NRC Bulletin 86-01

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

text

Bulletin 86-01: Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps

SSINS No.: 6820

OMB No.: 3150-0012

IEB 86-01

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555

May 23, 1986

IE COMPLIANCE BULLETIN NO. 86-01: MINIMUM FLOW LOGIC PROBLEMS THAT COULD

DISABLE RHR PUMPS

Addressees:

All GE boiling water reactor (BWR) facilities holding an operating license

(OL) or a construction permit (CP).

Purpose:

The purposes of this bulletin are: (1) to inform BWR licensees and

applicants of a recently identified problem with the minimum flow logic for

which a single failure could disable all RHR pumps, (2) to request that

licensees affected by the problem immediately provide appropriate

instructions and training to plant operators on how to recognize the problem

if it occurs and take appropriate mitigating actions, (3) to request that

licensees notify the NRC of the existence of the problem at their facility

within 7 days of receipt of this bulletin, and (4) to request that licensees

inform the NRC of measures taken to correct design or installation problems

that are identified as a result of this bulletin.

Description of Circumstances:

During a recent review of IE Information Notice 85-94, "Potential For Loss

Of Minimum Flow Paths Leading To ECCS Pump Damage During A LOCA," the

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant discovered that a single failure under certain

accident sequences could result in all RHR minimum flow bypass valves being

signaled to close while all other pump discharge valves are also closed.

This condition could result in no flow through the RHR pumps and could lead

to the pumps running dead headed with potential for pump damage in a few

minutes. If this single failure occurred in conjunction with an automatic

start of the RHR system, RHR pump damage may occur if unrecognized by the

operator. This event could disable RHR functions including Low Pressure

Coolant Injection (LPCI), head spray, drywell spray, shutdown cooling, torus

spray and suppression pool cooling. As a result of the loss of suppression

pool cooling over a long period of time, core spray pumps could ultimately

lose net positive suction head and also be unavailable.

The NRC staff has judged that the overall probability of a serious core

damage accident due to this problem is low. Nevertheless, such a single

failure vulnerability is not in compliance with the regulatory requirement

for independence in emergency core cooling systems and could compromise

several important systems.

8605230308

.

IEB 86-O1

May 23, 1986

Page 2 of 3

GE's initial review identified the following plants with some potential for

having the single failure problem: Pilgrim; Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3; Peach

Bottom 2 and 3; Duane Arnold; Millstone 1; Monticello; Quad Cities 1 and 2;

Dresden 2 and 3; Cooper; and Fermi 2. The staff understands that GE has

notified these potentially affected facilities and informal communications

from GE indicate that the list was narrowed to Pilgrim, Quad Cities and

possibly Dresden during preparation of the bulletin. The above listed plants

are being provided the bulletin by telecopy. Since there is not complete

certainty that other BWR's do not have the problem, they are also addressed

by this bulletin. Their copies are being sent by mail.

At Pilgrim, to prevent the pump from running dead headed, each pair of RHR

pumps is provided with a minimum flow bypass capability. The minimum flow

bypass consists of an orificed flow bypass which allows a flow of

approximately 10 percent of rated flow. The minimum flow bypass lines for

each pair of RHR pumps are connected to a single line and controlled by a

single minimum flow bypass valve. The minimum flow bypass valve is normally

open. The valve will close upon sensing flow in either of the RHR loops.

The current logic configuration for Pilgrim minimum flow bypass valves is

that a high flow signal from either the A or B RHR loops will close both A

and B bypass valves. Thus, a postulated single failure of a flow sensing

instrument may result in all RHR pumps running without bypass flow. If this

failure occurs during an event with a high drywell signal or low water level

signal, such as during small or intermediate size loss of cooling accidents

(LOCA) or spurious actuation, the RHR pumps may start and run dead headed.

One of the potential fixes being proposed by GE is to remove the automatic

closing signal from the RHR minimum flow bypass valves. This fix will result

in some of the LPCI flow being diverted through the minimum flow line. For

other RHR modes of operation, the values may be manually closed.

Although safety analyses may justify this interim fix, there are a number of

problems that need to be considered. For example, on many plants the minimum

flow bypass valves must be closed during shutdown cooling in order to

prevent draining the reactor vessel inventory to the torus. The minimum flow

bypass valves are considered containment isolation valves on some plants.

REQUIRED ACTION FOR GE BWR FACILITIES

1. Promptly determine whether or not your facility has this single failure

vulnerability.

2. If the problem exists, immediately instruct all operating shifts of the

problem and measures to recognize and mitigate the problem.

3. Within 7 days of receipt of this bulletin, provide (a) a written report

to the NRC which identifies whether or not this problem exists at your

facility, (b) if the problem exists, identify the short-term

modifications to plant operating procedures or hardware that have been

or are being implemented to assure safe plant operations.

.

IEB 86-01

May 23, 1986

Page 3 of 3

4. If the problem exists, provide a written report within 30 days of

receipt of this bulletin informing the NRC of the schedule for

long-term resolution of problems that are identified as a result of

this bulletin.

Should a licensee determine that any action requested by this bulletin

jeopardizes overall plant safety, the NRC should be notified of that fact

and provided with appropriate justification for not implementing the

requested action. Such notification shall be made within 7 days of receipt

of this bulletin.

The written reports shall be submitted to the appropriate Regional

Administrator under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a,

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also, the original copy of the cover

letters and a copy of the reports shall be transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 for

reproduction and distribution.

This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and

Budget under a blanket clearance number 3150-0011. Comments on burden and

duplication may be directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Reports

Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C.

20503.

If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or one of the technical

contacts listed below.

James M. Taylor, Director

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: Eric Weiss, IE

(301) 492-9005

M. Wayne Hodges, NRR

(301) 492-7483

Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins