ML20246C967
| ML20246C967 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Seabrook |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246C819 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-89-226 NUDOCS 8908250197 | |
| Download: ML20246C967 (35) | |
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.6 ATTACHMENT INITIAL OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW REPORT SUPPLEMENT 1 FOR SEABROOK STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-443 PREPARED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I l
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- TABLE OF CONTENTSL Page
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.3,0 Introduction......................................-....
-r 2.0 Plant Status.....................................................
2J 2.1L 0verview...................................................
3 2.2 Chronology of Major Plant Milestones.......................
4 2.3 Post-Fuel Load Hot Functional Testing................,......
2.4 Cold Shutdown' Activities...................................
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3.0 Facility, Construction...........................................
4 3.1 Overview and Status........................................
5 3.2 Design Changes.............................................
3.2.1 Control Building Air Handling System.............
5 3.2'.2 Contai nment Building Spray System................
5 3.2.3
' Post Accident Sampling Systems...................
5 3.3 Construction Deficiency Reports and 10' CFR 21 Reports......
6 3.3.1 Service Water Va1ves.............................
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3.3.2 Emergency Feedwater System.......................
3.3.3 Containment Equipment Hatch Personnel Airlock....
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3.3.4 Goul d Type J-10 Re1 ays...........................
7 3.4 Allegation Status..........................................
7 3.4.1 Employee's Legal Project.........................
v 3.4.2 As-Built Piping Discrepancies....................
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3.4.3 Al cohol a nd Drug Conce rns........................
10 3.5 NRC Bu11etins..............................................
10 3.6 Conclusions................................................
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4. 0 Fa c i l i ty Te s t i n g.................................................
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4.1-Summary and 0verview.......................................
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4.2 S t a r t u p - T e s t i n g..............................................
11 4.3 Conclusions................................................
11 5.0 Operational Readiness...........................................
11 5.1. Sumnary and 0verview.......................................
12 5.2 Plant Operations............................
5.2.1 Conduct of Operation.............................
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'5.2.2 Organization and Staffing........................
12 5.3 Operator Licensing Examinations and Licensed 13 Ope rator T ra i ni ng........................................
5.4 Maintenance and Survei11ance...............................
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-14 5.5 Radiological Control s and Chemi stry........................
'14 5.6 Emergency Preparedness.....................................
14 5.7 ' Security...................................................
14 5.8 Engineering and Technical Support..........................
15 5.9 Qu al i ty A s s u r a n c e..........................................
15 5.10 Conclusions.................................................
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l 6.0 NRC Inspection Program Hi story and Findings.....................
15 6.1 Routine Inspection Activities..............................
1 6.1.1 Inspection Program Status........................
15 6.1.1.1 MC 2512 Program........................
15 6.1.1.2 MC 2513 Program........................
16 6.1.1.3 MC 2514 Program........................
16 6.1.1.4 MC 2515 Program........................
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Table'ofContents.(Cont 1nued)'
'6-Page 17 6.1.2 Team Inspections.................................
6.1. 2.'1 Allegation Team - November,1986.......
18 6.1.2.2 ATWS Team - December, 1986.............
18 6.1.2.3 Allegation Team - April /May,- 1987..... 18 -
6.1.2.4 EP Exercise Team - December, 1987......
19 6.1. 2. 5 '.
EP Exerci se Team - June, 1988..........
19-6.1.2.6 SAT Evaluation Team - October /
November, 1988.......................
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-20 6.2 En f o rc eme n t Hi r.to ry.........................................
20 7.0 NRC Evaluation of Licensee Self Assessment......................
20 8.0 Financial Qualifications........................................
20 8.1 8ackground................................................,
21 8.2 Conclusions................................................
21 9.0 Future NRC Region I Actions.....................................
21 10.0 Overall Conclusion...............................................
ENCLOSURES - Inspection Summary - Enforcement History - NRC Bulletin Summary - Summary of SALP Evaluations - Review of New Hampshire. Yankee Operational Readiness Self-Assessment L
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1.0 Introduction Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) applied for a license to construct and operate Seabrook Unit 1 (DN 50-443) on July 9,-1973, and was issued a. Construction Permit (CPPR-135)' on July 7,.1976.
Unit 1 is a Westinghouse four-loop pressurized water reactor, rated at 1198 MWe which
- is housed in a reinforced concrete containment structure.
It is located in the town of Seabrook, Rockingham County, New Hampshire, along with Unit 2, a similarly designed reactor, currently 25% complete with construction halted. The construction permit for Unit 2 expired on October 31,'1988 and the Joint Owners have indicated that they have no intention of completing the project. The units are arranged using a " slide-along" concept with certain structures common to both units.
United Engineers and Constructors served as the architect / engineer and construction manager. PSNH has contracted with the Yankee Atomic Electric Company for specific services, including project engineering, licensing, fuel supply and the establishment and implementation of the Quality Assur-ance Program for design and construction.
YAEC will also provide engi-neering services ' necessary to support the operation of Seabrook Unit 1.
On June 23, 1984, an organizational change was made to create the New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) Division of PSNH with the primary responsibility for construction, startup and operation of Seabrook.
This ' followed a.
temporary suspension of construction activities, initiated on April 18, 1984 due to financial pressures on PSNH.
Other organizational changes released several contractors from the Seabrook project, replacing them with UE&C as the " direct employment" constructor. Other major construc-tion work stoppages occurred in February,1977 and July,1978 when the NRC suspended the construction permit because of questions regarding the cir-culating water tunnels and the lack of EPA approval for this cooling sys-tem. PSNH once again f aced financial dif ficulties in 1987 and filed for protection with the. U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manchester, N.H. on Janu-l ary 28,1988.
The Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (MMdEC), an eleven percent ownee, stopped paying its project share in June, 1988 and negotiations are resently underway to provide alternative financing.
During this time p.riod, project funding has continued at levels equal to that available prior to bankruptcy.
j NRC Region I began performing inspections at Seabrook in 1973 and has completed over 250 inspections totalling over 26,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. These inspec-
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tions involved observation of work in progress, examination of completed work, review of work control documents, independent measurements and calculations and the examination of quality records, as well as review of I
operations, maintenance, surveillance, security, emergency preparedness and health physics activities.
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.,2 This,'re' port describes the process used by the licensee to monitoran'd con'-
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trol the quaHty' of construction,7 testipg. apd operations. Also4+scussed' l
are the restr1G*of the licensee's _ Self Assenment,' 'and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (S~ ALP) program conducted 'by. NRC Region I.
l During heatup and approach to criticality, Region I will conduct,a Readi-l' ness Assessment Team Inspection to evaluate licensee performance and con-
'formance to license conditions and Technical Specifications. This assess-ment will focus on activities in the areas of operations, maintenance, surveillance, engineering and technical support, radiation protection',
radwaste, environmental monitoring, chemistry, management effectiveness and quality assurance.
l This report supplements the previous report which presented the basis for the Region I conclusion' that (1) Seabrook Unit I has been constructed sub-stantially in accordance with Construction Permit CPPR-135, the Final l
Safety Analysis Report and NRC regulations; and (2) New Hampshire Yankee, as a division of PSNH, is ready to safely operate the facility.
2.0 Plant Status 2.1 Overview l
Construction of Seabrook Unit 1 is essentially complete. All build-ings, systems, and equipment have been turned over to the station staff. Some construction completion activities such as painting and yard paving remain to be finished. Preoperational testing activities are complete. The majority of zero power startup testing has been completed with the major exception of the emergency feedwater system.
During the course of NRC inspection and investigation activities at Seabrook Unit I since 1973, over 1,000 inspection items requiring tracking and follow-up have been opened.
These items include en-forcement actions and allegation follow-up activities, as documented in other sections of this report; NRC Bulletins, Circulars, Infor-mation Notices, and Generic Letters; temporary instructions; 10 CFR 21 reports, licensee event reports and construction deficiency re-ports; TMI action plan items; and, unresolved issues and prgram weaknesses identified by special team inspections. Approximate)y 50 of these NRC inspection items currently remain open, the other items have been closed in NRC inspection or investigation reports, as appropriate.
The status of outstanding items is continually being assessed and updated as Region I inspection activities continue. At this time, no open inspection item, currently outstanding, is deemed to be of such significance as to affect the Region I recommendation for issuance of a low power license. An item currently under evalua-tion by the licensee involves the seismic qualification of Agastat
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1 7000 series time delay relays.
This problem was identified at an-other facility.
Licensee staff has placed a high priority on re-solving this issue. A written followup to this report will be pro-vided if this issue is not resolved prior to low power license issuance.
I In terms of readiness for operation, no major impediments to the low power license issuance have been identified.
Procedural preparation and validation and consistency review continue and it is anticipated that all procedures required for a particular mode of operation will be approved and issued prior to the plant entering that mode.
During the period covered by this supplement, a major transition occurred as construction and preoperational testing was completed and startup testing and operations under the technical specifications (TS) and license conditions commenced.
2.2 Chronology of Major Plant Milestones October 17, 1986 Facility Operating License NpF-56 issued for Sea-brook Station, Unit I authorizing fuel loading and precriticality testing.
October 22, 1986 Mode 6 entered as fuel loading commenced.
October 29, 1986 Fuel loading completed.
November 5, 1986 Mode 5 entered as reactor vessel head tensioned.
February 10, 1987 Heatup commenced and Mode 4 entered as plant tem-perature reached 200 degrees F.
February 11, 1987 Unusual Event declared due to containment equip-ment hatch airlock malfunction and immediately terminated.
February 15, 1987 Mode 3 entered as plant temperature reached 350 degrees F.
February 16, 1987 Plant achieves normal operating temperature and pressure.
post-core load hot functional testing begins.
February 26, 1987 Two steam generator safety valves lift during testing of the emergency feedwater system as a result of a pressure transient.
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March 20, 1987 Post-core load hot functional testing completed.
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Cooldown commenced and Mode 4 entered as plant temperature falls below 350 degrees F.
Cold shutdown is achieved as plant temperature falls below 200 degrees F.
-6 2.3 Post-Fuel Load Hot Functional Testing On October 17, 1986, a Facility Operating License was issued for Seabrook Station Unit 1.
Specific license conditions limited activ-ities to "zero power" operation and precriticality testing but did allow the licensee to load fuel and conduct hot operations in Mode 3 in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Initial fuel load was conducted during the period October 22-29, 1986.
Plant heat-up for the conduct of the precritical phase of hot func-tional testing (HFT) commenced on February 9,1987.
This testing-included those pre-operational tests for which additional startup testing was required. The most notable of these was testing on the steam-driven EFW pump because major design modifications had been implemented for this system since the previous HFT in December,1985 (refer to paragraph 3.3.2).
Plant cool-down from hot operations was initiated on March 19, 1987.
24 Cold Shutdown Activities The plant has remained in Mode 5, cold shutdown since the March, 1987 cooldown.
Plant temperature has been maintained between 110 degrees F and 140 degrees F with the primary system depressurized.
Major maintenance and/or modification activities were conducted on both primary and secondary systems.
The plant also conducted reactor coolant system mid-loop testing related to Generic Letter 87-12.
Other significant testing activ-ities involved fastener testing per NRC Bulletin 87-02 and hardness testing of flanges and fittings per NRC Bulletin 88-05.
No major safety significant events occurred while operating in Mode 5 although an Unusual Event was declared during heatup when equaliz-ing valves malfunctioned on the containment equipment hatch personnel airlock (refer to paragraph 3.3.3).
3.0 Facility Construction 3.1 Overview and Status The construction of Seabrook Unit 1 is essentially complete. Paint-ing in the turbine building and paving of the yard inside the pro-tected area fence remain to be completed.
Minor construction items remain and are identified on the construction " punch list." None of
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5 the above items has impact on low power operations.
Several design changes are in progress in the plant. These changes are routine for a plant in an outage condition and none are considered to be low power limiting.
The status of several significant design changes, 10 CFR 21 and 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports, and NRC Bulletins is described below. The status of the most significant construction related alle-gations is also summarized below.
3.2 Design Changes Several significant safety-related system design changes are in progress or awaiting plant milestones for implementation.
3.2.1 Control Building Air (CBA) Handling System The control building air nandling system was redesigned following NRC identification that the system was suscep-tible to a single electrical train failure.
Licensee an-alysis of plant operation with the current configuration was reviewed in Seabrook Safety Evaluation Report, Supple-ment No. 7 (SSER-7).
It was determined that the present design was adequate for low power operation.
The system must be modified prior to issuance of a full power license.
The current status of the design change is that the new filter unit and fan are mounted on their foundation.
The cross-tie piping to the other existing filter unit is com-plete up to the connection point.
No other work is to be completed until af ter low power testing because such work would make the system inoperable.
3.2.2 Containment Building Spray (CBS) System l
It was determined that the CBS system suction piping was not designed to withstand system pressures under all an-alyzed conditions. The licensee subsequently committed to modify the design.
In the interim, a thermocouple moni-toring system was installed to alert operators of check valve leakage which could eventually cause overpressuriza-tion. This issue was reviewed in SSER-7.
As long-term action, the licensee intends to add four motor operated valves to the subject piping prior to the first refueling outage.
3.2.3 Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
The PASS has undergone design modifications to allow improved sample temperature control.
Since there is not yet any coolant activity level, the PASS has not been demonstrated, however dilution factor testing will be
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conducted on heatup using boron concentration as a moni-tored parameter. The PASS is not required for low power operations.
3.3 Construction Deficiency and 10 CFR 21 Reports To-date at Seabrook, the licensee. has submitted 106 Construction Deficiency Reports (CDR). Of these, subsequent licensee evaluation
' determined that 17 items were not reportable and the applicable CDR's were withdrawn.
Only one CDR remains open concerning the emergency-
. feedwater system and it will be addressed during the heatup prior to initial criticality (refer to paragraoh 3.3.2).
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Service Water Valves This 10 CFR 21 report, submitted in July, 1987 described problems with the liners of Fischer Controls butterfly valves.
Licensee corrective action included modifying the seats of the valves installed in cr.itical locations. Final NRC closure of this item was reported in NRC:RI Inspection Report 50-443/88-10.
3.3.2 Emergency Feedwater System (EFW)
This 10 CFR 50.55(a) final report was made in May,1986 and concerned the inability of the EFW system to provide the
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design flow rate due to the configuration of the recircu-lation lines. The lines were subsequently modified. Dur-ing post-core load hot functional testing in February,1987 the EFW turbine driven pump continued to experience prob-lems in starting and achieving rated flow in the required time pericd.
Licensee modifications allowed completion of startup test ST-53; however, full functionality of the EFW system was never demonstrated.
The system redesign. was evaluated in SSER-4 During heatup prior to initial crit-icality, a new test procedure (STP-101) will be performed.
This test will include five cold starts of the system which were not previously demonstrated due to leaking steam sup-ply valves. Other system performance criteria will also be evaluated.
3.3.3 Containment Equipment Hatch personnel Airlock On February 11,1987, an Unusual Event was declared and promptly terminated because of a condition requiring plant shutdown. This condition involved the Technical Specifica-tion for containment integrity which could not be met due to a failure of the equalizing valves in the linkages for the personnel airlock in the containment equipment hatch.
In April, 1987 NHY reported this linkage failure as a 10 j
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7 CFR 21 report, described the redesign of the fau1 Ay L11nk-
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- ages and, indicated completion, of all modifications.
To date, the linkages have performed satisfactorily.
7 3.3.4-Gould Type J-10 Relays.
Telemecanique '(formerly' Gould),.. the; manufacturer of ' the type. -J-10 relays, reported-a defect in accordance with.
10 CFR 21 in October, '1987. The defect involved overheat-ing of 'a special magnet coil 'used in the Seabrook design. -
NHY replaced the-57. relays installed in safety-related applications.
This item was closed 'in NRC:RI Inspection
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Report-50-443/88-10.
3;4 Allegation Status 3.4.1 Employee's' legal Project The NRC Region I Office contacted the Employee's Legal-Project (ELP), a nonprofit organization,7 on August 4,,1986,-
regarding allegations L of questionable construction prac-tices at New England nuclear power plants. The'NRC became..
aware in the May-July,1986 time frame of the ELP and their eff orts to gather previous. nuclear power plant employee concerns.
Subsequently, the NRC acquired an unsigned let--
.ter to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from the ELP, dated September 12, 1986, containing, two anonymous affidavits and thirty-five allegations related to plant construction and management controls at. the Seabrook facility.. Further contact with the' ELP resulted in ten additional allegations.
The several allegation sources were consolidated by the NRC and each.ellegation was' re-viewed separately, although it may have resulted in dup-
.11cate allegations. This was done to preclude any. issues.
from being overlooked. This resulted in sixty-one separate allegations.
The allegations were grouped into.seven categories as follows:
concrete, piping and welding, painting, - procedures and training, security and drugs, electrical and management.
An interdisciplinary inspection team was established to investigate the allegations.
The inspection was conducted in November, 1986.
Plant hardware was inspected and inde-pendent tests performed where possible to evaluate each allegation.
In some cases the previous record of inspec-tion had documented the allegation and in these cases the record was reviewed and corrective actions verified. Inter-views were conducted of allegers and plant staff to aid in the inspection. The bases for any conclusions are derived
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from an&minspection of the actual item or area if known and l
accessible, previous ' NRC inspections of the issue, estab-lished engineering knowledge and quality assurance records.
The inspection, in many: instances, disclosed that previous knowledge of thq,. alleged condition was identified by the NRC or the licensee and documented in quality' assurance records, NRC inspection. reports.or formal correspondence between the licensee.and the NRC.
Thirteen of the. allega-tions were Substantiated in that the statement made by the I
alleger was accurate; however, eleven of these allegations were previously identified by the NRC or the licensee and were appropriately dispositioned..The remainder of the-allegations could not be substantiated,' but in all cases, even if the event had occurred, there would have been no nuclear safety significance.
The results of this first inspection are contained in' NRC:RI Inspection Report 50-443/86-52.
Subsequently, the ELP reviewed and commented on the 86-52 report, raised technical questions and comments concerning-the contents of the report and, in some cases, provided new information regarding the original allegations.
The in-spection team was reconstituted and additional inspections were performed onsite during April-ar.d May, 1987. The-NRC staff met with the ELP and some of the allegers on April 20, 1987,. to gather additional ' detailed information concerning the technical issues. During the ; interview, the ELP pre-sented a document to the inspection team containing new allegations.
Based on~ the new i nformati on', the. team was able to more accurately fdentify the specific areas of concern relative to. the original allegations.
The team determined th&t the allegations that were previously in-spected remained as originally characterized and did not represent a safety concern. The remaining allegations could not be substantiated. The new allegations also could not be substantiated as valid technical issues of which' the licensee was not previously aware and addressing.
The second report published in August, 1987 (50-443/87-07) contains two unresolved items that will receive further attention.
One item deals with the long-term ef fects of ground water on the reinforcing steel and the licensee's program to monitor the condition of the structures affec-ted.
The-second issue is an in-depth review of the con-crete cracks in structures such as the waste process build-ing and the cooling towers.
Neither of these items pre-sents an immediate concern to the operation of the facility.
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9 3.4.2 As-Built Piping Discrepancies The Region I Office was notified by Region III of an alle -
gation involving as-built drawings of safety-related piping systems at the Seabrook' Station.
The Region III staff.was informed of the allegation while conducting an ' interview with personnel from Computerized Interference Elimination (CIE), a former contractor to New Hampshire Yankee (NHY),
regard?ng alleged discrepancies ~ in as-built ' drawings of pip *eg systems in Units I & 2 of Byron Station.
4 Region I engineers traveled to Redmond, Washington on Oct hrr 21, 1986, to interview the two principal allegers from CIE. The allegers identified certain concerns regard-ing the existence of discrepancies in as-built drawings' of safety related piping systems designed by Westinghouse and United Engineers and Constructors at ' the Seabrook Station.
The allegation primarily dealt with concerns over tne ac-curacy of the measurements provided on the drawings and the impact on the adequacy of the licensee pipe' stress recon-ciliation efforts.
It also referenced other design activ-ities which would potentially be affected as a ' result of using input data from as-built drawings containing dis-crepancies.
An 1nspection was conducted in November, 1986 to evaluate the allegeri discrepancies.
Based on independent measure-ments of selected piping system dimensions and evaluation of the pipe stress reconciliation, building beam verifica-tion, seismic II/I and failure mode and effects analysis programs, the allegation was found to be unsubstantiated.
3.4.3 Alcohol and Druo Concerns In response to a letter dated January 28, 1988, to Chair-man Zech from Congressman Edward J. Markey, regarding an investigation that he initiated on October 28, 1986, into allegations of widespread drug and alcohol abuse at Sea-brook, the NRC staff conducted an independent multidis-ciplinary review of the Congressman's concerns. The review team included Region I and NRR personnel, and an independ-ent but related effort was conducted by the NRC Office of Investigation (OI) and OI:RI personnel.
The review team concluded that the Congressman's investigative efforts and the licensee's responses to the alleged drug and alcohol concerns identified no deficiencies or safety concerns that would impact or alter the NRC staff's previous conclusions regarding the adequacy of construction of Seabrook Station Unit 1.
a 10 3.5 NRC Bulletins A review of NRC Bulletins was conducted to ensure that no issues which remain outstanding could adversely impact low power operations.
A summary of bulletin status is listed in Enclosure 3.
Six bulletins remain open.
Licensee responses heve been made to four of these-.
Responses to the other two are not yet due. Licensee action on each Bulletin is well directed and none of the open issues affect plant startup.
3.6 Conclusions Regarding design changes, the licensee has submitted and the NRC approved actions to address concerns with the CBA and CBS systems.
Both systems are considered adequate as presently designed and installed to fulfill all requirements up to 5% power. The PASS will be tested to the extent possible prior to the existence of coolant activity and is not required at low power.
With respect to construction deficiency reports, reports of defects per 10 CFR 21 and NRC Bulletins, Region I has determined that no technical issues exist which would preclude issuance of a low power license.
The emergency feedwater system, while not completely proven, has demonstrated the ability to operate under normal condi-tions.
Special test procedure STP-101 will ensure that the system is fully operable prior to initial criticality.
With respect to allegations at Seabrook involving both technical and Fitness for Duty concerns, no issues remain open which would indicate any adverse impact on issuance of a low power license.
Region I concludes that facility construction is essentially com-plete, is essentially in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report.
The plant is ready to undergo initial criticality and low power testing.
4.0 Facility Testin,3 l
4.1 Summary and Overview The preoperational test program began in September,1983 and is com-plete.
The startup test program is partially completed.
Following fuel loading in October, 1986, the plant heatup commenced on February 10, 1987. During this post-core load hot functional testing (HFT) period, all required startup tests were completed. Plant cool-down was commenced on March 19, 1987.
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11 4.2 :Startup Testing'
' The first two phases of startup testing, initial fuel loading and pre-critical testing were accomplished in ' late 1986 and early -1987.
Significant testing ; completed to date includes fuel loading and' source installation, reactor coolant system flow, leakage and thermal expansion' tests, instrumentation testing, l rod control and nuclear --
instrumentation testing and retesting-of those preoperational tests which. were not completed during the~ previous HFT.
Two notable exceptions remain unresolved. The startup testing for the emergency feedwater system (ST-53) experienced additional problems. The start-up test was completed; however, further testing to prove operability and system functionality will be performed on.the next heatup (refer to paragraph 3.3.2)..
The steam generator blowdown test (ST-54)'was also completed; however, the blowdown flow instrumentation experi-enced accuracy fluctuations and will also be retested on the next heatup.
This testing will involva.iata taking to determine what additional changes, if' any, are necessary.
The system is presently capable of providing blowdown of the steam generators.
During the extended layup period, secondary systems were chemically treated, drained and maintained in a de-humidified atmosphere. Licen-see preparations for heatup are - underway and secondary systems are being made ready to support startup testing.
4.3 Conclusions Preoperational testing is complete, startup testing.has been com-pleted satisfactorily up to the point of initial criticality.
All items requiring retest on heatup are properly documented, tracked and scheduled for completion. The startup test program is ready to be continued with initial criticality and low power testing.
5.0 Operational Readiness
'5.1 Summary and Overview With the exception of the six week post-core load hot functional' testing period in early 1987, the plant has been operated in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, with primary temperatures between 110 degrees F and 140 degrees F.
The pressurizer has been vented and one residual heat removal (RHR) pump is normally operating to maintain boron concen-tration mixing. The zero power license issued under 10 CFR 50.57(c) includes license conditions which ensure that the 2100 ppm boron concentration in the reactor coolant system (RCS) cannot be diluted.
Operation is in accordance with Technical Specifications which in Mode 5 provide substantial flexibility to allow major maintenance and modification work to be performed.
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Fuel loading was conducted professionally, safely and without inci-dent. The declaration of an Unusual Event based upon leaking, con-tainment equipment hatch personnel airlock valves resulted' from a communications problem but had minimal safety, impact.
The affected valve linkages have been redesigned (refer. to paragraph 3.3.3).
The eighth Seabrook Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report covered the period between April 1, 1986 and July 31,1987. The findings of that report are summarized in each functional area below along with a current status. The eighth SALP report is generally favorable describing a licensee with. strong man-agement focus and effective programs.
A comparison of the seventh and eighth SALP report ratings is included in Enclosure 4.
The transition from construction to operation has been effective, although the long shutdown period has provided f'ew operational challenges.
5.2 Plant Operations 5.2.1 Conduct of Operations Routine plant operations continue to be conducted in ac-cordance with the highest standards of professional m.
In spite of a two year cold shutdown mode of operation, the vigilance of the operators has never lessened. The opera-tors are knowledgeable in their duties and conservative in their interpretation of Technical Specifications and License Conditions. Occasional errors, partly attributable to procedural weakness have occurred. The RHR/RCS mid loop test was performed without incident.
Several reporting errors including the failure to notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of the Unusual Event, diesel failures and 1E/non-1E problems have occurred but are not considered programmatic.
The department has re-duced the number of inadvertent ESF actuations.
Program-matic areas of weakness previously identified such as tag-ging, independent verification, temporary modifications and locked valves have been adequately addressed.
5.2.2 Organization and Staffing New personnel promoted to positions of responsibility with-in the department are responsive to NRC concerns.
Recent organizational changes have added a work control organiza-tion consisting of an additional Unit Shift Supervisor (referred to as the Work Control Supervisor), senior con-trol room operator and auxiliary operator to the control room.
This small team will coordinate tagging and work control on day shifts.
In addition, a Day Shift Superin-tendent position was created and staffed with a senior
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'13-h shift superintendent who reports to the AssistantL0pera-tions Manager and coordinates planning and scheduling. of.
. plant activities with other departments. < These dedicated staff positions are expected to enhance the: work control:
function as: well as free: the on-shif t operators of a ' pre-viously burdensome administrative work load.
5.3, Operator Licensing Examinations and Licensed Operator Training
. A summary of operator licensing examinations administered since the -
last recommendation - for license issuance is given below. 'It may be noted.that the station continues to achieve a high pass rate, indi-cative of a high quality training program which incorporates training on the site-specific simulator.
The Seabrook requalification program has been fully implemented and integrated 'into the. six shift rotation. Thirty-eight individuals hold senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses, twenty-three of whom are involved in plant operations. Nine individuals hold. reactor operator (RO)' licenses., eight of whom are involved in plant operations.
Fif-teen of the SR0s are qualified as shift technical advisors.
Examination Date No. of Candidates Results August,. 1987 13 SRO Candidates 13. Passed 7 R0 Cardidates
- 6. Passed
- January, 1988 1
R0 Retake 1
Passed 5.4 Maintenance and Surveillance The plant operational configuration has allowed for major maintenance activities to be accomplished when necessary. Major corrective main-tenance was conducted on the RHR pumps, emergency diesel generators, circulating water pumps, service water valves and piping and the pri-mary and secondary component cooling water heat exchangers.. Major component' repir3 Nere conducted on Elgar inverters, Veritrak/Tobar transmitters, Gamma-Metrics nuclear instrument cables, Gould J-10 L
relays and Westinghouse DS-416 reactor trip breakers.
Significant NRC Bulletin responses were made related to substandard flanges and fasteners.
Integrated planning and scheduling activities remain a strength and to date no significant maintenance related failures have occurred.
The surveillance program, fully implemented with issuance of the Technical Significations, has been relatively trouble free with only minor errors resulting in missed or overdue surveillance.
The licensee's failure to report diesel failures, previously identified
q n.
q 2.
la u.' ;
'14 l
j as s.<mptomatic of a programmatic weakness,.has been corrected. Sur-
- ve111ance activities in preparation for plant' heatup continue and
. ;l Mode 2 surveillance is on track.
1 5.5g Radiological Controls and Chemistry The radiological ' controlled area at - Seabrook. was recently re-estab-lished 1 for_ training and -_ familiarization purposes.
During the fuel.
1 loading evolution, the radiological protection staff demonstrated an 1
aggressive program geared toward commercial operation. No incidents of significance occurred during source installation and fuel loading The' health _ physics department appears ready for - low power testing.
The chemistry laboratory.has been in operation during the zero power license period. The department is aggressive in ensuring compliance with appropriate standards.
5.6 Emergency Preparedness Onsite emergency preparedness (EP) readiness is considered to be adequate with. respect to 5% operation, however, Region I is aware of-certair, hearing board activities related to 1988 EP Annual Exercise.
weaknesses which were clvsed for inspection purposes in NRC:RI In-spection Report 50-443/88-10.
This exercise was conducted 'in -June, 1988 and no deficiencies were noted. :It is expected that FEMA will provide NRC with a consolidated finding on offsite plans in the near
~
future.
5.7 -Security
' The NHY Physical Security Plan has been fully implemented for about
- two years.
The result is a program with substantially greater maturity than most at the low power licensing stage.
5.8 Engineering and Technical Support Since the previous recommendation, this area has undergone signifi-cant evolution.
The NHY corporate engineering staff is located on-b site and reports to the Vice-President, Engineering, Licensing and l
Quality Programs.
The technical support staff is a station depart-ment and reports to the Vice-President, Nuclear Production via the i
Station Manager. As evidenced by a Category 2 rating in the eighth SALP report, the corporate engineering program demonstrated weak-nesses'in several areas. A concerted effort to improve has been noted and liaison between corporate engineering and technical support engineers has improved as has the quality, timeliness and effec-tiveness of the overall engineering product.
Licensee technical support engineering remains a strength utilizing the system engineer E
7
. c 1 ;.
15 concept. This overall engineering organization will be able to meet station needs provided staffing by experienced personnel remains adequate.
5.9 Quality Assurance The eighth SALP report rated quality assurance (QA) as Category 2.
Little has changed since that time. Although the.QA organization has made efforts to become more pro-active in their role, they are ~ still program oriented.
In this respect,. they effectively schedule, per-form and track. inspections,. audits and surveillance.
They appear somewhat' relt.ctant to expand upon station or NRC identified areas of potential weakness. Detailed QA involvement in the startup program was r.ot in evidence until NRC concerns were raised. Presently, QA involvement in the startup program is under evaluation.
5.10 Conclusion An analysis of recent licensee performance by functional area reveals generally mature programs with strong management involvement with the exception of quality assurance (QA). Areas of weakness have-been aggressively addressed and corrected.
In the QA area the level of performance is acceptable but not equivalent to the high licensee standards found in all other programs. The station. staff and support organizations are ready to receive and utilize a low power license.
6.0' NRC Inspection Program History and Findings Since the original submittal of this recommendation in October, 1986, forty-nine inspections totalling 6059 hours0.0701 days <br />1.683 hours <br />0.01 weeks <br />0.00231 months <br /> have been conducted. Enclosure I summarizes these inspections.
6.1 Routine Inspection Activities Routine inspection activities are coordinated by the resident in-spectors. The inspection programs require both resident and regional specialist inspection. Additionally, team inspections are conducted to provide reactive or pre planned focus on one or several specific
- issues, 6.1.1 Inspection program Status The status and overall findings of the sequential NRC In-spection Manual Chapter (MC) 2500 series inspection pro-grams are given in the following paragraphs.
6.1.1.1 MC 2512 Program:
Region I inspections of con-struction activities at Seabrook have, in the past, been conducted in accordanct with the pro-gram established by the Office of Inspection
{,
4-g%
16 and - Enforcement.
The objective of these safety inspe::tions was to obtain sufficient information L
through direct observation in the field, per-sonnel interviews, and review ~of procedures and.
records to determine whether ' construction and installation of safety-related components, structures and systems met applicable require-ments. The -Construction Inspection Program at Seabrook has been completed.
6.1.1.2 MC 2513 program:
During the pre-operational testing period, two resident inspectors were assigned to the site with a third entry level inspector / trainee assigned until
- July, 1986.
Region I specialist inspectors provided signif-icant coverage including test procedure reviews, test witnessing and test results' evaluation.
Operational readiness was inspected by~ regional and resident personnel.
Staffing, programs and procedures were evaluated.
The Pre-operational Phase Inspection Program per MC. 2513 was com-pleted in early 1987.
6.1.1.3 MC 2514 Program:
Two resident inspectors were assigned to the site during the fuel loading and precritical testing time frame.
Currently, one Senior Resident Inspector with over three years experiene at Seabrook is assigned to the site.
Additional resident office coverage has been maintained with periodic assignments of regional inspectors to the site for periods.Lf from one to six weeks. The Startup Inspection Program is up to date with respect to current plant status.
Inspection of initial fuel loading and precriti-cal (post-core load) tests is complete. Froced-ure reviews required for initial criticality and low power tests are also complete. By memorandum dated April 20,1987 (Kane to Murley), the Sea-brook Startup Test Program Category 1 tests to be witnessed were identified.
The selection of Group A and selected Group B tests was supported by the PRA recommendations of the Region I/EG&G study completed in March,1986. NRC resident and specialist inspector coverage of the startup activities completed to date reveal only two anomalies. The EFW system test, ST-53 has been satisfactorily completed, however, certain NRC and licensee concerns remain.
These issues are to be addressed by accomplishment of special test
l
'17 s
procedure STP-101 which is scheduled to be -con-ducted during heatup prior to initial critical-ity.. The steam generator blowdown system test ST-54 'is also completed, however, erratic flow indication at low flow rates will require addi-tional analysis of data obtained during the next heatup.
The licensee preparation. of the startup testing procedures was excellent.
All 56 startup test procedures were finalized in a timely manner.
They were well written and received adequate review and approval.
Fuel load and post-core load HFT activities were deliberate and well coordinated.
Adherence to procedural controls was well in evidence. Start-up testing was performed by qualified personnel who interfaced well with their operations coun-terparts and with management in the prompt reso-lution of equipment problems and test deficien-cies. Test records were well prepared and main-tained. Test exceptions were few and disposit-ioned in a technically appropriate and thorough manner.
Overall, a high level of performance has been found to exist in the licensee's implementation of the startup testing program at Seabrook Unit 1.
Where system redesign was necessary and ad-l' ditional testing is required, further Region I follow-up inspection is planned during the low i
power testing phase.
i 6.1.1.4 MC 2515 Procram: The Operations Inspection Pro-gram has been implemented at the core level with selected reactive inspection module accomplish-ment on a case basis. Implementation of this pro-gram to date has been principally a resident inspection function.
Upon completion of low power testing, it is expected that additional regional resources will be allocated in antici-pation of full power license issuance.
l:
6.1.2 Team Inspections Srtveral special team inspections of Seabrook Unit I have been conducted since the original recommendation to sup-l plement the routine inspection program. These inspections are listed below with a description of the inspection scope and conclusions.
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6.1. 2.1 -
Region 1 Allegation Team Inspection - November,
,g 1986 3
' The ' purpose of this team. inspection was. to in-vestigate sixty-one allegations' made-by the Employee's Legal Project related to construction quality as well as 'several other' technical and-non-technical concerns.
The.- interdisciplinary team consisted ~ of specialists in the electrical,-
mechanical, civil and metallurgical engineering.
s fields.
Plant hardware. was inspected and independent-tests were performed where possible1 to evaluate the allegation. Previous NRC inspection' records were reviewed and. allegers and plant staff were interviewed.
Further details of'this inspection may.be found in paragraph 3.4.1.
Within the scope of this inspection, no nuclear safety significant issues.or violations were' identified.
'6.1.2.2 Region I ATWS Team Inspection - December. - 1986 The purpose of the ATWS Team Inspection was to address licensee activities taken 'in response to Generic Letter 83-28 concerning the Salem ATWS.
The *,eam was composed of three inspectors from the NRC:RI Quality Assurance Section.
Licensee actions in the area of equipment class-ification, vendor interface, post. maintenance testing, plant surveillance and QA/QC interface were reviewed.
No violations were -identified.
One unresolved item was opened with respect to spare parts and was subsequently closed in NRC:RI Inspection Report 50-443/87-26.
6.1.2.3 R_egion I Allegation Team Inspection - April /May 1987 The allegation team which performed the November, 1986 team inspection was reconstituted following a meeting with the Employee's Legal Project (ELP) in April, 1987.
During this meeting additional allegations were presented which were inspected on site during the weeks of April 6, April 20 and May 4, 1987.
f
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i While.no significant findings ' occurred from this inspection; two unresolved items concerning con -
crete cracking 'and. groundwater effects 'on rein-forcing steel were identified and referred to NRR.
for technical' analysis.
Brookhaven~ National Laboratory was contracted to perform independent l
analyses of. these.1ssues. - While resolution of 1
-these issues is still pending a response to Region I from NRR, neither are believed to be low power issues. Further details of this inspection may be found in paragraph 3.4.1, No violations-o were identified.
l 6.1.2.4 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Team
^
Inspection-- December, 1987 The 1987 annual Seabrook emergency drill was 3
observed by a team of three emergency prepared-ness (EP) specialists from Region I and NRR.
R This was a partial participation exercise with limited participation by the New Hampshire (NH)
Civil Defense Agency.
The. Commonwealth of Massachusetts and several NH communities did-not i
participate.
Six exercise. strengths.'and two
)
exercise weaknesses were identified and nine'open
~j items from previous EP inspections.were closed.
No violations were identified.
6.1.2.5 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Team
- l Inspection - June, 1988
'l The 1988 Seabrook annual EP exercise was observed i
by a team of seven. inspectors from Region I, NRR j
and Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
This was a j
full participation exercise and included t he --
states of Maine and NH as well as the NHY Offsite i
Response Organization (ORO).
The.0R0 is the l
organization 'which compensates for a lack of 1
participation on the part of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Five exercise strengths and four exercise weaknesses were noted.
The four weak-i nesses were subsequently closed in NRC:RI In-1 spection Report 50-443/88-10.
c 6.1.2.6 Rejion I Self Assessment Team Inspection -
October / November, 1988
)
The purpose of this NRC inspection was to evaluate the licensee's Phase I self assessment activities.
The team reviewed the NHY self l
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,2;..
assessment program and results as well as con-g ducted independent inspection to corroborate licensee conclusions.
No violations were iden-1 tified and it was determined that NHY is ready to j
heat up and conduct low power testing (refer to i
paragraph 7.0).
1 6.2 Enforcement History i
There have been ten Notices of Violation issued since the last l
recommendation. They are summarized in Enclosure 2.
It may be noted l
that while two violations involve the cnntrol building air handling.
j (CBA) system, no recurring problem areas are identified.
The CBA 1
concerns have been adequately addressed in a major, design change 3
which is presently in progress and will be completed before exceeding 5% power (refer to paragraph 3.2.1). No escalated enforcement action 1
has been initiated at Seabrook and the relatively low safety signif-icance of all the violations indicates that no major areas of pro-grammatic weakness exist.
j 7.0 NRC Evaluation of Licensee Self Assessment
)
A team inspection was conducted on October 31 - November 4,1988, at Sea-l brook to review the NHY Phase I Self Assessment of readiness to conduct l
initial criticality and low power testing.
The inspection included dis-cussions with licensee personnel, selected observations of self assessment activities and review of licensee self assessment findings. The team noted that the licensee has considerable experience in self assessment, having a permanent group which, since 1984, has conducted approximately 200 self assessments of various areas.
The overall conclusion of the team was that the licensee self assessment was a strong effort involving considerable resources and utilizing highly l
qualified individuals.
The assessment was formal, well structured and self critical.
Findings were found to have been reviewed by management ar.d assigned appropriate priorities for resolution. This inspection served to confirm the licensee's overall readiness to conduct low power opera-tions.
The team findings and conclusions are discussed further in a memorandum f rom J. E. Beall for J. T. Wiggins dated November 17, 1988,
" Review of New Hampshire Yankee Operational Readiness Self-Assessment,"
-(Enclosure 5).
8.0 Financial Qualifications
8.1 Background
The NHY Division of PSNH manages the Seabrook project for the twelve Joint Owners.
PSNH is the majority holder with 35.6% share. The Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (MMWEC) is a minority holder with 11.6% share.
On August 20, 1987 the Atomic
_-_n
4 21 Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) denied a petition by interveners to waive the financial qualification rule because of the financial status of PSNH at that time. On January 29, 1988 the ASLAB in hear-icg an appeal of the above ruling took up investigation of the issue based upon the PSNH bankruptcy filing of the previous day.
On April 13,1988, the ASLAB declined to rule on this issue and refused to re-open the record based on a
lack of information.
On July 5,1988, the ASLAB certified the above appeal to the Commission for further consideration based upon the MMWEC decision to halt pro-ject payments.
On August 11, 1988, NRR requested that NHY provide clarification of its financial coverage for its cost of operations, any permanent shutdown of the plant and pcst-low power test program maintenance. NHY has responded and continues to periodically update NRR on its status, most recently with respect to the agreement to provide alternative funding of the MMWEC shares.
8.2 Conclusions Region I was tasked with providing periodic updates to NRR concerning onsite observation of any potential impact on plant operations of the station's financial difficulties.
To date, there is no indication l
that the PSNH bankruptcy or the MMWEC withdrawal have had any adverse impact on safety-related ottivities at Seabrook. This evaluation was based upon resident inspector review of overtime, staf fing, training schedules, maintenance backlog, design changes, surveillance status i
and housekeeping.
l 9.0 Future NRC Region I Actions During the heatup to normal operating temperature Region I will conduct a Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI). The inspection team will evaluate licensee performance in the areas of operations, maintenance, surveillance, technical support, radiation protection, chemistry, en-vironmental monitoring, startup testing, management effectiveness and quality verification.
This heatup period will provide windows of oppor-l tunity to evaluate facility operation during heatup, mode changes and hot l
operations.
Routine surveillance testing, special startup testing and I
normal maintenance activities will be conducted and subject to NRC in-l spection.
The results of this inspection will serve to validate the licensee's readiness for initial criticality and provide an opportunity to ensure necessary corrective actions are taken if necessary prior to that milestone.
10.0 Overall Conclusion The licensee has established programs and procedures to track readiness related issues.
Both licensee and NRC evaluaticn of these mechanisms reveal a facility that is ready to startup.
These conclusions are sup-ported not only by recent evaluation but by over 26,000 inspection hours over the life of the project.
Management attention to organizational
.f goaJs remains high and independent reviews play an integral part in man-agement decision making. Self criticism has been encouraged since the establishment of the NHY Division of PSNH.
The ' licensee and facility level of operational readiness appears. to be i
excellent.
This has been substantiated by the' licensee self assessment -
and verified by NRC evaluation of that activity. Continued NRC inspection j
plans will provide real time feedback to-agency managers to ensure that the Seabrook startup, when conducted, is conducted safely and in accord-ance with all applicable regulations and requirements.
Region I concludes that the plant has been constructed and tested in accordance with the FSAR and NRC requirements. Programs, procedures and organization ' are in place to permit issuance of a low. power license.
Therefore, Region I supports issuance of a low power operating license.
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a
M ENCLOSURE 1 Inspection Summary Inspection Inspection Inspection Number Areas Hours 86-45 Routine Inspection of 36 CDRs, Procedures and Design Changes.
86-46 Routine Inspection of 358 Construction Design Changes, TMI Action Plac, Previous Items.
86-47 Routine Inspection of Testing, 428 License Issuance, Core Loading, Maintenance, Surveillance, Operations and Previoc' Items.
86-48 Routine Inspection of, srtup 48 Test Program and Procedo:es; Review of Containment Test Report.
86-49 Routine Inspection of Pre-Service 39 Inspection Program and Records and Previous Items.
86-50 Routine Inspection of Initial 331 Fuel Loading Activities.
86-51 Special Inspection To Review 97 Allegation of As-Built Drawing Discrepancies.
86-52 Special Team Inspection to Review 478 Allegations by ELP.
86-53 Inspection Number Not Used.
86-54 Routine Inspection of Operations, 187 Maintenance, Surveillance, Startup Testing and Previous l
Items.
86-55 Routine Inspection of Occupational 40 l
Radiological Controls Program and Previous Items.
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(l:
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2
- i..
I y
. Inspection V
Inspection Inspection' 7^
Number-y' Areas Hours j
86-56 Routine Inspection _of Physical 24 Security Program and Previous Items.
86-57 Inspection Number Not Used.
86-58
'Special Team Inspection To 118 Review Licensee Action on GL B3-28, ATWS.
87-01 Routine Inspection of 128 Preoperational Testing.
87-02 Routine Inspection of 432 Preoperational Testing, Maintenance, Surveillance, Operations and Previous Items.
87-03 Routine Inspection of 56 Surveillance Test Program.
87-04 Routine Inspection of Radwaste 30 Program and Preoperational Testing.
87-05 Routire Inspection of Startup 69 and Preoperational Testing.
87-06 Inspection Number Not Used.
87-07 Special Team Inspection of 583 Allegations Raised by ELP.
87-08 Special Inspection to Follow-up 26 Unusual Event of 02/11/87, 87-09 Routine Inspection of 34 Preoperational Testing.
87-1p Routine Inspection of 346 Preoperational Testing, Maintenance, Training, Operations and Previous Items.
o
W 3
Inspection.
Inspection Inspection l
y Number Areas Hours I
87-11 Routine Inspection of Startup 32 and Preoperational Test c,
Programs.
87,T2 Routine Inspriction of EP Program 54 i
and Previous Items.
87-13 Routine Inspection of Design 268
?
Control Program, Testing, f
Maintenance, Surveillance and Previous Items.
/
87-14 Routine Inspection of 34 Occupational Radiological Controls Program.
87-15 Routine Inspection of 33 Non-Radiological Chemistry Program.
87-16 Routine Inspection of Operations, 270 Maintenance, Surveillance, Design Changes, Training and Previous Items.
87-17 Operator Licensing Examination.
87-18 Special Inspection of Service 35 Water Valve Repairs.
87-19 Operator Licensing Examination.
87-20 Routine Inspection of 34 Maintenance Programs.
87-21 Routine Inspection of Physical 68 Security Program.
87-22 Routine Inspection To Follow-Up 32 Corrective Actions Concerning Onusual Event and Emergency Siren Status.
87-23 Routine Inspection of Operations, 115 Mair,tenance, Surveillance, Security, Licensee Reports and Previous Items.
7gDp 7
- . 9. - -
' V W" * '
a; h-A,
-Enclosure.1 4
940$
pn
$2$Y
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- Inspection
- Inspection Inspection' Number'
--Areas
- Hours-1 37-24:
Routine Inspection of 208-Operational Safety, Maintenance, Surveillance,' Licensee Reports and Previous Items.
187-25 Special Team Inspection of Annual 54' Emergency. Plan. Exercise.
87-26 Routine Inspection of 98 Operational Safety, Design
. Changes,_ Allegations and Previous Items.
'88-01
- Operator Licensing Examination.
88-02 Routine Inspection of 176 Operational Safety, Maintenance, Security and Previous Items.
24 88-03.
Routine Inspection of Emergency.
Preparedness Program.
88-04' Routine Inspection of the-34 Startup Testing and Follow-Up to General Letter 83-28.
88-05 Routine Inspection of Physical 42 Security Program.
88-06 Routine Inspection of Mid Loop Test, 210 Operations, Maintenance, Security Previous Items.
88-08 Special Inspection of Vehicular 30 Alert and Notification System.
88-09 Special Inspection of 176 of Annual EP Exercise.
88-10 Routine Inspection of Operational 224 Safety, Licensee Reports, Maintenance, Surveillance, Design Changes, Allegations and Training.
88-11 Routine Inspection of 75 Engineering and Technical Support.
O
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Inspection Inspection Inspection Number-Areas Hours
'88-12 Routine Inspection'.of
~ 19 Startup Testing,
-=
88-13' Routine Inspection of.
226 Operational Safety, Previous Items, Licensee Reports, Maintenance, Surveillance Design Changes and Previous Items.
88-14 Routine Inspection of 38 physical Security Program.
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3 ENCLOSURE 2-Enforcement History' Inspection Requirement Severity.
Description Brief Number' Level H-
. 86-46
'10'CFR 50, 4
. Seismic.2 Over 1 APP. B Controls For.
Temporary Equipment 86-47 10 CFR 50,-
4 Lock,ed Valve
, APP. B Controls-87-02 10 CFR 50,-
CBA System Not 4
APP.B Operated In.
Accordance With-Design Requirements 87-08 TS 6.7 1 4
Failure To Report' Unusual-Event.
87-13 10 CFR 50.59
.4 SW/SCW Temporary Modification 87-16 10 CFR 50,-
4 CBA System APP. B Inoperable 87-20 10 CFR 50, 5
Tagging Program Deficiencies 88-10 TS 4.8.1.1.3 5
Failure To Report Diesel Generator Failures 88-13 TS 3.8.4.2 5
Non Class IE Devices Connected to IE Sources 88-14 Physical Security 4
Vehicle Search Plan Deficiencies l
I
7 I
L 1
ENCLOSURE 3 1
NRC' Bulletin Summary r
-Bulletin No.
Subject Status 85-03
~ Motor-Operated Valve Common Open - Updated Mode Failures. During Plant in IR 88-13 by Transients Due to Improper NRC:NRR:0GCB Switch Settings.
y 86-01 Minimum Flow Logic Problems N/A That.Could Disable RHR-Pumps.
86-02 Static "0" Ring Differential Closed in 7/18/86 Pressure Switches.
IR 86-47 86-03 Dotential. Failure of Multiple Closed in
'2CS Pumps Due to Single IR 86-54 i
Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line.
86-04 Defective Teletherapy Timer N/A
'That May Not Terminate Dose.
,l 87-01 Thinning of Pipe Walls in Closed in
{
Nuclear Power Plants.
IR 87-16
_a 87-02 Fastener Testing to Closed in I
Determine Conformance With IR 88-10 I
Applicable Material Specifications.
88-01 Defects in Westinghouse Closed in Circuit Breakers.
IR 88-06 88-02 Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Closed in Cracks in Steam Generator IR 88-02 Tubes.
i 88-03 Inadequate Latch Engagement Open - Relays in HFA Type Latching Relays replaced 10/88
)
Manufactured by General Licensee response
- Electric (GE) Company.
due 88-04 Potential Safety-Related Open - Licensee Pump Loss.
response 2/88 i
indicates I
additional information due 12/31/88 1
I
_ _ = _ - - _ _ _ _ = _ _ - _ _ _
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= - - -
,>e:
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i
- .#. y Enclosure'3'
-2
-Bulletin No.
Subjecti Status 88-05
-Nonconforming Materials' Open L-Licensee :
d Supplied by Piping Supplies,-
response. 8/88 Inc. at Folsom,. New Jersey NRR requested
-l and West Jersey Manufacturing chemical ~ testing-R
' Company at Williamstown, of all. heats,.
resulted in two flanges replaced
'11/88. Final.
i response'due.
i 88-06 Actions to be Taken For N/A i
the Transportation of i
Model.No. Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure
.i Device.
88-07 Power Oscillations in N/A-Boiling Water Reactors.
88-08 Thermal Stresses in Piping-Open - Temporary Connected to Reactor Coolant modification
- Systems, installed to monitor for.
i leakage. Licensee i
responded 9/88.
i i
88-09 Thimble Tube Thinning.
Open - Inspection required at first i
refueling outage.
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. i.,,
k ENCLOSURE 4
' Summary of SALP Evaluations Report Number:
50-443/86-99 Apri_1 1~ 1986 - July.31,1987 Evaluation Period:.
Management. Meeting Date:
November.12, 1987' LManagement^ Meeting Location:.Seabrook, New Hampshire" PREVIOUS RATING CURRENT RATING
. FUNCTIONAL AREA' (Seventh'SALP)
(Eight SALP):
i 1.
' Construction Completion.
1.
1 2.
Startup Testing:
1 1-
- 3.
Plant Operations 1*
2
'.4.
Radiological-Controls
'1 5.
~1
' 6.
Security and Safeguards 1
L Engineering Support 2
.g 8.
Licensing Activities 1
1 9.
Training and Qualification 1
Effectiveness
- 10. Assurance of Quality 1
2
- During the previous SALP period, " plant operations" was evaluated in terms of
" operational readiness", which included " radiological controls", " security and safeguards", and " training / qualification" assessments in one general functional area.
- During the previous SALP period, Engineering Support was not evaluated as a separate Functional Area.
Y-.N- _ L-.__ - - -. _ - - - -.. _ _. - -. _ - -. - -...... -... -
...