ML18134A229

Summary of April 26, 2018, Public Teleconference with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC to Discuss Proposed License Amendment and 3 Regarding Technical Specification 3.8.1

ML18134A229
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/14/2018
From:	Audrey Klett Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	Batson S Duke Energy Carolinas
Audrey Klett. 415-0489
References
EPID L-2018-LRM-0029
Download: ML18134A229 (20)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 14, 2018 LICENSEE: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC FACILITY: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 26, 2018, PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE WITH DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC TO DISCUSS PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 (EPID L-2018-LRM-0029)

On April 26, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff held a Category 1 public teleconference with representatives from Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee).

The purpose of the teleconference was to discuss a proposed license amendment request (LAR) to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconee) Technical Specifications (TSs). The meeting notice and agenda, dated April 12, 2018, are available in NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System under Accession No. ML18102A861. A list of attendees and the meeting presentation material are enclosed.

The licensee presented background material for its planned LAR, which is needed to eliminate a vulnerability for a single failure scenario mitigated by protection circuitry when the underground assigned Keowee Hydroelectric Unit (KHU) is generating power to the grid. The failure in this scenario results in lockout of both the underground KHU and overhead power path. While the protection circuitry realigns the KHU assigned to the overhead to the underground power path, it does not realign auxiliary power for the KHU. A KHU can start and operate for some amount of time without alternating current (AC) power to auxiliary loads; however, this power must be recovered in order to ensure continued operability of the KHU. The loss of auxiliary power can affect operation of KHU by preventing make-up to the hydraulic oil accumulator tanks on each unit. These accumulators provide the oil to operate the governor and wicket gates to control turbine speed and, therefore, generator output.

A recent review initiated by the licensee determined that for events where a KHU is initially in commercial generation mode, following an emergency start signal, the governor oil accumulators would be exhausted and governor oil pumps would be required to start within a few minutes. The existing procedure and staffing requirements do not support manual realignment in the time required. More time is available if the KHU is initially in standby, as less wicket gate movement is required to bring a KHU to rated speed from standby compared with recovering from load rejection that occurs on receipt of an emergency start signal if operating for commercial generation. The licensee stated during the teleconference that the issue was a degraded and nonconforming condition and that it has implemented operating restrictions to

meet the guidance in NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, "Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety," dated December 29, 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031110108).

To address this issue, the licensee stated that it will propose to add a Surveillance Requirement (SR) to TS 3.8.1, "[Alternative Current] Sources - Operating." The proposed change would allow the licensee to credit the Keowee auxiliary power automatic transfer feature in place of the currently credited manual operator actions to facilitate mitigation of a postulated electrical fault. The proposed SR would require verification of the ability of each KHU auxiliary power system to automatically transfer from its normal power source to its alternative power source. The licensee stated that the Quality Assurance (QA)-1 automatic transfer circuitry was installed in 1993 and has been periodically tested since then, but no credit has been taken for its function. The licensee provided simplified site and Keowee electrical distribution system drawings in its presentation and discussed scenarios necessitating the change. The licensee plans to submit its LAR in May 2018.

The NRC staff asked the licensee questions regarding whether any design basis information contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would need updating, the timing of the automatic transfer, impacts to the degraded voltage relay setpoints, whether the automatic transfer scheme is subject to the Maintenance Rule, and operating experience regarding testing and maintenance of the automatic transfer scheme and associated components. In response to NRC staff questions, the licensee stated that any UFSAR updates would occur after the amendments are approved per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.71(e). The licensee stated that the automatic auxiliary power transfer function, which supports continued operation of a KHU after emergency start, would take 6 seconds to open the breaker, then another 30 seconds for an alternate breaker to close when normal voltage is lost. The licenses stated that per the TSs, a KHU is required to provide emergency power within 23 seconds. The automatic auxiliary power transfer function has no impact on that function. The licensee stated that the degraded voltage relays setpoints would not be affected as they are not tied to the auxiliary power to Keowee. The licensee stated that the automatic transfer scheme is safety related, consists of QA-1 equipment, has been tested and maintained since 1993, and is subject to the Maintenance Rule. The licensee has stated that there has never been a failure of the transfer scheme during testing, which has been changed from an annual to an 18-month frequency.

The NRC staff stated that the licensee may be changing design basis assumptions or descriptions with respect to credit for automatic versus manual actions and, therefore, requested the licensee's application describe any changes to the design basis and include proposed UFSAR updates or change pages, as appropriate. The NRC staff stated that its review may be more efficient if the licensee included thorough system descriptions, the licensing and design history surrounding the issue, detailed drawings of the transfer scheme, fault scenarios, descriptions of which single failures are assumed, operating experience associated with the transfer scheme, and electrical drawings in its LAR. The licensee stated that detailed electrical drawings and single failure analyses will be provided to support NRC review via a non-docketed process (e.g., a reading room or similar). Information relied on in the final safety evaluation will be submitted formally to the NRC.

The staff did not make any regulatory decisions or commitments at the meeting. No members of the public were announced during the teleconference. Any inquiries can be directed to me at 301-415-0489 or via e-mail at Audrey.Klett@nrc.gov.

Audrey L. Klett, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants

2. Meeting Presentation Material Cc: Listserv

Enclosure 1 List of Participants

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS APRIL 26, 2018, MEETING WITH DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Michael Markley Victor Cusumano Jessie Quichocho Audrey Klett Pete Snyder Hari Kodali Hang Vu Nageswara (Rao) Karipineni Duke Energy Carolinas. LLC Chris Wasik Boyd Shingleton David Wilson Leland Hawthorne Eddie Welch Keith Anderson

Enclosure 2 Meeting Presentation Material

1 h"*. . :.~:.a, w*~

- ~ti~

Oconee Nuclear Station

(_~DUKE Pre-Application Conference Call - April 26, 2018 LAR to Add TS SR for Keowee Auxiliary Power Auto Transfer Feature

<{; ENERGY

• David Wilson, Mech DBG Manager

• Leland Hawthorne, Mech DBG Principal Engineer

• Eddie Welch, Elect DBG Principal Engineer

• Keith Anderson, Critical Systems Keowee Manager

• Chris Wasik, Regulatory Affairs Manager

• Boyd Shingleton, Regulatory Affairs Licensing Lead Engineer

• Introduction Chris Wasik

• Proposed Technical Specification Change Boyd Shingleton

• AC Power System Eddie Welch

• Keowee Auxiliary Power Transfer Feature Eddie Welch

• Reason for Change Eddie Welch

• Technical Justification Eddie Welch

• Closing Remarks Chris Wasik

Chris Wasik Regulatory Affairs Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station

• The proposed change will allow ONS to credit the Keowee auxiliary power automatic transfer feature (in place of the currently credited manual operator actions) to facilitate mitigation of a postulated electrical fault.

• Adds Surveillance Requirement to TS 3.8.1 to require verifying the ability of each KHU auxiliary power system to automatically transfer from its normal power source to its alternate power source

• Upon NRC approval, Duke Energy will process a TSB change to revise the LCO Bases to require the Keowee Auxiliary Power Automatic Transfer feature to be OPERABLE.

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION

..., ..., rrrn T.v POWERIYITEM tol:IT AUXILIARY POWER IYITEM

.. B4T

... :::::::::::::::::::t::::::::::: ---------------------- -------------,

CT3

...IJ.J..i;_u.

"' '>411!10

~ - * - _szA~P~lf'i,L - * - ' NORMAL SOURCE J~~ STARTI.P SOURCE MFB#1 MFB"2

l. )

• 'I ;I

ICEOWEE ELECTIUCAL DISTRIBUTION 0

'""'"'~ - To SWITCHYARD (PCB *8 & 9)

Main V

.t. '

Trallllfonner lh"1oon,j'1:'iJll4

.., CT-4 l

1X Tralllformer T. ~ (;~* cl~,

I .......--.

CACB t

. 2 2X Tranlfomlor (I KPf KPF 12 cl KPF 10

• 11 CT-6 From 1TC CT-7 PSW PSW ex~

(1,c, I (IACB CACB CACB I5 I7 I 8 I8

( 1X LOAD CENTER ) ( 2X LOAD CENTER )

• KHU aligned to the underground path is required to have its auxiliaries aligned to receive power from Keowee Transformer CX

• KHU aligned to the overhead path is required to have its auxiliaries aligned to receive power from its auxiliary transformer (1X or 2X)

• Ensures independence of auxiliary power sources for the two KHUs to preclude the possibility of a single failure causing a loss or lockout of auxiliary power to both KHUs.

• Each normal and alternate breaker has its own undervoltage relay and manual control switch. One auto-manual switch per load center is provided to allow changeover from "Auto" to "Man" control.

• With the selector switch in "Auto," the logic is designed such that if normal voltage is lost and alternate power is available, the incoming breakers will transfer automatically to the alternate source.

• Electrical fault locks out underground KHU and overhead path.

• Overhead KHU automatically re-aligned to underground path.

• Keowee auxiliary power automatically realigned but not by TS required equipment.

• The existing procedure and staffing requirements do not support manual realignment in the time required when underground assigned KHU is generating to grid.

• Automatic auxiliary power transfer logic is tested and maintained but not required by TS 3.8.1 to support Keowee operability.

• Since requirement not included in TS but is needed to support operability, this deficiency is considered a degraded/nonconforming condition (OBDN)

• OBDN condition applies when the underground KHU is aligned to the overhead and generating to the grid during testing or commercial generation.

• Commercial generation with underground KHU currently being restricted for this reason.

• Proposed TS change replaces a manual operator action with an automatic action.

• The automatic transfer circuitry was installed in 1993 as QA-1 equipment but was not credited for restoring auxiliary power after a design basis event.

• The circuitry has been maintained QA-1 and tested periodically.

• The circuitry is currently installed and in use.

• The circuitry has been proven reliable through testing since initial installation

Questions Chris Wasik

• Oconee Regulatory Affairs Manager FOR INFORMATION ONLY

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 26, 2018, PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE WITH DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC TO DISCUSS PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 (EPID L-2018-LRM-0029) DATED MAY 14, 2018 DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPL2-1 R/F RidsACRS_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl2-1 Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource RidsNrrPMOconee Resource RidsNrrLAKGoldstein Resource RidsNrrDeEeob Resource RidsNrrDeEicb Resource RidsNrrDssStsb Resource RidsNrrDssSbpb Resource H. Kodali, NRR/DE H. Vu, NRR/DE P. Snyder, NRR/DSS N. Karipineni, NRR/DSS ADAMS A ccess1on No.: Mt:g S ummary: ML18134A229 1 es ML18134A249*b1yema ii Mtg Sl"d OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-1 /LA NRR/DSS/SBPB/BC*

NAME AKlett KGoldstein RDennig DATE 5/14/18 05/11/18 5/3/18 OFFICE NRR/DSS/STSB/BC* NRR/DE/EICB/BC* NRR/DE/EEOB/BC*

NAME VCusumano MWaters JQuichocho DATE 5/4/18 5/3/18 4/27/18 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1 /BC NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NAME MMarkley AKlett DATE 5/14/18 5/14/18 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 14, 2018 LICENSEE: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC FACILITY: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 26, 2018, PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE WITH DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC TO DISCUSS PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 (EPID L-2018-LRM-0029)

On April 26, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff held a Category 1 public teleconference with representatives from Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee).

The purpose of the teleconference was to discuss a proposed license amendment request (LAR) to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconee) Technical Specifications (TSs). The meeting notice and agenda, dated April 12, 2018, are available in NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System under Accession No. ML18102A861. A list of attendees and the meeting presentation material are enclosed.

The licensee presented background material for its planned LAR, which is needed to eliminate a vulnerability for a single failure scenario mitigated by protection circuitry when the underground assigned Keowee Hydroelectric Unit (KHU) is generating power to the grid. The failure in this scenario results in lockout of both the underground KHU and overhead power path. While the protection circuitry realigns the KHU assigned to the overhead to the underground power path, it does not realign auxiliary power for the KHU. A KHU can start and operate for some amount of time without alternating current (AC) power to auxiliary loads; however, this power must be recovered in order to ensure continued operability of the KHU. The loss of auxiliary power can affect operation of KHU by preventing make-up to the hydraulic oil accumulator tanks on each unit. These accumulators provide the oil to operate the governor and wicket gates to control turbine speed and, therefore, generator output.

A recent review initiated by the licensee determined that for events where a KHU is initially in commercial generation mode, following an emergency start signal, the governor oil accumulators would be exhausted and governor oil pumps would be required to start within a few minutes. The existing procedure and staffing requirements do not support manual realignment in the time required. More time is available if the KHU is initially in standby, as less wicket gate movement is required to bring a KHU to rated speed from standby compared with recovering from load rejection that occurs on receipt of an emergency start signal if operating for commercial generation. The licensee stated during the teleconference that the issue was a degraded and nonconforming condition and that it has implemented operating restrictions to

meet the guidance in NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, "Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety," dated December 29, 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031110108).

To address this issue, the licensee stated that it will propose to add a Surveillance Requirement (SR) to TS 3.8.1, "[Alternative Current] Sources - Operating." The proposed change would allow the licensee to credit the Keowee auxiliary power automatic transfer feature in place of the currently credited manual operator actions to facilitate mitigation of a postulated electrical fault. The proposed SR would require verification of the ability of each KHU auxiliary power system to automatically transfer from its normal power source to its alternative power source. The licensee stated that the Quality Assurance (QA)-1 automatic transfer circuitry was installed in 1993 and has been periodically tested since then, but no credit has been taken for its function. The licensee provided simplified site and Keowee electrical distribution system drawings in its presentation and discussed scenarios necessitating the change. The licensee plans to submit its LAR in May 2018.

The NRC staff asked the licensee questions regarding whether any design basis information contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would need updating, the timing of the automatic transfer, impacts to the degraded voltage relay setpoints, whether the automatic transfer scheme is subject to the Maintenance Rule, and operating experience regarding testing and maintenance of the automatic transfer scheme and associated components. In response to NRC staff questions, the licensee stated that any UFSAR updates would occur after the amendments are approved per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.71(e). The licensee stated that the automatic auxiliary power transfer function, which supports continued operation of a KHU after emergency start, would take 6 seconds to open the breaker, then another 30 seconds for an alternate breaker to close when normal voltage is lost. The licenses stated that per the TSs, a KHU is required to provide emergency power within 23 seconds. The automatic auxiliary power transfer function has no impact on that function. The licensee stated that the degraded voltage relays setpoints would not be affected as they are not tied to the auxiliary power to Keowee. The licensee stated that the automatic transfer scheme is safety related, consists of QA-1 equipment, has been tested and maintained since 1993, and is subject to the Maintenance Rule. The licensee has stated that there has never been a failure of the transfer scheme during testing, which has been changed from an annual to an 18-month frequency.

The NRC staff stated that the licensee may be changing design basis assumptions or descriptions with respect to credit for automatic versus manual actions and, therefore, requested the licensee's application describe any changes to the design basis and include proposed UFSAR updates or change pages, as appropriate. The NRC staff stated that its review may be more efficient if the licensee included thorough system descriptions, the licensing and design history surrounding the issue, detailed drawings of the transfer scheme, fault scenarios, descriptions of which single failures are assumed, operating experience associated with the transfer scheme, and electrical drawings in its LAR. The licensee stated that detailed electrical drawings and single failure analyses will be provided to support NRC review via a non-docketed process (e.g., a reading room or similar). Information relied on in the final safety evaluation will be submitted formally to the NRC.

The staff did not make any regulatory decisions or commitments at the meeting. No members of the public were announced during the teleconference. Any inquiries can be directed to me at 301-415-0489 or via e-mail at Audrey.Klett@nrc.gov.

Audrey L. Klett, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants

2. Meeting Presentation Material Cc: Listserv

Enclosure 1 List of Participants

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS APRIL 26, 2018, MEETING WITH DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Michael Markley Victor Cusumano Jessie Quichocho Audrey Klett Pete Snyder Hari Kodali Hang Vu Nageswara (Rao) Karipineni Duke Energy Carolinas. LLC Chris Wasik Boyd Shingleton David Wilson Leland Hawthorne Eddie Welch Keith Anderson

Enclosure 2 Meeting Presentation Material

1 h"*. . :.~:.a, w*~

- ~ti~

Oconee Nuclear Station

(_~DUKE Pre-Application Conference Call - April 26, 2018 LAR to Add TS SR for Keowee Auxiliary Power Auto Transfer Feature

<{; ENERGY

• David Wilson, Mech DBG Manager

• Leland Hawthorne, Mech DBG Principal Engineer

• Eddie Welch, Elect DBG Principal Engineer

• Keith Anderson, Critical Systems Keowee Manager

• Chris Wasik, Regulatory Affairs Manager

• Boyd Shingleton, Regulatory Affairs Licensing Lead Engineer

• Introduction Chris Wasik

• Proposed Technical Specification Change Boyd Shingleton

• AC Power System Eddie Welch

• Keowee Auxiliary Power Transfer Feature Eddie Welch

• Reason for Change Eddie Welch

• Technical Justification Eddie Welch

• Closing Remarks Chris Wasik

Chris Wasik Regulatory Affairs Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station

• The proposed change will allow ONS to credit the Keowee auxiliary power automatic transfer feature (in place of the currently credited manual operator actions) to facilitate mitigation of a postulated electrical fault.

• Adds Surveillance Requirement to TS 3.8.1 to require verifying the ability of each KHU auxiliary power system to automatically transfer from its normal power source to its alternate power source

• Upon NRC approval, Duke Energy will process a TSB change to revise the LCO Bases to require the Keowee Auxiliary Power Automatic Transfer feature to be OPERABLE.

ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION

..., ..., rrrn T.v POWERIYITEM tol:IT AUXILIARY POWER IYITEM

.. B4T

... :::::::::::::::::::t::::::::::: ---------------------- -------------,

CT3

...IJ.J..i;_u.

"' '>411!10

~ - * - _szA~P~lf'i,L - * - ' NORMAL SOURCE J~~ STARTI.P SOURCE MFB#1 MFB"2

l. )

• 'I ;I

ICEOWEE ELECTIUCAL DISTRIBUTION 0

'""'"'~ - To SWITCHYARD (PCB *8 & 9)

Main V

.t. '

Trallllfonner lh"1oon,j'1:'iJll4

.., CT-4 l

1X Tralllformer T. ~ (;~* cl~,

I .......--.

CACB t

. 2 2X Tranlfomlor (I KPf KPF 12 cl KPF 10

• 11 CT-6 From 1TC CT-7 PSW PSW ex~

(1,c, I (IACB CACB CACB I5 I7 I 8 I8

( 1X LOAD CENTER ) ( 2X LOAD CENTER )

• KHU aligned to the underground path is required to have its auxiliaries aligned to receive power from Keowee Transformer CX

• KHU aligned to the overhead path is required to have its auxiliaries aligned to receive power from its auxiliary transformer (1X or 2X)

• Ensures independence of auxiliary power sources for the two KHUs to preclude the possibility of a single failure causing a loss or lockout of auxiliary power to both KHUs.

• Each normal and alternate breaker has its own undervoltage relay and manual control switch. One auto-manual switch per load center is provided to allow changeover from "Auto" to "Man" control.

• With the selector switch in "Auto," the logic is designed such that if normal voltage is lost and alternate power is available, the incoming breakers will transfer automatically to the alternate source.

• Electrical fault locks out underground KHU and overhead path.

• Overhead KHU automatically re-aligned to underground path.

• Keowee auxiliary power automatically realigned but not by TS required equipment.

• The existing procedure and staffing requirements do not support manual realignment in the time required when underground assigned KHU is generating to grid.

• Automatic auxiliary power transfer logic is tested and maintained but not required by TS 3.8.1 to support Keowee operability.

• Since requirement not included in TS but is needed to support operability, this deficiency is considered a degraded/nonconforming condition (OBDN)

• OBDN condition applies when the underground KHU is aligned to the overhead and generating to the grid during testing or commercial generation.

• Commercial generation with underground KHU currently being restricted for this reason.

• Proposed TS change replaces a manual operator action with an automatic action.

• The automatic transfer circuitry was installed in 1993 as QA-1 equipment but was not credited for restoring auxiliary power after a design basis event.

• The circuitry has been maintained QA-1 and tested periodically.

• The circuitry is currently installed and in use.

• The circuitry has been proven reliable through testing since initial installation

Questions Chris Wasik

• Oconee Regulatory Affairs Manager FOR INFORMATION ONLY

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 26, 2018, PUBLIC TELECONFERENCE WITH DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC TO DISCUSS PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 REGARDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1 (EPID L-2018-LRM-0029) DATED MAY 14, 2018 DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPL2-1 R/F RidsACRS_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl2-1 Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource RidsNrrPMOconee Resource RidsNrrLAKGoldstein Resource RidsNrrDeEeob Resource RidsNrrDeEicb Resource RidsNrrDssStsb Resource RidsNrrDssSbpb Resource H. Kodali, NRR/DE H. Vu, NRR/DE P. Snyder, NRR/DSS N. Karipineni, NRR/DSS ADAMS A ccess1on No.: Mt:g S ummary: ML18134A229 1 es ML18134A249*b1yema ii Mtg Sl"d OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-1 /LA NRR/DSS/SBPB/BC*

NAME AKlett KGoldstein RDennig DATE 5/14/18 05/11/18 5/3/18 OFFICE NRR/DSS/STSB/BC* NRR/DE/EICB/BC* NRR/DE/EEOB/BC*

NAME VCusumano MWaters JQuichocho DATE 5/4/18 5/3/18 4/27/18 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1 /BC NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NAME MMarkley AKlett DATE 5/14/18 5/14/18 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY