IR 05000254/1987008

Insp Repts 50-254/87-08 & 50-265/87-08 on 870405-0606. Violations Noted:Failure to Rept on ESF Actuation

ML20216F675
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/24/1987
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216F635	List: IR 05000254/1987008 ML20216F631 ML20216F651
References
50-254-87-08, 50-254-87-8, 50-265-87-08, 50-265-87-8, GL-85-03, GL-85-3, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, IEIN-87-004, IEIN-87-008, IEIN-87-012, IEIN-87-017, IEIN-87-12, IEIN-87-17, IEIN-87-4, IEIN-87-8, NUDOCS 8706300918
Download: ML20216F675 (10)

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/87008(DRP); 50-265/87008(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

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Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 l Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: April 5 through June 6, 1987 k

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Inspectors: R. L. Higgins A. D. Morrongiello {

j Approved By- In Projects Section 10 I 4/lv/P 7 Dat4

, Inspection Summary Inspection on A)ril 5 through June 6, 1987 (Reports No. 254/87008(DRP); )

50-265/87008(DRJ)) {

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of operations; l maintenance; surveillance; LER review; routine reports; Information Notices; Bulletins; and Generic Letter Results: In the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to report on engineered safety features actuation - Paragraph 2). This i violation was of minimal significance to public health and safety. Several !

areas continued to perform well: operations, radiation protection, and securit l l

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DETAILS Persons Contacted  !

• R. Bax,. Plant Manager T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent T.'Lihou, Operating Engineer

• R. Robey. Technical Services Superintendent

• M. Kooi, Compliance Coordinator

• D. Gibson, Quality Assurance 4

• Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 12, 198 [ Operations (71707,93702)

The. inspectors, through direc't observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined plant operations. The: inspector verified that Lactivities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and wer inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions.and routine reports were in:accordance with Technical. Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards,. approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplishe '

by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were me during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service;-functional testing and/or. calibrations were performed prior to returning. components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished; quality control. records and logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, '

calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant !

conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, . l radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel i errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personne .1 Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Liquid Control System and High pressure Core Injection Syste Summary of Operations

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. Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit I was at full powe .For the remainder of the report period, the unit was either at full power or on Economic Generation Control (EGC).

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Unit 2 At the'beginning of the inspection period Unit 2 was.at full powe For the remainder of the report period, the unit was either at full power or on Economic Generation' Control (EGC).

Unit-2 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Stroke Timing

'At 0215' hours'on April 26, 1987, MSIV closure time verification surveillance QOS 250-S2, . required to be performed quarterly by Technical Specification - 4.7.D.I.c.2,' was performed on Quad Cities Unit 2 with the unit at 500-MW Per Technical Specification Table 3.7-1, the required closure time is between 3 and 5 seconds; inboard MSIVs IA, 18 and 1C closed in 2.97 seconds, 2.96 seconds, and 2.98 seconds respectively. These valves were declared inoperable and Unit 2 commenced an immediate. shutdown to bring.it to a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in accordance-with Technical Specification 3.7.D.3. An Unusual Event was declared at that time. At 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br /> the NARS-phone call was made. At 0250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> the NRC Operations Center was notifie At 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br /> ~the electrical load on Unit 2 was reduced to 400 MWe. The closure time for inboard MSIV 1A,18, and 1 C was rechecked and found to be slightly greater than 3 seconds for all 3 valves, which is:within j

'the required closure time. At 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> the Unusual Event was terminate i At 0515 hours0.00596 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.515212e-4 weeks <br />1.959575e-4 months <br /> the electrical load on Unit 2 was reduced to 200 MWe. The-drywell was then deinerted, a drywell entry was made, and the stroke times of' inboard MSIVs IA, IB and 1C was adjusted to 4.37 seconds; 3.98' seconds,and 3.97 seconds respectively. The drywell was reinerted and Unit 2 was then slowly returned to full powe Parking Lot Fire On May 18, 1987, at 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br /> an Unusual Event was declared. The reason-was that offsite fire assistance was needed to put out a car on fire in the upper parking lot. The fire was put out and the Unusual Event terminated at 0740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />. There were no injuries as a result of the fir Unit 2 Half Scram During Electrical Storm On the morning of May 20, 1987, an electrical storm was occurring in the Cordova area. During this storm, Bus 28 tripped on undervoltage resulting in a half scram, a half Group 1 and a half Group 2 isolation, and a full Group 3 isolation. Numerous spurious annunciators were also received. The full Group 3 occurred when the 2A RPS tripped (due to Bus 28 trip) which resulted in a spurious High Temperature isolation signal. The cause of Bus 28 tripping has been attributed to a nearby lighting strike. Both units remained at power during this transien '

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Control Room Ventilation Isolation On May 19, 1987, at 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> electrical maintenance personnel were working on MCC 16-3-1 distribution panel and bumped the breaker for the toxic gas analyzer, causing the control room ventilation to isolat In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) this required a notification to the NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the event. Notification was made on June 4, 1987, because this event was not determined to be an ESF l actuation until that time. The resident inspectors will review the licensee's determination of the reason for the delay in notification to the NRC and the corrective actions to preclude the inadvertent isolation ,

of control room ventilation. Failure to report an ESF actuation is considered to be a violation (254/87008-01 (DRP)).

3. MonthlyMaintenanceObservation(62703) l Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted .

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry

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codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions. for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;

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radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety i related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Portions of diesel generator air compressor overhau I (2) Portions of various valve overhaul (3) Portions of service water pump overhau )

(4) Portions of service water pump motor balancin No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) '

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that l limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration

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I of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the l test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were I properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Portions of low low reactor water level calibration on Unit 1 from !

the plant and from the control roo (2) Portions of steam jet air ejector radiation monitor functional from U-1 control roo (3) Analysis and Operations Division testing diesel generator relay (4) Diesel generator monthly on Unit (5) High pressure core injection and reactor core injection cooling monthly operational surveillanc (6) Control room portions of torus to drywell differential pressure indication calibratio No violations or deviations were identifie . LER Review (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. The LERs listed below are considered closed:

(1) Unit 1 (a) (Closed) LER 86029, Revision 00: Control Room HVAC Isolation due to Gas Analyzer Failur On October 2, 1986, Unit I was operating at 81 percent core thermal power and Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent core thermal power. At 0145 hours0.00168 days <br />0.0403 hours <br />2.397487e-4 weeks <br />5.51725e-5 months <br />, a " Control Room Standby H.V. System Major Trouble" alarm was received in the control roo This alarm condition automatically isolated the control room ventilation system on a high ammonia (NH ) concentration signal. The operating shift foreman and3 shift engineer investigated the problem and found two local alarms: " Toxic Gas High Concentration" and "NH, Detector Loss of Sample Flow".

These conflicting alarms indicated there was not a high ammonia concentration, but indicated a problem with the toxic gas analyze .

The cause of the failure was a broken belt on the timing mechanism. The belt was replaced and the analyzer was returned to service at 1815 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.906075e-4 months <br /> on October 15, 1986. Since this pump is located in an area where the ambient temperature is 120 F, maintenance is tracking equipment performance to determine if any other changes will be neede (b) (Closed) LER 87006, Revision 00: Unit 1 HPCI Inoperable Due to Loose Solenoid Soldered Connectio On April 3,1987, Quad. Cities Unit I was in the RUN mode at 100 percent thermal power. At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, while quarterly High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)system performing flow the rate test, it was discovered that the HPCI turbine could not be reset from the control room. The HPCI system was declared inoaerable. Appropriate surveillances were initiated per Tecinical Specification 3.5.C.2 and the NRC was notified at 1635 hour0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br /> Troubleshooting by the Electrical Maintenance Department revealed that a loose soldered connection on the SV-8 solenoid valve coil had caused the problem. The SV-8 solenoid valve is associated with the reset mechanism that allows the HPCI system to be reset remotely from the control room. The connection was loose due to the normal vibration created by HPCI operatio The solenoid coil, which was original equipment, was replaced and by testing it was verified that the HPCI turbine could be reset remotely from the control room. As a preventative measure, the SV-8 and SV-12 valve solenoids will be replaced on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI systems, and a restraint will be placed on the solenoid wiring to reduce strain on the connection (c) (Closed) LER 87004, Revision 00: Unit 1 HPCI Inoperable due to Normal Wear and Positioning of Pump Suction Valv The cause for this event was determined to be the result of normal wear due to operation of the valve and its position in the piping. When the valve was open, a slight misalignment between the valve disc and body developed over time due to the horizontal mounting of the valve. This created a resistance that caused the torque switch to stop valve closur Electrical Maintenance adjusted the M0-1-2301-6 open limit switch so that it did not open qu'.te as far and the valve was successfully cycled and timed three times. The HPCI sysem was proven operable at 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br /> on the same day, March 2, 198 (2) Unit 2 (a) (Closed) LER 86017 Revision 01: Linear Indications on Reactor Recirculation System Welds due to Postulated Intergranular Stress Corrosion Crackin l

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This LER was reviewed by a region based inspector. Refer to Inspection Reports 254/86019(DRS) and 265/86014(DRS).

(b) (Closed)LER87006, Revision 00: Unit 2 HPCI Inoperable Due !

to Control Circuit Failur !

On March 24, 1987, Quad Cities Unit 2 was conducting a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system operability test. At 1135 hours0.0131 days <br />0.315 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.318675e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 was operating in the RUN mode at 100 percent core thermal power. The HPCI system had been successfully started and proven operable. Following the operability test, the HPCI system was beirg manually shut down per procedure when it was observed that the HPCI turbine speed could not be :

reduced from approximately 4000 RPM by using either method of ;

speed control, i.e. neither the Motor Speed Changer (MSC) nor l the Motor Gear Unit (MGV) would work individually to reduce turbine speed. Simultaneous with the MSC/MGU failure, position indication was lost for the HPCI turbine stop valve, and the MSC and the MGU position In addition, the remote electrical trip for the HPCI turbine did not function. The HPCI turbine speed was subsequently-reduced to zero RPM by placing the MGU and MSC simulataneously in the " FAST LOWER" position of their control switches. The HPCI system was declared inoperable and required surveillances were begun in accordance with Q0S 2300-01, HPCI Subsystem Outage Repor The cause of the HPCI inoperability was determined to be equipment failure. Control switch contacts 9 and 9T on MGU control switch 2330-340 on the 902-3 panel were dirty, which led to the initial failure of the HPCI control circuit fuse EE F-5 in the 902-39 panel. During manual operation of the MGV, these switch contacts close to energize relay 2330-148 in the 902-39 panel. Contacts from this relay then open to isolate the output of the signal converter in the automatic flow control portion of the MGU control circuit from the 125 VDC power suppl During this event, control switch contacts 9 and 9T on switch 2330-340 did not make adequate electrical contact and thus the manual / automatic interlock relay (2330-148) did not energiz This resulted in the automatic flow controller output being applied to the MGU at the same time as the 125 VDC manual control power. This abnormal circuit configuration caused an electrical overloading of the MGU circuit which caused the fuse (902-39 EE F-5) in the MSC/MGU 125 VDC power supply to blo When this power supply fuse blew, the MSC and MGU manual control and indications were lost along with the stop valve position indication and the remote turbine trip. The HPCI system was able to be shutdown by simultaneously using the 8 MSC and MGU control switches because of the power available from the independently supplied flow controller backfeeding into the MSC circui l'

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Shortly after. system troub1e' shooting was begun, the blown -

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" initial fuse (902-39EE F-5) was discovered and replaced. The MGU' control switch was then manipulated to confirm operability but at that point, a second fuse (902-39 CC F-1) in the control circuit blew due to the same abnormal circuit configuratio The: investigation continued and at approximately 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />,

the dirty switch contacts.(9 and 9T on control switch 2330-340)

were identified to.be the cause. The MGU auto / manual interlock -

relay contacts were then cleaned and fuse CC F-1 was replace 'Following this work the HPCI system operablility test was completed and at:1900 hours the HPCI system ~was determined to-be operable, r

6.; Review of Routine and Special Reports (90713)

The inspector reviewed the Monthly Performance Reports for the months of March and Apri No violations 'or deviations were identifie .. Response to' Region III Request'Regarding Information Notice (IN) Followup

T92701)

In a memorandum from Charles E. Norelius to Region III Senior Resident Inspectors dated May 18,1987, the ins reviewed below were forwarded for review as the sample required in the annual inspection of the licensee's program for dealing with ins and Bulletins sent for information, i

,- i (1) (Closed) IE Information Notice No. 87-17: Response Time of Scram Instrument Volume Level Detector Response times for said detectors are approximately 4.0 seconds which is about a factor of 10:less than-the times noted in the Information Notice. The problem referred to in this Notice does not exist at this sit (2) (' Closed) IE Information Notice No. 87-08: Degraded Motor Leads in Limitorque DC Motor Operator There are no motor operators of the type mentioned in this Notice at this sit (3) (Closed) IE Information Notice No. 87-12: Potential Problems with Metal Clad Circuit Breakers, General Electric (GE) Type AKF-2-2 Many of GE's recommendations are already in place at this site. A l procedure change has been initiated to use the newly recommended lubrican Each refueling outage these breakers are essentially 1 overhaule I-(4) (Closed) IE Information Notice No. 87-04: Diesel Generator Fails Test Because of Degraded Fue !

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The problem of fouling was a problem at this site in the early Corrective actions taken by the licensee have successfully-j

'1970' J prevented its recurrence. The licensee purchases No. 1 fuel oil that meets ASTM.0-975-77 requirements. When the oil arrives onsite, the Chemistry Department obtains a sample. Prior to addition to the storage tank a visual inspection of the sample is made. -If the fuel is acceptable it is added to the tank along with a biocid Monthly, ~ the storage tank is sampled from the bottom and tested for water, turbidity, and biological contamination. Monthly..the fuel i filters on the diesel generators are replaced and, quarterly, its'"Y" strainer is cleaned. . A directive from corporate requires storage tanks to- be cleaned at least once every ten year A' review of the last 18 months of fuel oil samples by the resident inspector showed neither water not biological contaminations were present and turbidity was lo . Bulletin (92703)

(Closed) IE Bulletin 8402: . Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays

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in use in Class IE Safety System I The HFA' relays in both units used in Safety Related Systems, have been .!

replaced with the new Century Series HFA. relay !

No further actions are necessar l GenericLetters(92703)

'(Closed) Generic Letter 8503: Clarification of Equivalent Control Capacity for Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System The Standby Liquid Control System of Unit 2 has been modified to have a minimum flow capacity of 86 gallons per. minute of 13 weight per cent-sodium pentaborate solution which corresponds to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.52 and the Generic Lette No further actions are necessary, 10. Technical Meeting On May 1, 1987, Commonwealth Edison Company held an informational meeting with Region III to present data regarding the degradation of Boraflex in High Density Fuel Rack In July 1986, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station learned that Point Beach Nuclear Power Station had observed Boraflex degradation in their test .

coupons. Both stations use certain racks each outage to temporarily store the fuel that is designated to be reloaded into the cor Since operating practices were similar, Quad Cities decided to examine the condition of the High Density Fuel Racks in Unit 1 fuel pool. In August, National Nuclear Corporation was scheduled to perform Boraflex

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-i verification on the newly installed racks in.the Unit 2 Fuel Poo .Upon completion 'of_ Unit 2 testing,-National Nuclear Corporation examined several fuel cells in the Unit 1 pool. 'The results of this test revealed several anomalies which were believed to be gaps in the Boraflex. In order to better characterize these anomalies, new testing methods had to be devise The test methods revealed 155 anomalies in the 306 panels tested. The 30 worst case anomalies were further studied. The majority of these anomalies were in the mid-plane and upper region _of the panels and had a mean' gap size of 1.5 inche Continued use of these High Density Fuel Racks licensing was justified on the-basis that the fuel pool K licensing limit of .95 was never exceeded. Themechanism(s)forgIfformationandgapgrowtharenot

. fully understood at this time, due to the limited amount of_Boraflex data available. Further studies are underway to ascertain the mechanism for gap formation, rate of gap growth, and long term stability in a spent fuel-pool environment. The Resident Inspectors are continuing to follow this issu No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 12, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary, i

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