ML20246E120
| ML20246E120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1989 |
| From: | Hernan R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| References | |
| IEB-79-27, NUDOCS 8905110152 | |
| Download: ML20246E120 (19) | |
Text
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, May 2, 1989 Docket No. 50-289 DISTRIBUTION
. Docket File;. EJordan Mr. Henry D. Hukill, Vice President ~NRC'8" Local'PDRs BGrimes and Director - TMI-I Plant File ACRS(10)
GPU Nuclear Corporation SVarga P. O. Box 480 BBoger Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 SNorris RHernan
Dear Mr. Hukill:
0GC 1
SUBJECT:
RESULTS OF NRC AUDIT OF IE BULLETIll 79-27 CONFORMANCE The staff conducted an audit of GPU Nuclear's conformance to the guidance in NRC Bulletin 79-27 at Three Mile Island Unit 1. The audit was conducted during the week of October 31, 1988 and was the first step in our verification program associated with your implementation of the B&W Owners Group Safety andPerformanceImprovementProgram(SPIP). Two additional SPIP audits are planned later this year.
Based on the sample audit for the loss of three individual buses, the audit team was reasonably assured that a loss of power to the buses will not result in a plant condition that requires operator action and the simultaneous loss of the control room indication on which the required action to bring the plant to a safe shutdown using approved operating procedures is based. The audit results provided sufficient evidence that by using the existing procedures, a safe (cold) shutdown condition can be achieved at TMI-1 following the loss of power to any single Class IE or non-Class IE bus that supplies power to plant instrumentation and control circuits. The team therefore concluded that IE Culletin 79-27 concerns are adequately resolved for TMI-1. The team also concluded that, to ensure reliable operation of the devices that perform automatic switching of a bus from one power source to another, the devices should be periodically tested for their safety function. A preventive maintenance and periodic test program for these devices should be developed.
This staff position was discussed with members of your staff during the audit. The enclosure to this letter discusses our review in detail. l Our audit team noted the excellent spirit of cooperation by GPU Nuclear personnel during this audit and their competent awareness of plant electrical systems and of concerns dealt with in IE Bulletin 79-27. A good operator training program was also reflected in the familiarity of operators with the plant electrical systems and associated procedures. i Sincerely,
/
'S/ 1.
\
l Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager I 8905110152 890502 Project Directorate I-4 l ADOCK 0500 Division of Reactor Projects I/II I gDR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated i i
cc w/ enclosure: l See next page fBULLETIll 79-27 CONFORMANCE] n LA:PDI-4 PM:PDI-4 /g[ JL SNorriskdp RHernan:cb JS z FAAAam W K!YA&om N DJ m 1
O
< Mr." Henry D. Hukill Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, GPU Nuclear Corporation Unit No. I cc:
G. Broughton Francis I. Young 0 M Director, TMI-1 SeniorResidentInspector(TMI-1)
GPU Nuclear Corporation U.S.N.R.C.
Post Office Box 480 Post Office Box 311 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Richard J. McGoey Manager, PWR Licensing Regional Administrator, Region I GPU Nuclear Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 100 Interpace Parkway 475 Allendale Road Parsippany, New Jersey 70754 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 I C. W. Smyth Robert B. Borsum TMI-1 Licensing Manager Babcock ' Wilcox GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear Power Generation Division Post Office Box 480 Suite 525 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 1700 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esq. Governor's Office of State Planning Shaw, Pittman, Potts Trowbridge and Development 2300 N Street, N.W. ATTN: Coordinator, Pennsylvania Washington, D.C.
20037 State Clearinghouse Post Office Box 1323 Harrisburg,-Pennsylvania 17120 Sally S. Klein, Chairman Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Dauphin County Commissioner Bureau of Radiation Protection Dauphin County Courthouse Pennsylvania Department of ,
Front and Market Streets Environmental Resources '
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Post Office Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Kenneth E. Witmer, Chairman ~
Board of Supervisors of Londonderry Township 25 Roslyn Road Eilzabethtown, PA 17022 1
'o UNITED STATES g
i 2 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ENCLOSURE
~g* E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20665
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AUDIT' REPORT AUDIT OF THREE MILE ISLAND-UNIT 1 (TMI-1) DESIGN FOR THE RESOLUTION OF IE BULLETIN 79-27 CONCERNS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
OnNovemtier 10, 1979, an event occurred at the Oconee Power Station, Unit 3, whichisaBabcock&Wilcox(B&W)designednuclearpowerplant. The event started with a loss of power to a Non-Class 1E,120 Vac, single-phase power panel that supplied power to the integrated control system (ICS) and the non-nuclear instrumentation (NNI) system. This loss of power resulted in control system malfunctions and a significant loss of information to the control room operator.
The event a Oconee, Unit 3. occurred'as the result of Noh-Clas!! IE inverter failure and *,he failure of its automatic bus transfer (ABT) switch to transfer the instrumentation and control loads from the failed inverter to a designated alternate regulated 120-Vac power source. The resulting loss of power to the NNI rendered control room indicators and recorders for the reactor coolant system (except for one wide-range reactor coolant system pressure recorder) and most of the secondary plant systems inoperable. Loss of power also caused the loss of instrumentation associated with the systems used for decay heat removal I and coolant addition to the reactor vessel and steam generators. In addition.
upon the loss of power, all valves controlled by the ICS assumed their failure positions.
On November 30, 1979, the NRC issued IE Bulletin 79-27, " Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation" (Reference 1). I
.IE Bulletin 79-27 required licensees to review the effects of loss of power to each Class IE and Non-Class IE bus supplying power to plant instrumentation and centrols and to determine the resulting effect on the capability to achieve a i
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safe (cold) shutdown condition using plant operating procedures following the power loss. The intent of IE Bulletin 79-27 was to ensure that the loss of power to any bus in the plant electric distribution system would not result in control system actions that would cause a plant upset / transient condition requiring operator action concurrent with the loss of control room infomation (indications, alarms,etc.)uponwhichtheseactionswouldbebased.
On February 26, 1980, an event that involved a loss of NNI system power occurred at the B&W-designed Crystal River, Unit 3, nuclear plant. In this event, failed input signals provided to the ICS from the NNI system caused reactor coolant system (RCS) overpressurization and the subsequent release of reactor coolant into the reactor building. This loss of power also resulted in the failure of most of the instruments needed by the operator to respond to the event, making ' operator action very difficult. On March 7, 1980, the NRC issued IE Infomation Notice 80-10 (Reference 2), which expanded the scope of IE Bulletin 79-27 for B&W-designed reactors to include the implications of the Crystal River event. The NRC review of utility responses to IE Bulletin 79-27 focused on whether there was reasonable. assurance that the concerns of the bulletin had been properly addressed. This assurance was based on an affirmative or clearly implied statement of conformance to all bulletin requirements and a positive indication that all required buses were reviewed.
Following the issuance of IE Bulletin 79-27 and IE Information Notice 80-10, two events occurred at the B&W-designed Rancho Seco nuclear plant involving the loss of ICS/NNI power and loss of control room information. These events, occurring on March 19, 1984 and December 26, 1985, demonstrated that the concerns identified in IE Bulletin 79-27 continued to exist in B&W-designed plants. Additional background information regarding licensee responses to IE Bulletin 79-27 and the NRC evaluation of these responses can be found in Section 7, Precursors to the December 26, 1985 Incident at Rancho Seco and Related NRC and SMUD Actions," of NUREG-1195 (Reference 3).
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In order to resolve the concerns raised in NUREG-1195, the B&W Owners Group submitted a description of the B&W program entitled " Safety and Performance Improvement Program (SPIP)" in their document BAW-1919 on May 15,1986. The NRC staff reviewed BAW-1919 through Revision 5 and presented its evaluation in NUREG-1231, dated November 1987, and in Supplement No. I to NUREG-1231, dated March 1988 (Reference 4).
Included in the SPIP are specific tasks to be completed by each utility; however, the SPIP tasks do not include a review to detemine whether the specific concerns of IE Bulletin 79-27 have been properly addressed and resolved. The NRC staff believes that proper resolution of IE Bulletin 79-27 >
concerns, in conjunction with implementation of SPIP recommendations, should significantly reduce the frequency and severity of loss of power transients at B&W-designed piants, including those transients resulting from loss of power to the ICS/NNI. As part of the staff audit of the SPIP, the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch '(ICSB) is conducting an audit of each B&W facility to verify resolution of IE Bulletin 79-27 concerns.
2.0 AUDIT METHODOLOGY The Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1) audit consisted of two parts: 1) a pre-auditdocumentationreviewcomprizedof(a)examiningplantelectric distribution system single line diagrams along with other drawings from the ,
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), system descriptions, and reactor trip shutdownandcooldownprocedures(Reference 5),and(b)preparingalistofthe l equipment, instruments, controls, and indications identified in the procedure and needed to bring the plant from an operating state with a reactor trip to a safe shutdown and cooldown condition; 2) anon-siteauditcharteredwith detemining if a safe shutdown can be achieved in the event of a postulated worst case bus failure using established operating procedures. The audit team met with the licensee's representatives (Reference 6) to determine the sources of power to each of the instruments and equipment in the list prepared during the pre-audit documentation review. Three buses were selected for review by
the audit team based upon the majority of the components identified on the list and supplied from these buses, and their downstream connections, which failed due to the cascading power loss. The failure of the three selected buses appeared to represent potentially the worst case scenarios due to the consequential loss of a substantial number of instruments and equipment that could increase the complexity of the operator actions required to stabilize the plant and to achieve a safe shutdown following a reactor trip.
The applicable sections of the reactor trip, plant shutdown and cooldown l 1
. procedures were examined by the audit team and the utility representatives to !
determine how each step would be performed while failing the selected buses one at a time. For those steps that were affected by the bus failure, the licensee described how the step would be performed, (e.g., by using a redundant instrument, switching to another power source, or by performing manual actions to achieve safe shutdown. The audit team also examined annunciator response procedures to detemine if specific directions were provided to the operator.for dealing with the loss of power to the plant distribution system.
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3.0 EVALUATION The audit team evaluated the effects of the loss of power to each selected bus by analyzing the e d ined effects of the loss of power to the bus loads (instruments, controls, pumps, valves,etc.)andtheresultingeffectonthe ability to proceed to cold shutdown using approved procedures. The review included an evaluation of the indication and annunciation provided to alert the operator in the control room to the loss of bus power. Equipment and component losses that result from the failure of the selected buses were evaluated along with the cumulative effects of loss of power to loads due to cascading power losses, to determine the overall effect on the plant during operation.
The audit team selected three specific cases of bus failure and performed a detailed evaluation to determine operator capability for achieving a safe I
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5 shutdown using the applicable procedures in each case. These three cases are described below.
3.1 Loss of 120-Yac Bus ATB The inverter powered 120-Vac bus ATB (Diagram 1) is the power source for three significant systems that are relied on during normal operations and are also used for nonnal plant shutdown. These systems are the plant computer (for instrumentation readouts); the electrohydraulic control system (which controls the turbine generator); and the ICS/NNI power system.
The TMI-1 design does not have a separate annunciator window for the loss of power to bus ATB. However, this event is one of the signals to the alarm "ICS/NNI Power' Lost." All annunciators, including those for the loss of ICS/NNI power, receive auctioneered power from two independent sources (120-Vac vital bus V de and 120-Vac regulated bus TRA). The applicable annunciator response procedure lists all instruments and indications affected by the loss
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of power to ATB, identifies the automatic features of power restoration to certain essential instruments and indications and refers the operator to various emergency procedures for the required follow up actions. The audit team examined tho'se procedures (Map H, 1202-40,1202-41) to determine if adequate guidance was provided for the operator to mitigate the consequences of this event and referred to the applicable procedures if reactor trip, shutdown and cooldown was to be achieved. i The TMI-1 design includes redundant instrumentation channels for certain parameters that are provided to assess plant conditions during and following an accident. These redundant channels have independent power sources that enable an operator to cope with a single loss of bus power with instrumentation available to aid in achieving hot and, subsequently, cold shutdown conditions.
It was noted that either fully redundant instrumentation or an alternate means of information was available for those instruments and computer points that were normally indicated in the control room and were lost due to the loss of power to bus ATB (for example, the steam generator shell side thermocouple are l
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1 disconnected from the plant computer and reconnected in a manner that allows them to be read manually). Turbine control becomes coarser with the loss of bus ATB, however, the control can be maintained by using power from a pemanent magnet generator that is driven by the main turbine. Alternate means of controlling the steam generator level are also available, and turbine bypass valves can be manually operated. Operator training and procedures cover these actions.
The 120-Vac ICS/NNI power system consists of three buses named " HAND " " AUTO,"
and " FAN," each monitored and alamed in the control room. Power for automatic controls and instrumentation is provided by "AUT0" bus whereas " HAND" bus supplies for manual controls. " FAN" bus is the power source to ICS/NNI cabinets fan coolers. Manually operated switches are used to connect these buses to their respective primary and b6ck up power sources as shown in Diagram 1 of this report. Bus ATB is the priniary source of power to " HAND," back-up source of power'to " AUTO," and is not designed to supply " FAN" bus. On loss of the primary source (ATB), " HAND" bus will be manually transferred to the back-up source (bus ATA). This transfer will be alarmed in the. control room as "ICS system power transfer". Reactor control will not be affected and will remain in automatic mode as the ICS/NNI normal power source is "AUT0" bus whose primary source of power is bus ATA.
Similar scenario will occur for the loss of bus ATA (ATA is primary power source to "AUT0" bus) except that the reactor will be manually controlled using control power supplied by the " HAND" bus whose primary power source is bus ATB. However, if feedwater control cannot be established to maintain the plant in a stable condition, the operator will trip the reactor, main turbine, and both feed water pumps as per emergency procedure 1202-42 and follow procedure ATP 1210-1 for additional guidance. In case, " HAND" or "AUT0" power cannot be restored, a manual trip is procedurally required.
Based on the above design features, plant operating procedures, and operator training, the audit team concluded that following the loss of power to bus ATB,
q.,
l the operator has sufficient instrumentation, indication, and equipment 4
available in the control room to achieve cold shutdown using the approved i procedures.
1 3.2 Loss of' 125/250-Vdc Bus'1A 125/250-Vdc bus 1A of division A de system (Diagram 2) is the source of power for approximately half of all DC-powered instrumentation and controls.
- Additional equipment powered by DC bus 1A includes the' pressurizer electro-
-magnetic relief valve, the electrohydraulic controls for the main turbine and'startup feedwater regulation valve FW-V-16B. Bus 1A is powered by 2-125V batteries ar, 2 primary 150 ampere battery chargers (a third charger is available-as a backup).
Bus 1A is the power source for DC buses 10, IE, 1H, and IP, panel DCA (substractioncontrols),andrelayPanelsXCCXPCR,XCR,andXPL. Bus IA is also.the alternate power source to DC bus IM through an automatic bus transfer switch. DC control power is provided tc several of the 6900V, 4160V, and 480V load centers by'these DC buses.
The audit team noted that alarm response procedure Map A, associated with the loss of DC bus IA, leads the operator to procedure 1202-9A. Procedure 1202-9A specifically deals with the loss and recovery of DC bus IA. This procedure lists annunciators that indicate loss of this bus and the affected DC buses and distribution panels. The procedure also lists AC switchgear that lose control ;
power as a result of the failure of DC bus 1A. The procedure also provides !
precautions concerning the loss of the redundant DC bus 18 and for minimizing i
potential equipment damage.
)
( The audit team examined the loss of DC bus 1A and the consequential failure of the equipment, instruments, and indication that is needed to attain hot and, subsequently, cold shutdown conditions. Operating AC equipment will continue to operate as the loss of the circuit breaker control power will not trip the breaker. While the breaker position indication would be lost, system operation can still-be ascertained by pressure, system flows, and other instrumentation.
Instruments and indications need by the operator for safe shutdowh of the plant using procedures' are powered by the inverter supplied instrument buses. The instrumentation power will not be affected by this failure because the inverters supplying instrument power have AC as their primary power source and DC (battery) as the backup source of power. 480-Vac power is converted to DC within the inverter and auctioneered with the 125-Vdc source from the battery.
Should either source fail, the other is available to be inverted to 120-Vac instrument-power. If the inverter fails to supply its 120 volts' instrument bus, the bus is automatically transferred to a regulated power source by means of a static transfer switch. The main turbine will trip 8 seconds after the loss of 125/250-Vdc bus IA due to the loss of DC power to the electrohydraulic control system. The reactor will then trip as a result of the turbine trip if the reactor power is greater than 45 percent; if the reactor power is less than 45 percent a runb'ack of reactor power will occur. Plant cooldown procedure 1102.11 will be followed for maintaining the reactor in a safe condition.
Based on the above design. features, plant operating procedures, and operator training, the audit team concluded that following the loss of DC bus 1A, the operator has sufficient instrumentation, indication, and equipment available to ;
achieve cold shutdown using the approved procedures.
3.3 Loss of 4160-Vac Emergency Safeguard Bus ID 4160-Yac engineered safeguard bus ID powers a large number of safeguard equipmentdirectlyorthroughthedownstreambusesitsupplies(Diagram 3). j Besideseveralengineeredsafetyfeatures(ESF)pumpmotors,thisbusfeeds l l three 480-Vac load centers that power several ESF motor control centers (MCCs).
The MCCs supply power to several ESF panels and other components, including ]
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120-volt distribution panels, relay panels, and the AC feed to inverters 1A, IC, and IE.
Instruments and indications needed by the operator for safe shutdown of the plant using procedures are powered by the inverter supplied instrument buses.
These instruments will not be affected by the loss of bus ID, the AC source of power to the inverter, as described in Section 3.2 of this report. It appears l that bus ID failure at 100% reactor power will not cause a transient or a '
reactor trip. Each equipment deriving power from this bus has a redundant counterpart supplied from the redundant Class IE, AC power system.
Loss of power to bus ID is alarmed in the control room. The audit team I !
examined the alarm response procedure " Hap C" which lists all automatic and the required manual actions. This procedure directs the operator to verify start of the standby' emergency diesel generator and investigate the cause of the loss of power and trip of bus 10.
Based o,n the above design features, plant operating procedures, and operator training..the audit team concluded that.following a loss.of power to 4160-Vac engineered safeguards bus ID the cperator has sufficient instrumentation, indication, and equipment available to achieve cold shutdown using the approved procedures.
3.4 Automatic Bus Transfer Switches The continued power availability on certain buses, such as 120-Vac buses ATA and ATB (Section 3.1) and DC bus IM (Section 3.2), relies on the operation of automatic bus transfer (ABT) switches. Although there are cleaning and housekeeping procedures for these switches, the audit team was unable to find a requirement to periodically test the capability of the switches to perform their design function. Since the ABTs are installed to transfer the bus from Cne source of power to another and are assumed to operate, that capability ,
should be demonstrated periodically. A test requirement was also lacking for the Class IE instrument power inverters (for testing the switching from the
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nomal AC power source to the backup DC power source or from the inverter output to the regulated 120-Vac alternate power through a static transfer switch). It is the staff position, that the license should institute a j surveillance program that periodically tests the operability of these devices to demonstrate their reliability. This position is in concert with the B&W i Owner's Group SPIP recommendations which includes preventive maintenance and periodic testing of ABT switches used for maintaining ICS power supply (TR-183-ICS).
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4.0 CONCLUSION
Based on the sample audit for the loss of three individual buses, the audit team was reasonably assured that, a loss of power to either of the three buses will not resul't in a plant condition that requires operator action and the simultaneous loss of the control room indication on which the required action to bring the plant to a safe shutdown using approved. operating procedures is based. ,The audit results.provided sufficient evidence that by using the '
existing procedures, a safe (cold) shutdown condition can be achieved at TMI-1 following the loss of power to any single Class 1E or non-Class IE bus that supplies power to plant instrumentation and control circuits. It is, therefore, concluded that IE Bulletin 79-27 concerns are adequately resolved for TMI-1 design and procedures.
The audit team also concludes that to ensure reliable operation of the devices that perfom automatic switching of a bus from one power source to another, the devices should be periodically tested for their safety function. A preventive maintenance and periodic test program for these devices should be developed to l
comply with the staff position on testing.
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11 REFERENC S
- 1. NAC IE Bulletin No. 79-27, " Loss of Non-Class 1-E Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation," November 30, 1979.
- 2. NRC IE Information Notice No. 80-10. " Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear Instrument System Power Supply During Operation," March 7, 1980.
- 3. NUREG-1195, " Loss of Integrated Control System Power and Overcooling Transient at Rancho Seco on December 26, 1985," February 1986.
- 4. NUREG-1231, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group Plant Reassessment Program," November 1987 and Supplement 1 to the NUREG, March 1988.
- 5. Schematics, drawings, and procedures listed in Appendix A, of this report.
s
- 6. Licensee personnel contacted during the audit and listed in Appendix B of.
this report.
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- APPENDIX A DOCUMENTS EXAMINED The following documentation was examined as part of this audit.
taa Figure 8.2-3 Rev. 5 Electrical Power Systems- Single Line Diagram i Figure 8.2-4 Rev. 5 Arrangement- Batteries, Chargers, and DC System Figure 8.2-6 Rev. 5 4160 Volt Engineered Safeguards Switchgear Single Line Diagram Figure 8.2-7 Rev. 5 480 Volt Engineered Safeguards Switchgear Single Line Diagram Manuals Section A-1, Revision 0, "TMI-1 Operations Plant Manual BOP and IE -
Electrical Distribution (Including Substation)." i DRAWINGS Drawina Number Revision Title -
1C-621-41-1000 2 Logic Diagram, ICS/NNI Power Supply C-302-671 30 Liquid and Gas Sampling System (P&lD)
C-302-660 19 . Makeup and Purification System (P&ID)
C-302-670 14 ' Chemical Addition System (P&ID)
C-302-640 40 Decay Heat Removal System (P&ID)
C-302-650 35 Reactor Coolant System Diagram (P&ID)
PROCEDURES !
Procedure Procedure Numb'er Revision Procedure Title Training handout June 22, 1988 ICS/NNI 7R Mods ,
3210-88-0209 1 E-26 7 Cleaning and Alignment of Inverters j 1102-11 75 Plant Cooldown 1102-10 51 Plant Shutdown 1107-4 89 Electrical Distribution Panel Listing i 1107-5 66 Electrical Distribution Component Listing 1210-1 18 Reactor Trip 1210-2 11 Loss of 25'F Subcool'ed Margin 1210-3 12 Excessive Cooling 1210-4 12 Lack of Primary to Secondary Cooling 1210-10 18 Abnormal Transients, Rules, Guides, and Graphs
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APPENDIX A (con't)
DOCUMENTS EXAMINED '
PROCEDURES Procedure Procedure Number Revision Procedure Title i i
1420-INV-3 9 Inverter, Troubleshooting and Alignment 1202-2 24 Loss of Offsite Power 1202-9A 20 Loss of "A" DC Distribution System >
1202-40 15 Loss of ICS Hand and Auto Power i 1202-41 13 Total or Partial Loss of ICS/NNI Hand Power l 1202-42 15 Total or Partial Loss of ICS/NNF Auto Power Alarm Resoonse Procedures, Main Annunciator Panel location Revision Map A -
Station Battery Charger IA/1C/IE Trouble A-2-7 4 i Map B -
4 KV Motor Trip B-1-2 3 Map B -
4 KV Auto Transfer B-1-3 2 Map C -
4 KV Bus PT Trouble C-2-2 3 Map C -
4 KV ES Bus UV/0V C-2-3 4 Map H -
ICS/NNI Power Lost H-1-8 7 - .
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.. . APPENDIX B LICENSEE PERSONNEL CONTACTED A. Agrawal Parsippany, Diesels
' R. W. Bensel TMI-1, Plant Engineer, Electrical G. Bond Parsippany, SAPC
- W. Drendall Parsippany, Technical Functions R. Ezzo Parsippany, ICS I. Feinberg Parsippany, Projects C. Hartman TMI-I H. D. Hukill TMI-1, Director S. M. Kowkabany Parsippany, Licensing R. McGary . Parsippany
- V. P. Orlandi THI-1, Lead I&C Engineer R. Pruthi Parsippany, DC Systems G. Sadauskas Parsippany, Engineering H. Shipman TMI-1, Operator and Engineering Manager D. Sear Parsippany, Engineering M. Stark Parsippany C. W. Smyth THI-1, Licensing Manager NRC PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING I. Ahmed SICB/NRR -
R. J. Conte Region I/ Senior Resident Inspector /TMI-l C. C. Harbuck NRR Project Manager /ANO-1 R. Hernan NRR Project Manager /TMI-1 R. Kendall NRR.
A. C. Udy INEL M. W. Yost -INEL I
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