ML091660504

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04/21-22/2009 Summary of Category 2 Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Topics Involving the License Amendment Requests to Transition Shearon, Unit 1 and Oconee to NFPA 805
ML091660504
Person / Time
Site: Oconee, Harris  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/2009
From: Vaaler M
Plant Licensing Branch II
To: Boyce T
Plant Licensing Branch II
Vaaler, Marlayna, NRR/DORL 415-3178
References
Download: ML091660504 (100)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 24, 2009 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas H. Boyce, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11,..2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Marlayna Vaaler, ProjectManager Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 21 - 22, 2009, CATEGORY 2 MEETING WITH PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS, INC., AND DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, TO DISCUSS TOPICS INVOLVING THE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUESTS TO TRANSITION THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AND THE OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3, TO THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805, "PERFORMANCE BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION" On April 21 - 22,2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff hosted a meeting to discuss high level items associated with the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant and Oconee Nuclear Station License Amendment Requests to transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants." NFPA 805 allows the use of performance based methods, such as fire modeling, and risk-informed methods, such as Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment, to demonstrate compliance with the nuclear safety performance criteria.

Regulatory audits were recently conducted at both sites, and several issues generic to both pilots were identified by the staff. The meeting was an opportunity to further discuss these issues with the pilot plant licensees, and will serve to benefit the non-pilot plants that will be undertaking this transition in the future. The meeting was held at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland.

The NRC staff and several pilot plant stakeholders gave presentations relative to the issues and challenges associated with transition to NFPA 805, including the use of incipient detection, the change evaluation process scope and methodology, development of the fire modeling quality and verification and validation procedures, and the impact of recovery actions on the implementation of NFPA 805. There were no members of the public in attendance and no public meeting feedback forms were recieved.

The meeting agenda is attached as Enclosure 1, the meeting handouts are attached as , and the list of attendees is attached as Enclosure 3.

En~losures: As stated

CATEGORY 2 MEETING TO DISCUSS THE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUESTS TO TRANSITION THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1, AND THE OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3, TO THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805, "PERFORMANCE BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION" APRIL 21 & 22,2009 AGENDA APRIL 21, 2009 10:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m. NRC and Industry Introductory Remarks 10:15 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. Progress Energy Discussion of the Planned Treatment of Incipient Detection 11 :30 a.m. - 11 :45 a.m. Opportunity for Public Comment 11:45 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. LUNCH 12:30 p.m. - 2:15 p.m. Continued Discussion of the Planned Treatment of Incipient Detection 2:15 p.m. - 2:30 p.m. Opportunity for Public Comment 2:30 p.m. - 2:45 p.m. BREAK 2:45 p.m. - 3:45 p.m. Pilot Plant Discussion of Fire Modeling Verification and Validation 3:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. Opportunity for Public Comment 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. Pilot Plant Discussion on the Impact of Recovery Actions Transition of Operator Manual Actions into Recovery Actions 5:00 p.m. ADJOURN Enclosure 1

APRIL 22,2009 8:00 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. Continued Discussion on the Impact of Recovery Actions 9:00 a.m. - 9:15 a.m. Opportunity for Public Comment 9:15 a.m. - 9:30 a.m. BREAK 9:30 a.m. - 11 :00 a.m. Pilot Plant Discussion of Prior Approval of Fire PRA Methods to be Used in NFPA 805 Change Evaluations Post Transition 11 :00 a.m. - 11: 15 a.m. Opportunity for Public Comment 11:15a.m. - 11:45a.m. Discussion of License Amendment Request and NFPA 805 Infrastructure Schedules 11:45a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Closing Remarks and Final Opportunity for Public Comment 12:00 p.m. ADJOURN

Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)

Incipient Detection HNP LAR Audit Follow-up Meeting Washington DC April 21-22, 2009 Vijay D'Souza, Dave Miskiewicz, Alan Holder

~ Progress Energy Nuclear Generation Group Enclosure 2

Topics Covered

  • Background
  • Proposed Application
  • Detection Capabilities
  • Vendor Demonstration
  • EPRI 1016735 - Incipient Fire Detection Treatment
  • Operator Response to IFDS Alert / Alarm
  • Fire PRA - IFDS Sensitivity
  • Conclusion (f!GG Page 2 ~. Progress Energy

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Background

(I Early PRA results showed higher than desired CDF results for some electrical cabinet fire scenarios

  • CDF seen = IGF seen
  • IGF =Source ignition frequency modified based on the scenario heat release rate and source-target characteristics
  • NSP = Effectiveness of detection and suppression to limit damage to the identified scenario target set
  • CCDP =the probability of core damage given the scenario targets are damaged to failure

~GG Page 4 ~ Progress Energy

Background

  • The inherent conservatisms in the analysis methodology allow several approaches to demonstrate reduced risk
  • Enhanced circuit analysis (CCDP)
  • Refined ignition source characterization (IGF, NSP, CCDP)
  • Implement modifications to alter the target set or suppression-detection effectiveness (IGF, NSP, CCDP)

~GG Page 5 ~ Progress Energy

Background

  • All of the options involve a certain degree of uncertainty
  • NUREG/CR-6850 methodology provides no credit for very early stages of fire development. This impacts fire modeling and NSP (12 minutes from 0 to peak HRR)
  • NUREG/CR-6850 methodology does not address Incipient fire detection fJ~

~Jili Page 6 ~ Progress Energy

Background

  • Current methodology for fire PRA is generally based on bounding or conservative assumptions
  • Significant items currently being addressed include
  • Ignition frequency - updated values generally 2-3 times lower
  • Manual suppression curves that allow generic treatment of brigade response already included in the curves
  • Circuit testing for probability and duration of hot shorts
  • Incipient detection effectiveness

~GG Page 7 ~ Progress Energy

Background

  • Refining the analysis does not change the actual risk of a fire, but only our understanding or perception of the risk by reducing the uncertainty.
  • Modifications that prevent a fire or fire damage generally involve "real" risk reduction. The uncertainty is only applicable to understanding how much.

~~ Progress Energy

~ Page 8

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Global Proven Track Record

  • NASA
  • International Space Station
  • Telecommunication Facilities
  • Pharmaceutical Industry
  • Nuclear
  • Bruce Nuclear Generating Station (Ontario, Canada)
  • Significant use of IFDS for use in a performance based fire strategy.

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Progress Energy Page 10

Proposed In-Cabinet Application To ProM Detector

'-., Sampling Pipe Sample Head Sample Manifojd Seal ing Grommet

~ Page 11 ~ Progress Energy

Incipient Detection - Application

  • Low voltage electrical cabinets
  • Pictures
  • Ignition sites within cabinets

.. Overheated wires

  • Terminations
  • Circuit cards
  • Relays
  • Small fans
  • Small transformers and power supplies

.~

~oo Page 12 ~. Progress Energy

Cabinet I Panel Characterization Matrix INCIPIENT FIRE DETECTION INSTALLATION - CABINET/PANElIGNfTfONSOl)Rc;E/c;OMBUSTIBLE CHARACTERIZATION MATRIX Relays Switches Capacitors . ----- --rr-, IVentilation Fanl Resistors I Fuses H1;;:'UldlIUrJ Boards Uni Cabinet 1 X X X X X Cabinet 2 X X X X X Cabinet 3 X X X X X Cabinet 4 X X X X Cabinet 5 X X X Cabinet 5.1 X X Cabinet 5_2 X X X Cabinet 5.3 X X X X Cabinet 5.4 X X X X X X Cabinet 6 X X X X X Cabinet 7 X X X Cabinet 8 X X X X X Cabinet 9 X X X Cabinet 10 X X X X X Cabinet 11 X X X Cabinet 12 X X X X

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Page 13 ~1 Progress Energy

Typical - Photographs

~ Progress Energy

~ Page 14

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~ Page 16 ~ Progress Energy

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Incipient Fire Detection FI-Fire growth curve Re lationship Ultra violel \ j with other Inlla red forms of OI)t'leaI'\ 1 lObi' I detection loni1alion \

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~ Page 19 ~ Progress Energy

Typical Smoke Detector Sensitivity Ranges Typical smoke detector obscuration ratings Type of Detector Obscuration Level Ionization 3%/m - ll%/m Photoelectric 6%/m - l5%/m Beam 3%/m

  • Up to 600 times more sensitive than ionization detectors.

~oo Page 20 ~ Progress Energy

Thermal Particulate Point (TPP)

Thermal Panlculate Poi nt (TPP)

The temperature at 'Wt1ich a materiaJ begins to thermally dtgrade and off-gas sub micrometer particulate in large numbers, Note that the thermal particulate temperature is as much as half the ignition temperature of many materials~ thereby providing a signal that onlyProseries can detect.

Incipient Sta,ge Smoke stege (Overheating Before Smoke) (VisIble and Invisible) pvc Insulatfon 290-'= 944>OF xe .... ~ ..,....

Aerylon Carp~ng S20*' )

Wool car,pettng ,~""'w~.. I0450-F (511a.£1~-,, __.__",~, _

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_ ,,~~~.~!'.'ll~~~. ,., __ 910-' (4Sa C)

.,... _~~Pl.~~P'~._"~~ . ".,,~ 150ii f (399OC j

.... Teflon

~~~- .. __ ~."....... . ~ -~ ~-~~- ~.. 1220*' GGoac '

PoNst'Vrene 10631JF t513OC~

(ffGG Page 21 ~ Progress Energy

TPP - Van Luik Data (1973)

TABLE L 1'hermal Particulate Point in Air TemperalUTf!

.Uat~riaL (UP)

-'~" " .. --~-'------- ,,-- . - .. - -

Bakelit.e PV~ in8ulal:H:trl Amen: Type NM nonmdallit: cable wire insulation Anaconda 'Vice & Ctlble Dutl'ex TYP~J NM nonmetallic ca.ble wire iTl$ulation Anaconda Wire & Cabl{~ Dutl'oex Type N M nOllmetaJlic ca.llie outer COv~r G K FIAmpt\fi 340 Acrylon carpeting 340 W 001 carpeting 360 Bond writing paper 500 Pine board 320 Kentile (Vinyl) tile 370 Tetlon-FEP 610 Polystyrene 710 Polyethylene 410 RTV 340 Silicon rubber DC-93-072 33.5 Motor oil SAE 30 310

~ Page 22 ~ Progress Energy

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EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Fire PRA Methods Enhancements Incipient Fire Detection Systems:

  • Significantly more effective than traditional fire detection systems credited in NUREG/CR-6850 and EPRI 1011989.

Electrical Fire Progression Aave".. Fully InoJplent Indloatlonc Sm,*,el&moldHtng "pDtttntlally Condition "Ev4tntr:' 000... Challenglna::' Deyeloped Ooour. FI. .

  • tan. Fire Timeline * * *
  • m".....g ,not '.1) Ka~)

day& hOurs '0'& Or mlnute& m9n.ute&

Damage Development 0P4!r.lltJonal Det~ctlo

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"Brigade" Re6pOn&e '.... I:ndow Plant Response ~--------- I *

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~ Progress Energy

~ Page 25

EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Fire PRA Methods Enhancements Incipient Fire Detection Systems:

Credit for reduction of ignition frequency 1nay be taken in fire zones that have VE\l/FDS installed for me fol1o\l,~il1g cOll1ponents that are effecti\"ely covered by the s.ystem.

  • CotllpOnents. of 250V or les.s: batteries and battery chargers (bins 1 and 10), electrical cabinets and panels (bins 4 and 15), and air conlpressors (bin 9)
  • COfilponents of 480V or les.s: cable runs (bin 11 l. jUllC!lOn boxes (bin 18 :1. electnc motors I.bin 14). pll.l11pS I bin 21). and RPS r..'IG Sets (bin 22.1 The above components. are considered to be effectively covered by the VE\llFDS. meaning pre cOlnbustlon indications are expected to alaml the VE\VFDS \vell before a challenging fire 'would develop, allov.'ing for preenlptive actions by plant fire protection and fire brigade members.

~ Progress Energy

~ Page 26

EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Fire PRA Methods Enhancements Incipient Fire Detection Systems:

For m-cab11let installatIons, aSSU111e fire ckuuage is localized to the igllirion cOl11pOnent and that circuits associated \vith me 19niuon source \,*,11 be de-energized for troubleshooting purposes. Spurious operations do not need (0 be postulated due to the locahzed and 11nlited naUlre of the dat11age.

~oo Page 27 ~ Progress Energy

EPRI Guidance - EPRI1016735 Operational Experience Incipient detection systems in operating nuclear 1)o""9r pl:anls and operating experie.nce IFO Date In Reliability Plani 10 Type Locations AJarms Malfunctions Fire Events System I D':lI Ser"'108 TimeOOS Palo VESDA ;2: L.J.,Z'3r 8+yrs Spent Fuei Storage "Jone .AI feV~li nU;2-&nce None None Verde rX:ra:;: intlrfacs Shed. aJanns - drt, 1.2.3 f25 yrs SCBA Shop Unit 1. dust on '/,1ndy PrO:9C t,1 oi Couc total) Security Ccrnputlr days chamb&r 1 + 'lor Clooe:. 45 Acre (SAFE Fire) lake pump house TMl1  ::. rrua DOUel 12.:31':1'tl98 1 failure dunng 1'J0f"18 PMTtailure 2- cetec1ed oM chambe,r PO :.fs) PMT due to rnopierlto (SAFE Fire) mPfOPsr mamtenance Millstone 3 SAFE Fire GOUd S+J'r3 C3ble aprlad!ng "very reliable" I 1 nI.iloance-Aux None?

chamb&' roem po.....er ou:s!de of room Robinoon GtrS:tL-e I l...aaer 19'98 RTGB Board 1,'2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per None in 10 PO'...'lr supply None?

Y&5lr  :,o'saf3 fa1'ure in 2002 (AirSenae po yrs T 8chnology) reponed) .,.. 20d in 2002 Banetyand proc:eooOl'

.,.. 27dn 2006 maintlreplace Clin10n Girrua-Protec I Cloud 2001 ?? SVG Building None None 1- bBttery None?

PO\wr chamber f&iled PMT Station (&AFEFire) (7.,.ra) test. rspaced Hcpa SAFE Fire I Ooud 11/2000 Service Water Quarterf~' PMT 7 during None 1 incipient Creek cham~ Intake Structure hO'lWork pump (2.,.rs) monitoring 3 areas ODS time overheated in msint9nenC6 3 unknown pump bay 81m3 local hot poosibty duat work- 15hrs naerby brush fire

EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Effectiveness of IFDS

  • C'olllponents of 250V or less

- batteries "bin 1) - 0 out of 1 = 0.0

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(bin 10) - 3 of 3

- 1Jain Control Roonl panels (bm 4:1 - 3 out of 5 12 due to technician error, lul1uediately discoYered by technician}

electrical cabinets (bin IS.! i -34 out of 35

- air compressors (bin 9) -4 out of 4

  • Conlponents of 480V or less cable runs (bin 11) - 7 of 7 juncrion boxes <bin 18) - 20f :2 electric motors (bin 14) - 5 of 5 pumps (bin 21) -7 of7 RPS Ao'IG Sets (bin 22) - 5 of 5 (f!GG Page 29 ~ Progress Energy

EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Hughes Tests

  • Smoldering Combustion Tests (13 in total)
  • Ionization detectors failed to respond.
  • 2 out of 6 of the photoelectric detectors responded to the tests.
  • The IFDS responded significantly faster than the 2 photo detectors that showed any response.
  • The IFDS system responded to every fire test.

~ Page 30 ~ Progress Energy

EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Summary

  • Significant benefit in low voltage << 250 V) electrical cabinets.
  • Significant benefit for area detection.

~ In-Cabinet detection would logically be even more effective.

  • Common failure modes in electrical cabinets:
  • Overheating of electrical equipment and wires
  • Circuit card failure (smoking event with little to no flame)
  • Capable of detecting pre-ignition conditions before:
  • Smoke
  • Flame

~flG Page 31 ~ Progress Energy

EPRI Guidance - EPRI 1016735 Summary

  • Damage:
  • Data supports assumption that fire damage is localized to the ignition component (wire, circuit card, relay, switch, etc.).

. Very early warning supports assumption that multiple spurious operations do not occur.

  • IFDS has a much better reliability than conventional smoke detection systems.
  • OE data suggests that electrical cabinet fires would have been detected well in advance with IFDS.
  • Fire ignition frequency would effectively be

~educed. ...~

~/GG Page 32 ~ Progress Energy

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Alarm I Alert Setpoints

. Initial Baseline Determination II Vendor assisted Il'# Determines normal particulate count for each zone

. Alert and Alarm Thresholds lit Lowest acceptable ~ programmed into unit for alert/alarm notification

  • Sensitivity Setting is Fixed
  • Configuration controls determine process for adjusting sensitivity should baseline conditions change.

c!!oo Page 34 ~ Progress Energy

Operational Response

.. Actions for "Alert" and "Alarm" indications

  • Immediate Response to Investigate Indications

.. Enhanced Response by Site Fire Brigade

.. Positive Determination / Disposition of Indication and Source

.. Compensatory Actions

~

~ Page 35 ~ Progress Energy

Operational Response (cont.)

  • Actions for "Alert" and "Alarm" indications',

OPERATOR ACTION: "ALERT" LEVEL INDICATION

1. CONFIRM
a. Incipient Detection device "Alert" indication is present on Display.
b. Determine Specific Equipment Location / Zone for "Alert" indication present.
c. Without Delay Investigate fire detection zone to determine specific source with "Alert" indication
d. Monitor the SAFE IFD "real-time" graphic readout at the STA desk for the zone in alert to determine if alert reading is stable, decreasing or increasing. Take appropriate actions based on this monitoring (i.e. If increasing but still below the Alarm actuation level, notify the Site Incident Commander (SIC) of the event status.

OPERATOR ACTION: "ALARM" LEVEL INDICATION

1. CONFIRM
a. Incipient Detection device "Alarm" indication is present on Display.
b. Determine Specific Equipment Location / Zone of "Alarm" indication present.
c. Immediately dispatch Site Fire Brigade.

~

~GG Page 36 ~~ Progress Energy

Operational Response (cont.)

  • Immediate Response to Investigate Indications OPERATOR ACTION: "ALERT" LEVEL INDICATION
1. CONFIRM
a. Incipient Detection device "Alert" indication is present on Display.
b. Determine Specific Equipment Location / Zone for "Alert" indication present.
c. Without Delay Investigate fire detection zone to determine specific source with "Alert" indication
d. Monitor the SAFE IFD "real-time" graphic readout at the STA desk for the zone in alert to determine if alert reading is stable, decreasing or increasing. Take appropriate actions based on this monitoring (i.e. If increasing but still below the Alarm actuation level, notify the Site Incident Commander (SIC) of the event status.

OPERATOR ACTION: "ALARM" LEVEL INDICATION

1. CONFIRM
a. Incipient Detection device "Alarm" indication is present on Display.
b. Determine Specific Equipment Location / Zone of "Alarm" indication present.
c. Immediately dispatch Site Fire Brigade.

~ Progress Energy

~ Page 37

Operational Response (cont.)

  • Early Response by Site Fire Brigade OPERATOR ACTION: "ALERT" LEVEL INDICATION
1. CONFIRM
a. Incipient Detection device "Alere' indication is present on Display.
b. Determine Specific Equipment Location / Zone for "Alert" indication present.
c. Without Delay Investigate fire detection zone to determine specific source with "Alert" indication Jt
d. Monitor the SAFE IFD "real-time graphic readout at the STA desk for the zone in alert to determine if alert reading is stable, decreasing or increasing. Take appropriate actions based on this monitoring (i.e. If increasing but still below the Alarm actuation level, notify the Site Incident Commander (SIC) of the event status.

OPERATOR ACTION: JtALARM" LEVEL INDICATION

1. CONFIRM
a. Incipient Detection device "Alarm" indication is present on Display.
b. Determine Specific Equipment Location / Zone of "Alarm" indication present.
c. Immediately dispatch Site Fire Brigade.

~ Page 38 ~ Progress Energy

Operational Response (cont.)

  • Positive Determination / Disposition of Indication and Source

.. If required utilize Incipient Fire Detection Pro Locator Portable Detection Device to locate specific cabinet and internal component providing pre ignition indication.

  • Compensatory Actions

~ Progress Energy

~ Page 39

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IFDS Quantification

  • ~CDF presented as -5.8E-07/yr
  • IFDS was assumed to be capable of providing early warning 1000/0 of the time when installed inside low voltage electrical cabinets (control cabinets with no arc faults)
  • IFDS reliability was applied at 0.995
  • IFDS was analyzed as prompt suppression and adding time to find and prevent fire damage
  • Consistent with basic methodology presented in EPRI 1016735

~

~ Page 41 ~1 Progress Energy

IFDS Risk Sensitivity to Time and Applicability

  • Timing varied from 60 to 5 minutes It 5 minutes is prescribed by 6850 for in cabinet detection (incipient or otherwise)
  • Applicability varied from 100 % to 10%
  • CDF ranged from 3.06E-05/yr to 4.98E-05/yr
  • ~CDF ranged from -5.8E-07/yr to -4.9E-07/yr (1.13E-06/yr to 1.22E-06/yr for VFDs only)

~ Page 42 ~ Progress Energy

IFDS Risk Sensitivity to Time and Applicability Effects of Incipient Detection Times on CDF for Low Voltage Electrical Cabinets at HNP c _______

1.00E-04 9.00E-oS 8.00E-05 7.00E-05

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6.00E'{)S S.00E-05 90/10 4.00E'{)S j 3.00E'{)S 9S/S SIs 10/5 97/3 Ratio of Slow to Fast Pre* 30/5 tombU$tlon crowth Pre-lplhlon credh for 4S/S InciplentdetecdlXlln Mlnute$

(Slow Growth/Fest growth) 60/5

~ Page 43 ~ Progress Energy

HNP Comparison to EPRI1016735

.. Updated NSP event tree created combining EPRI 1016735 and NUREG/CR-6850 based on application at the ignition source level

  • 81: the fraction of the source ignition frequency that would be detected early by IFD8 (EPRI used "~" as the fraction of ignition source components in a location)
  • I0: detector reliability (same. as EPRI "R")
  • IP: pre-emptive response effectiveness (same as EPRI "P")

~ Progress Energy

~ Page 44

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HNP Quantification with IFDS Event Tree

  • CDF = 3.06E-5/yr
  • 81: baseline =0.999
  • EPRI "IJ" would be 1.00 for the analyzed sources (low voltage control cabinets)
  • 10: baseline =0.995
  • based on EPRI report w/semi-annual PMT
  • IP: baseline =0.999
  • based on EPRI report w/>45 minutes warning

~oo Page 46 ~ Progress Energy

IFDS Event Tree Sensitivity

  • Varied the IFDS top event probabilities
  • 81: sensitivities from 0.999 to 0.9
  • ID: sensitivities from 0.999 to 0.9
  • IP: sensitivities from 0.999 to 0.9

~ Page 47 ~ Progress Energy

IFDS Event Tree Sensitivities CDF Sensitivity dCDF Sensitivity 3.06E-5/yr 1.13E-6/yr, -5.8E-07/yr 1.00E-04 2.00E-06 9.00E-05 1.50E-06 8.00E-05 7.00E-05 1.00E-06

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~ Progress Energy

~ Page 48

IFDS Event Tree Sensitivities (alt)

CDF Sensitivity dCDF Sensitivity 3.58E-5/yr 1.36E-6/yr, -3.50E-7/yr 1.00E-04 2.50E-06 9.00E-05 2.00E-06 8.00E-05 1.50E-06 7.00E-05

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~ Progress Energy

~ Page 49

IFDS Event Tree Sensitivities CDF & dCDF vs. Incipient NSP Factors 1.00E-03 1.00E-04 1.00E-05

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Summary

  • Based on the HNP Application

~ The sources of interest will exhibit detectable incipient products prior to ignition.

  • Incipient Detection is superior to current system for this application .

.. In-cabinet detection is superior to area detection for this application.

  • Sensitivity results demonstrate that the LAR conclusions remain applicable for HNP.
  • Modifications that prevent a fire or fire damage generally involve "real" risk reduction.

~ Page 52 ~ Progress Energy

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Harris Nuclear Plant Oconee Nuclear Station NFPA 805 Transition Change Evaluation Scope and Methods LAR Audit Follow-up Meeting Washington, DC April 21-22, 2009 David Goforth - Duke Energy NFPA 805 Technical Manager

~ Progress Energy Page 1

Outline

  • Outline of Presentation
  • Purpose
  • Overview
  • Cause/Effect Relationship
  • Treatment - Fire Risk Assessment

~Dulce r-", Energy... Page 2 ~. Progress Energy

Purpose

  • Self Approval of Post-Transition Changes is Essential for an Effective NFPA 805 Program
  • NRC has Questions with Post-Transition Self-Approval of Change Evaluations (Oct. 2008 Mtg and Pilot LAR Audits)

+ Risk Evaluations Used in Support of Change Evaluations (not the Base Fire PRA)

+ Pilot LARs (AU. X - ONS and Atl. Z - HNP) Address Limited Aspects of this Topic

  • This Presentation Focuses on Change Evaluation Methods and Cause/Effect Treatment of Changes
  • This Process (Approved via NEI 04-02/RG 1.205) Provides a Consistent Means to Meet Section 2.4.3 of NFPA 805

~Dulce rtllfEnergy_ Page 3 ~ Progress Energy

Overview

  • Characterized by 19 General Categories
  • Changes in each Category Results in Few Unique Effects
  • Treatment of Each Unique Effect in Fire Risk Assessment Relatively Straightforward
  • Details of Treatment Must Satisfy the RG 1.200 Process and PRA Standards
  • Capability Category for Base Fire Risk Assessment based on Departure from Realism
  • Change Evaluations can Accommodate Large Departures from Realism - Conservative/Bounding Acceptable
  • Overall Process/Methodology to be Incorporated into NEI 04-02, Section 5.3 and Appendix J

~Dulce r-tIII1 Energy_ Page 4 ~ Progress Energy

Cause/Effect Relationship Scope of Plant Change (Cause) PRA Treatment (Effect)

1. Unprotected Cable Target Scope Change
2. Fire Area Boundaries Target Scope Change
3. Water Curtains Target Scope Change
4. ERFBS Barrier Worth Target Scope Change and/or Change in Suppression Credit
5. Transients Initiating Event Frequency
6. Suppression Target Scope Change and/or Change in Suppression Credit
7. Passive FP Features (dikes, curbs, etc) Target Scope Change
8. Embedded Conduit Target Scope Change
9. Floor Drains Target Scope Change
10. Recovery Actions PRA Model Change
11. NSCA Equipment and Cables Target Scope Change, Initiating Event Frequency and/or PRA Model Change
12. Detection Detection Credit
13. Incipient Detection Detection/Suppression Credit and/or Initiating Event Frequency
14. Ventilation PRA Model Change
15. Fire Brigade Program No Specific Treatment Required
16. Feasibility Criteria No Specific Treatment Required
17. Fire Watch Program No Specific Treatment Required
18. Ignition Source Target Scope Change and/or Initiating Event Frequency
19. Surveillance Intervals Refer to Affected Component

~Dulce rtlll1Energy_ Page 5 ~ Progress Energy

Treatment - Fire Risk Assessment

  • Target Scope Change - the quantification of the risk impact is performed using the same methods applied for the base Fire PRA.
  • Partitioning - changes to plant partitioning is performed using the same methods applied for the base Fire PRA.
  • Change Suppression Credit - use existing methods from the base Fire PRA.
  • Initiating Event Frequency - the calculation of fire ignition frequencies are performed using the same methods as the base Fire PRA.
  • PRA Model Change - A variety of changes can occur that require altering one or more elements of the PRA model or quantification process. Such changes would be performed using methods consistent with that applied for the base Fire PRA.
  • Detection Credit - detection is addressed via the manual fire suppression credit applied in the Fire PRA.

~Dulce r~Energy_ Page 6 ~. Progress Energy

Treatment - Target Scope Change

  • Treatment - identified change in target scope treated by altering the scope of PRA Model Basic Events failed due to fire scenario.
  • Unprotected Cable
  • Fire Area/Zone Boundaries
  • Water Curtains
  • Suppression

+ Passive FP Features (dikes, curbs, etc)

  • Embedded Conduit

+ Floor Drains

  • NSCA Equipment and Cables

+ Ignition Source

~Dulce rtlll' Energy.. Page 7 ~ Progress Energy

Treatment - Change Suppression Credit

  • Treatment - credit can involve manual and/or automatic suppression. Represented as an Event Tree branch. Probability based on type of automatic system, . time to damage, and manual non-suppression curves.
  • ERFBS Barrier Worth - affects target damage time
  • Suppression - node probability based on generic industry data, plant specific data, and developing technology treatment subject to applicable SRs from PRA Standard
  • Incipient Detection - time available for suppression

-'Dulce ~. Progress Energy rtlll'Energy_ Page 8

Treatment - Initiating Event Frequency

  • Treatment - changes to plant equipment population, equipment characteristics, or plant practices can affect fire scenario frequency.

Changes can alter frequency for an existing fire initiating event in the base fire risk assessment or require the addition of a new initiating event.

  • NSCA Equipment and Cables
  • Ignition Source
  • Incipient Detection

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 9 ~. Progress Energy

Treatment - PRA Model Change

  • Treatment - changes to some plant attributes require an altering of the base fire risk assessment logic model and/or related basic event probabilities. Changes would be assessed against applicable HLRs/SRs of the PRA Standard - such as HLR-PRM.
  • Recovery Actions
  • Ventilation

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 10 ~, Progress Energy

Treatment - Detection Credit

  • Treatment - detection affects the timing available for manual fire suppression actions. Two factors are involved - the reliability of the detection scheme and the reliability of manual suppression given the tim.e available for that action. Changes would be assessed against applicable HLRs/SRs of the PRA Standard - such as HLR-FSS-D.
  • Detection
  • Incipient Detection "Dulce ~1 Progress Energy r-., Energy_ Page 11

Relationship with RG 1.200 and PRA Standards

  • Change Evaluation Methods used for Self Approval
  • Self-Approval of altered condition per Fire Protection License Condition

.. Fire Risk Assessment required to reflect in-situ or planned plant condition/configuration

  • Altered condition will be evaluated against the base fire risk assessment per NEI 04-02 post-transition change process
  • Updates to the base FPRA in accordance with provisions of RG 1.200 and PRA Standards

~Dulce r-., Energy_ Page 12 ~ Progress Energy

Relationship with RG 1.200 and PRA Standards

  • Base equation for change in risk:
  • ~CDF = CDF altered - CDF non-altered
  • CDF/LERF non-altered acceptable based on pre-existing Peer Review
  • CDF/LERF altered will be evaluated and Peer Reviewed as necessary
  • LlCDFI LlLERF thresholds for self-approval account for uncertainty

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 13 ~ Progress Energy

Revision to NEI 04-02, Section 5.2 and Appendix J

  • Individual LAR Would Stipulate Invoking NEI 04-02 Methods and Treatments for Post-Transition Change Evaluations
  • Eliminate Need for Individual LARs to Repeat Details and Provides Degree of Consistency
  • Individual LARs May Supplement with Additional Items if not Addressed by NEI 04-02

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 14 ~ Progress Energy

Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V LAR Audit Follow-up Meeting Washington, DC April 21-22, 2009 A.L. Holder g~~~Flion ~ Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Requirements)

  • NFPA 805 section 2.7.3- Quality, provides guidance regarding analysis, calculation and evaluations performed in support of the LAR, including;
  • Review
  • Verification and Validation
  • Limitations of Use
  • Qualifications of Users
  • Uncertainty Analysis (not required for deterministic)

~oo 2

~. Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Resources)

  • Fire models used in development of the LAR used fire model codes including;

.. Fire Dynamics Tools (FOT's)

.. Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport (CFAST)

  • Tools are considered acceptable within the range of their respective applicability as described in;
  • NUREG-1824/EPRI 1011999 - "Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Application".

~oo 3

~. Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Approach)

  • Simplified approach incorporating fire model tools from NUREG 1824
  • Referred to as "Fire Modeling Generic Treatments"
  • Proprietary Hughes Associates, Inc. provided to NRC
  • Technical Reference Guide
  • User's Guide
  • Basis for V&V

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~.* Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Approach)

  • Detailed Fire Modeling

. Utilized fire model tools from NUREG 1824.

. Credited V&V from NUREG 1824 with benchmark cases applied

  • Conducted for certain ignition sources
  • Limited areas of application

.. Better characterization of Zone of Influence for cabinets

. Incorporated post-processing routine of data from CFAST

~1ili 5

~.* Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Approach)

"Fire Modeling Generic Treatments"

  • Provides tabulated results for specific fuel packages and configurations
  • Data obtained from correlations and CFAST model results
  • SFPE guides and NUREG 1824 provide validation basis for correlations and CFAST
  • Detailed results presentation provides a verification of the implementation
  • Sensitivity analysis demonstrates conservative configurations are used

~GG 6

~. Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Approach)

  • Additionally,
  • Hand calculations and CFAST runs were used for evaluating fire generated conditions in certain appIicati 0 ns.
  • Calculations quality level is ensured through the V&V basis provided under;

~GG 7

~. Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Approach)

  • Progress Energy Configuration Controls include:
  • Fire modeling calculations used (including hand calculations) are controlled under the NGG Fleet Procedure, EGR-NGGC-0017, Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations
  • Personnel qualifications are controlled and maintained under NGG Fleet Training Guide, ESG0010N, Calculation/Analysis Performance and Verification (Qual. Card)

~oo 8

~. Progress Energy

Fire Modeling Quality and V&V (Summary)

From HNP LAR Section 4.5.2, "The use of the Generic Treatments in specific applications at Harris falls within their limitations as described in the "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments". In addition to the generic fire modeling treatments that were used in the hazard analysis, several calculations were produced that used Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (CFAST), and the Fire Dynamics Tools (FDT)s as documented in NUREG 1824."

d9-oo 9

~. Progress Energy

Conclusions

  • Correlations used are per FDT Tools and/or other industry published sources (e.g., SFPE Guides)
  • Fire Modeling software codes have been V&V'd per NUREG-1824 N~

~!,\fu ~. Progress Energy 10

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Harris Nuclear Plant Oconee Nuclear Station NFPA 805 Transition Impact of Recovery Actions LAR Audit Follow-up Meeting Washington, DC April 21-22, 2009 Keith Began, Dave Miskiewicz, Bob Rhodes

~ Progress Energy Page 1

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Outline of Presentation
  • Terminology
  • Requirements and Guidance
  • Process Flowchart
  • Non-ASD Fire Area Approach
  • ASD Fire Area Approach

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 2 ~~ Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Terminology
  • Operator Manual Action (OMA) - Actions performed by op~rators to manipulate components and equipment from outside the MCR to achieve and maintain post-fire flo shutdown, not including "repairs." OMAs comprise an integrated set of actions needed to ensure that HSD can be accom~lIshed for a fire in a specific plant area ... (RG 1.189 Rev. 1) [Pre-Transition Term]

+ RecoverY Action - (NFPA 805 Sect.1.6.52) Activities to achieve the NSPC that take place outside of the MCR or outside of the primary control station(s) for the equipment being operated including the replacement or modification of components. FAQ 67-0030/[ARs (also DG-1218) clarify recovery action and primary control station scope. [Post-transition Term]

+ Defense-in-Depth Action - Actions that take place outside of the MCR or primary control station that are not categorized as "recoverY actions" but are part of the FPP to ensure FP DID. FAQ 07-00301LARs describe process. [Post-transition Term]

+ "Adverse to Risk" Review - PRA Review performed to determine if

~ctions (recovery actions, DID actions, others) could have adverse risk consequences

- . Dulce l~ P E r~Energy_ Page 3 ~i mgrass nergy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Requirements and Guidance
  • The use of recovery actions implies the use of a Rerformance-based approach per NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3.
  • Per NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4, when the use of recovery actions has resulted in the use of the performance based approach l the additional risk presented by their use shari be evaluated.
  • Consistent with NFPA 805 Figure 2.2 and R~~ulatory Guide 1.205, the Deterministic Approach of NFPA 805 includes compliance with the plant's pre-transition Current Licensing Basis (CLB).
  • For the purposes of addressing recovery actions, the pre-transition CLB is the "Deterministic Approach".

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 4 ~. Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Requirements and Guidance (cont'd)
  • Section 4.2.2 of NFPA 805 states that "for each fire area, either a deterministic or performance-based approach shall be selected ... "
  • In the pilot process, it was discovered that most fire areas used a "combined approach" with a combination of deterministic approaches (including reliance on the pre-transition CLB) and PB approaches (i.e., change evaluations) where the pre-transition CLB was not met.

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 5 ~. Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Requirements and Guidance (cont'd)
  • Pilot process developed to determine which pre-transition OMAs need to be characterized as post-transition "recovery actions" (FAQ 30).
  • DID actions do not require assessment of additional risk (process submitted in LAR) but are considered part of the FPP and would be subject to the post-transition change evaluation process (if modified).

.. Recovery actions that are VFDs (FAQ 06-0012 Bin H OMAs) are evaluated using the RI-PB change process. This is consistent with Sections 4.2.4.2 "Fire Risk Evaluation" of NFPA 805, Section 2.4.4 of NFPA 805 and RG 1.205 (C.2.2, C.2.3). Change evaluation constitutes the "evaluation of additional risk".

  • Recovery actions that are not VFDs are required to be evaluated for additional risk using qualitative and/or quantitative means.
  • Quantitatively, since "allowed OMAs" that transition as recovery actions are not VFDs, there is no ~CDF or ~LERF, per Section 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805.
  • Qualitative evaluation is provided in the LAR, Attachment G.
  • Consideration is taking deterministic actions at the appropriate time.

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 6 ~. Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Requirements and Guidance (cont'd)
  • NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4 describes two approaches:

.4.2.4.1 - Use of Fire Modeling

+4.2.4.2 - Use of Fire Risk Evaluation

  • Pilot plants use 4.2.4.2.
  • Fire Modeling is used as an integrated part of a Fire Risk Evaluation (Fire PRA) that supplements the Deterministic Approach.

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 7 ~~ Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Process Flowchart Pre-Transition OMA

/

Document Results - No FAQ 30 Process additional action necessary (Binning and Recovery tor "evaluation of additional Action Determination) 010 Action or Not Required risk" ecovery Action 4.2.3 ,..Use of recovery actions to demonstrate NFPA 4.2.3 Detenninistlc availabilrty of a success path for the nuclear Approach safety perionT1ance criteria automatically shall imply us. of the perform .. nce~ba.ed approach as outlined In 4.2.4. NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3.1 4.2.4" Perionnance-Based Approach. This subseclion shall provide for a performance based atternatlve to the detennlnlstlc approach provided In 4.2.3. When the us. of recovery actions h_ resutted in the us. of this NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4 approach. the additional risk presented by their Perfonnance-Based Approach U_ shall be evaluated. When the fir. modeling or other engineering analysis, Including the use of recovery actions for nucle.r safety analysis, I. used. the approach d_crtbed In 4.2.4.1 shall be used. When fire risk evaluation I. used, the approach described In 4.2.4.2 shall be uaed.

RI-PB Change Evaluation I.PB Change Evaluation" Yes (Fire Risk Evaluation per Required? NFPA 805 Sections 4.2.4.2, (e.g., Bin H OMA) 2.4.4. etc.)

lAW RG 1.205 C.2.3 No Additional Risk Evaluation (Using FAQ 30 process)

NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2 Is not required.

-'Dulce ~. Progress Energy r.,Energy_ Page 8

Impact of Recovery Actions 1-

>re-Trar,sr!IITOW Pre-Transition OMA

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~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 9 ~ Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions I ,

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~Dulce r-., Energy_ Page 10 ~ Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

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"Dulce ~ Progress Energy rt1ll1 Energy_ Page 11

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • Non-ASD Fire Area Approach
  • Fire PRA includes analysis of plant fire areas

., A review for "adverse risk impact" for OMAs was performed. In most cases, OMAs that were determined to have potential negative risk are being revised.

  • As part of the Fire PRA development, OMAs were typically not included in the Fire PRA model unless they were desired for risk reductions, or if they resulted in an "adverse risk".
  • No Non-ASD actions were transitioned as "recovery actions" for either pilot plant, so evaluation of additional risk was not necessary.
  • Un-modeled OMAs may still be retained as non-modeled DID actions. By definition DID actions are either risk neutral or risk beneficial. Quantitative risk evaluation is not necessary.
  • If there is a need for an OMA to be modeled in the Fire PRA, it is a "recovery action" and the risk of modeled actions can be evaluated quantitatively.

~Dulce rtll'Energy_ Page 12 ~ Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • ASD Fire Area Approach
  • Key Risk Considerations

+Environmental conditions

+Maintain command and control (functional)

+Procedural guidance to implement ASD

~Dulce rtllf1 Energy.,.. Page 13 .~. Progress Energy

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • ASD Fire Area Approach
  • Fire PRA Analysis, Non-MeR areas

+ASD may be treated as DID unless modeling is desired for risk reduction (otherwise assume failure to abandon)

+Failures are not recovered

+Early abandonment is not typically modeled

  • Procedural guidance in place
  • Potential for "adverse" risk impact
  • Offset by failure to abandon assumption

~Dulce l~. Progress Energy r.,Energy_ Page 14 ~\

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • ASD Fire Area Approach
  • Fire PRA Analysis, MeR

+Non-MCB fires are generally limited to the source

+Abandonment timing is generally a function of environmental conditions

+Fire spread in MCB is limited by NSP and abandonment

+Failures are not recovered

+Early abandonment is not typically modeled

  • Potential for "adverse" risk impact
  • Procedural guidance in place

+HEP for ASD is modeled at 0.1 "Dulce ~ Progress Energy r-tIII1 Energy_ Page 15

Impact of Recovery Actions

  • LAR Content (Att. G)
  • Listing of pre-transition OMAs

.. Disposition of pre-transition OMAs as recovery actions, DID actions, or neither

  • Description of approach and results for fire areas that could result in control room abandonment
  • Risk importance measures for modeled recovery actions (e.g., Fussell-Vesely or qualitative assessment)
  • Summary of results for Bin H OMAs evaluated by the RI-PB change evaluation process

~Dulce r.,Energy_ Page 16 ~ Progress Energy

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LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC Duke Energy Harry Barrett David J. Goforth Stephen Dinsmore Dan Frumkin Entergy (ANO)

Ray Gallucci Larry Young Donnie Harrison Jessica Walker Andrew Howe Naeem Iqbal ERIN Alex Klein Patrick Baranowsky Paul Lain Steven Laur KGRS Chuck Molton Andy Ratchford Margaret Stambaugh Liz Kleinsorg Marlayna Vaaler Shakur Walker NEI Sunil Weerakkody Steven Hutchins Progress Energy PNNL(Battelle)

Keith Began Rich Denning Dave Corlett Steve Short Vijay D'Souza Jeff Eltman Safe Fire Detection Alan Holder Ron Robertson Josee Macintyre Kevin Snyder Robert Rhodes ENCLOSURE 3

MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas H. Boyce, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Marlayna Vaaler, Project Manager IRA!

Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SUB..IECT:

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 21 - 22,2009, CATEGORY 2 MEETING WITH PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS, INC., AND DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, TO DISCUSS TOPICS INVOLVING THE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUESTS TO TRANSITION THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AND THE OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3, TO THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805, "PERFORMANCE BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION" On April 21 - 22,2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff hosted a meeting to discuss high level items associated with the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant and Oconee Nuclear Station License Amendment Requests to transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants." NFPA 805 allows the use of performance based methods, such as fire modeling, and risk-informed methods, such as Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment, to demonstrate compliance with the nuclear safety performance criteria.

Regulatory audits were recently conducted at both sites, and several issues generic to both pilots were identified by the staff. The meeting was an opportunity to further discuss these issues with the pilot plant licensees, and will serve to benefit the non-pilot plants that will be undertaking this transition in the future. The meeting was held at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland.

The NRC staff and several pilot plant stakeholders gave presentations relative to the issues and challenges associated with transition to NFPA 805, including the use of incipient detection, the change evaluation process scope and methodology, development of the fire modeling quality and verification and validation procedures, and the impact of recovery actions on the implementation of NFPA 805. There were no members of the public in attendance and no public meeting feedback forms were recieved.

The meeting agenda is attached as Enclosure 1, the meeting handouts are attached as , and the list of attendees is attached as Enclosure 3.

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC DRA rlf LPL2-2 rlf RidsNrrPMShearonHarris RidsNrrLACSola RidsNrrDorlLpl2-2 RidsNrrDraAfpb RidsOgcRp RidsAcrsAcnw MailCTR PLain, NRR HBarrett, NRR AKlein, NRR RidsNrrPMOconee MStambaugh, NRR SLaur, NRR DHarrison, NRR Accession Number" ML091660504 NRC-001 OFFICE DORL/LPL2-2/PM DORL/LPL2-2/LA DORL/LPL2-2/BC NAME MVaaler (TOrf for) CSoia -rBoyce (EBrown for)

DATE 06/18/09 06/17109 06/24/09 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD

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