ML20234F089
| ML20234F089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1987 |
| From: | Jamison J Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION |
| To: | Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8801110322 | |
| Download: ML20234F089 (7) | |
Text
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OBattelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
-n i.,p
.o.
. Box 999 3
J
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- c land, Washington U.5A. 99352 Telephone (509) 375-3782 Telex 15-2674 December 28, 1987
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Mr. W. M. Sartor l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Region II 101 Marietta Street l
Suite 3100
'1 Atlanta, GA 30303 j
Dear Bill:
GRAND GULF EXERCISE, November 17, 1987 Enclosed is the final report of Michael Stein who was the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PHL) participant during the subject exercise. Only minor changes have been made to the draft given to you prior to his leaving the site.
The areas covered by Mr. Stein included the CR and TSC.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on FTS (509)375-3782.
Sincerely, C44t w J. D. Jamison Technical Leader Emergency Preparedness Group Health Physics Technology Section HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT JDJ:tle
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I Enclosure cc:
DB Matthews, w/ enclosure 1
gRO1110322 871228 p
ADOCK 0500042 6 i
PDR sx AK _ - -
GRAND GULF ANNUAL EXERCISE November 17, 1987 A.
Name: Michael Stein B.
Assignment:
Observe control room response through activation of the TSC, then observe TSC activities through the remainder of the exercise.
C.
Site Personnel Contacted:
C. Morgan, Exercise Director; L. Robertson, Chief Controller; D. Bottomiller, Control Room Controller; D. Wells, TSC l
Controller.
D.
Positive Findings
. A coordinated, well-rehearsed exercise response capability was demonstrated.
The initial classification made in the control room was correct and timely.
The initial notification of state and local response organization was accurate and made within fifteen minutes of event declaration.
The TSC was activated expeditiously (within thirty minutes of ALERT l
declaration).
The trarsfer of control between the Emergency Director (ED) in the control room and the on-call ED was performed in a systematic manner that minimized disruptions.
The ED was sensitive to the routine aspects of emergency response such i
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as log keeping, updating status boards, periodic updates of state and l
l locals, public information releases, and frequent briefings of the TSC l
l staff. The superior performance of the ED and TSC personnel in those areas provided a stable foundation from which to solve the larger problems of event mitigation, dose projection, and recommendation of protective actions.
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, The layout of the TSC was very effective; it was functional, contributed to good communications among TSC staff and resulted in an acceptably low noise level.
. Strong performance by three key members of the TSC response organization were noted. The ED, TSC Coordinator, and Radiological Protection Manager 1
(RPM) were all aggressive in pursuing their' responsibilities, showed foresight in anticipating degraded plant and radiological conditions, and remained enthusiastic participants throughout the exercise.
E.
Negative Findings 1
, The TSC Coordinator routinely authorized the dispatch of teams from the OSC without conferring with the ED.
. Meteorology data was constant throughout the exercise, which is not realistic.
Although large wind shifts are not required, normal variations in met conditions provide stimuli for revised dose projections and ongoing decision-making regarding the safety of onsite personnel.
Varying met data also provides a discrete piece of information that can be used to judge the adequacy of communications from the RPM to the Health Physics Coordinator in the OSC, then to departing in-plant teams during briefings.
F.
Chronology Time Observation 0730 Exercise started.
I 0815 Division 3 D/G started for surveillance.
0820 Fire reported in Division 3 generator room.
0821 Fire announced on PA system; fire brigade dispatched.
0824 Emergency plan placed in effect; ALERT declared.
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Time Observation 0830 Message #1 transmitted via hotline to state and locals.
0825 ALERT passed on PA system.
0830 Message #1 transmitted via hotline to state and locals.
0835 Call completed; Port Gibson police did not answer.
0836 Call placed to Port Gibson police.
0839 Notification call made to NRC..
0840 Commenced reactor shutdown.
0846 Fire reported to be under control.
0849 Headset manned to TSC; SS reviewed check list from EPP.
0850 Fire reported.out.
0852 PA announcement made that fire was out.
0855 CR communicator dispatched to TSC to turn over to TSC communicator..
0856 Hutchinson relieved as ED; announced in CR and TSC.
0904 Checklist reviewed by TSC with CR.
0908 Radiation Protection Manager directed all hands to get dosimetry from Health Physics before leaving the TSC.
0914 ED agreed on recovering the Division 1 D/G with Ops Coordinator.
0919 Follow-up notification made to state and locals.
First priority is to recover Division 1 D/G
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Second priority to assess / recover Division 3 D/G bus 0944 TSC Coordinator briefed ED on status of Division 1 D/G.
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l Time Observation 0948 TSC Coordinator briefed ED on status of Division 1 D/G; 16 hrs to recover.
0950 ED briefed TSC staff from 0730 command messages.
0958 TSC Coordinator decided that repair of Division 1 D/G.was still #1 priority.
1000 OSC directed to seal all penetrations as quickly as possible.
1013 Loss of one source of offsite power reported.
1015 Loss of power simulated in TSC; loss of all offsite power; Division 2 D/G failed to start.
1017 ED briefed TSC staff; ED declared SAE without waiting 15 minutes because overall conditions were degrading and there was no reason to expect power loss to be less than 15 minutes.
1020 ED briefed TSC staff; RPM recommended evacuating areas downwind of station.
1030 OSC reported that a team had been dispatched to Division 2 D/G.
1043 Site Access Point (SAP) reported activated at 1040.
1050 ED directed TSC to develop method for drawing containment drywell air sample under loss of power conditions.
1053 NEMA requested level data; TSC provided.
1055 Discussion held between ED and RPM; recognized need to de-energize H2 ignitors before restoring power.
1100 No problems found during trouble shooting of Division 2 D/G. Fuel oil samples planned; Division 2 first.
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Time Observation 1104 TSC Coordinator directed CR to place switches for H2 ignitors to i
"off".
1112 TSC Coordinator directed OSC to open access cover to steam tunnel and shut a valve to isolate containment.
1115 Division 2 D/G restart attempted; failed to start.
1119 ED briefed TSC staff on status of E0F activation.
l 1125 TSC Coordinator directed OSC to research jumpering out RCIC high exhaust system trip.
1128 ED briefed TSC staff on turnover to EOF.
1132 Contaminated fuel reported in Division 2 D/F fuel tank; ED directed that dry tank be sampled and " stripped" if contaminated.
1136 E0F reported activated.
1140 Decision made to leave RCIC suction on suppression bool.
I 1149 ED directed that a 24 hr shift rotation be developed.
1158 Division 1 and 3 storege tanks reported contaminated with water.
1216 RCIC reported tripped - steam line break.
q 1218 Unable to isolate RCIC; steam tunnel rupture disks out; release in progress.
1220 Level below top of active fuel; ED advised that SAE still applicable.
1224 RPM recommended evacuating personnel from site.
1225 ED briefed TSC staff; TSC support recommended General Emergency.
1235 ED declined GE after consulting with Ops Coordinator and E0F, decision based on Radiation detector reading indicating' fuel damage l
had occurred.
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1236 Loss of fire pumps reported.
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l Time Observation 1300 OSC reported man missing from repair team.
1330 Received printout from security with location of missing man.
1344 Division 2 D/G reported ready for restart (day tank refilled) 1350 ED briefed TSC staff.
1351 Division 2 D/G reported rur.ning.
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1355 ED briefed TSC staff RCIC isolated Injection started; level above top of active fuel 1359 Zero percent H2 reported.
1400 Standby gas treatment system reported in service.
4 1410 Offsite power restored.
1430 ED briefed E0F on plans for recovery.
1500 Exercise terminated.