ML20196C629
| ML20196C629 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1998 |
| From: | Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Cowan J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812020076 | |
| Download: ML20196C629 (58) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. . November 20,1998 Mr. John P. Cowan, Vice President Nuclear Operations Florida Power Corporation ATTN: Manager Nuclear Licensing (SA2A) Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLAN - CRYSTAL RIVER
Dear Mr. Cowan:
On November 2,1998, the NRC staff completed an inspection resource planning meeting. The staff conducted thie review for all operating nuclear power plants in Region 11 to develop an integrated inspection plan. We conducted this meeting in lieu of the semiannual Plant Performance Review, which the staff has moved to February 1999 because of the agency's shift to an annual Senior Management Meeting cycle. This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the inspection planning meeting. We have provided it to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling 4 conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved before the inspector's arrival onsite. Enclosure 1 details our inspection plan for the next 4 months. We have provided the rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. During this scheduling cycle, we will continue to focus some of our discretionary inspection effort on the resolution of open inspection items. Therefore, we may conduct additional inspections, which are not listed on Enclosure 1, to close open inspection items that are ready to be resolved. We will notify you at least 3 weeks before the start of these inspections. l The NRC's general policy for reactor inspections is that we will announce each inspection, unless announcing the inspection could compromise the objectives of the inspectors. I Therefore, we may not have included some specific inspections on Enclosure 1, such as in the security and radiological protection areas, and these inspections may not be announced. Enclosure 2 contains a historicallisting of plant issues, called the Plant issues Matrix (PIM). The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Florida Power Company. This material will be placed in the public document room. 9812O20076 981120 5 # DR ADOCK 050003 2 a s hh
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-We willinform you of any changes to the enclosed inspection plan. If you have any questions, j please contact me at 404-562-4540.
! ( Original signed by S. Ninh for ) i- Leonard D. Wert, Chief 7 Reactor Projects Branch 3 !- Division of Reactor Projects f Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72
Enclosures:
- 1. Inspection Plan
- 2. Plant issues Matrix l- ' cc w/encis:
Charles G. Pardee, Director Nuclear Plant Operations (NA2C) L Florida Power Corporation Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 L Robert E. Grazio, Director [ ,
- Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (NA2H) .
! Florida Power Corporation - ' Crystal River Energy Complex . 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Gregory H. Halnon, Director Quality Programs (SA2C)
- - Florida Power Corporation
- L Crystal River Energy Complex l 15760 West Power Line Street
- Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 R. Alexander Glenn
( . Corporate Counsel Florida Power Corporation i MAC - ASA P. O.- Box 14042
~ St. Petersburg, FL 33733-4042 2
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UAT I E R 0 3 T 0 0 C DRC I D 7 9 E EOU 2 6 2 9 P CPR M SOMT A P P _ NRE R PTNS I I I I G O R P 11
' INSPECTION . NUMBER OF " PLANNED INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION -
' PROCEDURE / TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS . DATES COMMENTS -
TEMPORARY. INSTRUCTION PLANT SUPPORT -,. IP 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1 1/99 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM TREATMENT, AND , EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IP 86750 MONITORING SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION 1 2/99 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM - EXPOSURE IP 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF 1 3/99 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM , THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (EP) PROGRAM 4 1 4 ____ __ __ ___._._ ___.___________...________.________ ___ _ _ ___ __._ _ ____ __m______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ , - _ _ _ _ , .
e DICWSURE 2 Date: 11/16/1996 United States Nuclear Wegulatory Commission Tkn.: Om:u Page:1 of 3 nosion il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX CRYSTAL RtVER By Dale - Functional Temploto Dole Source Area ID Type Codes llom Description 09/12/1998 1998008 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4C Eroneering processes were upgraded to correct previous deficiencies. The Bcensee completed transition of the
- g. Configuration Document integration Project into the normal design process, placed Heensing basis archive information
- g on a computer network. and implemented on engineering calculation cross-reference system. These enhanced Ter-4A engineering's ability to perform design reviews and safety assessments and maintain occurate design basis documents.
09/12/1998 1998008 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A An at-power reactor buHding entry was closely coordinated, supervised, and planned, The lock of a specific foreign Sec: e m cmW@o o do W WW W RB W mom mW was necessay to Sec: 2B retrieve it . Tec 09/12/1998 1998008 P t OPS NRC POS Prt 1B The Ecensee's plant startup activities were deliberate and weD-controHed. The Ncensee was self-criticd and thorough in l Soc: Sec: 3A Tec 5A 09/12/1998 1998008 Prt PLTSUP NRC NEG Prt 3A Use of drinking fluids for high heat stress in o Rodiction Control Area (RCA) for the reactor building entry was
- g. dministered wet, but the lock of specific documented controls for their use and on exception to the RCA prohibition
~ Sec: IC on drinking had not been questioned by licensee Heattt' Physics personr.el supervising the entry.
Tec 3C 09/12/1998 1998008 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri' 3C inconsistent expectations were promulgated to plant personnel on the treatment of contaminated areo boundaries
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- Sec: IC ') * ** " ** Y ^
Physics to move the CAB ond relocated the bor code were considered oppropriate. r Tec C9/12/1998 1998008 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt IC A quarterly licensee emergency plan dnu wus observed Licensee drills continue to be diverse and effective training Sec: Sec: 1B Tec 09/12/1998 1998008 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1C Heoith Physics staff effectively controlled doses for on of power reoctor bunding entry. Expected conditions the workers Sec: ec M swee e d M W d Sec: 3A Ter: L ltem Type (Cu np;6 n. , Followup,Other). From 10/01/1997 To 11/16/1998
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission O "'E5"' Page: 2 of 3 - neolon il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX CRYSTAL RIVER By Dato . Functional Tomolate Date Source ~ Area - ID Type Codes flom Description 09/12/1998 1998006 ' Prt MAINT - NRC POS Pvt 4a Diesel generator 1B maintenance and modification work was precisely controlled . Pre-Job planning, scheduling. ond
- g. OPS kM coordination were highly detoDed and were dded by use of the system engineer os a s'ngle coint-of-contact. Work suspension and diesel recovery to available status due to adverse weather warnings were sig Wicantly enhanced by Tec 2B this preplanning. Excellent sensitMty was displaced towurd minimizing diesel out-of service.
09/12/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Technicions performing a reactor protection system surveBlance were knowtedgeable of pas problems and sensitive to See: OTHER Sec: 5C a ckWmces. M wm whM MW of eMech cmm och Tec 3B 09/12/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt SC A revision to o surveillance test to address a previous problem was not completed prior to the next scheduled M M 2B performance. The previous problem was not discussed in the pre-job brief. A formal operability resolution had to be reactively generated when the problem recurred. Tec 3A 09/12/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 3A Hunicone preportions were thorough and prooctive. Although tropical storm levels were not exceeded, the Rcensee Sec: MAINT Soc: IC on out-of-servk:e emergency diesel. Tec 09/12/1998 1998008 Prt OPS Self POS Prt 3A An unplanned monud reactor trip occurred due to o personnel error in control of troubleshooting, cousing a main Sec: MAINT See: 2B een m A ean a. ew pmm ems occM m N @ W h Ecesee effectively completed force outage work and planned power reduction work during the shutdown. Tec 1B Item Type (Compliance,Foltowup.Other), From taV1/1997 To 11/16/1998
Date:11/16/19?8 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission umo: o,oi:u
' PLANT ISSUE MATRIX
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-Legend Type Codes. Temologe Codes. Functionoi Areas.
BU Butetin IA NormalOperations GPS Operations CDR Construction IB Operations During Transients MAINT Maintenance DEV . Deviation IC Programs and Processes ENG Engineering eel Escalated Enforcement item 2A Equ!pment Condtion PLTSUP Plant Support IFl Inspector foBow-up item 2B Programs and Processes ' OTHER Other LER Ucensee Event Report 3A ' Work Performance UC Ucensing issue 3B KSA MISC Miscenoneous 3C Work Environment MV Minor Violation 4A Design NCV NonCited Violation 4B Engineering Support NEG Negative 4C Programs and Processes NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion 5A identification WON Notice of Non-Conformance SB Analysis P21 Port 21 5C Resolution POS Positive ID Codes. SGI Safeguard Event Report NRC NRC
""G Self Self-Revealed URI Unresolved item g VIO Violation WK Weakness Eels are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escolated enforcement oction in accordance with the " General Statement of PoEcy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Pohcy). NUREG-1dXL However, the NRC has not reached its find enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PtM entries may be modified when the finoi decisions are mode.
URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is on acceptable item, a deviatiort a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be o potentid violation that is not likely to be considered for escdoted enforcement oction. However, the NRC has not reoched its find conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the find conclusions are mode. Item Type (Cvoyi6 w, Followup,Other), From 10/01/1997 To 11/16/1998 - - - _ _ - _ - - - - - _ _ _ - --. , e - - - . .a - - ---- ---_ -- - - - - --_ _ - _ - -
3 CN United St;t a Nuclear Regul:tsry Commirion PLANT ISSUES MATRIX
*.,.. by SALP Functional Area CRYSTAL RIVER- 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES r
ewm- yq 8/1/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-07 NRC The performance of back-end corrective action effectiveness reviews by the licensee 1 234 5 was considered a beneficial and pro-active action. A 00000 B 00000 ; CO 000 8/1/98 Negative SAQV IR 98-07 NRC A problem with attemate indications for hot leg temperatGre hao been identified 1 234 5 months eartier by the licensee, but had not been corrected due to a corrective action program error that caused corrective actions to be left in an indeterminate state. The hcensee's program only tracked the completion of finalized corrective actions and A OOOOO root cause evaluations not the age of open precursor cards. Questioning by NRC B OOOOO inspectors resulted in the identification of the problem. O OOO 8/1/98 Positive MAINT 1R 98-07 NRC An example of excellent questioning attitude was observed when an operator 1 234 5 challenged the lack of a time limit requirement to inspect a service water heat exchanger removed from service for suspected blockage. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 8/1/98 Strength SAQV IR 98-07 NRC Control room operators rout:nely used the practice of peer-checking to verify their 1 234 5 equipment and control manipulations and to preclude human errors causing inappropriate actions. The consistent implementation of this practice was considered a strength. A OOOOO OOO c0 00O ! 8/1/98 Negative MA!NT IR 98-07 NRC Instances of poor equipment condition, standing water, and unsecured equipment in 1 234 5 the area around the borated water storage tank were cons'dered examples of poor maintenance and housekeeping of unfrequented areas and rooms with primarily abandoned equipmer:t that still contained operational components. A OOOOO cO 000 t 8/1/98 Negative SAQV IR 9847 NRC An example of ineffective corrective action was identified by the inspector. A Night 1 234 5 Order directed an operability determination review for the operating crews, without telling the crews' supervision the reason for the review or the specific points to smphasize. A OOOOO sOOOOO cO 00O , FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 1 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 6/26/98 Positive MAINT 1R 98-05 NRC Licensed operators had an adequate understanding of the Maintenance Rule and 1 234 5 understood their responsibihties for implementing the Maintenance Rule. The work control senior reactor operators, work week supervisors and schedulers were familiar with the use of the probabilistic safety assessment rnonitor in support of A OOOOO work control activities. B OOOOO cO 000 6/20/98 Negative SAQV IR 98-06 NRC A revision to the corrective action program requirements that did not consider the 1 234 5 impact on existing items in the system was identified as an example of poor change management. Two examples of active and open nonconformance De5ciency ReporM were identified with closed Precursor Cards tracking the issues in the A OOOOO corrective action program, contrary to the changed requirements. B OOOOO CO 000 6/23/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-06 SELF The licensee's Nuclear General Review Committee was meeting the commitments 1 234 5 as described in Final Safety Analysis Report Section 12.8.2, Nuclear General Review Committee. Each member of the Engineering and Technical Support Subcommittee, as well as the members at the full committee meeting, consistently A OOOOO contributed to discussions on the various subject matter presented. B OOOOO cO 000 6/20/98 Positive ENG IR 98-06 LICENSEE The licensee equipment label upgrade project was an ambitious and comprehensive 1 234 5 effort, which also corrected and upgraded configuration control databases. Good oversight and ownership of the project were displayed by the operator assigned to manage it. An action plan to resolve discrepancies was thorough and planned in A OOOOO advance between Operations and Engineering. A large number of missing labels B OOOOO and flow print discrepancies have been found during system walkdowns, which have validated the need for the project. O OOO 6/20/98 Negative IR 98-06 NRC The licensee's initial reportability determination for a mdeup pump lube oil pump 1 234 5 failure was timely, but the content of the information a st to the NRC was poor. Their explanation did not stand alone and did not appear to be well understood by the operators documenting and reporting the event. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 6/20/98 Negative IR 98-06 NRC The use of a wordprocessor macro for logging limiting condition for operation (LCO) 1 234 5 action verification was questionable because of the possibility to miss a required action if the Nuclear Shift Manager does not verify the actions against the improved Technical Specifications. Part of an LCO verification was found not logged A OOOOO B 00000 cO 800 6/20/98 Negative ENG IR 98-06 NRC Accurate and timely Operations' operability determinations was hindered by 1 234 5 acceptance criteria in surveillance procedures (SPs) that were poorfy referenced to a l source requirement and had no bearing on safety function and operability. Consequently, the operability impacts of failing to meet SP acceptance criteria were A OOOOO . ( not readily apparent to operators. B OOOOO ) cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 3 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC. SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 6/20/98 Weakness IR 98-06 NRC After discussions with Operations personnel and management followmg a delayed 1 234 5 operability decisbn, Operations
- understanding of timely operability determinations was identified as a weakness. An operability determination was not made, follomn9 a surveillance test failure on an emergency feed pump, for 2 hours, until engineering A OOOOO input was obtained. B OOOOO ,
cO 000 6/20/98 Negative SAQV IR 99-06 NRC During the evolution to deenergize Engineered Safeguards Motor Control Center 1 234 5 MCC-3A1 at power, Operations was uncertain of several equipment impacts which could have been resolved using resources outside of Operations. Most of the unknown load effects had minimal operationa consequences. While the evolution A OOOOO received appropriate management oversight, the potential existed for this oversight B OOOOO to be bypassed due to the informal action plan and lack of any process to capture it. O OOO 6/20/98 Positive MAINT IR 98-06 SELF Personnet associated with the evolution to deenergize Engineered Safeguards Motor 1 234 5 Control Center MCC-3A1 at power to remove a fau:ted breaker worked with a good sense of urgency. Overall, the evolution was executed well and controlled in a timely manner commensurate with safety. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 6/20/98 Negative SAQV IR 98-06 NRC The opening of a breaker cubicle door in a condition that clearty indicated an 1 234 5 abnormal condition was an example of extremely poor electrical safety practices by Operations. Operations management also did not initially recognize these electrical safety practices to be a signi5 cant problem. A OOOOO l OOOOO c8 OOO ; 6/20/98 Negative PLT SUP IR 98-06 NRC operations responded aggressively to several performance problems this period. 1 234 5 However, these problems were indicative of ongoing problems with unclear radiological work practice expectations, poor use of procedures, and human performance lapses. A OOOOO OOO cO 900 5/9/98 Negative SAQV IR 98-04 NRC Administrative implementation of the Operability Concems Resolution (OCR) and 1 234 5 Deficiency Report programs by Operations was poor. There was not a consistent way of implementing wingw story actions; there were errors in the OCR log; tracking of OCRs was unclear procedura!!y and was unfamiliar to many licensee A OOOOO personnel; an old Short Term instruction was active and renewed although it B OOOOO conflicted with a Deficiency Report Justification for Continued Operations evatuation; and, Precursor Cards were not promptly initiated to address some of these problems O OOO after they were identified. 5/9/98 Positive SAQV tR 98-04 NRC The new Corrective Action Review Committee was an effective and prompt licensee 1 234 5 initiative to address previously reported problems with inconsistent and weak apparent cause evaluations. Trending of items in the corrective action system was not a fully developed program but was evolving adequately per licensee plans A OOOOO already in place. B OOOOO cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/t6/98 Page 4 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 5/9/98 NCV ENG 98-04-01 LICENSEE This Non-Cited violation was identified for an example of poor implementation of 1 234 5 design change assumptions that resulted in the failure to monitor and detect pressure of backup air to the atmospheric dump valves that fell below equipment design basis hmits. The cause of the problem was similar to previously reported A OOOOO problems with identifying and implementing design change assumptions. B OOOOO cO 000 5/9/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-04 NRC The licensee issued a detailed set of 10 site 1998 Performance Goals that 1234 5 effectively captured their most important broad performance issues. Goals included creation of a Supervisory Development Program to ensure common senior management expectations and methods were understood, en overhaul of the A OOOOO Procedure Change Process to address disorganized and inefficient methods, B OOOOO consistent Plant Benchmarking Expectations, and improving Clear Management Performance Expectations. The inspectors concluded the licensee was very O OOO effectiwi at identifying and promulgating their broad programmatic problems. Final implem ntation of the licensee goals would effectively address several previously docume sted inspector and licensee concems. 5/3/98 Weakness tR 98-04 NRC A weakness was identified for several examples of poor licensee recognition of 1 234 5 Technical Soecification Limiting Conditions for Operation requirements and informal tracking of ee associated actions. The administrative requirements for this function were scattere throughout various and overlapping procedures and the individual A OOOOO accountability for tracking and compliance was not clear. B OOOOO cO 000 5/9/98 Positive MAINT IR 98-04 SELF A short turbine generator outage on April 3,1998 was well planned and executed. 1 234 5 and a thorough post-outage critique was conducted to further improve performance This was considered indicative of the improvement the licensee has made in scheduling and coordination between departments. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 3/21/98 Positive SAQV tR 98-03 NRC The licensee offsite review committee continued to focus on relevant areas of weak 1 234 5 licensee performance in their reviews. One minor concem was identified with the independence of their reviews to close internal committee open items in that they reliad solely on information provided by the licensee. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 3/21/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-03 NRC The licensee's Quality Assurance auditors' reviews remain focused on appropriate 1 234 5 areas. They implemented a thorough Power Ascension Inspection Plan which included extensive coverage of backshift activities. The licensee's new Corrective Action Program performance indicators were a significant improvement over A OOOOO previous indicators and provided appropriate insight into individual work group and B OOOOO overall program performance for management to verify expectations were met. O OOO FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 6 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 8/31/98 w- _ - - - - . - _ - - - _ _ - - - - . _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - - , _ - _ - _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ . - - - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - -
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 3'21/98 Negative ENG IR 98-03 NRC No major problems or concems were noted during the Nudear Services Closed 1 234 5 Cycle Cooling (Service Water) system walk down. General material condition and housekeeping were found to be adequate. However, the findings confirmed several already known problem areas: defidency tags still hung after work already A OOOOO completed; equipment tabeling. or tack thereof; an existing operator workaround for B OOOOO maintaining pressure in the Service Water surge tank; and, system drawings not matching valve lineups as desenbed in operating procedures. The licensee already O OOO had active projects in place to address each of these issues. 321/98 Negative ENG IR 98-03 LICENSEE The irv.pector conduded the licensee adequately justified operability of a core flood 1 234 5 tank following inadvertent addition of a full cytinder of argon in the gas space instead of nitrogen. The confusing vendor tabeling of the gas bottles that allowed the argon to be used instead of nitrogen was adequately addressed by the licensee by A OOOOO implementing their own site labelling of gas bottles. B OOOOO cO 000 3/21f98 Negative OPS IR 98-03 SELF An example of poor operator questioning attitude and verification of information 1 234 5 resulted in an inadvertent trip of the turbine generator on over excitation during an initial startup. A previously observed discrepancy with voltage control operation had been resolved by Operations based on an incorrect verbal explanation from a relay A OOOOO technician without any ver% cation of the actual olant design. The investigation after B OOOOO the trip revealed reversed ex6tinn Mnibit labels on the control board. cO OOO 3/21/98 VIO ENG 98-03-0 t LICENSEE A violation was identified for failure to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance 1 234 5 Requiremeat 32.3.1 when the axial power imbalance alarm was inoperable due to a computer failure. Operators did not recognize failure of the plant computer to update a reactor parameter display, which included reactor thermal power and axial power A OOOOO imbalance, for several hours. (See entry 973) B OOOOO cO 000 3/21/98 Negative OPS IR 98-03 LICENSEE Deficiencies were observed with operators' clearance tagging performance attention 1 234 5 to detail, further indicating this area remains a weakness. However, the licensee recognized the problems and has initiated a comprehensive project to completely revamp the dearance process. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 PJ11/98 Positive MAINT IR 98-03 LER 98-03-00 SELF Loss of power to the integrated Control System (ICS) caused a reactor trip due to 1 234 5 AMSAC actuation from feedwater reduction. Root cause of power loss to the ICS was a zener diode not adequately soldered to a printed circuit board for the power supply monitor. The inspector concluded that operators' response to a reactor trip A OOOOO was good. The licensee's root cause investigation was found to be methodical and B BOOOO thorough. cO OOO 2/7/98 Weakness SAOV IR 98-01 NRC A weakness was noted in the corrective action program in that it was not always 1 234 5 driving the corrective actions, and the corrective acDons were not always thorough. Corrective actions somenmes done outside of the process. A OOOOO B 00000 c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 7 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 2/7/98 Weakness SAQV IR 98-01 NRC Corrective action system remains adequate but weaknesses observed with 1 234 5 adequacy of Level C precursor card apparent cause evaluations and corrective actions and the timeliness of root cause evaluations. Poor oversight by the licensee's Nuclear Safety Assessment Team responsible for the corrective action A OOOOO system contributed to these problems developing. Senior Mgmt adequately B OOOOO addressing both issues. O OOO 8/7/98 NCV SAQV 98-01-03 LICENSEE Failure to follow an Operating Procedure for aligning a decay heat system 1 234 5 purification loop, resulting in hfting of a system relief valve. Contributing causes included poor communication between the reactor operator and building operator performing the evolution and leaking valves. Valves added to Workaround List A OOOOO Licensee re. ,ognized their corrective actions to a previous problem could have been B OOOOO more aggressive, and they responded thoroughly and promptly to this latest example. O OOO 2/F/98 Negative OPS IR 98-01 NRC Severa! observations of operator performance indicated deficiencies in Operations' 1 234 5 questioning attitude and attention to detail Examples involved review of Engineering Operability Assessment on throttled Makeup Pump valves and response to computer failure. A BOOOO OOO cO 000 PI//98 MISC OPS IR 98-01 LICENSEE Numerous Document Control problems identified by licensee, indicative of new 1 234 5 mgmt uncovering longstanding problems in this area. Problems contributed to procedure control weakness. Licensee's planned actions appropriate with good mgmt oversight. Problems include lack of control copy number system and lack of A OOOOO periodic audit requiremenL B OOOOO cO 000 2/7/98 Weakness OPS 1R 98-01 SELF Licensee identified a number of components not in their expected position, many 1 23 5 due to deficiencies in implementing procedure changes. Operations control and review of their procedures and their role in modif. cation impact screenhg is a collective weakness. Numerous procedure problems evident during startup activities. A OOOOO OOOOO c9 000 2/7/98 Negative MAINT IR 98-01 NRC Reactor Building closeout processes very detailed, but several discrepancies found 1 234 5 by inspectors that had not been questioned by licerssee. All items resolved and determined to have minimal safety significance; howevas, significant reactive effort expended by licensee resolving the items. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 2/7/98 Positive SAOV IR 98-01 NRC Operational Safety Team inspection (OSTI) team noted that individuals from various 1 234 5 plant departments were conducting independent observations of plant work and startup activities and had the correct threshold for findings. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 8 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8,G1/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 2/7/98 MISC MAINT IR 98-01 NRC OSTI team observed that plant materiel condition had improved and was acceptable. 1 234 5 but improvements can still be made. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 2/7/98 Negative OPS IR 98-01 LICENSEE Surveillance procedure for verification of proper Reactor Celant System ( RCS) 1 234 5 flows did not initially consider density effects of changing RCS temps at lower power levels. Numerous other minor procedure corrections required during startup, indicative of deficient procedure validation. A OOOOO 8 00000 cO 000 2/7/98 Negative MAINT IR 98-01 NRC Operator knowledge needed improvement on operating main turbine controls & 1 234 5 expected plant response while placing rnain generator in service. Use of annunciator response procedures / operator communications adente but inconsistent. Communications between operators and instrument technicians were also A OOOOO inconsistent. B OOOOO cO 000 2/7/98 Positive SAOV IR 98-01 NRC Operational Safety Team inspection: Management oversight of plant startup 1 234 5 assigned on 24 hr. shift coverage: focused on independent assessment of operator conduct & contributed to efficient closure of Engineering & Operations issues. Management actively participated in reactivity mgmt activities / emergent issues. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 900 2/7/98 Positive OPS 1R 98-01 NRC OSTI team observed excellent overall operator command and control, reactivity 1 234 5 mgmt. given highest priority, & oper. performance generally very good. Operations shift supervision aggressively pursued operational & design issues Good oversight of Control Room activities. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 900 2/7/98 MISC OPS IR 9841 NRC Operations very cautious and deliberate while performing reactor startup activities. 1 234 5 Numerous changes to routine Operations procedures indicative of weakness in procedure issuance / change control and poor review of procedures prior to significant evolution. However, many changes were the result of heightened scrutiny of A BOOOO problems that had not been challenged in the past. B OOOOO c0 000 2/7/98 VIO MAINT 98-01-01 LICENSEE Closure of red-tagged electrical components. As previously concluded in other 1 234 5 reports, clearance tagging process significantly deficient. Although licensee responded adequately with corrective actons, a comprehensive Corrective Action Plan is v.arranted considering errors vantinue to occur. Violation of Regulatory Guide A OOOOO 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A. Source of errors shifting to clearance preparation and B OOOOO being caught by the process now, but error rate still high. O OOO FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 9 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 1/30/98 VIO SAQV 98-02-01 NRC Corrective actions to previously identified errors in procedural guidance for in-plant 1 234 5 Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) actions were inadequate and an example of a violationof 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion XVI. Corrective Action. Additionall procedural guidance deficiencies for in-plant EOP actions indicated continuing tack A OOOOO of adequate verification & validation activities. EOP team found numerous V&V B OOOOO pr biems. cO OOO 1/30/98 Positive ENG IR 98-02 NRC Through additional justifications or procedure revisions, the licensee satisfactorily 1 234 5 resolved the deviations from the Techrscal Bases Document impacting the mitigation strategy documented in IR 97-12. Adequate resolution of NRC findings. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 1/9/98 Negative PLT SUP IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspect <xt The licensee failed to ensure Technical Bases Document actions 1 234 5 done by Technical Support Center were incorporated into procedures. See VIO 97-12-01. This was one more example. A OOOOO sD0000 cO 000 1/9/98 MISC ENG IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspection: Licensee review determined Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1 234 5 air start circuitry was property designed to prevent continued application of starting air to an EDG until depleting the starting air and appropriate operator training had been provided on how to respond to a tripped EDG. Review prompted by operator A OOOOO statement to an inspector that indicated system knowledge error. B OOOOO cO 000 1S/98 MISC OPS IFl 97-12-03 NRC EOP Inspecton: Possibility of control complex chiller trip & delay in re-establishing 1 234 5 chiller not recognized as part of verification & validation effort in EOP-14. Enclosure 17/18 interaction. Enclosures needed to be completed in series but no note to ensure. Doing in parallel could cause trip. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 800 1/9/98 Negative OPS IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspecbon: EOP/AP training program adequate for licensed operators. 1234 5 Weakness noted for not training secondary plant operators on resetting Emergency Feedwater (EFW) turbine's over speed trip. Licensee corrected. Only primary plant non-licensed operators tramed on EFW reset. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 t/9/98 MISC OPS IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspectiort Operating crews capable of mitigating transients presented by the 1 234 5 team. However, some examples of performance inconsistent with an EOP step, licensee mgmt. expectations or administrative guidance were observed. Problems dispositioned consistent with their significance. Numerous EOP simulator scenarios A OOOOO run by inspecbon team. B OOOOO c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 11 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 1/9/98 MISC OPS IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspection: EOP User's Guide was acceptable following a December 1997 1 234 5 revision. Probiems noted prior to revision with evaluation of proceduce sequence departures and EOP priority protocol exceptions based on pre-defined symptoms. AOOOOO s00000 cO 000 1G/98 Positive OPS IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspection: EOP Writer's Guide was comprehensive and adequately 1 234 5 implemented in EOP construction. This contributed to operators rarely having trouble reading or understanding the EOP steps during the simulator scenarios. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 1/9/98 VIO SAQV 97-12-02 NRC EOP Inspection: Inadequacies in the EOP in-plant verification & validation (V&V) 1 234 5 process. EOP-directed actions within control room could always be performed, but numerous in plant actions either cou!d not be performed or radiological consequences not assessed. This was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, A OOOOO Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions. Lack of support personnel, lack of property staged B OOOOO equpment, technically incorrect procedure steps, not incorporating actions int procedures. O OOO 1G/98 VIO SAOV 97-12-01 NRC EOP Inspection: Several examples of inadequate or lack of technical justifications 1 234 5 for Technical Bases Document deviations were indicative of numerous EOP development process weaknesses. Additionallustifications of EOP revisions were required. This violated NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMl Action Plan A OOOOO Requirements. Licensee deviated from Technical Bases Document numerous B DOOOO times. NRC identified omitted and inadequate deviation justifications. Still poor after licensee responded by upgrading justifications. O OOO 1/3/98 Weakness OPS tR 97-19 LICENSEE Procedure revision inefficiencies were observed in that enhancement comments 1 234 5 posted against procedures were often left unresolved when a procedure was revised (NUPOST process). Licensee has deterrrdned operational procedure weaknesses exist in all departments and has initiated plans for a procedure upgrade program. A OOOOO OOOOO c0 000 1/3/98 MISC SAQV IR 97-19 LICENSEE Mgmt. continued to exercise oversight of precursor card screening results & 1 234 5 developed appropriate baniers to correct inappropriate rating decisions. They have also taken appropriate preliminary actions to address problems w/ supervisory reviews of Precursor Cards. Problems continue in corrective action program but are A OOOOO recognized and addressed by licensee management. B OOOOO cO 900 1/3/98 Negative SAOV IR 97-19 NRC One precursor card reportability determination was found to be poor in that 1 234 5 operability requirements of the affected component were not initially recognized by Operations. Involved wires not terminated in Radiation Monitors (RM)-A1 and 2. Ten days required to determine reportable even though clearty required operable in A OOOOO Offsite Dose Calculation Manual B OOOOO cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 12 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8f31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 12/16/97 MISC OPS IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Significant amounts of overtime worked by Operations (OPS) personnel during last 1 234 5 several months of extended shutdown. No indications of significant fatigue. Licensee placing exper. OPS personnel into other groups & needs to continue to obtain more lic. operators. OPS had sman number of licensed operators. Long range plan in A OOOOO place to significantly increase numbers. B OOOOO cO 000 1?l16/97 Negative SAQV 37-20 (OSTI) NRC Operator knowledge of significant Proababilistic Safety Assessment information 1 234 5 needed to be improved. Overall knowledge of Technical Specification requirements and system operations good. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 12/16/97 Negative OPS IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC There was no procedural guidance for time to core uncovery/ boil curves for extended 1 234 5 shutdowns. Two deficiencies noted associated with outdated revisions of controlled procedures. Several uncontrolled operator aids identified. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 12/16f37 Strength OPS IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Availability of computerized programs such as NUPOST and VIEW / PRINT 1 234 5 considered a strength. Procedure adherence and usage good. Programs accessible to all personnel. NUPOST is procedure revision suggestion database. VIEW / PRINT allows access and printing of controlled procedure copio. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 12/16/97 Negative MAINT IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Numerous examples of poor housekeeping were noted. Lighting was nct effectively 1 234 5 rnaintained and some areas of plant not well lit. Numerous inconsistencies and deficiencies in equip. labeling. Labeling upgrade program should be continued. Licensee in initial stages of significant labelling upgrade program and plant condition A OOOOO refurbishment. B OOOOO c0 000 12/16/97 Negative OPS IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Procedural controls and emphasis on the work around program needed 1 234 5 improvement. Monitoring of control board deficiencies was not being performed accurately. Work around list not proceduralized. A OOOOO a00000 cO 000 1?J16/97 MISC ENG IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Lack of a separate program to control temporary modifications could lead to 1 234 5 rnodifications performed without proper assessment, though no safety significant examples identified. No designated log for jumpers and lifted leads, but adequately controlled by various .TA a. Temporary modifications controlled by same A OOOOO process as normal modifications, including aH the necessary detail. Consequently B OOOOO difficult to implement a temporary modification. O OOO FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 14 of 49 FOR PUBlJC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16ev-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 11/29/97 MISC OPS IR 97-17 UCENSEE Corrective actons appeared appropriate to address configuration control problems. 1 234 5 Recent trends have been positive; however, continued monitoring for effectiveness and elevated management oversight is warranted. Numerous and disparate errors have caused continued configuration control problems. Review of open Operations A OOOOO equipment status control violations. B DOO O O. cO 000 11/29/97 Strength SAQV IR 97-17 NRC Appropriate focus continued on Nuclear Quality Assessment (NOA) activities. 1 234 5 Management continued to utilize NQA to follow up on suspected problems, giving management an independent perfor nance assessmeni Appropriate management attention also devoted to screening problems in corrective action system. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 90O , 11U9/97 Positive OPS tR 97-17 NRC Though Operations performance problems remained, they were generally minor and 1 234 5 promptfy and appropriately corrected. Ucensee commited to continue focus on improving performance long beyond restart. Self-identification of problems encouraged by all groups. A BOOOO OOOOO cO 900 11!29/97 MISC OPS IR 97-17 NRC Even though the number of identified clearance errors has been increasing, the 1 234 5 impact of the errors has been reduced and the licensee has been identifying the errors mainly through review programs intended for that function. Errors more minor and being caught by process baniers. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 11G9/37 Positive OPS IR 97-17 NR" The evolution to establish a pressu izer steam bubble was well controlled and 1 234 5 displayed good coordination among operators. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 11/29/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-17 SELF Response to Raw Water (RW) Pump RWP-3A suction blockage perturbation was 1 234 5 very good. Ucensee displayed excellent sensitivity to preserving severat options of decay heat removal, took prompt interim corrective actions and developed appropriate action plan to secure pJmp/ remove suction blockage. Discharge A OOOOO pressure dropped from blockage, and pump was declared inoperable. Blockage was B OOOOO wooden wedge lost in RW pit we to poor Foreign Materials Exclusion control. O OOO 10/25/97 Positive ENG 1R 97-16 UCENSEE Ucensee's actions to address items on Workaround Ust were good and reflected 1 234 5 good management attention and mmmitment to reduce operator burden. Workarourris dropped from 25 tr. 5/97 to 12 in 10/97. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 900 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 16 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 10/25/97 Weakness OPS IR 97-16 NRC Individual corrective actions adequate to address the causes of some individual 1 234 5 violation eamples & a!!ow closure of open items. However, several deficiencies indcated a lack of coordination & a lack of a thorough evaluation of appropriate overall Correctrve Action scope. C!aarance tagging problems were numerous, which A OOOOO necessitated a coordinated and comprehensive corrective action plan. B OOOOO cO 000 10C5/97 Strength SAQV IR 97-16 NRC Operations Self Assessment was very thorough & self-critical, focusing extensively 1 234 5 on observations of field performance. Findings well organized, tracked for resolution and valid. Consistent use of outside organizations and individuals a strength. Licensee frequently uses third parties to participate or lead self-assessments. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10/25/97 Positive SAQV IR 97-16 LICENSEE A problem with improper classification of precursor cards was only notable 1 234 5 remaining deficiency with licensee's Corrective Action system, but licensee's oversight was appropriate to correct problem prior to restart. A OOOOO s00000 cO 000 10G5/97 Positive SACK 1R 97-16 NRC Self-assessment activities remain effective. Problems with follow up & presentation 1 234 5 for findings were adequately addressed. Training on improvements to Corrective Action (CA) system adequate. New system should be significant improvement in standardizing CA efforts. New CA database software procured from Duke Power. A OOOOO Replaces cumbersome spreadsheet FPC had been using. B OOOOO cO 000 10/25/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-16 LICENSEE Licensee had a good process and comprehensive plan for modification & start 4sp 1 234 5 procedure training for all site disciplines. A 00000 e00000 cO 000 10GS/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC Operations questioning attitude & communications have improved but remain a 1 234 5 challenge. Coordination between site organiutlons has significantly improved. Licensee continues to focus on improving pencenance; good progress being made-Restart issue A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10G5/97 NCV OPS 97-16-02 LICENSEE Numerous incorrectfy filed Technical Specification (TS) revisions in Control Room 1 234 5 found during corrretive action for previous problem with uncontrolled memos placed in TS. Control of Operations procedures given to Document Control as a corrective action' A OOOOO s00000 c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 17 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 10/25/97 NCV OPS 97-16-01 LICENSEE Two examples of failure to adhere to operations procedures during system 1 234 5 manipulations. Management showed appropriate concem over this evidence of operator inattention during evolutions involving safety related components (Decay Heat Purification Loop; RMA-6 Reactor Building Air Sampler). Appropriate A OOOOO corrective actions taken. Minimal safety significance in Mode 5. Poor procedure impiementation. B OOOOO cO OOO 10/25/97 MISC OPS IR 97-16 NRC Efforts to develop an interim Mode Restraint List were proactive & a good effort 1 234 5 considering limited time availability to review existing databases & develop a useful list. However, result was cumbersome manual system. Licensee planning to use mode tracking ability of new Corrective Action Program software in future outages. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10/24f97 Negative SAOV IR 97-14 NRC SSFl: A negative observation was identified for a lack of training in the area of root 1 234 5 cause for Quality Program Department personnel. A00000 B 00000 cO 000 10/24/97 Weakness SAOV IR 97-14 NRC SSFl: Down grading Quality Assurance (QA) audit & surveillance findings contrary to 1 234 5 Corrective Action program guidance and lack of guidance for ensuring OA management concurrence when down grading QA findings & for ensuring a 30 day response for QA findings. Weakness in Corrective Action program adherence. A OOOOO OOO cO 000 10/24/97 MISC SAQV 1R 97-14 NRC SSFl: Positive observation on effectiveness of self-assessments in identifying 1 234 5 deficient conditions, but a single negative observabon on grading of a Precursor Card (PC)- did not property identify a deficient condition. PC graded D for Self Assessment finding that required action. A OOOOO OOO cO 000 10/24/97 Positive OPS tR 97-14 NRC SSFl: Replacement Operator Training lessons were generally consistent with 1 234 5 system operating procedures and the enhanced design basis documents for these systems. Job Performance Measures were adequate to familiarize operators with equipment & control board manipulations. AOOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10/24f97 Negative OPS IR 97-14 NRC SSFl: Control room activities were observed to be conducted in an overall good 1 234 5 manner. During plant tours, opere.ars were recording log readings & equipment checks as required. However, lack of specific written guidance as to managements expectations for checks AOOOOO sOOOOO c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 18 of 49 Last Updated: 8/31/98 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 8/1/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The Program Manual for the third ten year Inservice Testing interval was consistent 1 234 5 with the Code Standards. The licensee identified the ASME Class 1,2 and 3 components which have a function in shutdown of the plant to a safe shutdown condition, maintaining safe shutdown, and in rnitigating accident conditions. A OOOOO Appropriate procedures have been developed and testing is performed in accordance with plant procedures. B OOOOO O OOO 8/1/98 Positive ENG 1R 98-07 NRC The emergent job to replace a leaking service water pump rnechanical seat was well 1 234 5 executed. Work packages were promptly prepared, workers displayed good teamwork, and excellent Limiting Condition for Operation time serisitivity was evident. Good component engineer support was observed for the seal replacement A OOOOO and the investigation of the seal leakage cause. B OOOOO cO 000 8/1/98 NCV 98-07-02 LICENSEE An excellent questioning attitude and attention to detail were displayed by an 1 234 5 Instrumentation and Controls technician that identified an anomaly during reactor protection system testing of the reactor coolant system low pressure trip. Previous opportunities to identify the same anomaly were missed during validation testing and A OOOOO testing by other technicians. B OOOOO c0 000 8/1/98 MISC OPS tR 98-07 LICENSEE Licensee management identified a deficient practice involving testing of vital bus 1 234 5 transfer switches. A test failure could resuit in deenergizing a vital distribution panel, potentially causing a reactor trip or transient. Operations subsequently prevented subsequent scheduled testing due to the risk of a transient. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 8/1/98 Positive OPS IR 98-07 NRC Observed testing and surveillance activities were performed in a highly controlled 1 234 5 manner by Operations personnel. Preparation and briefings for testing were thorough, a single point of contact was assigned for coordination, operators were knowledgeabis of the scope and purpose of the tests, communications were precise ABOOOO and formal, and supervisory oversight was strong. B DDOOO cO 000 E/26/98 Positive SAOV IR 98-05 NRC Maintenance Rule audits and self-assessments were thorough. 1 234 5 A 00000 sO0000 cO 000 6/26/98 Weakness SAQV IR 98-05 NRC Corrective actions for maintenance rule audits were adequate with the exception of 1 234 5 three issues which had been identified but not resolved for over nine months. This corrective action delay was considered to be a weakness. A OOOOO a00000 cO 000 l FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 20 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 6/26/98 - Positive IR 98-05 NRC The Maintenance Rule Inspection team walked down several systems. Generalty, 1 234 5 plant material condition observed during walkdowns was good. Very few examples of corrosion, oil leaks, or water leaks were evident. AOOOOO B 00000 cO 000 6/26/98 Strength IR 98-05 NRO Overati, the Maintenance Rule program for structures was considered a strength. A 1234 5 detailed and thorough inspection of Maintenance Rule structures had been performed and documented-AOOOOO s00000 cO 000 6/26/98 VIO OPS 98-05-02 EA 98-376 NRC Generally, for (a)(2) Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs), performance 1 234 5 criteria was estabt;shed; industry-wide operating experience was considered; operating data was being captured; appropriate trending was being performed; and corrective action was taken when SSCs failed to meet performatice criteria or A OOOOO experienced a maintersnce preventable functional failure. However, a violat6,n was B DOOOO identified for failure to cote.t unavailability time during surveillance testing of emergency diesels, contrary to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). O OOO 6/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Required structures systems, and components (SSCs), with the exception of one 1 234 5 structure (intake canel), were included within the scope of the Rule. For the (a)(1) SSCs eviewed, the licensee had established goals and monitoring with safety as a consideration. Operating experience was being captured and industry wide operating A OOOOO experience was used. Corrective actions for improving the perfomm. of (a)(1) SSCs were appropriate. B DGOOO O OOO 6/20/98 Positive IR 98-06 LICENSEE The use of a temporary calibrated gauge to verify if a permanern gauge was 1 234 5 malfuncborung was considered to be a proactive and appropriat? action during a turbine 41ven emergency feedwater pump and valve surveillant.e-AOOOOO B 00000 cO 000 6/20/98 Positive OPS IR 98-06 NRC A norWcensed operator consistently implemented the S.T.A.R. (Stop, Think, Act, Review) process during the conduct of a surveillance procedure on the tu-bine-1 234 5
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driven emergency feedwater pump and valves. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 5/9/98 Positive OPS IR 98-04 NRC The development of an accurate schedule and adherence 10 it were significant 1 234 5 licensee management priorities. Schedule adherence and planning implemanted by the new 12 week rolling schedule had improved coordination of work between licensee departments. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 900 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 21 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 5/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Many of the licensee goals for the rnaintenance perfommnce indicators have either 1 234 5 been rnet or displayed sustained positive trends, demonstrating improvement in the implementation of the maintenance program. Final assessment will depend on the licensee's completion of the plan and sustained improvement in the various areas A OOOOO OOO cO 000 5/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The licensee has established an improvement p?an for the mahtenanc3 function at 1 234 5 the plant. While sti!! in the earty stages of implementation, the plan appears to be thorough, defining the weak areas and systematically addressing the targets to be implemented to address the weaknesses. AOOOOO OOO cO 000 5/9/98 Negative IR 98-04 NRC in areas that had not yet been cleaned and re-coated, such as the sea water room 1234 5 and the lower level of the turbine building, there was some evidence of corrosion and deterioration of equipment and supports. A OOOOO g00000' cO 000 $/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Improved material condition was noted in the areas where the plant coatings project 1 234 5 had been completed, such as the intermediate building and the upper levels of the turbine building. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 Ef3/98 Weakness IR 98-04 NRC A weakness was identified because of a discrepancy between Preventive 1 234 5 Maintenance (PM) procedure PM-275 requirements, and the implementing PM Control Sheet and work request for the Auxiliary Foedwater Pump FWP-7 Backup Power Supply MTDG-1, A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 5/9/98 Positive OPS IR 98-04 NRC Maintenance activt%s were adequately performed and documentation was good. 1 234 5 Procedures were in place and were being conscientiously followed by qualified Maintenance personnet. Interface between Maintenance and Operations personnel A OOOOO B 000OO c0 000 3G1/98 Weakness MAINT IR 98-03 NRC Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor knowledge and understanding of the 1 234 5 licensee's second party verification program, including the applicability of a controiting procedure. A final field installation cleanliness inspection was certified based on an inspection done in a maintenance shop and verification of cleanliness A OOOOO controls when transporting the part. The licensee's investigation conclusion did not B OOOOO discuss the primary licensee controlling procedure. O OOO > FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 22 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 2/7S8 Negativa ENG IR 98-01 LICEldSEE A localleak rate test (LLRT) on new High Pressure triection recirculation valves 1 234 5 failed because a required back pressure specification was pooriy conveyed to the vendor. Consequently valves not designed to withstand LLRT back pressure. Although corrective actions to modify the valves were appropriate because the A OOOOO valves passed the test, omission of the back pressure specification was an example B DOOOO of poor Engineering performance. O OOO PJ7/98 Positive OPS IR 98-01 NRC Integrated Engineered Safeguards Actuation Sys%n testing was performed in a 1 234 5 deliberate and controlled manner. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 1/9/98 NCV ENG 97-12-04 LICENSEE EOP Inspection: Program for implementing Techrucal Specification 5.6.2.4 for 1 234 5 system leakage outside containment was not adequate, but actual external leakage did not exceed post-accident dose consequences requirements. Licensee taking appropriate corrective actuans to correct. Parts of Makeup and Purification system A OOOOO used in Low Pressure injection - High Pressure triection piggyback operation not in B OOOOO leakage monitoring program. O OOO 1 S/98 Weakness OPS IR 97-12 NRC EOP inspection: Work control process did not consider tnat work could inhibit 1 234 5 access to in-plant EOP action locations. Licensee was formulating corrective actions to this weakness. A OOOOO a00000 cO 000 1/3/98 Weakness SAOV IR 97-19 NRC Resolution of the specific Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) problem resulting in a 1 234 5 raw water pump (RWP) blockage was extremely poor. Specific aporopriate corrective actions not developed, apparent cause evalutations wer" cursory efforts & no extent of condition review for other potential blockages perforr -two level C A OOOOO Precursor Cards (PC)s. Corrective action incorporated into alrean Jng level B B OOOOO PC on FME, but specifics of RWP not addressed, and C level PCs :..,t cross-referenced to B level PC. C level PCs did not stand alone. CO OOO 12/16/97 MISC MAINT IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Licensee nondestructive inspection examiners thoroughly aware of recent industry 1 234 5 experience involving High Pressure injection piping & thermal sleeve cracking and performed appropriate exams to assure condition did not exist at CR3. Weakness noted in written exam criteria. Licensee prepared a precursor card to address this A OOOOO deficiency. B OOOOO cO 000 1711697 MISC MAINT tR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC Licensee's surveillance program was acceptable for plant operation. Surveillances 1 234 5 were satisfactorily scheduled, procedural! zed, performed & documented. Pre-job briefings for surveillances thorough and well-presented. A OOOOO s00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 23 of 49 FOR PUBUC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 12/16/97 Strength MAINT IR 97-20 (OSTI) NRC The strong maintenance supervision presence and involvement on the job site was 1 234 5 considered a strength. A 00000 B 00000 cO 900 11/29/97 Weakness MAINT IR 97-17 NRC Control of work in the protected train of Engineered Safeguards systems during 1 234 5 Mode 5 shutdown operation lacked adequate procedural guidance and a clear definition of what constituted a protected train. Also, changes to mcdification scope were issued directly to the field, bypassing the Operations Shift Supervisor. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 11G9/97 MISC MAINT IR 97-17 SELF An instrument technician elected not to perform test procedure steps that appeared 1 234 5 to be not applicable, but he did not discuss the decision with supervision. Resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the pressurizer spray valve that fortuitously had rninimal consequences. Implications of problem recognized and appropriate A OOOOO corrective actions were taken by licensee. B OOOOO cO 000 10/25/97 MISC ENG IR 97-16 LICENSEE Licensee performed tracer gas testing of Control Complex Habitability Envelope 1 234 5 (CCHE) that initia!!y appeared to meet acceptance criteria for CCHE in-leakage. However, original design basis in-leakage had been exceeded and license submittal planned to resolve the difference & change in methodology. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10G5/97 Negative MAINT IR 97-16 LICENSEE Licensee identified a history of repeat maintenance on certain safety related 1 234 5 components & began to identify causes. Concemed with potential programmatic and personnel issues indicated by high incidence of repeat maintenance. Trend developed - FPC noted from Corrective Action database. Problems particularty on A OOOOO pump maintenance. B OOOOO c0 000 S025/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-16 LICENSEE Though not within their indmdual department goals, Mechanical & Electrical 1 234 5 Maintenance shops greatly reduced individual corrective rnaintenance backlogs. Overall Maintenance department goals reached in 9/97 and have been maintained - demonstrating sustained improvement in management of the work backlog. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 900 10/24/97 Positive ENG IR 97-14 LICENSEE SSFl: Licensee adequately identified and prioritized the maintenance backlog for the 1 234 S makeup and purification and decay heat removal systems as a function of the System Readiness Review Process. A OOOOO s00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 25 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 801/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 10/24/97 VIO MAINT 97-14-07 NRC SSFl: Failure to follow foreign material exclusion (FME) procedure requirements per 1 234 5 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Also, a weakness was identified for inconsistent procedura: guidance provided by Compliance Procedure CP-116A (FME program procedure). Inspection Report 98-04 dated 6/8/98 documented closure of A OOOOO Violation 97-14-07. CP-116A was extensively revised to provide better instructions B OOOOO and requirements, and plant staff received special training on the revised procedure. in addition. *10 Keys to a Successful FME Program' was added to the licensee's O OOO existing program. 10/24/97 Positive ENG IR 97-14 LICENSEE SSFl: Procurement documentation for a sample of installed Makeup purification & 1 234 5 Decay Heat removal systems' equipment demonstrated the implementation of appropriate technical & quality requirements in the procurement process. A OOOOO B 00000 , cO 000 10/24/97 VIO ENG 97-14-06 NRC SSFl: The program for control of portable Measuring and Test Equipment ( M&TE) 1 234 5 mahltained by the calibration laboratory was good, but a violation was identified for failure to evaluate consequences of out-of-tolerance permanently installed instnaments used as M&TE, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Xil. A OOOOO Inspection Report 98-04 dated 6/8/98 documented closure of violation 97-14-06. The B OOOOO licensee reviewed all inservice Test surveillances where installed instruments were used as M&TE. Nineteen instruments were found to be out-of-tolerance and OO OOO deliciencies were corrected. New requirements and guidance were developed and incorporated into the licensee's Technical Support Standard documentation. 10/24/E7 VIO MAINT 97-14-05 NRC SSFi: Procedural guidance inconsistent for backfilling/ draining level instrument 1 234 5 reference legs. VIO identified for failure to provide an adequate procedure for calibration of reactor vessel instrument for reduced inventory operation, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Last step in procedure invalidated calibration A OOOOO by adjusting to meet tygon tube level. Inspection Report 98-06 dated 7/20/98 8 OOOOO documented closure of violation 97-14-05. Surveillance and instrument calculation procedures were revised, to include compensatKm for density effects from O OOO temperature and boration conditions. 10/24/97 VIO MAINT 97-14-04 NRC SSFl: Failure to test high pressure injection valves 23,24,25 and 26 power selector 1 234 5 switches adequately, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. Were not in a surveillance. Inspection Report 97-19 dated 1/29/99 documented closure of violation 97-14-04. The appropriate Survei!!ance Procedure was revised to include testing of A OOOOO these HPI vaives when they are powered from their attemate power supply. B OOOOO c0 000 10/24/97 Negative MAINT IR 97-14 NRC SSFl: A weakness was identified for not performing vibration monitoring of the 1 234 5 Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System pump motor cooling fans. A 00000 g00000 cO 000 FRCQ4: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 26 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 10/24S 7 Negative ENG IR 97+14 NRC SSFl: A negative observation was identified for the marginal valve stroke 1 234 5 acceptance criteria for Makeup Valve-257. Adjustment of maximum stroke time to meet ASME Section XI requirements left minknal testing margin. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 10/24S 7 Weakness ENG IFl 97-14-03 LICENSEE SSFl: Open item was identified to ensure that all required ASME Section XI valve 1 234 5 testing would be completed as required. Also, a weakness identified for not identifying all valve testing as needed to meet ASME Section XI program. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 10/24/97 Negative MAINT iR 97-14 NRC SSFl: Material condition of the makeup and purification and decay heat systems in 1 234 5 the Auxiliary Building was generally adequate. Material condition & housekeeping in the Reactor Building (RB) were poor. RB repainting in progress but rnuch remains for next Refueling Outage. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10/24/97 Negative SAOV IR 97-14 NRC SSFl: in self-assessment process, resolution of Precursor Card 97-3449 failed to 1 234 5 characterize the scope of the deficiencies with thread engagements on High Pressure injection valves adequately- A OOOOO B 00000 c0 000 10/24S 7 VIO ENG 97-14-02 NRC SSFl: A corrective action violation of 10 CFR 50, Apperxxx B, Criterion XVI was 1 234 5 ident6ed for failing to install stem protectors on Makeup Valve (MUV)-58 and MUV-73 actuators when the condition was identified in March 1996. Inspection Report 98-04, dated 6/8/98, documented closure of violation 97-14-02. Valve stem covers A OOOOO were installed on a!! safety-related and Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valves. B OOOOO in addition, the appropriate Compliance Procedure was revised to prevent further similar occurrences. O OOO 1Cf24/97 Weakness MAINT IR 97-14 NRC SSFl: Weakness identified for not adequately maintaining the heat trace system and 1234 5 inappropriately voiding work requests. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 g g g y nt~~my FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 27 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 8/31/98 Positive Uc Amendment 170; NRC The NRR staff noted that the quality of this submittal was good and required no 1 234 5 NRC ltr dated August 31 additional information or darification. Licensee submittal was a license amendment 1998 request to change reactor coolant pump flywheel requirements. A OOOOO sD0000 cO 000 8/1/98 Negative OPS tR 98-07 NRC A discrepancy with the licensee's implementation of reactor vendor owners group 1 234 5 guidance for reactor coolant pump restart following a boron dilution event was determined to be an isolated occurrence of poor Emergency Operating Procedure A OOOOO sO0DOO cO B00 8/1/98 Negative OPS IR 98-07 NRC Reliability of the plant computer remains poor and continues to present challenges to 1 234 5 the operators. Modification and upgrade of the current system is in progress. Although corrective actions for previous computer malfunctions did not aid in waming of a subsequent computer display problem, operators alertly detected the A OOOOO problem during a power increase. B OOOOO cO 000 7/30/98 Positive Uc. Amendment 169; NRC Prompt notification to the NRR staff of the potential condition and timely submittal of 1 234 5 NRC letter dated Ju'y 30, a thorough request permitted this amendment request to be processed under non-1998 emergency conditions. Ucensee submittal was an exigent license amendment request regarding steam generator tube end anomalies. A OOOOO s00000 cO 000 7/14/98 Positive SAQV NRC Letter dated 7/14/98 NRC FPC actions in response to a non-conformance (which included en engineering 1 234 5 assessment of the structuralintegrity of the Decay Heat Sea Water (RW) piping in support of relief request 98-001-RR) were in accordance with applicable NRC requirements. Ucensee promptly prepared and submitted a relief request for a pin-A OOOOO hole leak in RW system piping even though repairs were completed as soon as parts B OOOOO were available. Repairs were completed before NRC could start the review of the request. O OOO 6/2E!98 Strength MAINT 1R 98-05 NRC System engineers demonstrated excellent knowledge of their systems, were 1 234 5 proactive in corrective actions, and had a good understanding of the Maintenance Rule requirements and how to apply the Rule to their systems. This area was considered a strength. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 28 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE I ast Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE ' TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 3/21/98 Positive SAQV tR 98-03 LICENSEE The licensee was effectively addressing identified problems in their engineering 1 234 5 organization. They implemented a department reorganization to improve oversight of deficient areas and beorporate new and broadened functions, such as integration of design changes into the configuration documents. They also implemented an AOOOOO improvement plan that stressed self-assessment and clearly delineated individual B OOOOO accountability for each problem area. The inspectors concluded the licensee was being proactive in attempting to improve engineering performance. O OOO { 3/21/98 _ Negative OPS tR 98-03 NRC A lack of procedure guidance for an attemative Technical Specification surveillance 1 234 5 methodology if computer display points were lost was identified early in the inspection period by the licensee. However, they have yet to develop the required backup procedures to be taken on a loss of the computer monitoring capability. AOOOOO Points included parameters such as reactor coolant system (RCS) T-hot, core flood tank level, and RCS flow. B DOOOO O OOO ! 3G1/98 Weakness CPS IR 98-03 NRC Administrative controls for the plant computers were inadequate. Engineering 1 234 5 routinety performed various operations on this system without the use of procedures and without documenting the actioris taken. Poor configuration controls contributed to a system function monitor being disabled which directly impacted the inability to A OOOOO detect a loss of data input to required Technical Specification alarm functions. (See entry 964 for VIO 98-03-01) B DOOOO , c0 0OO 3G1/98 Negative OPS IR 98-03 NRC The licensee has experienced several integrated control system problems, some of 1 234 5 which have caused plant transients that were handled well by operators. However, a lack of aggressive and coordinated response to the problems has delayed a final comprehensive resolution to these issues. A OOOOO OOO . I cO DOO l 3/9/98 MISC OPS License Amendment 165 LICENSEE Modif. to Reactor Building Recirculation system Fan Cooler (RBFC) motor starting 1 234 5 logic to ensure only one of the three fan coolers would automatically operate upon initiation of a Reactor Btdg. Isolation and Cooling signal, to preclude Service Water system overheating. Final resolution of Restart Design Issue and open GL 91-18 A OOOOO Justification for Continued Operation. Two fans used to start but could remove too B OOOOO much heat from Reactor Bldg. and overload Service Water system, impacting other cooled components. O OOO 2/7/98 Negative OPS IR 98-01 NRC During open restart issue review involving implementing changed setpoints, it was 1 234 5 noted that required procedure changes had not been completed following the calculation upgrados. The needed individual procedures were not being tracked as mode restraints until the inspector questioned it. Considered poor tracking of AOOOOO necessary restart restrictions B OOOOO c8 000 2/7/98 Negative OPS IR 98-01 NRC Boron Precipitation admin controls and hardware modifications were insta!!ed which 1 234 5 adequately address License Condition 2.C(11), described in Lic. Amendment 164. Thermocouples to detect flow in large pipes (replacing old ultrasonic detectors) had been classified as inoperable based on acceptance enteria in draft procedure A OOOOO revision. Eng. determined that acceptance criteria were irrorrect, demonstrating deficiencies during procedure revision review. B OOOOO O OOO FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 31 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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l l DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES ! 2/7/98 NCV ENG 96-01-05 UCENSEE Ucensee failed to promptly correct seismic qualification concem with NuPro valves - 1 234 5 ! inadequate corrective achons to ensure a!! NuPro RL3 relief valves removed or prevented from being used in plant. Several valves subsequently found insta led in the plant. F.xtent of condition review for earlier Precursor Card focused too narrowly A OOOOO and peJv.Jee poor regarding prior resolution of the problem, identified in B OOOOO September 1997. No action ultimately required other then upgrading seismic qualification paperwork, though. 0 0OO 2/7/98 Weakness OPS tR 98-01 NRC Modification process did not support accurate procedure and plant equipment 1 234 5 control changes. Open item tracking was informal, scattered in various programs. Modification retum to service and procedure impact screening processes were weaknesses. Format of modification retum to service packages poor and informal, A OOOOO which did not support performance of detailed and quality reviews by Operations. B OOOOO Numerous problems identifed by NRC and licensee. O OOO 2/7/98 Positive ENG IR 98-01 LICENSEE Licensee was effectively addressing some identified problems in their modification 1 9 34 5 processes. They were applying more conservabve mgmt. expectations to longstanding inappropriate practices with generic modifications and control of temporary configur. changes. Management eliminated generic rrod. process and A OOOOO temporary power process that bypassed temporary mod. controls. B OOOOO cO 900 2/7/98 NCV SAOV 98-01-04 LICENSEE The licensee was over one year late in submitting a required report of improved 1 234 5 Technical Specification Bases changes. A 00000 g00000 cO 000 1/30/98 VIO ENG 98-02-09 NRC During piggyback mode of High Pressure injection (HPI) pumps, Low Pressure 1 234 5 Injection valves would need to operate in a severely throttled condition. The valves were not designed for throttling and were not throttled during piggyback testing, which was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control. A OOOOO Licensee had insufficient data to certify HPl pumps and other components for long B OOOOO term post-accident operation. O OOO 1/30/98 MISC ENG URI 98-02-08 NRC The single failure limitation associated with the Low Pressure injection crossover 1 234 5 mode of long te rn core cooling and the normally closed positioning cf low pressure injection system injection valves, requires further NRC evaluation. Licensee had deleted procedural guidance for crossover line use on two previous occasions. A OOOOO Licensee had failed to enact appropriate, timely corrective actions to known design B OOOOO "S-
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cO OOO 1/30/98 Negative ENG tR 98-02 NRC Mission dose evaluation and validations for Reactor Building purge activities was 1 234 5 inadequate (see VtO 98-02-01). Also error in design process for not revising affected rnission dose calculations when Core Operating Umits Report was revised each A OOOOO sODOOO cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 33 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC. SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 1/30/98 VIO SAQV 98-02-06 NRC A number of recently issued calculations supporting Emergency Operating 1 234 5 Procedure actions were inadequate, and a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11. Quality Assurance Program. Other recent;y issued calculations contained errors or weaknesses, but conclusions were valid. The type of A OOOOO inadequacies and errors identified indicated a lack of attention to detail in checking B OOOOO and verifying calculations. O OOO 1/30/98 MISC OPS Conf. Action Letter (2 NRC Confirmatory Achon Letter (CAL) Closure isssued by Ril authorizing restart of CR3. 1 234 5 001) Closure 5 issues identified in the CAL have been satisfactorily addressed. Licensee will confer with NRC before proceeding above 50 percent and 90 percent power plateaus. A OOOOO OOOOO c0 000 1/27/98 MISC ENG License Amendment 164 SELF lssued to delete requirement for installation and testing of flow indicators in the 1 234 5 emergency core cooling system to provide indication of 40 gpm flow for boron dilution. Thermocouples added to Decay Heat system drop and Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray lines, capable of detecting flow initiation. Was condition 2.C.5 which could A OOOOO never be met with previous ultrasonic instrument accuracy (couldn't detect 40 gpm in B OOOOO a ten-inch pipe - 40 gpm had no technical basis). O OOO 1/24/98 MISC OPS License Amendment 163 SELF Technical Specifcation (TS) changes on Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident 1 234 5 mitigation Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) upgrade and EDG load rejection test and steady state loads (TS Change Request Notice 210) issued for one operating cycle. Significant integrated resolution to complex interrelated accident mitigation A OOOOO problems. B OOOOO cO 000 1/9/98 Negative SAOV URI 97-12-07 eel 98 NRC Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Inspection: Recent change to FSAR on 1 234 5 07(EA 98-109) Low Pressure injection (LPI) long term core cooling (use of LPi crossover line) anconsistent with topical reports. FSAR change not identified as Unreviewed Safety Question. During two periods since initial licensing no procedural guidance existed A OOOOO to use the LPI crossover line with flow split between the two LPI lines to mitigate the B OOOOO consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident. Also, UFSAR inconsistent with topical reports. Elimination of LPI crossover feature from UFSAR and EOPs not recognized O OOO as USO since part of 50.46 topical reports, and an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59. After Enforcement Conference, apparent violation withdrawn since r'ot a USO, although was considered a poor original 50.50 review because not att information considered. 1W98 NCV ENG 97-12-10 LICENSEE EOP inspection: Wiring error in the control room heating and ventilation system. 1 234 5 Licensee taking appropriate corrective actions. Engineered Safeguards function of system not affected. Noted by an operator on the simulator when switch differed from control room operation. A OOOOO B OOOOO c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 34 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 1/9/98 MISC ENG URI 97-12-05 NRC EOP inspectiort Low Pressure injection valves were maintained normally closed per 1 234 5 FSAR. However, licensee committed to maintain valves normally open and update the FSAR accordingly, per letter dated 1/13/76, prior to initial licensing. These actions were never accomplished. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 9/9/98 VIO ENG 97-12-08 NRC EOP impm. tic 6. The makeup pumps used for Emergency Core Cooling System 1 234 5 High Pressure injection were not purchased to specifications commensurate to the duty to be incurred during a postulated post-accident Loss of Coolant Accident. This violated 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Critenon IV, Procurement Document Control. A OOOOO Purchase order specified one day of post-accident operation. Design basis is 30 B OOOOO d Y cO OOO 1/9/98 MISC SAQV URI 97-12-06 NRC EOP ?nspscoon: During at est two time periods, no procedural guidance existed to 1 23 4 5 use Low Pressure injection (LPI) crossover line with flow split between the two LPl lines to mitigate consequeness of a Loss of Coolant Accident. Procedures had been deleted, but crossover line rernained listed as mitigation strategy in Final Safety A OOOOO Analysis Report. B OOOOO c0 000 1/9/98 VIO SAQV 97-12-05 NRC EOP Inspection: Known calculational inadequacies (issued prior to 1995) not 1 234 5 corrected in EOP set point calculations and occasionally, did not contain enough info to enable a technically qualihed person to review / understand analyses / verify adequacy of results. Although small sample size reviewed, calculations issued in A OOOOO 1997 to support EOP set points were far better. This was a violation of ANSI B OOOOO 45.2.11,1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants. O OOO 1/3/98 MISC SAQV IR 97-19 NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-06 concems adequately resolved. Unique solution 1 234 5 implemented by expansion chamber design. GL intent fully embraced. However, restart issue closure pkgs occasionally poorly organized compilations of raw data not ef'ectively justifying safety concem resolution. Another example of a previously A OOOOO observed problem with corrective action not being driven by a precursor card in the B OOOOO corrective acticn system. O OOO 1/3/98 ED SAQV IR 97-19 NCV 97-21-01 NRC High Pressure injection Re '. utation (Restart Design issue D-1) adequately 1 234 5 LER 97 08 modified and tested to resolve issue. However, test procedure not issued in time for adequate reviews. Test safety assessment (SA) erroneously assumed plant conditions not required by test, issued 12 days pre-test issuance & contained errors A OOOOO in Low Trmperature Over Pressurization (LTOP) parameters. SA problems B OOOOO considered as similar example to VIO 97-17-01 which licensee is in the process of correcting. O OOO 1/3/98 MISC OPS IR 97-19 LICENSEE Post rnodification testing for EDG 1 A power uprate successfully completed. 1 234 5 Deficiencies in the control of grease in the bearings for the radiator drive shaft were identified but were corrected prior to retuming the diesel to operation. Bearin9 problems didn't impact previous operability. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 35 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 10G4/97 Positive OPS IR 97-14 SELF SSFl: System Readiness Reviews were of good quality & well organized, with 1 234 5 appropriate assurance that restart issues were being addressed. System Engineers' knowledge of decay heat and Makeup Systems was good. Sensitivity to initiation of Precursor Cards was good. A OOOOO B OOOOO cO 000 10/24/97 VIO ENG 97-14-13 NRC SSFl: A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requirements was 1234 5 identified. Licensee failed to take adequate correctivo actions to identify and correct the design weaknesses associated with the adequacy of the past 10 CFR 50.59 review for positioning of Decay Heat Valve (DHV)-34 and DHV-35 during normal A OOOOO operation. Suction valves to C.' cay Heat pumps from Borated Water Storage Tank - B OOOOO changed to normally closed valves in 1985. Problem raised in 1996 PC but not resolved. O OOO , 10/24/97 Negative ENG IR 97-14 NRC SSFl:The Engineering Design Basis Documents and the FSAR were adequate for 1 234 5 the selected systems; however, one discrepancy was noted in the FSAR regarding required operator action for a High Pressure injection line break sma!I break Loss of cooiant ment A OOOOO sOOOOO cO 000 10G4S7 Positive ENG IR 97-14 LICENSEE SSFl: The licensee had a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model and had 1 234 5 changed an Emergency Operating Procedure based on PSA information. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 10/24/97 Negative MAINT 1R 97-14 NRC SSFl: Two negative observations: 1) Problems with attention to detail while 1 234 5 performing surveillance testing , and 2) Lack of a pump and valve trending program. A 80000 s00000 cO 000 10/24/97 MISC ENG URI 97-14-12 NRC SSFl: An Unresolved ftem was identified for NRC review of the licensee response to 1 234 5 Generic Letter 88-17 associated with reduced inventory operation. Question involves lack of two independent piping taps for Reactor Coolant System level. A OOOOO B 00000 c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 41 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 10/24/97 VIO ENG 97-14-11 LER 97-36-00 NRC SSFl: A violation was identified for overload relays not installed as automatic reset 1 234 5 as stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Cnterion lit. Thermal overload relays for Makeup Pump (MUP) system High Pressure injection (HPI) valves (MUV-24,25,26) were not set in the automatic reset A OOOOO mode of operation, contrary to FSAR. Relays set in manual reset mode since B OOOOO original modification install; requirement for automatic reset mode in FSAR but not included in modification. Violation 97-14-11 was closed and documented in CO OOO Inspection Report 98-03, dated 4/8/98. Motor control centers were examined by the licensee, and overload relays were adjusted for the affected valves. To prevent further recurrence, all Emergency Core Coo!ing System electncal drawings were being reviewed and overload relays were being adjusted, as necessary. I'.47 MISC ENG URI 97-14-09 NRC SSFl: An Unresolved item was identified for NRC evaluation of the acceptability of 1 234 5 the makeup (MU) system trains crosstied without the ability to remotely isolate the trains. Discharge of MU pumps cross connected - one isolation valve has power removed for Appendix R concem. A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 10/24/97 MISC ENG URI 97-14-08 NRC SSFl: Item opened for NRC evaluation of the acceptability of thermal expansion 1 234 5 chambers for containment penetration line modification. Part of FPC Generic Letter 96-06 response modifications. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 10/24/97 ED MAINT NCV 97-21-01 LER 97- LICENSEE Following calibration, the Reactor Building Spray System pressure switches and 1 234 5 37-00 transmitters had not been adequately leak tested (at a pressure equal to or greater than the analyzed peak Design Basis Accident pressure for containment)in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. FPC failed to recognize penetrations A OOOOO required for post-maintenance leak testing, and the potential containment breach B OOOOO caused by removal of instrument lines. O OOO 10/16/97 ED ENG NCV 97-21-01 LER 97- LICENSEE A design error resulted in the inability to provide automatic reactor coolant system 1 234 5 35-00 inventory makeup during a postulated Appendix R event (Loff of Offsite Power (LOOP) and fire in control room). Durring Appendix R fire with LOOP, tose air to Makeap Valve MUV-31 (normal MU valve) and control power to High Presure A OOOOO injection line valves. Fixed by changing latter power supplies. B OOOOO c3 000 7pgggwwwq 6/20/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The temporary relocation of the protected area boundary to support removal of the 1 234 5 Technical Support Center for a construction project was verified to be done we!!. Compensatory measures were established and effective to ensure no decrease in security effectiveness per 10 CFR 50.54(p). The controls for accessing individuals in A OOOOO an emergency were observed during an Emergency Plan drill through a temporary B OOOOO gate and were considered appropriate and sufficient. O OOO FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 42 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 6/20/98 Negative IR 98-06 NRC The licensee's Emergency Plan drill on May 27,1998 was successful in 1 234 5 a-iv;hJag it's training objective. However, conversations took place without the Emergency Coordinator's knowledge or awareness that could have resulted in the loss of relevant information to help in decision making. Also, suspension of A OOOOO safeguards controls was not well understood by drill participants outside of the B OOOOO Security organization. cO OOO 6/20/98 Negative SAOV IR 98-06 NRC During review of the licensee's corrective actions for a violation of contamination 1 234 5 control procedures, the inspector noted that
- lessons leamed" from the problem were not self-critical. The licensee's Health Physics organization did not accept responsibi5ty for the problem and a root cause was not identified. These were A OOOOO considered poor corrective actions. B OOOOO cO 000 EG/98 VIO 98-04-04 NRC Per 10 CFR 50.54(p)(1), a violation was identified when Revision 13 of the Physical 1234 5 Security Plan decreased the effectiveness of the security plan and was not submitted to the NRC. Licensee didn't recognize decrease in effectiveness. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 5/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Both passive and active bamers of the Vehicle Barrier System were in place and 1 234 5 operational as required by the Physical Security Plan.
A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 Ef998 MISC IR 98-04 NRC The inspector determined that additional administrative duties assigned to 1 234 5 Secondary Alarm Station operators did not impede their responsibility to rnonitor the alarm response activities of the Central Alarm Station. A OOOOO B 00000 cO BOO 1 5/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Records reviewed by the inspector reflected that the licensee was in compliance with 1 234 5 10 CFR 73.56(e) security regulations and implementing procedures for appeal rights of individuals denied unescorted security access. A OOOOO B 00000 c0 000 SS/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Radioactive waste and radioactive material shipping papers were property 1 234 5 completed. Documentation and corrective actions for Health Physics and Chemistry related program problems were adequate and improving. A lower threshold for initiating items in the corrective action system was observed and developed A OOOOO corrective actions were more comprehensive. B OOOOO cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 43 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 5/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC No adverse trends were antified in the Annual Radiological Effluent Report and all 1 234 5 effluents were well within lirnits. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 5/9/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Overall, the plant water chemistry for primary and secondary water systems was 1 234 5 being maintained well below the applicable Technical Specifications and procedure limits. A OOOOO s00000 cO 000 5/9/98 Negative IR 98-04 NRC The inspector concluded that although the chemistry activities were performed in 1 234 5 accordance with procedures and in each case the desired results were obtained, a lack of attention to detailin the chemistry procedure
- was observed- A OOOOO g00000 c3 000 3"21/98 Positive PLT SUP IR 98-03 NRC The inspectors concluded the licensee's quartetty emergency drill was an effective 1 234 5 training exercise, and the recent renovations to the Technical Support Center significantly improved the flow of information to dritt participants- A OOOOO g00000 cO 900 3/21/98 Positive ENG IR 98-03 NRC Several inspector reviews concluded that the licensee had adequate detection 1 234 5 capability and was adequately monitoring and trending intermit'ent transients in indicated pnmary to secondary leakage in the B steam generator by several different A OOOOO s000OO cO 000 3/21/98 VIO ENG 98-03-04 NRC Calibration frequencies for the containme' ; nigh range radiation rnonitors were 1 234 5 conducted in accordance with requirerr..nts. However, the failure to conduct in situ special calibrations by electronic signal 5 ALL of the required ranges as committed to in the post-TMI March 14,1983 Order aix! NUREG 0737, Table fl.F.1-3, was A OOOOO identified as a violation. Licensee was only checking 4 of the seven decade ranges B OOOOO above 10 rem / hour O OOO 3/21/98 Negative MAINT IR 98-03 NRC Examples of poor housekeeping practices were identified for Radiation Monitoring 1 234 5 System equipment. Tools and supplies were found routinely stored in the radiation rnonitor cabinets. A CCCCC B 00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 44 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES . 3/21/98 VIO PLT SUP 98-0342 NRC A violation was identified for failure to label an outside storage shield cask (OSSC) 1 234 5 wotai,-A 9 radwaste in accordance wih 10 CFR 201904(a) requirements to have a VISIBLE label. A label was affixed but was totally obscured when the container was repositioned, inspection Report 9846 dated 7/20/98 documented closure of VIO 98-A OOOOO 03-02. Corrective actions included: 1) Placing another radioactive material label on B OOOOO the subject OSSC and adjacent OSSC; 2) Writing a Health Physics Supervisor information notice regarding visibility of container labels; 3) Covering the violation O OOO and corrective actions taken in continuing training; 4) Modifying appropriate Health Physics procedure; and 5) Developing a document standard covering area posting and container labeling practices. T18/98 Negative PLT SUP IR 98-03 NRC Negative findings were identified for verifying liquid sample volume eccuracy, for 1234 5 determining liquid waste tank volumes released, and for effluent release equipment reliability during observation of February 18,1998, Waste Discharge Tank re! eases. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 2R/98 NCV PLT SUP 98-01-09 LICENSEE Failure to perform radiation protection general employee training walk-through in the 1 234 5 Radiation Control Area. This was reviewed by NRC Office of Investigations. A 00000 B 00000 cO 000 1/3/98 NCV PLT SUP 97-19-05 LICENSEE Identified for failure to compensate for a security zone in access mode. Zone not 1 234 5 manua!!y 'estored by Central Alarm System (CAS) operator after testing. A 80000 B 00000 cO 000 1/3/98 NCV PLT SUP 97-19-04 LICENSEE Identified for failure to have a protected barrier in place. Closure of Licensee Event 1 234 5 Report (LER) 97-S01 on circulating water system waterbox breach. A 00000 8 00000 c0 000 1/3/98 NCV PLT SUP 97-19-03 NRC identified for failure to rescreen Fitness for Duty personnel under provisions of 10 1 234 5 CFR 26. A 00000 B 00000 c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 45 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER $6-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 12/12/97 MISC ENG IR 97-18 LICENSEE Resolution to control heat buildup and use of attemative cooling in the Control 1 23 4 5 Building complex was satisfactory and should provide sufficient cooling for safety related components to meet Appendix R requirements. A OOOOO B 0000O cO 000 12/12/97 Positive PLT SUP IR 97-18 NRC Installation of MECATISS electncal raceway fire barrier was of high quality and met 1 234 5 Appendix R requirements. Installed to replace ThermcFlag. A 0G000 g00000 cO 000 12/12/97 MISC ENG IR 97-18 LICENSEE Completion of the modif cation work associated with rewiring the circuits for 26 Motor 1 234 5 Operated Valves ( MOVs) would place the facility into compliance with intent of Information Notice 92-18 and would adequately resolve hot short concems. Work scheduled to be completed prior to restart, and was being tracked.16 MOVs A OOOOO needed for hot shutdown,10 others for cold shutlown. B OOOOO cO 000 12/12/97 MISC ENG IR 97-18 NRC The licensee had implemented extensive corrective action to correct the design 1 234 5 , errors regarding hot shorts with remote shutdown circuits that resulted in operation outside the design basis of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. A OOOGO eD0000 c0 000 12/12/97 Positive ENG IR 97-18 NRC The licensee's corrective action, including modifications and repairs to the Reactor 1 234 5 Coolant Pump (RCP) oil collection system, was sufficient to place the RCP oil collection system in compliance with Appendix R requirements. This was final closure of long-term issue. Licensee significantly reduced RCP oil leakage and A OOOOO upgraded oil collection system. B OOOOO c0 000 12/12/97 MISC PLT SUP IR 97-18 LICENSEE A complete reassessment of Appendix R fire protection requirements was 1 234 5 completed, and appropriate actions were being taken to revise the Fire Study and Procedures. All of the required independent assessment restart issues completed or scheduled for completion prior to restart, except for several items related to A OOOOO documentation issues. B OOOOO c0 000 12/12/97 Positive ENG IR 97-18 NRC Effective Appendix R corrective action program with sufficient personnel with good 1 234 5 knowledge assigned to resolve identified discrepancies. Good Engineering documents developed. Unit will be ready for restart when issues on Restart Mode Restraint Report complete. This was the main overview conclusion of NRC 4 OOOOO Appendix R inspection. B OOOOO c0 000 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/98 Page 47 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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CRYSTAL RIVER 16-Nov-98 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES SMM Template Codes: SALP Functional Areas: ID Code: 1A ERATION PERFORMANCE 4 brmal Operations [; OPERATION PERFORMANCE -t perations LICENSEE 3ENSEE 1B ENGDuring Transients l ENGINEERING NRC 1C joPERATION PERFORMANCE - F cograms and Processes MAINT SELF lNRC fMAINTENANCE :SELF-REVEALED 2A jMATERIAL CONDITION - Equipment Condition OPS : OPERATIONS 28 i MATERIAL CONDITION Programs and Processes PLT SU PLANT SUPPORT 3A jHUMAN PERFORMANCE - Work Performance SAOV , SAFETY ASSESSMENT & OV 38 ! HUMAN PERFORMANCE - KSA 3C [ HUMAN PERFORMANCE-Work Environment 4A ' ENGINEERING / DESIGN - Design 48 ENGINEERING / DESIGN - Engineering Support 4C jENGINEERING/ DESIGN - Programs and Processes SA PROBLEf)I IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Identification 58 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Analysis SC ! PROBLEM IDENT!FICATION & SOLUTION - Resolution Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference. URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made. { FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 11/16/96 Page 49 of 49 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 8/31/98
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