ML20246C894

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Forwards Wv Thomas,Rj Traub,F Vosbury & G Wehmann Finalized Rept Re Grand Gulf Emergency Preparedness Exercise.Areas Covered Listed
ML20246C894
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Grand Gulf
Issue date: 04/13/1984
From: Thomas W
Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To: Marston R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20246C819 List:
References
FOIA-89-226 NUDOCS 8908250171
Download: ML20246C894 (28)
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+w April 13, 1984-Paciic Northwest Laboratories P.O.2o:999 Rahlano Washington U.5A 99.152 Wr. Ronald Marston.

" N U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., Suite'3100 Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Ron:

CnAhD GULF EXERCISE Enclosed is the finalized report of W. V. Thomas, R. J. Traub, F. Vosbury, and G. Wehmann, who were Pacific Northwest Labortory participants during the Grand Gulf Emergency Preparedness Exercise, April 11. Only minor changes were made from the rough draft given to you prior to leaving.

Areas covered by PNL are as follows:

W. V.. Thomas" OSC, In-Plant Health Physics, and Fire Drill R. J. Traub OSC and Offsite Monitoring F. Vosbury Control Room and TSC Operations G. Wehmann TSC, all operations w

If you have any questions regarding.this report, please contact W. V. Thomas on(FTS)509-375-2088.

a Sincerely yours,

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h'LTechnicalLeader Senior-Research Scientist 2mergency Preparedness Group Health Physics Technology Section Health Physics Technology Section RADIOLOGICAL SCIENCE; DEPARTMENT tv RADIOLOGICAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT j

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Q OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (0SC)

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Name: Walter V. Thomas B.

Assignment: Operations Support Center, In-Plant Health Physics, and Fire Drill C.

Site Personnel Contacted:

W. Lewis, Bechtel Industrial Safety; F.

Barron, Mississippi Power and Light (MPL) Industrial Safety; L. Hughes, Health Physics Technician (HPT); M. Owent, HPT; T. Hildebrandt, IP Coordinator; P.

Sudnak, OSC Controller, Fire Drill Controller; B. Gulley, OSC Controller; W.

Boots, OSC Maintenance Supervisor; F. Walsh, OSC Director; M. Sember, Fire Drill Observer; D. Hileman, Fire Drill Observer D.

Positive Findings: The activation of the OSC was accomplished in a prompt and orderly manner.

The OSC was fully functional by 0825 hr. OSC operations were supervised by the licensee officials predesignated in the emergency plan, consisting of the OSC Director HP Coordinator, and Maintenance Supervisor. All OSC Supervisors were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities and performed them in a conscientious manner.

Voice communication was established and maintained throughout the drill and the Control Room, the TSC, and the E0F.

The OSC was frequently monitored with radiation survey instrumentation and air samples were taken to confirm the habitability of the area. Personnel protective equipment for Iodine protection was available. The OSC emergency stores contained charcoal canisters, KI and spare bottles for Diopacks and Scott SCBA's.

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A large. status board was maintained in the OSC containing plant parameters and

' conditions, repair / recovery team members, locations of teams,- and names of individuals available for team assignments by craft / specialty. Radiation monitoring results within the OSC and in-plant were also displayed. Adequate numbers of health physics technicians, electrical maintenance technicians, and instrument and control technicians were available for repair / corrective action teams.

Radiochemistry and chemistry technicians were also available to take and analyze samples. Controllers did not prompt, coach or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the OSC.

Congestion and noise levels were kept to a minimum. All communications l

systems in use functioned properly.

Personnel to perform tasks requested by the control room or the TSC were assigned in a timely manner. Dose assignments for all tasks were determined by HP personnel in the TSC from the -

accumulated dose computer printout sheets. All teams were briefed prior to departure from the OSC and upon return.

Good health physics procedures were practiced and good contamination control procedures were used by all teams i

observed.

Fire Drill

.The fire drill was very realistic.

Two fires were actually set to enable the fire brigade members and the offsite backup support fire department to respond to and extinguish an actual fire. This was done to increase interest and to test the actual use of the fire brigade equipment.

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' Negative Findings E.

Communications protocol deteriorated as the-drill progressed.

Initially all personnel declared "This is a drill" when using radios onsite.

By

1300 hr personnel were using given names'and not stating "This is a

. drill." All personnel participants in drills must use proper radio protocol to prevent confusion and reduce rumor. Participating personnel should be referred to by drill title and not by name.

Additional training in this area is indicated.

The MP&L fire brigade. team arrived at the firesite after the fire had extinguished itself.

The fire burned for over 35 minutes after it was ignited, and for most of the time produced a very dense, heavy cloud of black smoke, which should have been visible a considerable distance.

The Claiborne County Fire Department arrived at the fire scene about two l

' minutes after the MPSL team and extinguished the fire assigned to them in a prompt manner. Upon arrival at the fire scene the fire brigade members l

l were not dressed in fire turnout gear and did not appear to be familiar with the fire fighting equipment.

It took an additional 10 minutes to get the foam deluge cannon operational.

It was apparent that additional training on the proper use of the fire brigade equipment was in order.

The reason for the fire brigade delay was complicated due to strict adherence to security procedures by the guard force, lack of turn out gear stored on the fire truck, and lack of designated OSC personnel being assigned to the fire brigade beforehand. Procedures should be I

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e implemented to assure'that emergency ingress and egress from the plant is

not complicated by security considerations. Sufficient turn-out gear for the minimum number of personne1 required to operate the fire truck and-l-

Lequipment should be stored either in or on the vehicle or at least in a l

readily assessible location to the fire truck.

Fire brigade members should be assigned upon, initial assembly in the.0SC and should be restricted from others duties unless it is clear they will not be needed for fire fighting activity.

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Chronology 1

Time' Observation 0800-Arrived at OSC.

0806 Alert announced on PA.

OSC activation began.

0825 OSC fully activated.

0913 CRD A pump reported burned out (bearings).

- 0933 Attended briefing of reconnaissance team by maintenance supervisor and OSC director.

0940 Accompanied team to 166 ft level'of turbine deck to monitor and take air sample.

0954 Steam leak on turbine deck.

Team evacuates to HP lab on 93 ft level without air sample.

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' Time Observation j

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0958;-

l Portal monitor. in HP area ~' alarmed, _ frisker' offscale. -

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. Set up new stepoff pad ~ area procure new frisker.

1015' Watched decontamination of team members.

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1120 Returned to OSC.

Went out with steam tunnel team.

l 11200 Arrived at fire scene.

1210_

Fire ignited and burning well.

Security guard instructed to call in fire report.

.1250-

,First fire extinguishes itself._

1255.

Second fire still burning.

1305 Fire Brigade arrived.

1307 Claiborne County Fire Department arrived.

1310 Port Gibson Fire Department arrived.

1311 Claiborne County fire extinguished.

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Time-Observation-

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Fire brigade ~attac'ked fire..

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i 1400 Returned to OSC.-

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' 1420-Departed OSC with onsite survey team..

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Returned to OSC.

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' Drill secured.

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OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC), AND OFFSITE MONITORING l

A. -Name:

R. J. Traub l

B._ Assignment: Operations Support Center and Offsite Monitoring g

C.

Site Personnel Contacted: OSC - Russ Comerford, Controller; Sam Merry, Maintenance Supervisor; Jack Hurst; Victor King, Charles Anding; Paul Sudnak, Controller. Offsite Monitoring - Bill McKelvy, Controller; Sid Flatt,

-Observer; John Cotton, Team !eader; Jeff Kireham D.

Positive Findings:

OSC The workers in the OSC appeared to be familiar with their assignments.

Individuals such as HP tech dressed in anti-C clothing upon announcement of an Alert. The names of individuals available for emergency repair, etc. were posted.

Potential emergency response team members were tagged with the dose they could receive for the quarter.

This information had been taken from a computer printout dated 10, April,1984. Based on meteorological data, sectors which would be affected were drawn on a map.

The emergency response team which was observed appeared to be well trained.

They were in constant radiocontact with the OSC.

The HP technician frequently requested the controller for meter readings. The HP technician also frequently called for checks of pocket dosimeters. When notified that the turbine building was filling with steam there was no hesitation by the team L

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leader in calling.'for evacuation. During the evacuation, the team leader

- checked the window in the door at every. level..

Offsite Monitoring The. team observed appeared to be familiar with the local roads and sites visited. 'The-individual at the SAP who provided instructions to the team.

appeared familiar with the local area and and roads.

The instructions were understood by team.

The. team members appeared familiar with the use of the instruments used. The team members were observed to check the batteries of their instruments. Also-the team members were observed to don gloves prior to handling filter samples and they were observed to check their hands after handling the filter, even those having background readings. Open and closed window readings were taken with the R0-2A.

The team members were observed to make periodic radio checks to ensure contact with the SAP / EOF. Radio reports were observed to be prefaced by caller ID.

E.

Negative Findings:

OSC

. The emergency response team observed (sent to check turbine building for j.

damage) did not wear hard hats, only skull caps.

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Offsite Monitoring The positive reading and.its background reading were made in the apparent plume.

The reading should have been retaken some distance from point of collection.

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Iodine readings were taken with an unshielded pancake probe which allowed high' background. A shielded probe should have been used.

I The van used by the team would not have been very useful on some unpaved i

roads observed in the area. A FWD would be useful here.

Radiotransmission was not good at 10-12 miles.

There appeared to be confusion on the part of the Controller re:

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count data radioed in at 11:06.

l l-Offsite team I received no information concerning changes in field conditions, plant conditions, etc.

F.

Chronologg Time Observation OSC 8:04 Announcement "this is a drill, this is a drill." Alert announced.

8:13 HP technicians began preparing pencil dosimeters.

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Time Observation 8:30 Emergency response teams dressing in anti-C's.

l 9:03 Emergency. response team members tagged with dose which could be received for the calendar quarter.

Based on computer listing date-10 April 84.

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9:24-Teams organized to enter turbine building and to view turbine -

building roof.

l 9:30 Emergency response team I instructed to go to turbine building roof and observe damage and repair if possible.

Instructions recommended 1

to go to 166 ft level and observe from there.

l 9:31 Emergency Response Team I (ECT) received HP briefing 95% power and normal readings, no expected contamination or radiation.

Check l

j dosimeters every 10-15 min.

l ll 9:32 Tested radios, third radio tested was used.

9:41 ERT-I stopped at HP lab to ask if HP team in turbine building.

l 9:44 In turbine building - R0-2A readings normal.

9:49 Report rain was coming in on exciter and on HP instruments.

Team checked pocket dosimeters.

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r Tine observation L

9:53-Area was noticed to be filling with steam.

Team leader ordered an immediate evacuation. Team. leader looked through door window at i

l every level during evacuation.-

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9:56

Team at entry to HP lab (the exit from plant), team members found to

- i be contaminated, outer clothing was removed and preparations for showers were made.

Observer exited to observe offsite monitoring teams.

Offsite Monitoring l

10:25 Offsite team appraised that centerline thought to be at Bechtel gate.

10:33 Offsite team dressing in whites.

10:34 Two-way radio antenna placed on van.

10:39 SAP activated.

10:40 Team instructed to take dose rate and air sampler at approximate position of the small br,idge.

10:49 Saw slight deflection on R0-2A. Max reading - 0.5 mrem, about 100 yd east of Bechtel gate.

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. Time Observation 10:50 Team instructed to take 10 ft3,j p. 3,,p),,

l 10:51 Took beta reading - found no measurable beta.

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10:53 Air sample taken. - 1.5 cfm for 7 minutes. estimated 1 mile from

. plant, used 55 gal drum as base for air sampler.

10:56 Referred to procedure for offsite monitoring.

10:57 Checked dosimeters.

11:02 Air sample read with pancake probe. Background - 1300 cpm; iodine filter 1780 cpm; ammended by controller to 4080 counts / min - net..

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. 11:06 Reported 4080 counts / min for 10.5 ft sample. Logged in date on data sheet HP 1016.

Instructed to proceed to Sector B-12.

11:32 At Presbyterian Church at Yokena reported position.

Instructed to stay and wait 30 minutes for plume.

12:00 Monitoring team turned over to EOF.

1:12 Radioed to SAP, instructed to return to SAP as all readings were background.

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Time-Observation 1:39 Offsite Team 1 arrived t.t SAP, frisked themselves and gave sample to be sent to chemistry for analysis.

1:50 Offsite Team 1.sent to switchyard boundary. to take readings on 60*N sector.

2:04 Drove to impassible location on boundary. Team. leader took frisker and R0-2A on foot to take readings.

2:19.

At perimeter of switchyard on north side of unit 2 coolant tower (location described' by team leader) all readings background.

Returned for truck.

2:31 Reported in readings, instructed to obtain a 5 min air sample.

2:46 Field monitoring team began 5 r;in air sample on hill overlooking unit 2 cooling tower excavation.

2:55 Returned to van, removed filters, counted particulate and iodine filters, background readings were obtained.

3:02 Team reported air filter readings and were informed that the drill was terminated.

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CONTROL ROOM AND TSC OPERATIONS A.

Name:

Fred Vosbury 8.

Assignment: Control Room and TSC Operations C.

Site Personnel Contacted: Control Room Shift Personnel, Shift Superinten--

dent, Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operator,- Shift Operations Supervisor, Control Room Controller, Emergency Director (ED), Plant Manager (PM)

D.

Positive Findings:

The control room operators rapidly classified the unusual event and alert.

Initial accident assessment by control room personnel indicated s station

- would escalate to an. Alert.

Recommended to man the TSC and OSC, was given early thereby allowing the TSC and OSC to be activated within 5 minutes of declaration of the Alert.

. The control personnel are proficient in the use of procedures.

I The control personnel kept the plant informed during the Unusual Event.

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Negative Findings:

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. TSC was slow or did not provide information on plant status to plant per-sonnel, e.g., steam line break in turbine building was not announced for 20 minutes. No other information was announced inplant.

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It took the TSC 36 minutes to declare a site emergency. Site emergency.-

was required to be declared on a steamline break outside containment with-out isolation.

No habitability surveys were taken in the control room until 2:37.

The function / layout of the TSC should be reviewed.

Insufficient room exists for the TSC and the status boards are inadequate should be separated into different rooms if possible to reduce crowding and noise level.

The Emergency Director spent too much time talking with control room per-sonnel. He should minimize his conversations and allow them to perform their functions.

F.

Chronology Time Observation 6:00 Exercise began.

6:03 Unusual event declared based on issued hurricane warning - Shift Superintendent declared himself the Emergency Director (ED).

Consnenced procedure on severe weather.

6:07 Unusual event announced on plant PA system.

6:08 Consnenced offsite notifications.

6:10 Started the diesel generators.

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Time-Observation 6:15 Loaded diesels. All local agencies had been notified except the NRC. ED wanted to shutdown plant.

i l-6:23 ED recommended to Duty Plant Manager to activate.the TSC and OSC.

l ED directed Shift Supervisor to place all emergency equipment on emergency power supplies and place RCIC on recire.

I ED recognized that a scram would occur if they tried to shutdown.

i ED infonned Load Dispatcher that he wanted to drop to 50% power, and will drop power regardless of Load Dispatcher recommendations.

1 ED's intention was to minimize th'e scram transient by reducing

- power.

l 6:28 Plant notified NRC HQ.

6:30 ED had meeting in control room to discuss plant status and his intentions to shutdown.

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6:35 ED told Load Dispatcher he would drop the load in 5 minutes.

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6:36 Controller had ED keep plant on line for drill scenario.

6:40 Followup notifications completed.

I 6:55 Plant Manager arrived and ED briefed him.

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-Observation-7:04' PM directed manning of TSC and OSC.

7:05-Shift turnover started, y

17:49 Load reduced 25%.

' 7:53 Wind speed increased to 75 mph. Alert declared.

= 7:55 Plant Manager assumed role of ED.

8:02 TSC activ.1ted.

8:07

Alert announced on plant PA system.

8:30-Time compression began.

9:00 9:13 Turbine building (TB) panels blown 'off.

Control room requested HP to sample turbine building atmosphere.

9:18 Control room requested OSC sample turbine building atmosphere.

p 9:21-MCC tripped.

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9:30 Shift Supt. discussed LCO's due to loss of MCC.

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. Time Observation 9:41 Scram / loss.of offsite power / main steam line break.

9:49 Determined MSIV A not closed. Turbine building ARM's at 400 mR/hr.

9:57 Shift Supt.: recommended plant depressurized.

10:01 Turbine buf1 ding evacuation ordered.

10:06 Control room rec. mmended declaration of " site area emergency."

10:08 Reactor depressurized.

10:17 Site area emergency declared.

10:30 Control room encountered a problem getting an operator to OSC.

. 10:40 Control room issued 0-5 R dosimeters.

11:15 Main steam ifne break isolated.

No air sample taken in CR, ordered by.

ED at 11:02.

- 11i45 No plant status announcements have been made.

11:58 Site evacuation ordered.

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Time Observation 12:30 Fire announced at pistol range.

12:35 CR and TSC discussed whether or not to fight fire with onsite team.

12:39 Fire brigade leader left for OSC.

12:42 TSC to request offsite assistance to fight fire. Note:

Is fire truck going to pass through plum?

12:51 Discovered fire is real.

1:05 Fire truck left protected area.

1:30 TSC directed HP to measure iodine levels in CR.

1:43 HP sampled control room.

2:27 ED discussed recovery priorities: plug holes in turbine building, regain offsite power, cleanup turbine building, sample turbine i

building sump, control access to turbine building, recharge air bottles, order fuel for diesels.

2:37 CR air sample < MDA (first air sample taken).

3:00 Exercise terminated.

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p TSC

'A.

Name: George Wehmann B.

Assignment: TSC - all functions C.-

Site Personnel Contacted: Robert Snyder, Controller; Rodney Brown, Controller; Exercise Director.

D.

Positive Findings:.All TSC personnel appeared to understand their assignments and to perform them in an efficient manner. The TSC Emergency

' Director maintained positive control over all operations.

E.

Negative Findiregs:

'The TSC Emergency Director did not recognize the need to elevate the exercise from an Alert to a Site Emergency. He had to receive a " prompt" from the TSC Controller.

Recommended protective actions were not provided offsite organizations until I hr and 45 min after the Site Emergency had been declared. This i

notification is required within 15 minutes.

Radiological release data was not provided to offsite personnel via the q

follow-up notification proceoure until 1144 CST - nearly 2 hr after the release began.

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.TSC-did not dispatch field teams until I hr after release was first recognized.

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.. The site evacuation alarm was not initiated until more than 2 hr and 15 min after the release began.

L The Emergency Director had to be furnished with an offsite dose L

assessment " prompt" message by the. Controller. This message contained information relative to protection action guides.

False dose assessment indications resulted from preliminary " default" method calculations. As a consequence a number of decisions Were delayed or incorrect. The fact that the default values might not be correct was not recognized until 11:02 CST.

The relative concentrations (Chi /Q) at 0.433 miles for a "G" stability index and 4 mph wind speed is 1711 x 10-6 m/sec per plant procedures.

This is a factor of 4.8 times greater than the value of 359 x 10-6 m/sec reported.in the scenario for the very same distance, stability index and wind.

It appears that only two dose assessment calculations were made by TSC using field data prior to assumption of this responsibility by E0F.

The observer was unable to verify the dose calculations made by TSC nor to make an comparative analysis with dose projection data provided in the scenario.

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e-Based on this exercise, it appears that the present TSC has certain defici?ncies. An average of 18 players occupied the TSC with no provisions to reduce noise. Telephone and power-cords were laid on top of the rug and several people tripped on them. The loud speakers could not be muted when the evacuation sirens was alarmed.

F.

Chronology Time Observation 1

7:05 Control room Shift Superintendent requested TSC staff to assemble.

7:58 TSC activated - all principal staff present.

8:00 Alert declared.

8:06 Alert announced over PA.

8:44 Dose assessment attempting to make default calculations - trouble getting offgas flowrate.

9:10 Offgas flowrate still a problem - three values reported; 39,100 or 120 scfm.

9:20 Damage to turbine building reported. Emergency Director requested team dispatched from OSC to investigate damage.

9:41.

Report to offsite alarms given to Emergency Director.

Initially treated as a rumor.

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L Time Observation 9:48 Use of.offsite sirens is confirmed.

9:50 Emergency Director receives report of steam line break.

Turbine I

building ARM value is 400 mR/hr.

- 10:02 Evacuation of tui bine building ordered by Emergency Director.

10:12 Upgrade to General-(Site) Emergency decided by Emergency Director.

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Default dose assessment calculation indicate very low doses.

10:18 Announcement'of Site Emergency made over PA.

10:24-Default dose assessment calculations still indicate very low dose.

10:25 Dose assessment requests source data.

10:40 Offsite monitoring teams dispatched.

10:52 First field data at site boundary received.

10:58 Emergency Director considering protective action recommendations.

11:10 Offsite dose data " prompt" provided the Emergency Director by Controller.

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' Observation

.11: 11 ~

Offsite. teams having trouble getting into location.

Emergency Director considering' assistance from helicopter, weather permitting.

11:18

.First dose projections using field data become available.

11:20 RPM.and NRC agree that sheltering out to 10 miles should be considered.

11:40 EOF assumes responsibilities of dose assessment.

11:43' Emergency Director makes decision to evacuate site with certain staff personnel to remain behind.

' 12 :01

Site evacuation alarm is activated.

12:15 TSC dose assessment efforts continuing although responsibility has been assumed by EOF.

12:32 TSC receives report of black smoke near site.

12:42 Emergency Director briefed on fires by Controller, Director concerned if fire brigade would have to go through plume.

12:44

' Director orders fire brigade to respond and requests offsite support.

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Time Observation 12:55 Director learns that it is a real fire.and not simulated.

1:10 Emergency Director continues to try to analyze source'of radioactive release.

2:03 Emergency' Director'is considering downgrading of exercise'and commencement of recovery operations.'-

. 3:00 Exercise terminated by Controller.

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. Mississippi Offsito Sequence of Eventy s

i Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise April 10-12, 1984 I

Time Event

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0530 LIERCISE SECINS.

Distribute initial conditions to key players.

Duty officer makes appropriate notifications based on vaather conditions.

0600 National Weather Service issues severe weather statement.

0615 UNUSUAL ETEKI DECLARED.

Declaration is based on severe weather conditions.

Appropriate notifications are nede based on conditions at GCNS.

l 0645 Reports of flash flooding in claiborne County.

0700 National Weather Service issues severe weather statement.

0730 Reports of tornado sightings in Claiborne County.

0800 ALERI DECLAED.

Declaration is based on severe weather conditions.

Appropriate notifications are made based on conditions at GCNS.

0800 National Weather Service issues severe weather, statement.

0815 Scace communications officer unable to get to Jackson.

0830 TIE COMPESSION.

0840 Loss of power at Claiborne ECC.

0855 Power restored at Claiborne EOC.

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0900 National Weather service issues severe weather statement.

091'0 Reports of vind damage in Claiborne County.

0910 Loss of power at State EOC.

0915 RESUME REAL TIE.

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0925 Power restored at S tate EOC.

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'0945 State Communications Officer arrive's at State EOC.

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4 1000 SITE AREA EMERGENCT DECLARED.

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unctatralled, utmonitorsd relocse.

The ralcosa inventory is 4.

high in iodines. -Projected thyroid. dose should result in a recommendation for sheltering out to two miles in sector 8, which will af fect protective action area 1.

1015 Activation of sirens, tone alert receivers, and EBS.

1050 Report that portions of Highway 13 are washed out.

i 1100 Reperc of a fire in Port Gibson.

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1105 Reports of debris blocking roads.

1115 Reports of fallen power lines.

l 112,5 Inquiry about protecting dairy cattle.

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1135 Report of a fire in the county.

1 1140 Possible problems with water system contamination.

1145 warren County shelters request that arrangements be made for 1-substitute clothing.

1150 Claiborne County Bospital needs portable generators due 'to j

power failure and problems with existing generators.

1155 Requests for transportation assistance.

1200 Evaluate copiah County shelters.

1200 Reports of spontaneous evacuation.

t 1205 Fire in Port Gibson reported out.

1205 Local industry requests information on how to shut down during sheltering.

1210 Health Department requests Wildlife Conservation to arrange for boats and personnel to support sampling activities.

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1220 Inquiry'about the availability of stored feed.

I 1230 Reports that gasoline supplies are low.

3 1240 GGNS Bet-Line communications lost.

1240 Fire in county reported out.

1245 claiborne County Rospital requests that ambulances be arranged for evacuating patients if neccesary.

1250 inquiry about protecting unharvested crop.

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