IR 05000456/1986032
| ML20206L613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1986 |
| From: | Danielson D, Kaufman P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206L599 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-86-32, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8608200230 | |
| Download: ML20206L613 (8) | |
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e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-456/86032(DRS)
Docket No. 50-456 License No. CPPR-132 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Braidwood Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braidwood, IL Inspection Conducted:
June 12-13, 16, 23-27, 30, July 1-3, 28-31, and August 6, 1986 Inspector-P. D. Kaufman P Mk4 Date
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h Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief
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Materials and Processes Date Section
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Inspection Summary i
Inspection on June 12-13, 16, 23-27, 30, July 1-3, 28-31, and August 6, 1986 (Report No. 50-456/86032(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced safety inspection of previous inspection findings, the implementation of IE Bulletin 79-14, and the testing of safety--
related pipe support and restraint systems.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8608200230 860814 PDR ADOCK 05000456 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECol M. J. Wallace, Project Manger
- D. Shamblin, Project. Construction Superintendent
- E. Wendorff, Project Field Engineering M. Lohmann, Assistant Construction Manager
- P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor C. W. Schroeder, Superintendent Licensing
- D. Cecchett, Regulatory Assurance t
- M. Inserra, Start-Up Test Engineer B. Wazing, Station QC Inspector
- D. Boone, Construction Engineer G. E. Groth, Assistant Construction Superintendent N. Kaushal, Project Field Engineering Manager T. Prokop, Project Construction Engineer Sargent and Lundy_ ens neers (S_&L)
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K. Fus, Mechanical Project Engineer D. A. Gallagher, Field Project Manager
- M. Flynn, Mechanical Field Coordinator Phillips-GetschowCompany(PG_Co]
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M. Galloway, Assistant Project Engineer T. Johnson, Group Supervisor / Hanger Engineering K. Kranz, QA Manager W. Berg, QC Supervisor The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.
- Denotes those attending the final exit interview at the-Braidwood Station on August 6, 1986.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Finding (Closed) Violation (456/85041-01; 457/85040-01): Phillips-Getschow Company was modifying several safety-related riser clamps W main steam lines inside the containment for pipe supports IMS05GNS, MS06007S, IMS07006S and IMS08007S without receiving the approva' v' the esponsible design organization prior to implementation of the r ak.
Phillips-Getschow initiated Nonconformance Report-(NCR) 5973 to address this issue. The NCR was dispositioned " accept-as-is" based on Sargent &
Lundy's (S&L) correspondence with the clamp manufacturer (ITT Grinnell)
on August 26, 1985.
ITT Grinnell's engineering evaluation concludes that-the field welding of gusset plates to their " Type A" riser clamps can
only add to the torsional rigidity and hence strengthen the clamps.
These four " Type A" riser clamps supplied by ITT Grinnell to the
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Braidwood site had been previously analyzed by ITT Grinnell in 1983 per special analyses SA-2069-7, SA-2069-8, and SA-2069-3 and found to be acceptable as " Type A" clamps.
Thus the clamps were acceptable even without the gusset plates.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (01csed) IE Bulletin 79-14 (456/79-14-88, 456/79-14-1B, 456/79-14-2B, 456/79-14-3B):
" Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping System." The licensee has responded to the bulletin, and the bases for l
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closure of the bulletin is documented in Region III Inspection Reports l
No. 50-456/85041, No. 50-456/86012, and Paragraph 6 of this report.
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Braidwood Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Items (Closed) SER Item (456/86000-10):
Piping vibration test program. The licensee's detailed program for pipe vibration is documented in Pre-operational Test Procedure, BwPT-EM-12, " Pipe Vibration," Revision 1.
Specified piping was monitored by instrumentation and visually inspected by the licensee during Preoperational Hot Functional Testing conducted during March 1986.
The following systems were inspected for vibrations:
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Component Cooling System
Chemical and Volume Control System (safe shutdown portion)
Residual Heat Removal System
Safety Injection System
Essential Service Water System
Containment Spray System (except spray headers)
Chilled Water (Control Room) System
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
Reactor Coolant Pressurizer System
5.
Testing of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems a.
FSAR The licensee's requirements and commitments regarding examination and testing of safety-related pipe support and restraint systems during preoperational vibration and dynamic effects testing were reviewed by the NRC inspector.
The licensee's program for examination and testing of designated piping / supports for selected systems is specified in-Chapter 14.0 of the FSAR.
The acceptance criteria outlined in the licensee's Preoperational Test Procedure, BwPT-EM-12, Revisita 1 and BwPT-EM-10, Revision 2, is commensurable with the FSAR commitments.
Thus, the NRC inspector concluded that the procedure requirements and acceptance criteria met the FSAR commitments.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Observation of System Piping Movements During Hot Functional Testing (HFT)
The NRC inspector observed several of the licensee's certified ASME Section XI, VT-3 and VT-4, inspectors taking thermal movement, snubber position and piping clearance data at specified temperature intervals during HFT on systems whose operating temperature exceeds 250 F.
The licensee's inspectors had to verify by snubber movement that components and piping could expand without restriction of movement during non-nuclear heatup and return to their baseline positions upon system cooldown.
Also, for systems whose maximum normal operating temperature was not attained during HFT testing, the expected amount of movement was calculated and evaluated to assure snubbers would remain within their stroke capabilities.
The NRC inspector concluded that the inspectors utilized the proper acceptance criteria and recorded deficiencies as required by procedure.
However, the NRC inspector did observe a Figure 98, " Type F" spring can for support 1SD-05034V, Revision C on an 1 1/2" diameter 450 F Steam Generator Blowdown line which still had the travel stops installed on one side of the spring can.
A review of Phillips-Getschow's Procedure PGCP-48.1, " System Balancing Procedure," Revision 1 and the system balancing checklist for variable spring supports, contained in this procedure, requires a QC verifi-cation that the travel sto)s have been removed per Item 2 on Form PG/QA-5-113, " System 3alancing Checklist for Variable Spring Supports."
The particular checklist for variable spring support 1SD-05034V had been signed off by Phillips-Getschow QC on March 5, 1986.
The travel stops were denoted as being removed on the checklist.
In addition, this support was visually examined by the licensee's inspectors four separate times during the HFT Thermal Expansion Testing and no deficiencies had been written on the travel stops being installed in the spring can.
The NRC inspector informed the licensee of the installed travel stop on the above variable spring support while the system operating temperature was approximately 450 F.
The licensee initicted appropriate corrective actions by issuing a deficiency report against the above variable spring support and pulling the travel stop.
In addition, the licensee commenced a thorough walkdown of all variable spring cans required to be monitored during the HFT Thermal Expansion Testing.
The walkdown revealed that no other variable spring supports had any travel stops installed.
Thus, the NRC inspector considers the one observed case to be an isolated occurrence.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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c.
Review of HFT Preoperational Thermal Expansion Test and Results The NRC inspector reviewed quality records documenting the results of ECCS Systems Thermal Expansion and Restraint Testing data compiled during Hot Functional Testing.
The following systems were visually inspected and monitored by the licensee:
Reactor Coolant (RC)
Reactor Coolant Pressurizer (R4)
Safety Injection (SI)
Chemical and Volume Control (CV)
Main Steam (MS)
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Steam Generator Blowdown (SD)
Specified piping was examined prior to conducting the expansion test while the piping systems were at ambient temperature and with the reactor vessel water temperature stabilized at 250 F 120 F, 450 F 120 F, RCS Hot Condition 557 F and upon return to ambient temperature.
The test results and deficiencies were evaluated by the Architect /
Engineer, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), following the non-nuclear heatup.
S&L has accepted and approved the test results.
The NRC inspector concluded that the test evaluations were adequate. Therefore, the expansion test demonstrated that the piping systems are capable of performing their design function.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin '4-14 Activities The implementation and verification of the licensee's as-built program as related to actions set forth in IE Bulletin 79-14 for safety-related Seismic Category I piping systems was examined by the NRC inspector.
The attributes reviewed, inspected, and examined that are essential to the seismic piping stress analysis included:
piping configuration; pipe support / restraint locations, design, function, and clearances; and valve and valve operator locations and orientation.
Assessment of these attributes was required to verify that the safety-related piping systems were constructed and seismically analyzed in accordance with the final design documents / requirements, a.
Review of Walkdown and Engineering Evaluation Procedures Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Project Instruction PI-BB-64,
" Evaluation of Formal Analysis As-Built Subsystems,"
Revision 1, dated November 12, 1984.
Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Project Instruction PI-BB-28,
" Activities of the Byron /Braidwood Station Mechanical Engineering, Piping, Desi AnalysisFieldPersonnel,gn,SupportDesign,and Revision 4, September 20, 1985.
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Sargent & Lundy (S&L) Project Instruction PI-BB-96,
" Limited Clearance Walkdowns," Revision 0,- dated July 1, 1985.
Phillips-Getschow Company Construction Procedure
(PGCP)-48.1, " System Balancing Procedure," Revision 1, dated March 14, 1986.
Phillips-Getschow Company Construction Procedure
(PGCP)-48, " Final Line Walk of Components Supports /
Restraints," Revision 3, dated March 14, 1986.
Phillips-Getschow Company Construction Procedure (PGCP)-40,
" Verification Preparation and Transmittal of "As-Constructed" Drawings," Revision 6, dated December 10, 1985.
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Phillips-Getschow Company Quality Control Procedure
(QCP)-B-23, " Installation & Inspection of Component Supports," Revision 14, dated October 18, 1985.
Sargent&Lundy(S&L)ProjectInstructionPI-BB-63,
" Receiving /or Contractor Select Supports; (3) Piping and Handling Piping "As-Built," Closeout letter and Clearance Walkdown Information," Revision 3, dated February 13, 1985.
Theprocedures, specifications,andprojectinstructionswere determined to be consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments relative to IE Bulletin 79-14, " Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems."
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Safety-Related As-Built Piping System Walkdown Portions of piping systems were randomly selected for assessing the adequacy of the licensee's as-built walkdown inspection and design verification program.
The NRC inspector's review encompassed subsystem as-built packages from the following three safety-related piping systems:
Subsystem Number System Title 1SX-65 Essential Service Water ICV-39 Chemical Feed & Volume Control IRC-03 Reactor Coolant System The as-built subsystem walkdown packages were comprised of, but not limited to, the following documents / drawings:
Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L) Support Design Drawings
S&L Analytical Drawings
Contractor Piping Fabrication / Installation Isometric Drawings
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The NRC inspector conducted field verification walkdowns of the following as-built documentation / drawings selected from the above safety-related piping systems:
Pipe Support / Restraint Drawings 1SX-65001X 1CV-39003X 1CV-39013G 1SX-65002R 1CV-39004X 1CV-39014G 1SX-65003X ICV-39005R 1CV-39016X 1SX-65004X 1CV-39006X 1CV-39017R 1SX-65005R 1CV-39008G 1CV-39018R 1SX-65006R 1CV-39010G
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1SX-65007X-1CV-39011X 1SX-65009R 1CV-39012G 1RC-03001V 1RC-03004V 1RC-03005X 1RC-03006X 1RC-03007X 1RC-03008X Piping Isometric Drawings 1A-SX-13, Sheet 2 Revision A i
1A-CV-35, Revision A 2546A-73, Revision E 1RC-1, Revision C Piping Analytical Drawings ISX-65 1CV-39 1RC-03 In general, the installed / erected piping and supports inspected were found to be constructed in accordance with the applicable design drawings and procedural requirements for the attributes verified.
llowever, while conducting the as-built verification walkdowns, the NRC inspector observed that Class "A" pipe support IRC-030085, Revision C was missing a skewed T-fillet weld between a piece of tube steel and plate.
The Phillips-Getschow final linewalk verification checklist Form PG-QA-5-72 for this component support
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revealed that all welding was visually inspected and complete per attribute No. 3 of the checklist which was QC and production verified on January 21, 1986.
The NRC inspector requested that the licensee or Sargent & Lundy perform a reverification calculation of the support eliminating the skewed T-fillet weld from' support calculation and verify that the support would not be overstressed.
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The NRC inspectors review of the requalification calculation which S&L performed on July 28, 1986, determined that the restraint drawing faulted design load utilized in the calculation was incorrect.
S&L had used the faulted load of 9,746 lbs. from Revision B of the restraint drawing instead of 17,667 lbs. from Revision C of the restraint drawing.
Subsequently, S&L performed another requalification calculation for this support on July 31, 1986, which was found by the NRC inspector to be acceptable and the sup) ort would have remained functional under a faulted condition even wit 1 the missing skewed T-fillet weld.
The NRC inspector believes this to be an isolated occurrence since only one out of 60 pipe supports inspected during/85041 andthis inspection and previous RIII inspections (Reports No. 50-456 No. 50-456/86012 had a missing field weld.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives-(denoted in Paragraph 1)'
on August 6, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of this inspection. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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