ML20207J553

Insp Repts 50-321/86-36 & 50-366/86-36 on 861018-1121. Violation Noted:Failure to Perform Actions Required by Tech Spec 3.5.3.1.b.2 to Verify Operability of LPCI W/Both Trains of Core Spray Inoperable

ML20207J553
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/22/1986
From:	Cantrell F, Holmesray P, Nejfelt G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J517	List: ML20207J512 ML20207J522 ML20207J553
References
50-321-86-36, 50-366-86-36, NUDOCS 8701080515
Download: ML20207J553 (7)

See also: IR 05000321/1986036

Text

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, n UNITED STATES

g e [Eivq^o"

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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n REGION 18

g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• '* ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323

\...../

Report Nos.: 50-321/86-36 and 50-366/86-36

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch I and 2

Inspection Conducted 0ther18-November 21, 1986

Inspectors: , _ Nf. /2 2!8/,

Peter Holja Da'te Signed

af,Se61orResidentInspector

kOlk M

Gregory M. Nejfelt,'Re'sident Inspector

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Da'te Signed

Approved by: Mu[ . /2/7MVd

Date Signed

Floyd S. Cantrell, Cfspf', Project Section 28

Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification,

Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance Observation,

Potential Neutron Monitoring Failure, and Reportable Occurrences.

Results: One violation was identified - failure to perform actions required by

Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3.1.b.2 to verify operability of low pressure

coolant injection (LPCI) with both trains of core spray (CS) inoperable.

8701080515 861222

PDR ADOCK 05000321

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

T. Beckman, Vice President, Plant Hatch

• H. C. Nix, Plant Manager

• D. Read, Plant Support Manager

• H.L. Sumner, Operatfors Manager

B. McCloud, Maintenance Manager

• T.R. Powers, Engineering Manager

R.W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

• C. Coggin, General Support Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

• 0.M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

C.T. Moore, Training Manager

• S.B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

Other licer:see employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 24, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. -The licensee did not identify

as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors

during this inspection.

(0 pen) Violation 50-366/86-36-01 - Failure to verify that at least one train

of low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) was available with both trains of

core spray (CS) inoperable (paragraph 4).

The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

The following LER's contain licensee identified violations which were

reviewed and closed during this inspection.

(Closed) Licensee Identified Violation (LIV), 50-321/86-36-02 - Failure to

obtain reactor water conductivity measurement within time frame required by

Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.F.2.a.1, during a refueling outage. This

item was reported in Unit-1 Licensee Event Report (LER)86-001 (para-

graph 10).

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(Closed) LIV, 50-366/86-36-03 -

Failure to perform suppression

chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker surveillance within the time

frame required by TS 4.6.4.1. This item was reported in Unit-2

LER 86-013 (paragraph 10).

4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of

the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the

control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and

recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment,

controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions

for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data

sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection

activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their

supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature

(ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by

veri fying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power

supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage,

lubrication, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside

areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifi-

cations, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant

conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress,

radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification

systems, and containment isolation.

On November 14, 1986, at 12:19 a.m. (EST), the licensee identified that both

Unit-2 trains of core spray (CS) and one train of residual heat removal

(RHR) were inoperable without the verifying within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> that low pressure

coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the remaining RHR train was available, as

required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.1.b.2. Both CS trains were

tagged out at approximately 3:46 p.m. (EST) on November 13, 1986, in

preparation for the unit integrated leak rate test (ILRT); and were returned

to service by 3:30 a.m.(EST) on November 14, 1986.

The technical significance of this situation was minimal, because:

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No maintenance or operations activities, which had the potential

for draining the reactor vessel, were on going.

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There are no postulated accidents in the Unit-2 Final Safety

Analysis Report (FSAR), which could drain the reactor vessel.

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RHR was in shutdown cooling (SDC) mode; and could have been placed

by the operators into the LPCI mode within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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The reactor decay heat load was minimal, since the unit was

shutdown nearly two months ago and one-third of the core was

composed of new fuel.

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All control rods were fully inserted.

However, the failure to perform the required LPCI mode verification with no

immediate means of providing water inventory to the reactor vessel is

considered a violation (50-366/86-36-01).

In the area of housekeeping, it was observed that during the final closeout

of the Unit-1 drywell on November 19, 1986, on the 114' elevation, the floor

drains were clogged > with debris, two hard hats were left in the area,

and plastic bags were on the floor. These items were corrected prior to

startup. Also, the leaking 55 gallon drums of lubrication oil in the

reserve oil storage area that was described in IE Reports 50-321,366/86-33

have been removed; and the area has been cleaned up.

In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a

review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of

various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of c'aily

activities to include: protected and vital access controls, searching of

personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting

of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts. The additional security

required for the Unit-2 refueling in the reactor building at the drywell

entrance and on the refueling floor was observed. Additional security

was also observed at the drywell for the Unit-1 scheduled snubber outage

between November 14 - 20, 1986.

Other than the failure to perform the LPCI verification, no violations or

deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance

activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical

Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,

and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

On October 17, 1986, the inspector identified a number of 55 gallon drums

containing "Q" level lubrication stored near Warehouse #1 which did not have

affixed Quality Control (QC) Conformance Tags that are required by procedure

55MC-MTL-001-05. The tags for these drums were found by the licensee to be

either removed or destroyed by the effects of weather. Because of this

finding, approximately 15 drums were no longer considered "Q" level grade

lubrication due to a loss of documentation. To prevent loss of lubricant

history obtained by procedure 45QC-QCX-001-0S, the drums stored in this area

are now marked with an indelible pen with the drum purchase and order

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numbers.

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This item will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item (IFI)-50-321,366/86-36-04, until a procedural method is established to supplement

the QC Conformance Tag for "Q" materials that are stored in unsheltered

areas.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Plant Modification (37700)

The inspectors observed the performance of selected plant modification

Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a review of the DCR

for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verifi-

cation of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the

actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the

system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability

based upon the acceptance criteria.

The licensee has initiated As Built Notice (ABN)86-744 to revise the 0 to

15 ampere meter for the 4160-600V station service transformer switchgear on

the 4160V Bus "1F" in drawing, H-13356, to reflect the 0 to 50 ampere meter

actually installed. This item was identified in IE Report 50-321/86-33.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances. The

observations included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal

from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and

review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.

The inspector made the following observations concerning the procedures to

measure the primary containment electrical penetration nitrogen pressures -

safety related procedures, 52SV-T52-001-1, Revision 0, and 52SV-T52-001-2,

Revision 0:

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The nitrogen pressure readings recorded monthly varied by as much

as 2 psi between penetrations when they were expected to agree

within the accuracy of the gages (0.3 psi based on one-half of

one percent of the 0 to 60 psi range of the pressure gauge as

reported by the licensee). The readings were expected to agree

since they were initially charged to essentially the same

pressure, environmental conditions were essentially the same, and

no nitrogen was added. Readings for the penetrations varied

monthly both above and below the other nitrogen pressures ruling

out more leakage in one penetration than in other penetrations.

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The initiative to take corrective action to repair electrical

penetrations that consistently failed 52SV-T52-001-2 either was

untimely or was not done. The surveillance test on electrical

penetration X-202 failed ten times between August 11, 1985 and

June 6,1986, before maintenance work order (MWO) 2-86-714 was

written to correct the situation. Also, the surveillance test

on electrical penetration X-1008 failed five times between

October 10, 1985 and July 5, 1986, with no corrective maintenance

action initiated.

Based on conversations with the regional specialist, no code or regulation

required that the nitrogen pressure for these electrical penetrations be

maintained. Therefore, no regulatory action was taken, however, these

items were discussed with the licensee so appropriate actions could be

taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conduct partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve

and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified

both locally and in the control room to verify that the lineups were in

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accordance with licensee requirements for. operability and equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. The inspection of the Unit-1 drywell for

final closeout was also used to verify that emergency core cooling systems

(ECCS) in the drywell were in the required position and locked, if required.

, No violations or deviations were identified.

, 9. Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Potential Fuse Failure (92701/71711)

Based on General Electric (GE) Rapid Information Communication Services

Information Letter (RICSIL) Number 007, the licensee was investigating a

failure mode-of the neutron intermediate range monitors (IRMs) that may not

provide the reactor protection system with a scram signal during startup.

Loss of the IRM negative power supply voltage would not cause an inoperable

IRM trip card light; and would result in a signal output from the amplifier,

which uses the negative power supply, to be above the downscale trip and

below the upscale trip regardless of the actual condition.

The licensee is developing design change request (DCR)86-377, which would

replace the 0.75 ampere IRM negative power supply fuse with a 1.50 ampere

fuse. Also, the plant operators were alerted of this potential failure by

the licensee's October 1986 Operational Experience Assessment Report (OEAR).

GE is examining relay / contact modif f ration, which would monitor the IRM

negative power supply and would initiate an inoperable trip light, if a loss

, of power occurs. The results of GE's final recommendation will be in a GE

, Services Information Letter.

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The potential IRM negative power supply fuse failure will be tracked as

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tospector followup item (IFI) 50-321,366/86-36-05,

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10. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were

also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications

were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost

consideration. The following LERs are closed:

Unit-1: 86-001 (item is also tracked as LIV, 50-321/86-36-02);86-041.

Unit-2: 86-001;86-002; 86-007**;86-013 (item is also tracked as

LIV,50-366/86-36-03).

• • Tied with violation (SL4, 50-321,366/86-28-02) for missed Technical

Specification requirement, because licensee has not had an opportunity

to respond to the violation.

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