IR 05000456/1988009

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/88-09 & 50-457/88-10 on 880303-07. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Allegation Riii 88-A-0009

ML20148M777
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	03/28/1988
From:	Gardner R, Neisler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148M774	List: IR 05000456/1988009
References
50-456-88-09, 50-456-88-9, 50-457-88-10, NUDOCS 8804060168
Download: ML20148M777 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/88009(ORS); 50-457/88010(ORS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-75 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: March 3-7, 1988 Inspectors: J. H. Neisler ,' q 3- b Y-PY Lh. bb Approved By: 2. N. Gardner, Chief 3 Plant Systems Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on March 3-7, 1988 (Reports No. 50-546/88009(DRS);

No. 50-457/88010(0T5))

Areas Instected: Special safety inspection to follow-up allegation RIII 88-A-000 Results: No violations or deviations were identified, 8804060168 880331 PDR ADOCK 05000456

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DETAILS i

1. Persons Contacted Principle Licensee Employees

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• D. O'Brien, Services Superintendent

• P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• R. Preston, Director, Quality First

• E. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance

• T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance

• K Kofron, Production Superintendent

• J. Jursenas, Quality Assurance M. Takaki, Regulatory Assurance S. Hedden, Master Instrument Maintenance P. Hart, Quality Assurance D. Kline, Store's Supervisor R. Vine, Technical Staff

• Denotes those personnel attending exit intervie . Allegation RIII-88-A-0009 (Closed)

Region III received correspondence from a former contractor employee at Braidwood concerning alleged deficiencies in instrumentation calibrations at Braidwood. The individual's concerns included supervisor qualifications, radiation monitor calibration and testing, uncontrolled substitution of parts, and the quality control and traceability of material The individual had informed the Graidwood Quality First Team of his concerns subsequent to his contacting the NRC. The licensee investigated

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each of the individual's concerns prior to the NRC's inspection. Generally,

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the licensee's findings agreed with the NRC inspector's findings.

, Each of the i.9dividual's concerns is addressed below:

Concern 1: Material tags marked "Quality Assured" buried in the ice

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outside the main access to the plan i The individual stated in his January 4,1988 letter that

for the last three days he had observed what he understood

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to be material identification tags in the ice outside the plant main acces NRC Review: Through discussions with Braidwood Quality Assurance personnel and review of appropriate documentation, the

inspector determined that the Quality Assured material tags had been identified in QA audit QAA-20-88-44, '

Finding No. 4, dated January 4, 1988. The loose tags had

, originally been taped to oil drums stored approximately ,

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50 yards west northwest of the main plant access. The  !

inspector found other tags on the ground near the fenced  !

oil storage area. The licensee has changed from paper l tags taped to the drums to metal tags tied to the drums  !

with wire so they will not be affected by inclement l weather. Material traceability was not affecte !

Conclusion: This cor,ern was substantiated in that loose Quality l Assured tags were found on tho geound west of the main access; however, they had been previously identified by {

the licensee's QA program, and corrective action was  !

complet )

Concern 2: Using unqualified components in applications that require l qualified components. The alleger indicated that i temperature switches in the pump rooms' HVAC units had i missing components and were not properly installe *

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NRC Review: The licensee had investigated this concern. The i inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's  ;

investigation which included a walkdown of temperature  !

switches in all the pump room HVAC units for proper  !

installation and environmental qualification requirement !

The walkdown identified that the as-installed switches met {

requirement I l

In addition, the inspector reviewed the installation ,

procedures and installation drawings to determine if the j switches met the installation and environmental requirements =

of drawing 20E-0-3391AN. The switch mountings were as i shown on the drawing. Procedure BWIP 2400-111A8a, Revision 0, dated September 19, 1986, Step B.2.c., requires a switch assembly lock nut to be torqued to 60 inch pound This was the procedure used by the alleger. Temporary  :

Change Notice TCN-1006, issued February 16, 1987, approve l per the architect / engineer, for extended use, switch l assemblies without lock nuts. The United Electric switch 1 assemblies, installed according to detail 6778 of drawing  !

20E-0-3191AN, Revision S, do not require lock nuts, i Apparently, the alleger's supervisor did not inform the alleger of TCN-100 Conclusion: The individual's statement that some temperature switch assemblies were installed without lock nuts is correct; however, drawings and procedures do not require all switches to have the lock nuts. This concern was not substantiate Concern 3: Unqualified batteries installed in area radiation monitoring cabinets. The alleger stated that he was directed to install batteries that did not have qualification documentation in the area radiation monitoring cabinet I

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NRC Review: By observation and review of parts classification lists and Sargent und Lundy's QAF assignnent request, the inspector determined that the batteries were not safety related since the radiation monitoring cabinets normal

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power supply is a Class 1E system. The battery is described l on the parts list as battery assembly, 4V SAH, for Process /

Area radiation monitor "no substitution." The manufacturer, G. A. Technologies, did not list the battery assembly, ( Part No. 0357-1815-001 for model RM-80, as safety relate In addition, the inspector detennined that tne batteries are not installed in harsh environment Conclusion: There were no requirements for qualification documentation l on the GA Technology model RM-80 radiation monitor battery l assembly; therefore, this concern was not substantiate Concern 4: Inadequate calibration of AR/pR skids. The alleger questioned the calibration methodology of the radiation monitoring skids, specifically the high range monitor hRC Review: The inspector reviewed the calibration procedures fcr radiation monitors used at Braidwood which are identified as GA models RD-23, RD-80, and RD-10B. Also, the inspector reviewed the program for replacement and refurbishment of calibration source Since each source has a finite half-life, the licensee's health physics group periodically l measures the source strength. Once the source decays tu a pre-determined level, it is replaced with a new source and returned to the manufacturer for refurbishment or is disposed of, according to NRC regulations, i The method of calibrating the high range monitors was questioned. The monitors are calibrated at one RAD and '

12 RAD, then electronically calibrated to 10,000 RAD. This is the method of calibration outlined in NUREG-0737 for the high range radiation monitor Conclusion: The licensee's procedures comply with NRC requirements,  ;

therefore, this concern was not substantiate I Concern 5: Unquali'ied supervisors. The alleger stated that a foreman and a general foreman were not qualified to be supervisor NRC Review: The inspector discussed the qualifications of the na supervisors with licensee management. The licensee produced evidence that the foreman had been demoted and the general foreman terminated from employment at Braidwood because of their lack of supervisory or managerial capabilities. The licensee's evaluation of their activities determined that plant safety was not affecte . - - -, ._ . .- - . - - . .-

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i Conclusion: Based on the licensee's actions in removing the l

individuals from their supervisory positions, this concern was ubstantiated. Review of the licensee's evaluation of their activities determined that plant safety was not affecte Concern 6: Calibration of temperature switches in the personnel and equipment hatches. The alleger stated that the switches, when calibrated in a temperature bath, would not function as designed when placed in the syste NRC Review:

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The inspector reviewed Procedure BwlP 2505-007, preoperational test proce.dures PR-10 and PR-50, and ;

deficiencies PR-50-008, PR50-990, PR-10-022. The alleger <

l had written an instrument deficiency report (IDR) stating ;

the prcblems with calibrating the temperature switches

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l l outside the system as required by the procedure. The ,

IDR was given to his supervisor who forwarded it to the

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license The procedure was subsequently changed by TCR-004 to require in-site calibration of the temperature switches using a heat gun and reference thermometer l Upon successful completion of the test, the IDR was close ;

The alleger was not informed of the change in procedure by l his superviso j Conclusion: The inspector determined by review of the above data that the alleger was correct in that the calibration procedure ,

was inadequate as originally issued. However, the licensee's l l program corrected the procedure. Therefore, this allegation i was not substantiate i Concern 7

Improper sign-off of deficiency AF-50-088. It was l l alleged that the deficiency was closed before all 1 deficient items (gage 2PI-AF124) were correcte l NRC Review: The inspector reviewed deficiencies AF-50-088, AF-50-180, and the Broldwood safety related component list. Pressure !

indicator 2PI-AF124 is a non-safety related gauge that l measures gear box oil pressure on auxiliary feed pump 28.

l AF-50-088 identified a broken bezel on 2PI-AF124. The l gauge was replaced with another gauge with a different scale. AF50-088 was closed on May 17, 1987. The licensee then issued deficiency AF50-180 to identify and correct the scale on 2PI-AF124. The scale was corrected, the

! instrument was calibrated on August 28, 1987, and AF50-180 I

was closed on August 31, 1987. The inspector found no current deficiencies relative to this instrument.

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Conclusion: The inspector determined that AF50-088 had been signed l off with a deficiency in the installation; however, the ;

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licensee's program. identified the problem and performed the necessary corrective action. This concern was not substantiated as affecting plant safet Concern 8: Wrong length thermocouples installed in circulating water syste The alleger stated that 14 inch long thermocouples were installed as replacements for 28 inch long thermocouples in the circulating water pump NRC Review: The circulating water system at Braidwood is not classified as a safety-related system. The inspector verified that under length thermocouples were installed in the pump A deficiency had been initiated, and at the time of this inspection, the installed thermocouples were being reviewed for acceptability by the architect / engineer,

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Sargent and 1. und Conclusion: This concern was not substantiated as pertaining to a safety-related system. The licensee followed the quality program for non-safety-related component . Exit Interview l i

The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The ,

licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments. The inspector also  !

discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with ' ,

regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection. The '

licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar l

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