCSFs. However, section 6.6 of this procedure required issuance of a report of the status NCRs generated as a result of QC inspection The NRC inspector also reviewed an apparently unofficial " desk procedure" entitled, " Instructions for Deficiency Notices." This instruction described the processing of DNs and gave many examples of deficiencies which should be documented on a DN rather than on a NCR when discovered during inspection activitie The NRC inspector reviewed the DN log and a book containing all 28 DNs listed in the log. The DNs were initiated between January 20, 1986, and October 29, 1986. All of the DNs were closed as of December 17, 1986. The NCRs initiated by the modification QC section during the recent refueling outages (2RS and IR7) were reviewed by the NRC inspector. There were 32 NCRs in this sample. Two of the NCRs were found to be invalid during the AP&L review process. The other 30 appeared to be appropriately dispositione Conclusions The NRC inspector found that inspection procedures with acceptance criteria were available for inspection activities related to construction and modifications. The acceptance criteria were generally not explicitly stated, but were included by reference to specifications or drawings. One of the prerequisites which was required to be signed for on the QCIRs prior to performing inspections was completion by the NRC inspector of a review of the inspection and reference criteria for availability, familiarity, and correct approval and revision status. The portion of the allegation relating to lack of inspection procedures and acceptance criteria was not substantiated by the NRC inspecto The NRC inspector found that the procedural and other written guidance available to QC inspectors for using NCRs was not well coordinated and could be confusing. Particularly, the procedure guidance was potentially confusing regarding when to write a NCR or when to write a DN or QCDF. The " desk procedure" on DNs contained raany examples of deficiencies which would appear under some circumstances to meet the criteria for writing NCRs. Procedural clarification appears to be reeded to integrate the deficiency

. reporting systems at ANO and to ensure that deficiencies which are i identified receive the appropriate levels of management review. An l AP&L management representative informed the NRC inspector that procedure revisions were being prepared. He stated that this was necessary to coordinate the QC procedures following a recent reorganization of the ANO quality group. This is an open item pendin0 procedure revision and NRC revie (313/8640-01; j 368/8640-01)

l No violations or deviations were identified.

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8._ Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclea Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of this inspection. At this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.

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