IR 05000302/2013002
| ML13114A326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/2013 |
| From: | Rich D NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3 |
| To: | Hobbs T Progress Energy Florida |
| References | |
| IR-13-002 | |
| Download: ML13114A326 (19) | |
Text
April 24, 2013
SUBJECT:
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000302/2013002
Dear Mr. Hobbs:
On March 31, 2013, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 15, 2013, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Daniel W. Rich, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000302/2013002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket No.:
50-302
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
Facility:
Crystal River Unit 3
Location:
Crystal River, FL
Dates:
January 1, 2013 - March 31, 2013
Inspectors:
N. Childs, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Sowa, Farley Senior Resident Inspector
Approved by:
Daniel Rich, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000302/2013002; 01/01/2013-03/31/2013; Crystal River Unit 3; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Crystal River Unit 3 began the inspection period in No Mode with the full core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool. The unit remained in this condition for the remainder of the inspection period.
On February 5, 2013, Progress Energy Florida (a subsidiary of Duke Energy) publically announced their intent to retire Crystal River Unit 3. On February 20, 2013, Florida Power Corporation, the licensee, certified the permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13056A005). The NRC acknowledged the licensees certification of permanent fuel removal by a letter dated March 13, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Adverse Weather Condition
a. Inspection Scope
==
On February 26, 2013, the inspectors evaluated the licensees response to a tornado watch. The licensee implemented emergency management procedure EM-220, Violent Weather, for the tornado watch. The inspectors walked down outside areas and reviewed operator logs and EM-220 documentation to ensure required actions were implemented. This constituted one sample of impending adverse weather protection activities.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. The tornado watch expired with no violent weather or tornado formation near the site.
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Equipment Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors performed walkdowns of the critical portions of selected trains to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine the correct system and power alignments, and the required positions of select valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact mitigating system availability. The inspectors verified the following two partial system alignments through system walkdowns. Documents used to facilitate the system walkdowns are listed in the attachment.
- emergency diesel generator EGDG-1A and A train 4160V engineered safeguards (ES) bus while EGDG-1B was out of service
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
==
.1 Fire Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant to assess the licensees implementation of the fire protection program. The inspectors checked that the areas were free of transient combustible material and other ignition sources. Also, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and compensatory measures for fire protection problems were verified. The inspectors checked fire suppression and detection equipment to determine whether conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the function of the equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on the equipment necessary to support spent fuel pool cooling. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the requirements of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.8, Plant Fire Protection Program, were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. The inspectors toured the following three areas important to safety:
- auxiliary building sea water pump room
- A and B train 4160V ES switchgear rooms
- spent fuel pool floor
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On February 1, 2013, the inspectors observed the licensees fire brigade response to a simulated fire. The drill involved a fire in the A step-up transformer area. The inspectors checked the brigades communications, ability to set up and execute fire operations, and their use of fire-fighting equipment. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee considered the aspects as described below when the brigade conducted the firefighting activities and during the post drill critique. The inspectors attended the drills post-drill critique to verify that the licensees drill acceptance criteria were met and that any discrepancies were discussed and resolved. Administrative instruction AI-2205, Administration of CR-3 Fire Brigade Organization and Duties of the Fire Brigade, was reviewed to ensure that acceptance criteria were evaluated and deficiencies were documented and corrected. This activity completes one sample representing observation of selected fire drills. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. The inspectors observed that:
- The brigade, including the fire team leader, had a minimum of five members.
- Members set out designated protective clothing and properly donned gear.
- SCBAs were available and properly used.
- Fire brigade leader had copies of the pre-fire plans.
- Brigade leader maintained control: members were briefed, discussed plan of attack, received individual assignments, and completed communications checks. Plan of attack discussions were consistent with pre-fire plans.
- Fire brigade arrived at the fire scene in a timely manner, taking the appropriate access route specified in the strategies and procedures.
- Control and command was set up near the fire scene and communications were established with the control room and the fire brigade members.
- Fire hose lines reached all necessary fire hazard locations, were laid out without flow constrictions, and were simulated as being charged with water.
- The fire area was entered in a controlled manner following the two person rule.
- The fire brigade brought sufficient fire-fighting equipment to the scene to properly perform its fire-fighting duties.
- The fire-fighting plan strategies were utilized.
- The drill scenario was followed, and the drill acceptance criteria were met.
- All firefighting equipment was returned to a condition of readiness.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures
Internal Flood Protection
a. Inspection Scope
==
The Inspectors reviewed FSAR Chapter 2.4.2.4, Facilities Required for Flood Protection, and the design basis documents that depict protection for areas containing safety-related equipment to identify areas that may be affected by internal flooding. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. A walkdown of the B train decay heat removal (DHR) and building spray (BS) vault was conducted to ensure that flood protection measures were in accordance with design specifications. Specific plant attributes that were checked included structural integrity, sealing of penetrations, and operability of sump systems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification and Performance
==
.1 Requalification Activities
a. Inspection Scope
On January 15, 2013, the inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator crew response and actions for licensed operator simulator evaluated session CPE-0060C, that included equipment failures resulting in the inadvertent closure of two B-train once-through steam generator (OTSG) main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), a manual reactor trip, failure of two control rod groups to insert, a B-train OTSG tube leak, a letdown cooler tube leak, and a service water (SW) suction header pipe leak. The plant degraded to a point where the crew entered an Unusual Event emergency declaration.
The inspectors observed the operators use of the following procedures: emergency operating procedures EOP-02, Vital System Status Verification, EOP-05, Excessive Heat Transfer, and EOP-06, Steam Generator Tube Rupture; and abnormal procedures AP-510, Rapid Power Reduction, and AP-520, Loss of RCS Coolant or Pressure.
The operators actions were verified to be in accordance with the procedures mentioned above. Event classification and notifications were verified to be in accordance with emergency management procedure EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator. The simulator instrumentation and controls were verified to closely parallel those in the actual control room. The inspectors attended the crew critique and evaluation to verify the licensee had entered any adverse conditions into the corrective action program. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes related to crew performance:
- clarity and formality of communication
- ability to take timely action to safely control the unit
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- correct use and implementation of abnormal, emergency operating, and emergency plan implementing procedures
- control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
- oversight and direction provided by supervision, including ability to identify and implement appropriate technical specification actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan classification and notification
- overall crew performance and interactions
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Control Room Observations
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance in the main control room during an intake bus fire on January 14, 2013. Inspectors reviewed the licensees emergency plan implementing procedure EM-216, Duties of the Fire Brigade, and abnormal procedure AP-880, Fire Protection. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Inspectors focused on the following conduct of operations as appropriate:
- Operator compliance and use of procedures
- Communication between crew members
- Use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications and alarms
- Use of human error prevention techniques
- Supervision of activities
- Crew status updates
This activity constitutes completion of one control room observation inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the licensees effectiveness in performing routine maintenance activities for the spent fuel pool cooling (SF) system. A review of system condition reports (CRs) and work orders (WOs) initiated over the previous two-year period was also performed. The review included an assessment of the licensees practices associated with the identification, scope, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as common cause failure evaluations and the resolution of historical equipment problems. The inspectors verified that maintenance rule performance criteria were properly monitored and that the 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) system classification was justified in light of the reviewed equipment condition. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors either observed or reviewed post-maintenance test results as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to verify whether:
- (1) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed,
- (2) acceptance criteria were clear, and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents,
- (3) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application,
- (4) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied, and
- (5) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The three post-maintenance tests reviewed are listed below:
- SP-354B, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel Generator EGDG-1B, after planned maintenance per WO 2113071
- SP-354A, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel Generator EGDG-1A, after planned maintenance per WOs 2038571, 2119957, and 1927198
- SP-334B, SFP-1B Quarterly Surveillance, after planned maintenance per WO 1972003
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
==1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Steam Generator Replacement Refueling Outage (RFO16)
==
a. Inspection Scope
On September 26, 2009, the unit was shutdown for a planned steam generator replacement refueling outage. The previous quarters NRC inspection activities in this area were documented in NRC integrated inspection report 05000302/2012005. During this quarter, the inspectors observed and monitored licensee controls over the refueling outage activities listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- outage related risk assessment monitoring
- controls associated with reactivity management of the spent fuel pool (SFP)
- controls associated with electrical and mechanical alignments for those systems used to support spent fuel pool cooling
- implementation of equipment clearances
- foreign material exclusion controls associated with the SFP
- work controls associated with the protection of SFP cooling and support systems from maintenance activities
b. Findings
No findings were identified
==1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors observed surveillance tests and reviewed the test results for the three surveillance tests listed below to verify that improved technical specifications (ITS)surveillance requirements were followed and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. Additionally, the inspectors verified that equipment was properly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted to ensure the equipment could perform its intended safety function following maintenance or as part of surveillance testing.
In-Service Tests:
- SP-334A, SFP-1A Quarterly Surveillance
- SP-375B, CHP-1B and Valve Surveillance
- SP-344B, RWP-2B, SWP-1B and Valve Surveillance
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Daily Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). This review was accomplished by attending daily plant status meetings, interviewing plant operators and applicable system engineers, and accessing the licensees computerized database.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in section 4OA2.1 above, plant status reviews, plant tours, and licensee trending efforts. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of October 2012 through March 2013, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the issue warranted. The review also included issues documented in various departmental CAP performance assessment & trend reports for the third and fourth quarters of 2012 and the November 2012 Plant Health Committee Site Focus List. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees corrective action program were reviewed for adequacy.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspectors evaluated the licensees trend methodology and observed that the licensee had performed adequate trending reviews and appropriately addressed identified trends within the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any new trends.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status reviews and inspection activities.
b.
Finding
No findings were identified.
.2 Steam Generator Replacement Project and Containment Repair (IP 50001)
a. Inspection Scope
During this quarter, the licensee performed limited field work associated with containment wall repair. The licensee monitored containment stability utilizing installed acoustic and displacement sensors. The data from the sensors was periodically reviewed by the inspectors to verify containment stability.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/187, Inspection of Near-Term Task
Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
As discussed in NRC integrated inspection report 05000302/2012004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12298A503), the inspectors accompanied the licensee on a sampling basis, during their flooding walkdowns, to verify that the licensees walkdown activities were conducted using the methodology endorsed by the NRC. These walkdowns were completed in the 3rd quarter 2012 inspection period and verified that the licensee confirmed the following flood protection features:
- external visual inspection of the flood protection feature was performed for indications of degradation that would prevent its credited function from being performed
- critical SSC dimensions were measured
- available physical margin was determined
- flood protection feature functionality was determined using either visual observation or by review of other documents
During the current inspection period, the inspectors independently performed their walkdown and verified that the following flood protection feature was in place:
- emergency diesel generator fuel storage tank vent pipes (Flood protection feature ID: URS-120)
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and issues identified in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, Item 2.g of Enclosure 4, were entered into the licensees corrective action program. In addition, issues identified in response to Item 2.g that could challenge risk significant equipment and the licensees ability to mitigate the consequences will be subject to additional NRC evaluation. This completes the inspection activities required by TI2515/187 and the TI is closed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 15, 2013, the inspection results were presented to Mr. Terry Hobbs, Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- T. Hobbs, Plant General Manager
- J. Huegel, Manager, Maintenance
- B. Wunderly, Director, Engineering
R, Wiemann, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- P. Dixon, Manager Training
- B. Foster, Manager, Operations
- D. Westcott, Supervisor, Licensing
- B. Akins, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- C. Bergstrom, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
- M. Kelly, Manager Outage and Scheduling
- R. Llewellyn, Superintendent Operations Training
NRC personnel
- D. Rich, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
- 05000302/2515/187 TI
Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns (Section 4OA5.3)
Discussed
None