IR 05000302/1989009

Summarizes Enforcement Conference on 890628 Re Environ Qualification Deficiencies Identified in Insp Rept 50-302/89-09.List of Attendees & Handouts Encl

ML20247E354
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/18/1989
From:	Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Wilgus W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8907260142
Download: ML20247E354 (76)

Text

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v July.18,'1989

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L Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Florida Power Corporation Mr. W. S. Wilgus Vice President, Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing P. O. Box 219-NA-21 Crystal River, FL 32629 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-302/89-09) l l

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on June 28, 1989. This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Crystal River facilit The issues discussed at this conference related to those environmental qualification (EQ) deficiencies identified during the subject inspection and Florida Power Corporation's (FPC's) corrective action In this meeting you discussed the specific details for each of the eleven deficiencies as presented in the handouts enclose The staff concluded that there was little new information prnented that would differ signifi-cently from the facts presented in the , sport detail You took the position in the meeting that-none of the deficiencies, separately or collectively, were considered to be safety significant. However, you did admit ~that the EQ program was somewhat transparent at the station in that the requirements were simply added' to existing procedures and not highlighte Also, you did not have a dedicated EQ group as do most other utility program Based on actions you took in 1985 (Refuel V), you believed your EQ program was conservatively addressing E0 deficiencies by replacement of components /

equipment rather than analyzing your. total EQ concerns. You also indicated that your proposed EQ enhancement efforts would have discovered the staff's finding You concluded your presentation with a statement that escalated enforcement or a civil penalty is not necessary to inform or encourage FPC to improve the way it implements the EQ progra During the meeting, there was a great deal of discussion about the planned completion date for the EQ enhancement effort. You indicated that you would provide additiunal information to the staff regarding the completion of this progra ,

8907260142 890718 i FDR ADOCK 0500gC 2 l(

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v -July 18, 198 Florida Power Corporation 2

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I A listL of attendees I and a copy of your handouts are enclosed. We are continuing our review of. these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement

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, , actio In accordance- with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy-of- this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact u

Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY r M. L. ERNST Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator

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Enclosures:

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< List of Attendees

- Handouts (3)

REGION II PERFORMED AN E.Q. AUDIT ~ "'

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o NOV.:1988 - FPC/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING ON'E.Q. AND: .

INDUSTRY. AWARENESS .

I o 1 NOV. 1988 - FPC QUALITY PROGRAMS AUDIT /

o DEC.1988 - FPC INITIATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ENHANCEMENT. PROJECT PLAN o DEC. 1988 - REJOINED NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP'CN' o MAR. 1989 - COMPLETED DEVEI4PMENT OF FPC~

~1 ENHANCEMENT PROJECT PLAN 1

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o APRIL 24-28, 1989 - NRC E.Q. AUDIT

l o MAY 1, 1989 - CONSULTANT BEGAN ASSESSMENT OF FPC E.Q. PROGRAM (ANTICIPATE JULY 1989 COMPLETION)

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PRELIMINARY FPC EaO. ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM .

o PROGRAM SCOPE DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF FPC AND NRC AUDITS OF FPC'S PROGRAM AND PRELIMINARY

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DISCUSSION WITH THE INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT o PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT FALLS INTO THE FOLLOWING SEVEN AREAS:

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ORGANIZATION

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PROCEDURES

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FIELD VERIFICATION

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DOCUMENTATION I

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILES

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E.Q. MASTER LIST

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IRAINING

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i ORGANIZATLQH

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DEDICATED E.Q. GROUP ON"SDS 1

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l PROCEDURES

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REVISE PROCEDURES TO BETTER DEFINE PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERFACES <

FIELD VER.LFICATION EFFORT

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PERFORM FIELD REVERIFICATION OF CR-3 E.Q. EQUIPMENT

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VERIFICATION EFFORT A.?PROACH

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UTILIZE COMPREHENSIVE WALKDOWN PROCEDURE INCLUDING GENERIC AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA COLLECTION SHEETS

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DEDICATED WALKDOWN TEAMS  !

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SPECIAL TRAINING OF WALKDOWN TEAMS

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REORGANIZE VENDOR QUALIFICATION PACKAGES INTO A FORMAT THAT IS COMPLETE, SELF-SUFFICIENT, AND EASILY

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UTILIZED

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REORGANIZATION EFFORT WILL INCLUDE A TECHNICAL RE-REVIEW TO ASSURE COMPLETENESS i

• DEVELOP SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE MANUAI;/ INSTALLATION DETAIL DRAWINGS

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ENVIRONMENTAL PROFTL_RE

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RE-EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL ZONE MAP SHEETS WILL BE CONDUCTED TO RECONFIRM RADIATION AND '

TEMPERATURE ASSUMPTIONS B MASTER LIST (EOML) REVERIFICATION

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FPC INTENDS TO REVERIFY THE E.Q. MASTER LIST AT CR-3

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PERFORM IN TWO-DISTINCT STAGES

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STA.GE:1-- E.Q.. AWARENESS TRAINING WILL'BE'PROVIDED

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STAGE 2 ' INVOLVES A L COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING ~ PROGRAM -

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. Tli!.T WILL OCCUR AS 'IFFERENT : ELEMENTS OF. THE ABOVE E.Q. ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED .

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ITEM 89-09-01 ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO

CONSIDER CRACKS IN THE AUXILIARY STEAM LINE j LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WHEN CATEGORIZING THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AS A MILD  !,

ENVIRONMEN S Y S TJ LM S I N V O L V E D SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR CONTROL CENTER UNITS 3A1, 3B2, AND 3B3 COULD HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A HARSH ENVIRONMENT IN THE i l

AUXILIARY BUILDIN THESE MCC's CONTROL i

i SEVERAL AUXILIARY BUILDING COMPONENT (LER #88-27, dated January 9, 1989)

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FPC POSITION

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FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A CRACK IN_THE SUBJECT-

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zAUXILIARY STEAM LINE COULD 'HAVE EVENTUALLY

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.HOWEVER, 'FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE DEFICIENCIES .WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN .THEREFORE, THEY DO.NOT' INDEPENDENTLY, OR-WHEN COLLECTIVELY- CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, MARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO . ROOT CAUSE

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THE INSTALLED MODIFICATION INTENDED' TO ELIMINATE THE AUXILIARY STEAM LINES AS A SOURCE ONLY WORKS FOR LINE BREAKS BUT NOT

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. y BAFETY BIG]iIFICANCE

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. THE SUBJECT LINE ONLY CONTAINS STEAM APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN DAYS PER YEAR. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A CRACK WOULD OCCUR DURING THE FIFTEEN DAY USE PERIOD IS MINIMA . THE POSTULATED 1811 CRITERIA CRACKS ARE NOT AT HIGH STRESS LOCATIONS AND ARE, THEREFORE, UNLIKEL . PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AREA AND LIKELY WOULD PROMPTLY DISCOVER AND ISOLATE THE CRACK PRIOR TO THE CREATION -

OF A HARSH ENVIRONMEN . THE. STAFF HAS RECOGNIZED THE MINIMAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ISSUE IN GRANTING (JUNE 5, 1989) CR-3 A TEMPORARY EXEMPTION, TO GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA (GDC)-4, WITH RESPECT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS (HE7B) UNTIL THE END OF REFUEL VII (CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR THE SPRING OF 1990). THE STAFF INCLUDED IN THE EXEMPTION THOSE MODIFICATIONS MADE FROM THE ORIGINAL PLANT CONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESEN THIS INCLUDES THE SUILTECT SYSTE ~ - - ---. --

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SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE. ACTIOl{g,

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THE SUBJECT LINE WAS PROMFfLY CONFIRMED AS ISOLATE IT WILL NOT BE USED ONTIL ONGOING ANALYSES OF TH AREA ARE COMPLET . AS STATED ABOVE, FPC REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A GDC-4 EXEMPTION THAT BOUNDS THE SUBJECT ISSU LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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FPC WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT ITS HELB PROGRAM AND l l

ASCiRTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL ROOT CAUSES IF OTHER f SIMILAR DEFICIENCIES ARE IDENTIFIE i q

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FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT l PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIE .

ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 i

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89-09-01

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OTHER CONSIDERATION

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFIC 12 'CY :

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WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPOP'"ED BY THE LICENSE .

WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN A SEVERITY LEVEL I . WAS PROMPTLY REPORTE .

WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTED AND FPC's HELB EFFORTS SHOULD PREVENT RECURRENC . WAS NOT WILLFU !

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CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH V.B, FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT >

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ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO INSTALL QUALIFIED TAPE SPLICES ON THREE MOTOR H

OPERATED VALVE ONE MOV IS INSIDE THE-

-REACTOR BUILDING - AND - TWO MOV's ARE IN THE TURBINE BUILDIN SYSTEMS INVOLVED MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES (FWV-14

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AND 15) I4CATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDIN i WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM NORMALLY CLOSED

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE (WDV-406) LOCATED'

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.. . 7 ZE0_ POSITION FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT A BREAK IN THE MAIN STEAM LINE COULD HAVE CREATED A HARSH TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY ENVIRONMENT FOR FWV-14 AND 1 ALSO, AN ACCIDENT IN THE REACTOR BUILDING COULD HAVE CREATED A HARSH ENVIRONMENT FOR WDV-40 ,

FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THEREFORE, THEY DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO ROOT CAUSE THE E,Q. UPGRADE PROGRAM ADDRESSED SPLICES ON MOV'S AT THE SAME TIME OTHER MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE TO THE RESPECTIVE MOTOR OPERATED VALVE THESE MOV'S DID NOT REQUIRE ANY OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR SPLICES

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WAS NOT RECOGNIZE !

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THE POTENTIAL HARSH ENVIRONMENT INVOLVES TEMPERATURE AND' l HUMIDITY ONL .

. SPLICES ' WERE CONTAINED IN AN ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURE AND WOULD HAVE MINIMAL EXPOSURE TO THE POTENTIAL HARS ENVIRONMEN .. THE. REQUIRED' FUNCTION FOR' THESE VALVES . IS TO PROMPTLY CLOSE ON A SIGNAL FROM THE EPIC EQUIPMENT'- THIS ACTION

. TAKES PLACE BEFORE' THE EQUIPMENT IS EXPOSED TO THE HARSH ENVIRONMEN '

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EFIC ALSO PROMPTLY TRIPS THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP WHICH IS.THE SOURCE.0F WATER THESE VALVES ARE ISOLATIN . 'EFIC ALSO PROMPTLY TRIPS THE BACK-UP VALVES FWV-30, 31, 36, 29, 32, 3 .

THE SPLICES WERE AN INDUSTRIAL TYPE SPLICE AND LIKELY DID NOT REQUIRE E.Q.- QUALIFICATION FOR THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTIO FPC TOOK A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH BY

' INSTALLING RAYCHEM SPLICES AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO QUALIFY THE SPLIC . BASED ON Ti3E ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC ?

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Cont'd.)

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. WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM

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THE REQUIRED FUNCTION FOR THIS VALVE IS TO REMAIN CLOSE THIS VALVE WILL RECEIVE A SIGNAL FROM E.S. (ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS) TO INSUPE IT IS CLOSED. THIS SAFETY FUNCTION WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE EQUIPMENT IS EXPOSED TO A i HARSH ENVIRONMEN .

E.S. ALSO PROMPTLY CLOSES THE BACKUP VALVE WDV-40 .

THE TERMINATIONS WERE A KERITE TYPE SPLICE AND WERE LIKELY QUALIFIABLE FOR THEIR INTENOED SAFETY FUNCTIO FPC TOOK A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH BY INSTALLING RAYCHEM SPLICES AND NOT ATTEMPTING TO QUALIFY THE SPLIC . BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC .

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BHORT TEFJJSRRECTIVE ACTIONS I

. SPLICES WERE REPLACED WITH QUALIFIED RAYCHEM SPLICE j i

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WALKDOWN WAS PERFORMED TO IDENTIFY ANY ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE TURBINE .

LOILDIN !

l LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT AND CORRECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIE . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 )

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89-09-02

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v OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH  ;

V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:

WAS IDENTIFIED AND REPORTED BY THE LICENSE I

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WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED NO GREATER THAN I A SEVERITY LEVEL I I

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. WAS PROMPTLY REPORTE . WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTE )

. WAS NOT WILLFU .

CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT >

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- 89-09-03

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ITEM 89-09-03  ;

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO INCLUDE PENETRATION EPA-128 ON THE E.Q. MASTER LIS SYSTEM INVOLVED _

PENETRATION, EPA-128, CONTAINS INSTRUMENTATION CABLES FOR TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS (AH-536, 537, 538, 539-TE)- THAT MEASURE REACTOR BUILDING TEMPERATUR A h

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PPC POSITIQ){

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i FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ELECTRICAL PENETRATION  !

EPA-128 WAS NOT ON THE E.Q. MASTER' LIS THE STAFF ACKNOWLEDGED BY INSPECTION REPORT 50-302/89-09 (PAGE 6) 'u{AT ACCEPTABLE QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTATION WAS IN THE FILE AND THE TERMINATIONS APPEAR TO BE SATISFACTOR THEREFORE, THE D'FICIENCY E WAS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THIS DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WhEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO JtOOT CAUSE

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ENGINEER ERROR RESULTED IN THE PENETRATION BEING

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89-09-03

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D.AEETY SIGNIFICANCE

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THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION WAS QUALIFIE i

. MINOR DOCUMENTATION DEFICIENC . NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC l

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89-09-03 SHORT_ TERM CORRECTlVE ACTION

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THE E.Q. MASTER LIST WAS UPDATE i

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A REVIEW OF'ALL REG. 1.97 ITEMS TO ENSURE

THEY ARE ON THE E.Q. MASTER LIST WILL BE '

COMPLETED SHORTL .I,0NG TERM CORRECTlVE ACTION

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. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT L SIMILAR DEFICIENCIE .

ENHANCED TRAINING ON E.Q. WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 .

COMPLETE REG. 1.97 REVIEW TO ENSURE ALL ITEMS ARE ON THE E.Q. MASTER LIS .

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. - . , - . . , . . . . - - 1

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Enclosure"2~ .

. Pa,ge 16 * ,~ "

?',.E, Handout 2 .

F I6 ,

.

.-- 89-09-03

,.y  ; .-. .

'

, ;.i

,;

ay  ?

,

_j OTHER CONSIDERATIO . CONSISTENT WITH 1 CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS . CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST. ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE '{

REQ IRED- TO OPERATE 'UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT .

s t

,

'

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En'closurG 2?' " "f- Page 1 "

. l Handout2 4 w

'l

'

. .. 89-09-04 "i

- v!

.

!

'I

)

.

ITEM 89-09-04

.e ACCORDING TO THE' STAFF, FPC DID NOT HAVE AN FILE OR ANALYSIS ..FOR THE TAPED-TYPE

,

TER74INATION ON AHC-112.. FPC WISHES TO CORRECT THE STAFF'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS ISSUE IN-THAT THERE WERE FILES FOR TAPED-TYPE l i

SPLICES; HOWEVER, THE REVIEW PERFORMED TO REMOVE THE KERITE SPLICE FROM THE MASTER LIST WAS IN ERRO .

l SYSTEM INVOLVED THE . AIR HANDLING SYSTEM (CIRCUIT AHC-112).

LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING COULD HAVE

' BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A HARSH ENVIRONMENT IN THE REACTOR BUILDING -

THIS CIRCUIT j

.

PROVIDES POWER TO A REACTOR BUILDING AIR HANDLING FA * I i

'l i

'

b i___________[__1_.__._ [ E~ '

' '

-

'

-* l!

"' '

IlhdoM1 ' '

Page 18-l IiHandout'2

.

s a ..

i!

,;j

-

- 89-09-04

.,

..

-) ' I 1 FPC POSITION FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE KERITE TAPE i

CONFIGURATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ACTIVE

,

E.Q. FIL THE ARCHIVED E.Q.. FILE CONTAINED A TEST REPORT THAT QUALIFIED THE AS-INSTALLED CONFIGURATIO ACCORDINGLY, THE AS-FOUND TAPED CONFIGURATION WAS QUALIFIABLE, AND THE l

DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THE l i

DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDIVIDUALLY, OR WHEN '

COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO ROOT CAUSE FPC ENGINEERING'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE TESTED CONFIGURATION WAS IN ERRO .

l

!

\

l

1 I

• ,

,

,,, ,- .--

. . . . _ . , , , . . . . . . . , . . .

, . . _ . . . . , _ , , , , , . . . . , , , , -

_ -- _ _ . _ _

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- - = , - . . -y

"Endl o su re . 2,.y-- . ,

~ ~

Page 19

-

J. Handout;2 .

,

..

.,

-

- 89-09-04

.

-

.f i

I a

.

EAZETY SIGNIFICANCE

. THE AS~FOUND INSTALLATION WAS QUALIFIABL . THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC .

I

,

~~ "'

~ ~ " ~ * * * ~ ~ " ~

"""#'

-

" ' " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' " ~

- _ - - - - - _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ . ..

__ . _ _ - _ -

- _ . .

'

Enclosure 2.' Page 20

. Handout.2~ g

. 89-09-04 BHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE KERITE TEST REPORT AT THE TIME OF THE NRC INSPECTIO THE TEST REPORT WAS REVIEWED FOLLOWING THE INSPECTION PER NUCLEAR ENGINEERING PROCEDURE 222 AND FOUND ACCEPTABL . AN ACTIVE E.Q. FILE HAS BEEN CREATED THAT .

!

CLEARLY ESTABLISHES QUALIFICATIO . THE FPC ENGINEER WAS COUNSELLED ON USING VENDOR DOCUMENTATION AND- CLEARLY UNDERSTANDING IT BEFORS USING IT AS TECHNICAL INPU I JtONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

!

!

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT SHOULD MINIMIZE

.

SIMILAR DEFICIENCIE . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE i PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 THAT WILL l

ADDRESS THE USE OF TEST DOCUMENTATIO o l'

= w w =, +- - r 4 .s y 9, m -p y og gg-,ggg_pe % ,g y. ..maene e q m. , ,e W

________-.m_ _ . _ _ . - - . - _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - --

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'

'. Enclosure 2- Page 21 m$

,

, ,

. Handout 2  ?]

i

-

- 89-09-04 (3

~

. -ih

.

.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

'

j l

i

!

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY j EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED A( TION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY, CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT .

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.y ... ,, .,

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...-,....~,-..-,.-~,,.9*-. fy,

- - _ _ - _ - _ - - - _ - - - - _ _ _ . - - - - - - - . - . _ - - - -

.m . ,_- .4-

-

, ;.,_ - -

y

' *

Enc *losure 2- Page 22

Handout 2-

-

- 89-09-05 ITEM 89-0?-05

'

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED TO MAINTAIN SILICONE FLUID LEVEL IN THE GEMS REACTOR BUILDING LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION BOXE I FYSTEMJ NVOLVED REACTOR BUILDING FLOOR AND SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION BOXES (WD-303-LT-A&B, WD-302-LT-B).

.

i

'

i

1 e

i l

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l

. - , . . . . . . -..,_ ,. .. ._ .

,.]

_ .. _ _

,

7*

Enclosure 2 .Page 23

+ ,H3ndo'ut 2 ,

-

- 89-09-05

,

FPC POSITION FPC - ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE THREE GEMS LEVEL  !

TRANSMITTERS DID NOT CONTAIN ADEQUATE SILICON FLUID IN THE INSTRUMENT TERMINATION JUNCTION BOXES, AT THE TIME OF THE NRC INSPECTIO HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THIS DEFICIENCY WAS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THE DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN 1 i

COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER l

DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT i

ACTIO OOT CAUSE PROCEDURES DID NOT INCLUDE VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAINTAIN SILICON FLUID LEVEL IN THE LEVEL TRANSMITTER TERMINATION

.

BOXE !

,

i

,,- , . - . , ,- -

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. * ~pg=

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Endlosure2- Page 24 l

• Handout' .

s

- -

89-09-05 f!AFETY _ SIGN.JJ_ICANCE 'l l

W D_-_3_0 2 -LT- B

!

l

. THIS TRANSMITTER IS LOCATED IN THE REACTOR SUM a l

. FPC HAS NOT POSTUfATED ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT REQUIRING THIS TRANSMITTE THEREFORE, THE i TRANSMITTER IS QUALIF1ABLE FOR ITS DESIGN FUNCTIO I

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC !

ILD-3 03-LT-A Q l

. THESE TRANSMITTERS ARE LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR -l BUILDING ON THE WAL . SILICON OIL IS REQUYRED TO PROTECT AGAINST  !

SUBMERGENC l

. THE BOXES ARE NOT SUBMERGED DURING ACCIDENT CONDITION .

THE BOXES CONTAIN RAYCHEM SPLICE QUALIFIED FOR LOCA/HELB CONDITION j

.

. THREFORE, THE TRANSMITTERS ARE QUALIFIABLE FOR THEIR DESIGN FUNCTION WITHOUT OI )

. THESE TRANSMITTERS PROVIDE INDICATION FOR INITIATION OF SUMP RECIRCULATIO ,

. BASED ON THE ABOVE, HERE WAS NO SAFETY i SIGNIFICANC i L 1_ _ -. -

-

- - - ~ ~ - - - -

-I

,

a -- @agi %$

! . Ehclosure 2

.. 'llandout 2 ,

- 89-09-05

.

,

SHORT TERM CORRECfIVE ACTION

. THE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS WERE FILLED WITH SILICON OI . SP-175 (CONTAINMENT SUMP AND FLOOD LEVEL MONITORING SYSTEM CALIBRATION) HAS BEEN REVISED TO CHECK FOR OI . E.Q. FILE WAS UPDATED TO ?.EQUIRE THE OI .LONG TERM CORRECTIVP ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL ENSURE VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS ARE ADDRESSED IN PROCEDURE . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 THIS WILL HEIGHTEN ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE

-

AND PERSONNEL AWARENESS OF EQ REQUIREMENT .

i

. ~ ~ ,v . . - ..

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,-~~..,.._...,e,.,.,.,.._.y,.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _

,

. . . - - . _ _ _ - - - -

- _--_--_- ,

'

.Enciosure~2' Page 26

.c Handout 2 l

l

- _

89-09-01

,

QTHER CONSIp3RATIONJ

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES TPAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPR7 ATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT ,

, ., , ., . ,-- .,,..,.f,...,v.~.- .4.- -

. ~ - - . . - - - - - - - . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ . - - _ _ . . - - _ - _ - - . - - . _ . _ . . _ . - - . _ . - - - - . . . . - _ _ _- . - - . . - - - . . . - . _ _ - - . . . . - - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

- _ _ _ _

. . _ _ _ - -

_, - . _ , .

Inclosure 2 ~

Page 27

..- Handout 2'

- - 89-09-06

"

.

ITEM 89-09-06 ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC HAD FOUR LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATORS INSTALLED INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT WITHOUT FUNCTIONING T-DRAINS AND GREASE RELIEF ByBT_E_liS INVOLVED

-

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

.

MOTOR OPERATED PORV BLOCK VALVE (RCV-11) .

CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM

. MOTOR OPERATED SAMPLE VALVES (CAV-1, 3,

.

AND 4),

. ,

, ..

- , . . _ . m ..cm, _ . , , , . , - . , , - - . - , ,;

____ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

Cnclosure 2 Page 28 ){

-- Handobt2 l

.

. 89-09-06 FPC POSITION -

!

-FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE MOTOR OPERATED i'

VALVES DID NOT HAVE OPERABLE GREASE RELIEFS AND T-DRAINS WERE EITHER MISSING OR INOPERABL HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED ,

LATER, THE- DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY j SIGNIFICAN HOWEVER, THE AS-FOUND CONDITIONS DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT l

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO JtOOT CAUBJ

. FAILURE WAS DUE TO FPC RELIANCE ON LIMITORQUE AND NOT DOING AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE LIMITORQUE CONFIGURATION R6QUIREMENT . FAILURE WAS ALSO DUE TO THE FACT THAT FPC DID NOT SUFFICIE'ITLY EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF NO1 PAINTING OVER THE T-DRAINS AND GREASE RELIEFS.

l ,

.,, . ....e.,..nr.~, -

. , . .

. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ a

, - -

_ -

__ _

-__

,

En&losure 2 Page 29

, 'iiandout'2

'

r

-

89-09-06 BAPETY SIGNIFICANCE .

'

BCV-11

. PORV IS A BACKUP VALVE DOWNSTREAM OF RCV-1 . CR-3 HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INVENTOR . CR-3 SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS BOUNDS THIS EVEN CAV-L ' . THESE VALVES ARE NORMALLY CLOSED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE . THESE VALVES PROMPTLY RECEIVE AN ES SIGNAL TO CLOSE AND WILL HAVE PERFORMED THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION EEFORE BEING EXPOSED TO A HARSH ENVIRONMEN . ALL VALVES HAVE BACKUP VALVE CAV-1 - CAV-2 CAV-3 - CAV-2 CAV-4 - CAV-6 BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE IS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC f l

. . . . . . . . , . . . , . -

r--- . _- . _ - - . .

_ - . _ _ _

-- ._ . Enclo'sure 2- Page 30

'

. Handout 2-

-

- 89-09-06

, .

, F].QBT TERM CORBECTIVE ACTION ALL E.Q. VALVES IN THE REACTOR . BUILDING WERE INSPECTED AND ANY DEFICIENCIES PROMPTLY COPRECTE IeO19_TlRM _ CORRJpTIVE ACTJ.O_li

.

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL DETECT SIMILAR DEFICIENCIE f

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE i PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 .

,,.:.wo .u .c# ,

-^ 1

--n~~.___.n.._---

.

-- - _ - _ _ - _ _

L Enclosure 2 Page 31-

. tiandoui2- 1

- 89-09-06 l i

~

l l  !

l

'

CYHER CONSID.JRATIONS

!

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT-PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEF. ORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE C DER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT !

!

.

h u____..__________ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ __ _

..

-

__ _ . . - -_ _ _

_ _ . -. . _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - ,

,

p . Enclosure 2 Pege 32 l . Handout 2 '

I

"c' 'l ;

',

'

-

l i

i

j

.

ETEM 89-09-07 )

j l

I

!

ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC FAILED .TO

'

!

ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE IN THE E.Q. FILE A 40-

{

YEAR QUALIFIED LIFE ON ASCO SOLENOID VALVE (S) .

SYSTEM INVOLVED MAIN STEAM (11 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SOLENOID VALVES).

'

.

i

'

!

. . . . . - -

-a__.Amnm..-. --._--

, __ .-

,.,

Enclosure 2 Page 33 i L: Handout 2-' l

!.-. . .

J l

,- -

- 89-09-07

!

'. .

'{

)

FPC POSITION FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE QUALIFIED LIFE I

CONTAINED IN THE FILE WAS NON- )

CONSERVATIV HOWEVER, DURING THE PERIOD THE VALVES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, THEY HAVE ALWAYS H BEEN QUALIFIE THE MINOR ANALYSIS DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THIS DEFICIENCY INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, DOES NOT WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO BOOT CAUSE

-

' FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR BOUND AREA SPECIFIC TEMPERATURES IN CALCULATING QUALIFIED LIF ,

h

_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . __ ._ _

,. __ _ _

.. . _ __ - _ _ _ . - - _ - _ . _ .

_ - _ _ _ ,

.y End$suri2 - -

Page 34 Jiandout 2 ,

89-09-07

,

.

h'

SAFETY BIGFIFICANCE

. THE MAIN STEAM SOLENOID VALVES WERE QUALIFIED. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO SAFETY -

SIGNIFICANC a

.

M A

N **'4F*% Y't '$

'Ud--- - - _ - . - - , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _

g ~

. , ;, , _- p r Eoiclosure 2 'i Page 35

' '~

1- . .

,

l

-

. . Handout 2' '

l :.

.

. , 89-09-07

-

l pHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION i

. A NEW QUALIFIED L'IFE WAS ESTABLISHE !

f

. QUALIFIED YEARS OF l

. TEMPERATURE OF 140 . THE E.Q. FILE WAS UPDATED AS APPROPRIAT .

O h

)

. , _ , . _ .

. , .

_

, _

.,._,.-..,.,__,-..,,--,.-_..,.;..-.,y,--.-..-,,,

_

,

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

,

t-

J .

Eheiosure 2' Page 36

Handout 2 .,

.

-

-

- 89 -09-07

..

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOli

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRA . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 .

THE SOLENOID VALVES WERE AND REMAIN ON THE REFUEL VII LIST OF ITEMS TO BE REPLACE . VERIFY ACTUAL TEMPERATURES OF THE SOLENOID VALVES DURING JULY AND AUGUST OF 198 !

.

RECALCULATE QUALIFIED LIFE FROM FIELD MEASURED TEMPERATURE .

.

REVISE E.Q. FILES AS APPROPRIATE.

i L

i

,

$

l

. . . . - , ., - - . . - . . . , -

.--.-.7,r..-.......,,,,- ---)

r-,

yc w- ;.g

.

' Enclosure 2, Page 37 s .

. Handou OTHER CONSIDEA&TJp]iB

.

CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERA"'E UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ' ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED l

ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT .

h n , . ~ . . , . _ .-

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.

. , . , . ,.,,n.,,.,.. . . , . . ~ . . . , . . .

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.-

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}

. Enclohure2 Page 38

'

1- - Haddout2-

. . 89-09-08 l

j ITEM __89-09-0% '

i ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC's PLANT PROCEDURES MP-405 DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER

!

VENDOR BEND RADIUS LIMITATIONS AND PM-133 DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER VENDOR REQUIREMENTS i

REGARDING BEARING LUBRICATION PROCEDURE # Y S T E M S _ I t!y pq L VJ R i

MP-405 (BEND RADIUS)

s REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS (RC-003A-PT1, 2, 3, AND RC-014A-DPT1, 2, 3).

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LEVEL

'

TRANSMITTERS (SP-017-LT, SP-020-LT). PM-133_ (LUBRICATION)

AIR HANDLING SYSTEM FAN (AHF-1A).

>

)

'

_ i_ __________f___ _ 'Z1

..

-

_ ~ - -

, -- -

. , , ._ .

,n,, ,

A h Enclo5ure 2- _ . - - <

Page'39

[ Handout 2

-

- 89-09-08

..

,

FPC POSJfJ_QE FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT MP-405 DID NOT CONTAIN MINIMUM BENDING CRITERIA FOR RAYCHEM SPLICE HOWEVER, THF AS-FOUND RAYCHEM SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABL THE DEFICIENCY IS NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN MORErVER, THIS DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY

,

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT

ESCALATED ENFORCEMEN FPC ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THAT PM-133 DID NOT l

REFLECT THAT THE VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT '

THE FAN MOTOR SHOULD BE RUN FOR A PERIOD OF TIME WITH THE DRAIN PLOG OPEN TO ALLOW FOR {

j EXPANSIO HOWEVER, FPC's LUBRICATION )

PRACTICES SATISFY THE INTENT OF THE VENDOR AND l ARE ADEQUAT MOREOVER, THIS DEFICIENCY DOES NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTilER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO ;

l BOAT CAUSE PROCEDURES DID NOT INCLUDE VENDOR  !

RECOMMENDATION .

~ ~

' ~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - " ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

_-_ -

, ,

'

Enclosura 2 Page 40

+. 'Handodt2 l]

'

- 89-09-08 l

.

i BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE MP-4 0fi

!

i

.

AS-FOUND SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABLE USING 1 WYLE TEST REPORT #17859-02P AND, #17859-02 THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY b1GNIFICANC MP-133

. IF A FAILURE HAD OCCURRED, A REDUNDANT SAFETY SYSTEM (BUILDING SPRAY) WAS AVAILABL . BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC i i

<

.

l,,

a s ,

. .

ai_MLwi i_ __ ___ _ _ _ . _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ ___i__ ___

.

= . , . . __,_ _

. -

.

, -_ - . _ __- ,

- .. __ _ . -

-- ,

'

Dnclosure 2 _Page 41

., , Handout'2

-

- 89-09-08

-

.

SHORT TERM SORRECTIVE ACTIOH HP-4.01i

. SPLICES WERE CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED WITH SPLICES MEETING VENDOR RECOMMENDED MINIMUM' BENDING RADI . MP-405 HAS BEEN REVISE . FPC PURCHASED THE WYLE TEST REPORTS FROM COMMONWEALTH EDISON AND PERFORMED 7sN ENGINEERING REVIEW THAT DEMONSTRATES THE AS-FOUND SPLICES WERE QUALIFIABL I .Ei .121

. REVISION TO PM-133 HAS BEEN INITIATED AND  ;

!

WILL BE COMPLETE PRICR TO THE NEXT OUTAGE -I

.WHEN LUBRICATION OF THE AIR HANDLING FAN MOTORS t'ILL OCCU .

t n'

.

.

l

'

)

.

.1 ,,

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t == 9,rWc t mr iepqpe g,m me g gy ep + m- e *-e =gnous L CE_i_'J2im__m__!__ ____i'.___ _

'

__

, , .

, .. . - - . - - = - _ - . - - - -

- - - - - , - - - - -

'7~ ,

.

,

, Diclossre,2 o

. y ,;Page,45,=---.

-

...-

LHandout?2-

.

-

--89-09-08

,.c

-*

., , ,

'

's,._i LONG TERM CORRECTIVE.ACTIQH

. FPC: HAS' INITIATED A' LONG' TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL ENSURE'

VENDOR' RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MAINTENANCE

, PROCEDURE . INHANCED TRAINING 'ON- WILL BE PERFORMED IN- AUGUST 1989 THAT WILL HEIGHTEN PERSONNEL AWARENESS OF

IMPORTANCE OF VENDOR REQUIREMENTS AND-RECOMMENDATION e

'

,, )

r

{.

{ 4 l: '

k^ +'

.

'

i-

~ +. . , 3, . - . . , - . , . -w.,, y, 7> j

-

,

,

. . ; -r ,,7,.,.,..;y,.

,

,a..,, ,. . . ..

-.

.; , . -- . . - - - - -

, .,; -

, ,

,

. .

i Page 43'

.... Erclosure 2 i

"[Nandout'2

'

.

i. :-

R/ '

.

- 89-09-08

.

,

a b

.

~

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

'

..- CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2', ' APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH

-

V.B, FPC HAS .' CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTAR EFFORTS TO REVIEW ' PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT

' PRIOR- DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION "ULLY MITIGATING-ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT [I

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Enclosure 2 'Page 44'

. ,s Handout'2 -

,

v

-

. 89-09-10

.,

. 4 JTEM 89-09-10 ACCORDING TO THE NRC STAFF, FPC DID NOT HAVE WEEP HOLES IN THE TERMINATION BOXES CONTAINING WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCKS AND THE E.Q. FILE WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONTAIN A SIMILARITY ANALYSI i SYSTEM INVOLVED THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCKS ARE LOCATED IN THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM INSIDE CONTAINMEN :

!

l

.

l

,

.- - -

..c .- , m....._.. . , _ - . , ...._..,~..y_..m.,- .. .

- - _ . _ _ _ . - _ -

f*nclosuFe 2 Page'45 i-o Handout 2 l

-

89-09-10 I L 1 L i l 1'

FPC POSITION FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE TERMINAL BOXES CONTAINING THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BIDCKS DID

!

NOT CONTAIN WEEP HOLES OR A SIMILARITY j k

ANALYSIS WAS NOT IN'THE E.Q. FIL HOWEVER, j

'!

FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE DEF.'CIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THEREFORE, THEY l DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY )

CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT 1 i

ESCAIATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO ROOT CAUJJE WEEP HOLES WERE NOT INSTALLED DUE TO INADEQUATE COMPARISON OF THE AS-INSTALLED CONFIGURATION TO THE QUALIFIED TEST

.

CONFIGURATIO >

--

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...,,.r; -y ,.3 r .. .,_w,...,..,,,, . ~ ~ - -,

.

_ _ _ _ __ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _

Hlg Ecclosure 2 s Page.46

.

. Handout 2 .i

.

-

- 89-09-10

-

.

BAFETY BJGNIFICANCE

. THE WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BIDCKS WERE USED IN THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM (RCITS).

l

.

RCITS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT AND ACCORDINGLY WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN CR-3 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE l

. RCITS WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION . BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY i

'

SIGNIFICANC l L i 1 1 l~

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_ _ . - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _

Ehclosure 2: Page 47

. i'

-

Handout 2-

.

89-09-10 'I

.

,

SHORT TERM COERECTIVE ACTION

!

WEEP HOLES WERE PROMPTLY INSTALLED IN THE TERMINAL BOXES CONTAINING WEIDMULLER TERMINAL BLOCK LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL FURTHER ASSURE THAT THE isS-INSTALLED DESIGN CONFIGURATIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE TESTED CONFIGURATION . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 AND MILL ADDRESS

.

THIS ISSU >

l

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. - . _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - - -- _

- _

- _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _

-___ _ _ _ - -_-_ - .

.Encicsure 2' Page 48 I

.

Hanopu l c

i l

l I

'

i l

QTEEE CONSIDERATIONS l

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH V. FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY i EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE

- REQUIRED TO OPERATE !"NDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT .

.

- .. . . , - . . . .

. . - . . , . . . , . . _ . . . . - . - . - .

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,89-09-11A n%;, 71.-:] 7,s, u ; .. - , .

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[;0 ITEM 89-09-11A

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. '

FPC.' PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TEAT THE 90RV ' BLOCK p g

- ,

H-- VALVE. RCV-11 WAS . FOUND WITH ' CRACKED NIRING AND r?

r, <

.jf' '

l'

'

DEGRADED. GREASE IN.THE GEAR BOX.

i.'

i SYSTEM INVOLVED t

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REACTdR' COOLANT SYSTEM (RCV-11) -

PORV BLOCK

- VALVE.

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[Handou't:2.-

d A

_

~

FPC POSITION

,

..,

c EPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE JORV BLOCK VALVE WAS FOUND WITH DEGRADED GREASE AND CRACKED WIRIN HOWEVER, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED LATER, THE

? ,

DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN THEREFORE'THEY DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER-DEFICIENCIES, WARR?.NT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.-

JtOOT CAUSE FAILURE TO. ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE FULL EFFECT OF THE UNIQUE LOCAL AMBIENT TEMPERATURES ON

'THE PORV BLOCK VALVE WIRIN .

-.

f g- . , - , , _ , . . . _ _ . . . , _ . _ . . . . _ . . . . . _ . . . . , , _ _ _ . _ . _.., _ _.__._ _ _,

E- _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___

, _ -

Enclosure 2 -Page 51 E*Handsut 2.-

,

-89-09-11A BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

. THE PORV PROVIDES A BACKUP TO THE BLOCK VALV . CR-3 HAS THE MAKEUP CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INVENTORY SHOULD BOTH VALVES FAIL OPE . CR-3 SMALL BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS BOUNDS A LEAK THE SIZE CREATED BY BOTH VALVES'

FAILED OPE I

.

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)

,

l f

,. - -= .. __, . . . . . . , . , , . . , , , , . . . , _ _ _ _ _ . . .

,

_ _ _ . _ - ,

.

Enclo'sure 2 Page 52

. Handout 2

. .89-09-11A q

..

SHORT__ TERM CORREQ_TJVE ACTION

. THE BLOCK VALVE HAS BEEN CLOSE . TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN ON JUNE 15, 1989 TO BETTER DETERMINE THE ACTUAL LOCAL CONDITION LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM TO MINIMIZE DEFICIENCIES LIKE THI . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 198 . ADDITIONAL TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE EVALUATED TO BETTER ESTABLISH THE QUALIFIED LIF ,

..... ,.. p w n w m. - - .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __

f

~

'dnclosure'2/ Page 53 >

'

z.. . Haridout 2

. .89-09-117 QINER CONSIDERATIONS -

. ' CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART .2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD ~ NOT. ISSUE A NOTICE OF~

VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:

,

. WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE' LICENSE . WAS PROMPTLY REPORTE . WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN A SEVERITY LEVEL I . ACTIONS TO CORRECT THE IMMEDIATE DEFICIENC WERE PROMPTLY TAKEN (REPLACE COMPONENTS).

. WAS NOT WILLFU .. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT .

- ~7,,...,pw.- +

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

._. . -. _.______

En' closure'2 Page 54

. Handout 2

- . 89-09-11B

'

..

ITEM 89-09-11B FPC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT 17 CABLES AND <

SPLICES WERE LOCATED BELOW THE SUB!CF :;ENCE LEVEL AND HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ANALYZED FOR SUBMERGED OPERATIO SYSTEMS INVOLVED REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEMS (RC ITS) LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (RC-163A/B-LT1, RC-164 A/B-LT1) .

REACTOR COOLING SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS (RC-14A/B-DPT1, 2, 3).

l MAKEUP SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE (MUV-505).

SECONDARY PIJd4T SYSTEM EFIC LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (SP-31, 32, 21, 22, 23, 24-LT).

,

i l

. _ _ . . . , . . _ . . .,

m_____----___ m____ . ___.. _

'Enclos'urG 2:

-

.Page 55-

'

d.LHa'ndouf B-

-

.

FPC POSITION

'

FPC ACKNOWLEDGES THAT- 17 CABLES AND FOUR r TERMINATION' BOXES WERE .FOUND BELOW THE'

SUBMERGENC LEVEL AND HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY QUALIFIED FOR SUEMERGED US HOWEVER,- - SINCE . THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS WILL PERFORM THEIR INTENDED' DESIGN FUNCTION PRIOR TO SUBME!tGENCE OR HAVE COMPLIMENTARY EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD . PERFORM THE INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION, THE DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY SIGNIFICAN MOREOVER, THE DEFICIENCIES DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY , - OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO ROOT CAUSE INADEQUATE DESIGN COORDINATION -BETWEEN

.

DISCIPLINES REGARDING THE LOCATING OF EQUIPMENT DURING PLANT MODIFICATION )

l

+ \

l I

_- . . . . _ . _ _

._

_ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - __ a

Enclosure 2 Page 56

.. . Handout 2

-

89-09-11B

<

.

BAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

.RC-163A/B-LT1, RC-164 A/B-LT1 ARE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS THAT ARE PART OF THE REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY TRACKING SYSTEM (RCITS).

. RCITS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS -

ACCIDEN . RCITS IS NOT IN EMERGENCY PROCEDURE . RCITS IS NOT IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RC-14A/B-DPT1, 2, 3 ARE TRANSMITTERS THAT PROVIDE A TRIP SIGNAL TO THE RPS SYSTE . THE TRIP SIGNAL IS PROMPTLY SENT BEFORE THE CABLES AND TERMINATIONS ARE SUBMERGE l

>

l

. . . . . . , , . .

-

._

---_u_ . - - - - . - - - _ - _ _ - - - - . -

__ _ - _-_-_ _

_ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - ._ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

I En* closure; 2 l 'Page 57

>f**;liandout2

. _ 8 9 -09-11B '.

<

>

MUV-505

. LETDOWN COOLER' ISOLATION VALV .- VALVE .IS CLOSED WHEN THE THIRD LETDOWN COOLER IS *.OT IN SERVIC . WHEN THE THIRD LETDOWN COOLER IS BEING USED, THE o

' VALVE IS OPENED AND IS BACKED UP BY MUV-49 AND 49 . THIS VALVE PROMPTLY RECEIVES AN E.S. SIGNAL TO CLOSE

- AND WILL HAVE PERFORMED ITS SAFETY FUNCTIONS BEFORE BEING EXPOSED TO A HARSH ENVIRONMEN . SHOULD THE WIRING SHORT TO GROUND, A FUSE WILL BLO THIS WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE VALVE IS CLOSED, 'AND IT WILL REMAIN IN ITS' SAFE STAT SP-31, 32, 21, 22, 23, 24-LT ARE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS THAT CONTROL THE EFIC VECTOR VALVES -

LACK OF: CONTROL CAN CAUSE OVERFILLING OF THE STEAM GENERATOR . EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ADDRESS AN OVERFILLING EVEN . OTHER INSTRUMENTS THAT MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE EQUIVALENT INFORMATIO .. EFW PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW INDICATORS

. LOSS OF SUBCOOLED MARGIN - SPDS DISPLAY

. DECREASE IN RC PRESSURE

. EFIC MANUAL CONTROL IS AVAILABLE TO THE OPERATO BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANC l l

i

!

]

l

-

.)

l Enclosure 2 Page 58

. Handout 2

- -

89-09-11B

..

.

SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION f

. ALL AFFECTED CABLES AND SPLICES HAVE BEEN MOVED TO ABOVE THE DESIGN BASIS FLOOD LEVE . COUNSELLING HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE CONDUIT SUPPORT ENGINEER )

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROPERLY LOCATING EQUIPMEN I (

. ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE j

. i PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 THAT WILL i l

STRENGTHEN THE NEED TO COORDINATE )

EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS WHEN DOING MODIFICATION .

, , , _ - . , , - ,

_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

LEntfosure 2- =Page 59

~ '

s ' Handout ~2L

. -

n ,

-

89-09-11B

'

.

i. i ;OTHER CONSIDERATION 8'  !

.- CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, ' PARAGRAPH

'V.G, THE STAFF 'SHOULD NOT ISSUE 'A NOTICE OF VIOLATION-BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY: .

- . WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSE ,

. WAS PROMPTLY REPORTE . WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN A SEVERITY LEVEL I . WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTE . WAS NOT WILLFU I

.. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH FPC HAS' CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO. REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR ' DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED i ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT !

I

.

h

'

!

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. _ - .__ _

..

,Coclosure 2' Page 60

. Handout 2

.89-09-11C

.

i l

ITEM 89-o9-11C i

!

FPC PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT A TOTAL OF ELEVEN RAYCHEM SPLICES WERE USED ON THE MAIN STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTERS THAT WERE INCORRECTLY SIZE I SYSTEMS INVOLVED i

MAIN STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS (MS-106-PT THROUGH MS-113-PT).

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTERS (EF-24-FT THROUGH EF-26-FT).

i I

>

>

!

l l

. - . , .,

.l

.

- - _ - _ - . . _ _ _ .. 1

. _ _ . . _ _ - - _ - _ . - _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _

_

'

LEncidsure.2? Pagel61

, Handout:2

., ,.

-89-09-11C

.

,

FPC POSITION FPC ' ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE A DIFFERENT RAYCHEM SPLICE ON 'CERTAIN TRANSMITTERS IN THE' EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND MAIN STEAM SYSTE HOWEVER, FOR REISONS' DISCUSSED LATER, THE DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT SAFETY' SIGNIFICAN l

'ACCORDINGLY, THE DEFICIENCIES DO NOT INDEPENDENTLY, OR WHEN COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED WITH OTHER DEFICIENCIES, WARRANT ' ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIO ROOT CAUSE  !

,

IN HINDSIGHT, FPC BELIEVES BETTER ENGINEERIN JUDGMENT COULD HAVE BEEN USED IN THE SELECTION OF CERTAIN RAYCHEM SPLICE SLEEVE ;

'

i ,

l l

= _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

Endidsu,ra2 Page 62

'.Hsndout 2

_ .89-09-11C

!

RAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

!

. FPC CONSERVATIVELY CLASSIFIED THE SPLICES INADEQUATE IN THAT THE AS-INSTALLED i SPLICE DIMENSION WAS LESS THAN . 05 INCHES i TOO LARG THE SLEEVE MAY NOT HAVE REDUCED IN SIZE SUFFICIENTLY TO ESTABLISH l A SEA . THE AS INSTALLED CONFIGURATION WAS QUALIFIABLE BASED ON A COMMONWEALTH EDISON E.Q. TEST REPOR . BASED ON THE ABOVE, THERE WAS NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE TO THE DEFICIENC ,

I

. i

.- . - - - _ .

Enclosure .2 Page 63 s n

. Handoet 2 l

-

89-09-11C

,,

,

SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

. FPC HAS CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED THE SPLICES WITH NEW (BETTER SIZED) RAYCHEM SPLICE O I

. CABLES ARE BEING MEASURED TO MORE ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE SPLICE BEFORE ITS INSTALLATIO i JaONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOJi

. FPC HAS INITIATED A LONG TERM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM THAT WILL MINIMIZE  !

THE PROBABILITY OF THIS EVENT HAPPENING AGAI . ENHANCED TRAINING ON WILL BE l PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1989 TO PROVIDE A

'

BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON TECHNICAL

)

DETAIL {

I l

. THE COMMONWEALTH EDISON REPORT WILL BE ADDED TO THE E.Q. FIL l l

i

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _

C i Ehclostare 2 Page 64

• Yandout'2

- -

89-09-11C

,

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

. CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH V.G, THE STAFF SHOULD NOT ISSUE A. NOTICE OF VIOLATION BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCY:

. WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSE . WAS REPORTED PROMPTL . WAS A CONSERVATIVE REPOR . WOULD NORMALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS NO GREATER THAN A SEVERITY LEVEL I . WAS PROMPTLY CORRECTE i

. WAS NOT WILLFU . CONSISTENT WITH 10CFR PART 2, APPENDIX C, PARAGRAPH i

V.B, FPC HAS CLEARLY EMBARKED ON MAJOR VOLUNTARY EFFORTS TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES AND TO CORRECT PRIOR DEFICIENCIES BEFORE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITION ACCORDINGLY, IF THE STAFF DETERMINES THAT ESCALATED ACTION IS APPROPRIATE, ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FULLY MITIGATING ANY CIVIL PENALTY IS APPROPRIAT !

i

_ - . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _