IR 05000456/1986028

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/86-28 & 50-457/86-22 on 860604-0814.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Resolution of Previous Insp Findings,Followup on Allegation & Insp of Steam Generator Tube Shot Peening

ML20206R300
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	08/29/1986
From:	Danielson D, James Gavula, Jeffrey Jacobson, Schapker J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206R194	List: IR 05000456/1986028 ML20206R188
References
50-456-86-28, 50-457-86-22, NUDOCS 8609050392
Download: ML20206R300 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/86028(DRS);50-457/86022(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: June 4-5, 10, 19, 24, July 10, 17, 22, 31, and August 12, 14, 1986, Inspectors- . M. Jacobson f 29 U Date Sa/M g. A. Gavula //46 o.r7^ 28, / hit Date e

J. F. Schapker 21!f*4

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Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief 8 29!h Materials and Processes Section Date Inspection Summary

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Inspection on June 4-5, 10, 19, 24, July 10, 17, 22, 31, and August 12, 14, 1986, (Reports No. 50-456/86028(DRS); 50-457/86022(DRS)?

Areas Inspected: Unannounced, special safety inspection of the resolution of previous inspection findings, follow-up on an allegation, and inspection of steam generator tube shot pcenin Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

8609050392 DR 860029 "

ADOCK 05000456 PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Co. (CECO)

• A. J. D' Antonio, Regulatory Assurance

• D. L. Cecchett, Regulatory Assurance

• P. L. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• J. K. Jasnosz, Regulatory Assurance

• R. D. Kyrouac, Station QA Supervisor

• L. E. Davis, Assistant Superintendent Technical Services

• G. E. Groth, Assistant Construction Superintendent

• D. L. Shamblin, Project Construction Superintendent

• C. J. Thomashek, Startup Superintendent

• E. E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager

• C. W. Schroeder, Services Superintendent W. Bruns, Field Engineer D. Throne, QA Surveillance R. C. Tate, QA Auditor J. E. Smith, QA Auditor L. K. Comstock R. Seltman, QA Manager I. Dewald, QC Manager Sargent and Lundy R. L. Hooks, SED, Assistant Division Head P. K. Agrawal, Senior Structural Project Engineer The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those attending the exit meeting at the Braidwood Station on August 14, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (456/85006-02; 457/85006-02): Use of Level I QC Inspectors for inspection and acceptance of electrical contractor (Comstock) welds. ANSI N45.2.6 - 1978 specifically provides that Level I inspectors are capable of performing inspections, examina-tions, and tests. Also, Level I inspectors are permitted to accept inspection results if the procedure provides for such acceptance and as long as the Level I is not the sole person to evaluate the results and sign for final acceptanc _- _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - . --_

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Prior to December 1984, Comstock (LKC) weld inspection procedures permitted individuals qualified as Level I inspectors to inspect and accept welds. While Level 11 review signatures were present on the I inspections records, it was learned from interviews conducted by the NRC inspector that the Level II review was for completeness and proper documentation only. This review was found to be inadequate in that the Level II review should have included an evaluation of the Level I inspector's results for validity and acceptabilit Furthermore, the information on the inspection reports was not specific enough to allow for a technical review of the result With respect to the electrical contractor prior to LKC, (E. C. Ernst) there were no records to indicate any involvement on the part of Level II inspectors with regard to review of the Level I weld inspection The licensee issued a directive to site contractors regarding the use of Level I weld inspectors in May 1985. This directive provides that only Level II or III inspectors are authorized to perfonn weld inspections. For other types of inspections, Level I inspectors are permitted to record specific data which is to be reviewed, evaluated, and verified by a Level II inspector. In addition, LKC procedures were revised to clarify the responsibilities of the Level I and II inspectors with regard to the gathering and review of inspection dat To assess the quality of the welds accepted by Level I inspectors, the licensee developed the " Level I Reverification Program" (LRP).

This program essentially consisted of reinspecting a sample of the welds inspected by each of the Level I inspectors in question. The program was developed such that a minimum of 99% reliability and 99% confidence level was maintaine The NRC inspcctor reviewed the results of the LRP and found that no design significant discrepancies were identifie In addition to the above review, the NRC inspector examined in excess of 300 welds performed by the electrical contractors and found them to be of acceptable quality. The review of the licensee's corrective actions and the weld examination performed by the NRC inspector provides confidence in the quality of the electrical installation welds, (Closed) Violation (456/83-07-02; 457/83-07-02): Failure to document bolting deficiencies for mechanical equipment installa-tions. Phillips Getschow's mechanical equipment installation procedure QCP-B22 was revised to include additional controls required by ANSI F45.2.8. An extensive review of the this procedure is included in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-456/85050; 50-457/85048,

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In addition to the procedure revision, the licensee initiated a program to reinspect safety-related mechanical equipment installed prior to the revision of procedure QCP-B22. NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-456/86009; 50-457/86008 documents the NRC review of the licensee's final report on this issue, " Report on Braidwood Safety-related Mechanical Equipment Retrofit Program."

The discrepancies identified by the reinspection program have either been dispositioned by an engineering evaluation or modifications have been completed to assure compliance. The final result is that both the QA records and the equipment are in compliance with ANSI N45.2.8. Based on the licensee's corrective actions this item is considered close c. (Closed) Violation (456/83-09-01; 457/83-09-01): Failure to establish measures to control field changes to drawings for field routed small bore piping. Procedural changes to Phillips Getschow (PGCo) Procedure QCP-821 requiring engineering department involvement in rerouting of piping has been reviewed by the NRC and documented in NRC Inspection Reports No. 456/85032; 457/85031. Also included in this report is the NRC review of the licensee's walkdown and documentation of piping systems installed prior to the revision of QCP-821 and Sargent and Lundy's (S&L) review of the as-built configurations for acceptabilit In addition to the above actions, S&L issued Engineering Change Notice (ECN) No. 22822 in order to define installation clearance

- guidelines and mechanisms for reporting potential piping clearance infringement i The NRC inspector reviewed S&L Project Instruction 88-96, Revision 1 which describes responsibilities and instructions for conducting final clearance walkdowns of HVAC systems and safety-related pipin This project instruction contains provisions for reporting and evaluating those items which violated the 3 inch clearance envelope established by ECN No. 22822.

. The above mentioned procedure revisions and final clearance walkdown, combined with the walkdown perforced during the Hot

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Functional Test (BWTP-EM-10) and the PGCo hanger walkdown adequately addresses this issue.

(Closed) Violation (456/84-44-09; 457/84-40-09)

Inadequate correct 9ve action re During a Construction Appraisal Team (CAT)garding a nonconformance. inspection conducted at was found that a nonconformance report (NCR) issued for deficient weld quality was closed without assuring that the corrective actions had been fully implemente NCR 293, issued in May 1981, identified questionable welds discovered during receipt inspection on back to back (BB) B-Line strut and c

spaced back to back (SBB) B-Line strut. The corrective action stated on the NCR was to rework the welds on the BB strut and return the SBB struts to the vendor, Systems Control (SC). Inspection of installed SBB B-Line strut by LKC and NRC CAT inspectors identified numerous

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weld deficiencies indicating that the corrective action for NCR 293 had not been implemented fully. According to receipt records, 1000 feet of SBB strut had been received; however, only 800 feet was returned to the vendor. Of this material, the vendor subsequently sent back 100 feet of purportedly repaired SBB strut. The licensee rejected the 100 feet of strut upon receipt inspection and then apparently lost control of the material. Therefore, there exists a total of 300 feet of SBB B-Line strut which has been rejected but cannot be accounted for. The licensee performed a 100% plant walkdown to inspect all locations where SBB B-Line strut is installed. A sample of installed SBB strut was removed from the plant and destructively tested to detennine load bearing capabilities. The test specimens were selected by a Level III weld inspector and represent those with the least amount of effective weld. Six specimens were selected for evaluation based on the AISI provisions for establishing structural performance by testing. The NRC inspector reviewed the test results and engineering evaluation (SL-7034) and determined that the welded SBB strut is adequate to perform its design functio In addition to the above review, the NRC inspector performed a visual inspection of approximately 100 welds located on SBB strut installed in the plant. In the NRC inspector's opinion, the weld quality appeared to be representative of commercial quality welded strut. The results of the testing demonstrate the ability of the strut to perform as designe e. (Closed) Violation (456/83-09-07(A); 457/83-09-07(A)): Failure to perform adequate corrective action to correct a nonconforming condition. Phillips Getschow (PGCo) NCR 789, dated September 17, 1982 identified the discovery of some 1/2 inch, Schedule 80 stainless steel pipe which had been installed without material test reports or records of receiving inspection. The schedule of the pipe refers to its wall thicknes The disposition of this NCR was to use the material "as is," because the material test reports for this heat number (745107) of 1/2 inch pipe were subsequently located. This pipe may have been improperly received as 1/2 inch, Schedule 160 stainless steel pipe which had the same heat number. Records of receipt and receipt inspection existed for 2.662 feet of 1/2 inch, Schedule 160 pipe with heat number 745107. Presumably 746 feet of this shipment was actually Schedule 80 pipe. As documented on NCR 789, this pipe was found to be acceptable without performing a receipt inspection (for the Schedule 80 pipe) and verifying quality or quantit NCR 1128 was issued to document resolution of this item. As changes to the program to resolve this item occurred, NCR Nos. 1640 and 4884 were issued by CEC NCR 1128 required as-built drawings to be reviewed in order to locate installed Schedule 80 and 160 1/2 inch pipe with heat No. 745107. Wall thickness of installed pipe was to be measured and

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i checked for compliance with design. A receipt inspection report was to be generated to document review of the material test reports for

the Schedule 80 pipe. Finally, the total footage of piping in

storage and installed was to be reconciled with that received.

I When it was found that the total footage.of installed pipe could I not be reconciled with that received, CECO issued NCR 1640. The i disposition of this NCR was to locate all material and verify

wall thickness in safety-related and ASME systems with heat

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No. 745107 through the existing Material Traceability Verification I (MTV) Program and Instrument-Retro Program (IRV). When CECO could

not locate the pipe in question using the IRV, due to the limited i scope of the IRV, NCR 4884 was issued.

i i NCR No. 4884 and the supporting documentation was reviewed by the l NRC inspector for proper disposition of the pipe in question.- The following actions were reviewed: ,

l I (1) The MTV program located 126 feet-7 inches of schedule 160 pipe with heat No. 745107; no schedule 80 pipe was located for ASME  :

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t l (2) Based on NCR 1128, drawings, data packages, and Stores

Requests were reviewed for issuance of } inch pipe with heat j No. 74510 Field QC verified actual wall thickness of this

! installed pipe. Where the installed pipe was found to have a

] wall thicker than that called for on the drawings, as-built

drawings were made and submitted to S&L for review. Where a ,

wall thickness less than that called for on the drawings was found, PGCo Discrepancy Reports (DR) were generated for jl dispositioning. It was necessary to remove approximately 15 ,

feet of pipe and replace that pipe with a thicker walled pipe  !

i in order to meet original design requirements, as documented

) on DR Nos. 1366 and 1367. No pipe with heat number 745107 j was located in storage.

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(3) The NRC inspector reviewed PGCo's Procedure PGCP-30 which established improved controls for the QC inspection and

! verification of safety-related instrument piping materials.

! Also reviewed was the PGCo QA Procedure QAP-12 which was j revised to better control NCR processing.

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' (4) PGCo Work Instruction PGWI-37 was issued to review and evaluate ,

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i PGCo's past nonconformance and corrective action effort. This l work instruction included a 100% review of closed NCR's No. 1 l t through 1500 (dated May 4, 1984) and a sample review of l

additional NCR's through No. 4500 (dated April 25,1985). The  ;

results of this effort were reviewed by the NRC inspector and l found to be acceptabl l j i l  !

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O f. (Closed) Violation (456/85-009-01; 457/85-009-01):

(1) L. K. Comstock, (LKC) the electrical contractor, welders qualification records exhibited numerous clerical errors and omission (2) A LKC welder qualification record was signed and dated prior to the testing of the welder's coupons by the independent testing laborator The licensee's electrical contractor (LKC) performed a 100%

review of all welder qualification records. The audit was performed by Level II or III weld inspectors. The review resulted in the issuance of seventeen ncnconformance reports (NCR). The NCR's identified various violations of the applicable procedure requirements. The type of deficiencies identified during this review were procedural and clerical and had been justified to meet code requirements with the utiliza-tion of back up documentation - such as the independent testing laboratory's records included with the LKC-E.C. Ernst records of welder qualificatio The NRC inspector reviewed the applicable NCR's and performed a random sample review of 50 welder qualification records. No violations were identified during this review. The NRC inspector also reviewed LKC QA Audit I-112-085 performed on October 1, 1985, LKC Corporate Audit CQA-85-139 dated December 18, 1985 and CQA-86-2 dated February 14, 1986. One finding was identified in the LKC QA audit which was in violation of LKC procedures, but was not a code violation. Corrective action for that finding was adequate. The LKC corporate audits did not disclose any findings in the welder qualification progra The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's audits and QA surveillances of LKC's welder qualification program. CECO Audit 20-85-535 dated June 14, 1985, as well as a sample of Ceco QA's weekly surveillances of the list of qualified welders, did not disclosed any violations to the LKC procedural requirement During the course of the ASLB Braidwood Hearings, currently in process, the individual who provided the allegation investigated in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-456/85009; 50-457/85009 supplied additional information concerning welder qualification records. As part of his testimony, the concerned individual stated that in checking records for updating welders qualification there existed no weld rod withdraw form for an unidentified welder who had performed a weld on an unidentified dat This record was allegedly necessary for the welder to continue his certification as a welder in the process for which he had qualifie (The AWS D1.1 code requires a welder to perform weldir g in each process for which he is qualified at least once within a

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six month period, to maintain his qualification without retesting). The individual also stated that he also checked a log, which an inspector maintained, reflecting that on that particular day, the weld inspector had gone to the field and actually witnessed a particular welder performing a weld. The discrepancy being that the welder who had performed the welding as witnessed by the LKC inspector had no record of drawing weld filler material on that date. The individual did not know the welders identity, but recalled that he was a foreman, and that it occurred in the latter part of his employmen The NRC inspector reviewed the weekly in-process welding inspection log and the weld rod withdraw log as reported by the individual. The review included the month of July and August, 1984. During that period only two foremen were active welders maintaining their welder qualifications. The NRC inspector determined that the welder / foreman for which the individual made reference had performed welding on July 30, 1984, and had no record of withdrawing welding material on that date. However, the " Storage, Issue and Control of Welding Material" Procedure LKC 4.3.10 Revision C, which was in effect at that time, pennitted the welder to maintain control over weld rod by locking the same in his gang box. Therefore, the welder in question may have withdrawn the weld rod on another date and may not have necessarily withdrawn weld material on that dat Further review of the LKC in-process weld surveillance log revealed that the same welder had performed welding on June 25, 1984, and on the same date had withdrawn welding material. The NRC inspector also reviewed the weekly in-process welding inspection checklist (LKC form 19A) for foremen welding on July 30, 1984. The welding performed on that date was performed on a nonsafety-related hanger for which no weld inspection record is required. However, the Form 19A provides positive objective evidence that the welder had performed welding on that date as recorded by a LKC weld inspector, who visually observed and recorded the welding variables as required on the LKC Form 19A. This form is the basis for the updating of the welder's certification and not the weld material withdraw fonn. The NRC inspector concluded from these findings that no violations of procedures or NRC requirements had occurre (Closed) 03en item (456/84-36-02): Failure to document welding preheat. )rior to August 1983, the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) contrdctor Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) failed to document welding preheat required by the AWS D1.1 Code. As of August 1983, welding procedures to be used for a specific installation are specified on a Weld Process Sheet. The Weld Process Sheet is also used to document welding prehea To provide assurance that preheat, if not performed, will not result in deficient welds, PSM qualified Procedures BS-15F and BS-11F on thick material without preheat. The NRC inspector reviewed the procedures and qualifications which provide technical justification

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l for acceptance of welds performed without documented evidence of l preheat. In addition, the NRC inspector examined in excess of 300 welds and found them to be acceptable, h. (Closed) Open Item (456/86007-01): An event occurred on March 25, 1986, which damaged two hangers and several snubbers on the nonsafety-related portion of the "B" Main Steam Line. The NRC inspector review 2d the following documentation of the event: j (1) Event Scenario On the evening of March 25, 1986, THF test personnel were in ;

the process of warming up the main steam line downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). The MSIV bypass valves were nearly full open and the main steam header pressure was approximately 1,000 psig. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) I temperature was being maintained at 557*F by the heat from the four operating reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). The steam generator PORVs were available for RCS temperature control, but their use was limited due to noise consideration At 1915, one of the test engineers heard a loud popping noise followed by an even louder hissing sound. He then observed a cloud of steam rising over the south end of the "B" Moisture Separator Reheat (MSR) and reported it. By 1917, the Unit-1 Operator had closed all four MSIV bypass valves and main steam header pressure had dropped to approximately 800 psig. To expedite main steam header depressurization, the steam dump !

controller was taken to 40% demand, causing steam dump "J" to open 100% and Steam Dump "B," "F", and "K" to open 70%. The resultant steam flow and header depressurization apparently caused a pocket of water resting in the downstream side of MSIV

"B" to boil and accelerate down the 200-foot long steam tunnel piping. This event resulted in damage to two pipe supports at the elbow at the end of the steam tunnel piping ru At 1921, the operators initiated a steam generator blowdown to control RCS temperature and prevent the steam generator PORV from lifting. Seven minutes later, the 1A RCP was secured to l aid in this effort. Within the hour, plant conditions were l stabilized at 557 F and 2235 psi I A team of engineers, investigating the source of the steam cloud, discovered that the Second Stage Reheat Drain Tank, 1H004TB, hand-hole gasket had rupture The gasket ruptured when the tank was inadvertently pressurized by one or more of the closed isolation valves leaking by its seat. Further investigation narrowed the suspect valve down to 1MS0688 which was closed but not fully seate Fully seating of 1MS068B eliminated the Reheat Drain Tank pressurization problem when the main steam header was repressurize . g

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(2) Damage Description Dcmage to the "B" main steam line was restricted to the supports in the general area of the second 90 elbow f om the MSIV. This elbow is situated at the end of a 200 foot long steam tunnel. Two rod hanger brackets were detached from their base plates and three snubbers were inoperable based on a simple stroking test. A walkdown of all four main steam lines was conducted and all main steam line supports were inspecte No other damage was identifie (3) Restart Plan The two damaged supports, IMS01040R and IMS01043R, were repaired and returned to service on March 28, 1986. After completion of the repairs, a blowdown of the lines upstream of all four MSIVs was performed prior to opening each MSI All four MSIV bypass valves were opened on March 28, 198 Thermal expansion movements of the Main Steam lines were monitored during the heat-up. These measurements were compared with snubber reference (baseline data) measurements taken on March 26, 1986, and found to be acceptable. The MSIVs were opened sequentially (A, C, D, and B) with a differential pressure across the valves of approximately 2 psig. No abnormal line movements or vibrations were observed when the valves were ope In addition, the air supplies to all but one steam dump valve were isolated to provide finer control of main steam deprcssurization. An operator directive was also written to manually drain the upstrea:n condensate polisher once per hour whenever the 18 MSIV was open. This was done to ensure that

• any condensate formation in the sloped portion of the line was blown dow (4) Event Evaluation Sargant and Lundy (S&L) performed an evaluation to determine if the failed supports end brackets should be reinstalled in their original orientatio Based on the piping's thermal movements, S&L recommended the supports end brackets be reinstalled in their original orientation. S&L also performed a Drop of Line (potential damage) evaluation. The eva19etion included:

(1) a field walkdown of the piping and scubbers in the area of the failed supports to inspect for any oavious damage; and (2) calculations to consider the effects of the loss of dead weight support and the impact of a forced displacement of the unsupported piping un the piping stresses. The S&L analysis demonstrated that the piping sustained no permanent damag In addition, S&L conducted an evaluation and design of a drain line. Engineering Change Notice 31297 has been issued to provide a four-inch drip leg and il inch drain line to permit manual draining during start-u . t

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Based on the NRC inspector's review of the above information and various discussions with NRR personnel, this item is considered closed, i. (Closed) Unresolved Items (456/84042-04; 457/84038-04 and 456/84042-06; 457/84038-06): Concerns were expressed relative to S&L's generic acceptance of unspecified welds on pipe supports and electrical panels. As noted in the interim NRC Inspection Report No. 456/85032; 457/85031 (Item 2.b Page 10), subsequent to the identification of the unresolved item, the licen.iee's quality assurance department perforried a surveillance on this issue. As a consequence, the issue was ultimately expanded to include the structural and HVAC areas of work as wel The major technical concerns expressed on this issue were as follows:

(1) Additional welds may alter the behavior of specific connections with respect to their analytically assumed behavio (2) Additional welds may damage the base metal as a result of defects within the unspecified wel (3) Additional welds may distort the attached parts due to excessive heat inpu These concerns were addressed by the licensee in the following manner:

(1) Unspecified welds would adversely affect only two types of connections in the plant. These connections, cross flange welds and clip angle return welds, were specifically restricted from unspecified welds in S&L's general notes on drawing M-999 and other specifications. All other connections would not be adversely affected even though its response could be changed from a pinned connection to a fixed connection through the addition cf unspecified weld (2) Although a weld may be unspecified, it will still be inspected by Quality Control Personnel for attributes that could adversely affect the base metal. The attributes specifically referenced are weld cracks and undercut. Assuming that these two items are within the acceptance criteria, any unspecified weld will not be a detriment to the base meta (3) All welding performed in the plant is based on preapproved welding procedures. These procedures control the size, and amount of heat input for any type weld. The basis for any procedure qualification is a resulting weld that produces an adequate weld with acceptable warpage to the parts. On this basis, any unspecified weld will not adversely distort the attached piece _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ - - - - _ - - - - _ - _ -

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In an effort to clarify the unspecified weld issue, Engineering Change Notices (ECN) were issued to Pullman Sheet Metal, Phillips Getschow, L. K. Comstock and G. K. Newberg contractors. These ECN's revised various specifications and specific drawings to better define the requirements for any unspecified weld. The following procedures were subsequently reviewed by the NRC inspector:

L. K. Comstock -

Procedure No. 4.8.3 " Weld Inspection" Revision J, October 18, 198 Unspecified welds referenced in Section Phillips Getschow C Procedure No. QCP-B-23 " Installation and Inspection of Component Supports" Revision 14, October 18, 198 Unspecified welds referenced in Sections 9.4.1 Item F and 9.4.2 Itun Procedure No. QAP/BR-VE-01 " Visual Examination Procedure" Revision 7,

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October 8, 1985. Unspecified welds referenced in Sections 11.5.1.12 and 11.5.1.1 Procedure No. PGCP-18 " Whip Restraint

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Installation" Revision 12, February 27,

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1985. Section 9.6.3 refers back to QAP-VE-0 G. K. Newburg _

Quality Control Procedure Section 55

"AWS Visual Welding Inspection" Revision 7, November 18, 198 Section 4.4.12 refers to the acceptability of unspecified weld _

Quality Control Procedure Section 31

" Erection and Inspection of Structural Steel" Revision 14, December 17, 198 Pullman Sheet Metal _

Quality Assurance Procedure No. B10. " Visual Weld Inspection" Revision B, December 13, 198 Unspecified welds referenced in Section 5.1 Quality Assurance Procedure No. B10. " Installation Inspection Procedure".

Unspecified weld acceptance referenced in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit . _ _ __ _ _ - _____ _- __ _ _ __

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No adverse observations were made as a result of the revie In an attempt to further investigate the effect of unspecified welds on the connection behavior, (Technical Concern No. 1), a sample of eight supports was randomly chosen during a field walkdown at the site. The basis for selection was a support configuration containing a knee-brace which was assumed to be analyzed as a pinned connectio The eight supports were:

1 CC03150X 1 CC01088X 1 CV08005X 1 CV01110X 1 SI 06125V 1 SI 06202S 1 SI 03307S 1 SI 06026V The selected sample was then evaluated by S&L for changes in load distribution. Instead of the normally assumed pinned knee braces, fixed end knee braces were analyzed. Differences in base plate stresses, anchor bolt margins and member stresses were then note No design significant changes were found in any of the analyse Based on the NRC inspectors review of the above work, all technical concerns appeared to be adequately addressed. This item is therefore considered close . . Allegation Follow-up (RII-85-A-0066) ,

In March of 1985 the NRC resident inspector at Braidwood was informed of a potential problem with a structural weld on a beam in the auxiliary buildin Allegation (Closed) The structural weld on a beam near column line P-18 was rejected by Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL) and later reworked by the direction of a Sargent and Lundy (S&L) engineer without proper documentatio NRC Findings The weld in question was one of several American Bridge connections (identified on Non-Conformance Report (NCR) No. 690) which did not

" Conform to S As a result of this NCR, Field Change Request (FCR)pecifications."

, No. L-16741 was initiated to " Identify In-Place Condition of Component Connection." The connection in question (Beam No. 6AB288-Left DWG-S-1294) was subsequently re-inspected on January 5,1985, and found to have multiple areas of weld overlap, a small area of undercut and several areas of undersized weld .

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The beam was again inspected on March 13, 1985, with the inspection report carrying the notation " Weld Map After Grinding the Overlaps."

It was this work of grinding the overlaps that was done by the direction of an S&L engineer. The intent of the work was to verify proper fusion of the fillet welds between the clip angles and bea Utilizing the information from the second inspection, S&L approved the FCR on the condition that the as-built condition of the connections be documented on the appropriate drawing At the request of the NRC inspector, another inspection was performed on the beam in question. This subsequent inspection was performed without prior knowledge of the previous March 1985 inspection. The results of this inspection were compared to the results of the previous inspection by the NRC inspector. In addition, the NRC inspector visually verified the existing configuration of the structural weld on the beam. This comparison confirmed that no additional changes had be made to the b?am connection since the March 1985 inspectio Conclusions The allegation was substantiated in that modification work was performed on the weld in question. However, all of the work was performed in response to an FCR with the intent of verifying the as-built condition of the welds. Once this condition was confirmed, the beam connection was determined to be adequat . Shot Peening of Steam Generator Tubes Extensive operating experience with PWR steam generators indicates that the roll transition area of the tubes are susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). IGSCC requires a combination of tensile stress, susceptible material, and an aggressive environmen Elimination of any one of these conditions prevents 1GSCC from occurrin The purpose of shot peening is to remove the tensile stress on the ID surface of the tube and replace it with compressive stres Shot peening is a cold working process whereby an item is bombarded with round shot (in this case type 316 stainless steel) leaving the surface in a residual compressive state. The system is an automated process thereby providing uniformity and repeatabilit The following Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) and Metal Improvement Co. (MIC)

documents were reviewed:

Process Specification for Shot Peening Manual Shot Peening Procedure System Cleanness Requirements QC Engineer's Responsibilities Shot Peening Process Development Report

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The corrosion testing performed to qualify this process demonstrates that

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primary side IGSCC in the tube roll transition areas is effectively eliminated for the design life of the steam generator In addition to the above review, the NRC inspector observed the process in operation and examined the test strips used to verify the repeatability of the process. The results of the NRC inspector's review indicate that the process was being properly applied and is effective in mitigating transition area degradation from IGSC . Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 14, 198 The inspector sumarized the purpose and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged this information. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regards to documents or processes reviewed during the inspectio The licensee representatives did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar