ML20244E588

Insp Repts 50-369/89-11 & 50-370/89-11 on 890330-0421. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Followup on Previous Insp Findings

ML20244E588
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	06/05/1989
From:	Shymlock M, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20244E584	List: ML20244E582 ML20244E586 ML20244E588
References
50-369-89-11, 50-370-89-11, NUDOCS 8906200405
Download: ML20244E588 (8)

See also: IR 05000369/1989011

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA ST N.W. 4

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~ Report.Nos.: 50-369/89-11.and 50-370/89-11

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Licensee

Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street <

.. Charlotte,LNC 28242

Facility: Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

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H Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370

. License Nr>s.: NPF-9'and NPF-17.

Inspection tondu ted:~M rch 30, 1 89 - April 21, 1989-

Inspector:fs //d #/ .. f 7

-K. VanD6orn, Senior Resident Inspector aie Signed

Accompanying Inspectors:-

T. Cooper, Reactor Inspector

S. Vias, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: b II'f

R. B.. Shymlock, Section Chief /) Date Signed'

Division of Reactor Projects *

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations

safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities,

l 'and follow-up on previous inspection findings.

_.Resul ts : In the areas inspected, one violation was identified (see paragraph

7.b.) involving three instances of temporary loss' of' the Residual

Heat Removal system, on Unit'1. Procedural weaknesses contributed to

two events and an. inadequate drawing contributed to the other.

l System function was regained in a timely manner .in each case. The.

l unit was in mid-loop operation during the first of the three events.

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Several minor housekeeping discrepancies were also identified. (see

paragraph 3.c.)

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, , REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services

• 1. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling-

G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services

• T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager

• D. Murdock.-McGuire Design Engineering, Division Mv.ager

W. Reeside, Operations Engineer

• M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance

• R. Sharp, Compliance Manager

J. Snyder, Performance Engineer

• J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager

• A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman

B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations

R. White,_ Instrument and Electrical Engineer

Other licensec employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office

personnel.

• Attended exit interview

.2 . Unresolved Item:;

An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is

required to determine whether it is acceptahle or may involve a violation

or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.

3. Plant Ope' rations (71707, 71710)

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to

verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room

logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment

removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were

conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,

and performance personnel.

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at

shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as

prescribed .in applicable station administrative directives. The complement

of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required

by Technical Specifications.

Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not

limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2

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electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading t00ms, and the

station yard zone inside the protected area.

During - the- plent tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

equipment. status and radiation contrcl practices were observed. In

, addition the-. inspector conducted a ' detailed walkdown of the Diesel Air

(VG)' system on both units.

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a. Unit 1 Operations l

The unit was in mid-loop operation the entire period while testing

and evaluation of steam generator (SG) tubes centinued. Eddy Current

testing had been completed , t the end of the period, tube plugging

was in progress and laboratory analysis continusd of pulled tubes.

The projected on-line date was May 5, 1989.

b. Unit 2 Operations

Unit 2 began the period at 100% power. On April 6,1989 the unit was

manually tripped due to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) to

the C steam generator failing shut. The licensee identified a

ruptured feedback bellows asscciated with the valve positioner as the

cause of the valve failing shut. The ruptured bellows and bellows of

the some age on oth:r FRVs were replaced. The unit was back on-line

on April 7. The bellows is a metal part and had not been included in-

the preventive maintenance program. The unit ended the period at 60%

power for fuel conservation to support the upcoming refueling outage

scheduled to begin July 5.

c. On April 4 the inspector noted that the distribution damper for the

Control Room Ventilation Fan 2A was labeled "CR Vent Fan 2B Dis Damp

CR 0AD8". Also, the 2B fan damper was labeled "CR Vent Fan 2A Dis

Damp CR OAD7". The license 6 was notified and a followup inspection

disclosed that the damper labels were corrected. Several minor

housekeeping problems were noted in the Auxiliary Building which were

passed on to the licensee for corrective action. Two compressed gas

cylinders were r.oted whit.h had the " Firm Removal Date" marked over

and changed. The licensee indicated that this was not the intended

way to change dates. A wooden lead shielding support was noted at

column JJ56 on the 733-foot elevation with a housekeeping tag dated

10-6-86. Two scaffolds without scaffold or housekeeping tags were

noted near the component cooling system on the 750-foot elevation.

Also component cooling heat exchanger end covers were noted draped

over piping and the heat exchangers horizontal surface.

d. On March 10, 1989, the licensee questioned operability of the Control

Room Ventilation (VC/YC) system due to nori-seismically qualified

valve positioners on several YC and service water (RN) valves. The

positioner is located between a qualified solenoid and the valve

actuator. These valves fail open on a loss of air. The valves i

affected are 1YC54, 76, 113, 135, 148, 162, 176, 192, 204, 218, 232

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and 246 and IRN442, 445, 457 and 460. The licensee determined on

. April 6,1989 that the affected valves may not fail open during a

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-seismic event. A Justification for Continued Operation was

." documented and discussed with NRC on April 6,1989. The licensee

determined that sufficient time was available (30 minutes) to verify

valve positions using non-licensed operators (NL0s) if an earthquake

should occur. On April 7 the inspector physically observed the

valves in question and verified appropriate instructions had been

given to operations personnel. Since the valves were not all easily

accessible and were un three different elevations the inspector

verified that two NL0s had been assigned to the task. The inspector

verified later that the requirement to check the valves had been

incorporated into the earthquake procedure, RP/0/A/5700/07,

farthquake.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. SurveillanceTesting(61726)

Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the

nspector to ascertain procedural and performance acequacy and conformance

with applicable Technical Specificati.ons.

Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved

procedures were available and in use, that ' test equipment in use was

calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that systein v6storation was

completed and test results were adequate.

Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:

pROCE0VRE EQUIPMENT / TEST

TT/0/A/9100/301 Control Area Ventilation Restricted Intake

Test

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance Observations (62703)

The only maintenance activities reviewed during the period were regular

dis::ussions with licensee person;.a1 regarding results and status of the SG

tube testing and evaluations. This review is continuing under NRC/NRR

Materials Engineering Branch lead.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700)

The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting

requirements have been met, the cause appears accurate, the corrective

actions appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered, and

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whether the event is rslated to previous events. Selected LERs were.

chosen for more detailed followdp in verifying the nature, impact, -and

cause of. the-event as well as corrective ' actions taken. These LER's are

noted with an asterisk (*). The following LER's are closed:

• LER 369/88-37. Two Groups of Ice Baskets in the Unit 1 Ice Condenser

Found to Weigh Below the Required Tech Spec Weight. The inspector

reviewed periodic test results associated with this event.

LER 369/88-45, Rev. 1: Auxiliary Feedwater System Train B Inoperable due ~

to Incorrectly Set Valve Travel Stop. The inspector reviewed this report

for completeness, Verification of corrective actions will be accomplished

through followup of Violation 369/88-33-09.

LER 369/89-03: Doghouse Wat_er i.evel Feedwater Isolation Actuattor.

Instrumentation for Unit 1 and 2 was nJt tcsted as required by Technical

Specifications.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- 7. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)

The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that I

the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in

compliance with regulatory requirelaents and corrective actions have been

completed. Selective verification irdluded record review, observations,

and discussions with licensee personnel.  !

a, (' Closed) Violation 369/87-41-04, Failure to follow procedures and

failure to perform retest, resulted in inoperable ND pump miniflow

valyc. Both examples included in the violation were attributed to

personnel error. The licensee has completed corrective action for '

the violation. The follcwing items were reviewedt

o Counseling letter dated 12/2/87 to both of the technicians,

stating the staticn policy on adherence to proceduras.

o Process Procedure rec 6rd ID No. TT/1/A/9100/206, Change No 1

dated 10/20/87, " Post modifications test procedure for ' lockout'

releys 186A/1B and associated indicating lights." Section-

13.13, added specific steps necessary to perform adequate

verification of the loc'kout relay modifications.

o Pevised PM/PT work request computer program for instruments

1&2MNDPG5050 and 1&2MNDPG5051 to reflect that the status is

safety related and that there 1s the potential that the work

could be a Technical Specification (TS) item.

o Station Dircctive {SD) 4.2.1 which was revised to include the

directive St6ted in a memo from the station manager to all

McGuirc NPD employees, dated 10/27/87. After reviewing the memo

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and then Station Directive 4.2.1., the inspector noted that SD

4.2.1 had been revised as stated but that the statements as

stated in paragraphs (A) & (B), from the memo were not

incorporated. This type of concern is discussed in further

detail with other examples in Report 50-369,370/89-01.

b. (Closed) Unresolved Item 369,370/88-33-02: Losses of RHR Requiring

Further Followup. This item involved three losset of Residual Heat

Removal System 6,D) which occurred on Unit I which appeared to

involve procedural or drawing weaknesses. The events were previously

-disc.ribed as follows:

"On November 23, 1988 tne licensee experienced a loss of the residual

heat removal (ND) system for approximately 40 minutes. Reactor

Coolant (NC) temperature increastd approximately 25 degrees F. The

unit was in Mode 6, Refueling. The event occurred while valve stroke

timing Containment Spray (NS) valve INS-1B (HS pump 1B suction from

containment sump). Apparently, ND pumo IB lost suction pressure due

to inadequate system venting in the horizontal piping between valve

its-18 and valve 1NI-184 (reactor building sump to train IB of ND and

NS). Apparently the inrush of NS water into the voided containment

sump piping forced air into the ND IB pump suction and air bound the

pump. The pump was trippea to avoid darage. Recovery consisted of

cross-tying ND pump 1A to ND heat exchanger 1B, assuring fill and

vent cf the ND 1A sump and starting the 1A pump. Problems with

venting the ND pump 1B casing delayed restart of 10 pump. The

licensee checked both ND trains on both units and found significant

hmount's of air in some of the piping. The licensee is evaluating

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past ND operability for both units and is planning to add more

controls an testing interfaces, tc upgrade ND procedures and to

evaluate the need for improved fill and vent practices and

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procedures.

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On November 29, 1988, while in cold shutdown, Unit 1 experienced a

loss of ND when a train B blackout occurred. The blackout occurred

when Operations (.losed the B train 6900 Volt Bus standby breaker

which was in the test position for testing causing the normal breaker

to open as designed. This action deenergized the B train including

the operating ND p:np and started the B train emergency diesel

generator. Reactor coolant temperature increased 4 degrees F during

the approximately seven minutes that the ND pump was not operating.

LER 369/86-B was submitted on this event.

The licen ee assigned a cause of management deficiency to the event

since the unit superviso' did not provide adequate written and/or

verbal instructions to the operator for testing the standby breaker.

A defective procedure was assigned as a contributing cause since

Op/1/A/6350/08, " Operation of Station Breakers", did not contain

precautions to alert operators of interlocks associated with the

breakers to be tested. The licensee stated that a general precaution

would be added to OP/1/A/6350/08 to review the effects of interlocks

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prior to ' testing breakers. Also a caution ~ would be added. fcr the

6900 volt breakers to prevent this from recurring.

On December 1, 1988, while in cold shutdown, ND was lost again when

.ND-1B (reactor coolant system inop 10 to ND system containment

isolation) closed. Licensee personnel were deenergizing a circuit

associated with the Resistance Temperature Detector-(RTD)

modification when ND-1B closed on a simulated high pressure signal

securing ND flow.. ND-1B closed at 12:06 a.m., the ND pump was

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secured at 12:07 a.m. and ND finw was restored at 12:17 a.m. Plant

temperature increased approximately 5 degrees during this time.

Personnel involved had misread the drawing and did not realize that

ND<-1B would close."

The licensee cenducted additional evaluation of the November 23

event. A concern was that air trapped in the lines downstream of

either valves NI-184B or NI-185A could be drawn into the ND pumps if

the valves were open at the start of a post accident recirculation.

The analysis showed that water remaining in the Refueling Water

Storage Tank (RWST) would provide enough pressure to push any air to

the Containment Sump and not toward the ND pumps. The air would be

dissipated through the sump before the RWST was isolated. The

inspector reviewed this analysis. It does appear that procedural

weaknesses contributed to the event in that adequate fill and vent

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was not required by PT/1 & 2/A/4200/08, NS System Valve Stroke Timing

and further, there was no operations procedural guidance for filling

and venting of specific systems other than' the Reactor Coolant

system. The Removal and Restoration procedure (0MP 2-17) is

typically used for filling and venting.

The 39 minutes it took to place 1A train in service appears

raasonable considering operations was assuring the train was

adequately vented and closely monitoring temperature.

As described above, procedural inadequacies also contributed to the

November 29 event.

Further evaluation of the December 1 event disclosed that a drawing

(MC41399.03-0300-001) was not properly updated which resulted in a

misinterpretation by Instrument and Electrical personnel.

The unit was in mid-loop operation during the first event . 1. oops

were full during the other events.

10 CF0 50s Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities affecting

quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or

drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The above three examples

are considered in the aggregate a violation of this criteria. This

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is Violation 369,370/89-11-01: Inadequate Procedures and Drawings

l Leading to Loss of Residual Heat Removal on Three Occasions.

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Violation 369,370/88-33-05: Failure to Follow TS for

c. (Closed)

Heatup'and Cooldown. Corrective actions for this violation included

appropriate _ training and procedural improvements which were described

> in the licensee response dated March 16, 1989 and in LER 370/87-20.

The inspector verified completion of the ' corrective actions during

the review described in Report 369,370/88-33 and, therefore, this

item is closed.

d. (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-01-06: Written Guidance

on Use of Procedures. The inspector discussed the licensee's

progress in this area and reviewed Revision 7 of Operations

Management Procedure 1-2: Use of Procedures. The General Statements

of philosophy, which address the first concern described in Report

369,370/89-01, paragraph 11, have been reordered. In addition the

new procedure now provides guidance for use of Abp'ormal and Emergency

Procedures. Other concerns described in the previous report are not

yet addressed. Therefore, this item remains open.

One violation was ident.ified as described above.

8. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection findings identified below were summarized on - April 21,

1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following'

items were discussed in detail:

(0 pen) Violation 369,370/89-11-01: Inadequate Procedures and Drawings

Leading to Loss of Residual Heat Removal on three occasions. (paragraph

7.b.)

The housekeeping comments described in paragraph 3.c.were also discussed.

The licensee representatives present effered no dissenting comments, nor

did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the

irispectors during the course of their inspection.

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