ML20141E837

Insp Repts 50-456/97-07 & 50-457/97-07 on 970408-0520. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Engineering & Plant Support

ML20141E837
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	06/17/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141E786	List: ML20141E781 ML20141E814 ML20141E837
References
50-456-97-07, 50-456-97-7, 50-457-97-07, 50-457-97-7, NUDOCS 9707010173
Download: ML20141E837 (30)

See also: IR 05000456/1997007

Text

.... .- . - - . ~ - . . _ - _ . . - -- .-

'

,

'

. i

=

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION lil

Docket Nos: 50-456, 50-457

License Nos: NPF-72, NPF 77

Report No: 50-456/97007; 50-457/97007

. . .

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison (Comed) l

Facility: Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: RR #1, Box 84

Braceville, IL 60407  ;

l

Dates: April 8 through May 20,1997

l

Inspectors: C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector

J. Adams, Resident inspector i

T. Esper, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

Approved by: R. D. Lanksbury, Chief, Projects Branch 3 'li

Division of Reactor Projects

I

~

9707010173 970617

PDR ADOCK 05000456

G PDR

- . . . .- -. - - , . - -. -. -. - _ = _ _ _ . - . - . - . - _-

.

'

.

4

l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-456/97007; 50 457/97007

. This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and

j plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection. '

>

4

Operations l

,

-

The inspectors concluded that an augmented control room staff for the outage unit

improved the supervision of evolutions and demonstrated a strong safety focus on

shutdown operations. The inspectors also concluded that the operating staff in the

control room demonstrated excellent team work and communications during most

evolutions. (Section 01.1)

1

-

The inspectors were concerned about the closure of the Unit 1 containment.

i Although cleanliness was generally good, following the licensees closecut

inspection, the inspectors found a 2 foot long by 5 inch diameter metal cylinder

laying on the floor and debris in floor drains that were part of a TS leakage

detection system. The inspectors were also concerned about standing water

observed in the floor drains that was not questioned by licensee personnel.

(Section 01.2)

-

The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety

evaluation prior to placing the Unit 2 motor driven feed pump discharge isolation

valve out-of-service (OOS) open. The valve had an automatic closure function on a

feedwater isolation signal. A Notice of Violation was issued. The inspectors also

concluded that the communications within the operating department for this

evolution were poor. (Section 02.1)

Maintenance

-

The inspectors concluded that outage maintenance on the 1 A emergency diesel I

was performed well. However, on the 18 emergency diesel, the inspectors

observed two examples where foreign material exclusion (FME) control was lost

and one example where the maximum jacket water pressure, allowed by the

procedure, was exceeded. (Section M1.1)

-

The inspectors concluded that the preparation for and performance of fuel

movements for refuel outage A1R06 was good. Fuel handlers and supervisors

were knowledgeable of procedures, equipment, and of their responsibilities.

(Section M4.1)

-

The inspectors observed several surveillance tests and concluded that most

surveillances were properly performed and met the testing requirements of the

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and t".e TS. However, the inspectors

concluded that check valve surveillance testing on the safety injection and

2

.. _. _ -

- _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ __. __ _ __ _ - . . _ - _ _ _ ___

.

,

!

I centrifugal charging systems was poorly controlled by the system engineers acting

as the test director.s. The inspectors observed two instances where acceptance

criteria were exceeded without the test director identifying a problem, and one

-

instance of the test director failing to record required data. The inspectors also

'

concluded that there was a breakdown in communications between maintenance

i

and engineering that resulted in the use of the wrong instrument range in flow

calculations. A Notice of Violation was issued for two examples of failing to follow

procedures. (Sections M4.3 and 4.4)

Plant Suonort

.

-

The inspectors observed several examples of failing to follow procedures regarding

the fire protection program. On April 23, the inspectors identified that an individual

4 was sleeping while acting as a fire watch during ongoing welding activities. On-

April 22, the inspectors found a fire door blocked open with no one in attendance

i

without a required Plant Barrier impairment (PBI) completed, and on May 19, the

inspectors found combustible materialin the auxiliary building with no one in

attendance and no transient fire load permit completed. The inspectors concluded

l that attention to detail regarding fire protection requirements during this inspection

i period was poor. (Sections F1,1,1.2, and 1.3)

3

. . - - - - - _ _ - - - _ -

,

4

.

Reoort Details

Summarv of Plant Status

Unit 1 entered the period shut down for a scheduled refueling outage and remained shut

down for the entire period.

Unit 2 entered the period at or about 100 percent power and remained at or about

100 percent power for the entire period.

l. Operations

01 Conduct et Operations

01.1 Unit 1 Control Room Observations

a. Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed the performance of the Opert.'mg Department personnel

while engaged in assigned control room duties. The following major plo,

evolutions were in progress during the observation period:

-

reactor coolant loop venting

-

reactor trip response time testing

-

1B diesel generator 24-hour run test and hot restart

-

containment spray additive tank flow verification test

b. Observation and Findinas

From May 8 to May 20, the inspectors made the following observations:

- a Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) was assigned to each evolution,

- the unit NSO was assigned to maintain an overall awareness of the Unit 1

Status without distraction,

- the NSOs assigned to plant evolutions routinely informed the unit NSO and

the unit supervisor of changes in plant conditions, .

- the unit supervisor was continuously present in the area of the controls and

was observed supervising most evolutions,

a two additional senior reactor operators (SROs) were utilized on Unit 1 to

4

perform routine administrative tasks normally performed by the unit

supervisor,

- the assisting supervisors screened control room access requests,

.

4

__. _ ._ - _ _ _ __ , _- _ _ _ . . __ _ _

.

.

.

-

the shift manager made frequent tours of the control room,

a

procedures for each evolution were used and frequently consulted by the

NSOs and unit supervisor,

-

short briefings were conducted prior to performing important procedural

steps, l

-

three-way communication was consistently used in the control room and

with personnelin the field,  ;

-

an emergency report of a personal injury was received in the control room

and expeditiously handled without sacrificing control and oversight of the l

evolutions in progress, and

-

two of the evolutions were briefly halted when field personnel experienced

problems with their radios.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the shift staffing exceeded procedural and TS

requirements but was not excessive considering the number of evolutions in

progress and that the unit supervisor maintained control of the multiple evolutions.

The outage organizational structure of adding additional SROs improved the

supervision of evolutions and demonstrated a strong safety focus on shutdown

operation. The use of additional supervisory operating personnel to screen work

packages and control access resulted in a reduction of distractions and was

considered a strength.

The inspectors also concluded that excellent team work and comrnunications were

demonstrated by the operating staff in the control room for observed activities. All

of the NSOs in the control room understood their specific esponsibilities and the

chain of command. NSOs responsible for the performance of an evolution

coordinated the performance of critical steps through the unit supervisor and unit

NSO to prevent the need to perform critical steps on multiple plant evolutions

simultaneously. This level of coordination was facilitated through the use of

frequent discussions and briefings between the personnel performing the

evolutions, the unit supervisor, and the unit NSO.

01.2 Unit Containment Closecut

a. Insoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors toured the Unit 1 containment to perform a closecut inspection on  !

May 15,1997.

5

- . - . - - - . - . -

_ _ - .,.... --- - - - . - - - -- - . . . - _ . . - - . - .

s

.

i

l b. Observation and Findinas

i Following the licensee's closeout inspection, the inspectors observed that the

general cleanliness of the containment was good. However, there were exceptions.

i The inspectors observed the following:

$ - A metal cylinder of unknown origin, about 2 feet long and 5 inches in

diameter was found laying in the trackway for the reactor cavity bridge .

crane.

4

,

. Containment floor drains inside the missile barr8.. on the 377 foot elevation

. were observed to have debris in at least three drains and standing water in

three more.

l'

The inspectors questioned the presence of the standing water. The licensee

j subsequently determined that the floor of the Unit 1 containment was not built in

l

accordance with the original plans and there was a high spot in the floor drain

system which resulted in the standing water. The licensee performed an operability

i evaluation and determined that the condition was acceptable. The licensee also

committed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation,

b c. Conclusion

j Tne cleanliness of the containment was generally good with the exception of a lone

2

cylinder ar'd debris in several floor drains. The floor drains were significant because

they communicated with a techriical specification leakage detection system. -The

inspectors also were concerned that licensee personnel did not question the

presence of standing water in the floor drain system until prompted by the

"

inspector.

4

~

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

I O 2.1 Feed Water Valve Reauired To Shut Durina Feedwater Isolation Taken Out-Of-

Service Ooen With No Safety Evaluation

a. inspection Scope (71707,37551)

i

The inspectors performed a routine inspection of the Unit 2 control room panels,

reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 15.0.7, * Plant

Systems and Equipment Available For Transients and Accident Conditions," and

Section 15.1.2, "Feedwater System Malfunctions Causing An increase in

Feedwater Flow," and interviewed the Unit 2 operating engineer.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors observed on April 18 that the Unit 2 motor driven feedwater pump

discharge isolation valve (2FWOO2A) was out-of service in the open position and

6

_ _ __ _ _ .__. . . - _ _ __ ..

.

'.

.

the feedwater pump control switch was in the pull-to-lock position. The inspectors

questioned this lineup and found that the valve had been taken out-of-service on

April 14 for work scheduled on the valve actuator. The maintenance had been ,

'

moved to a later date but the schedule held by operations had not been changed.

The schedule change had been communicated to the weekend operations crews,

which were directed not to hang the out-of-service, but not to the Monday crew.

This resulted in the valve being out-of-service for 5 days for no reason.

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and identified that 2FWOO2A automatically

closes on a feedwater isolation signal. Although, the motor driven feedwater pump

i was not in operation, there were no restrictions on placing the motor driven

feedwater pump in operation with the automatic closure capability of the 2FWOO2A

removed. In addition, the inspectors identified that no 10 CFR 50.59 safety

evaluation was prepared to remove the automatic closure capability of 2FWOO2A

and keep the valve in operation.

I c. Conclusions

,

The inspectors concluded that the communications within the operations

'

department for this evolution were poor. The inspectors also concluded that the

.

~

. failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for removing the automatic

closing feature of 2FWOO2A was a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 (50-457/97007-

01(DRP)).

'

08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)

i 08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-457/96002-00: Both Trains of Emergency Core

i Cooling System inoperable Due To An inadequate Out-Of-Service Caused By

.

Personnel Error. This event was discussed in inspection Report 96005 and was

! discussed as one of several examples of failure to follow procedures and inadequate

'

corrective action that resulted in a Cited Level ll1 Problem and a Civil Penalty. The

< corrective actions for this event are part of the total corrective actions for

, 50-456/457/96005-01 through 05 which are discussed below. This item is closed-

2 08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-456/457/96005-01 throuah 05: Five apparent violations

were identified in Inspection Report 96005. Five violations culminating in a LevciIll

Problem for the failure to follow procedures and inadequate corrective actions were

'

issued under the headquarters tracking numbers 01013,01023,01033,01043,

'

and 01053. The inspectors verified by observation or review of documentation the

completion of the following corrective actions:

4

- work analysts and operators were counseled on procedure adherence and

management expectations;

- formal classroom training was conducted on what level of detail was

,

necessary to properly fill out the additional information section of the

electronic out-of-service request;

.

7

.- - . ~ .

.

..

.

-

a work execution center was manned and implemented within the expected

dates and that the work execution center functioned as expected to remove

administrative burden from the control room staff and review OOSs prior to

placement;

-

a dedicated OOS group manned by the operations department created the

majority of the OOSs used and the location of the OOS group was such that

it optimized communication with work planning:

-

operators were instructed that prior to any valve manipulation the required

position of the valve should be known;

-

signs were posted inside and outside the hydrogen monitor cabinets warning

that internal throttle valves affected operability, and the shift engineer shall

be contacted prior to operation;

-

changes were made to the corrective action system to improve timely

followup of previously identified issues;

-

operations department performed complete walkdowns of all electrical and

mechanical lineups, walkdowns of all systems were planned to be

reperformed within a three year time schedule; and

-

an effectiveness review process was implemented for all Level lil and above

corrective action items; the effectiveness of the effectiveness review

process was not evaluated.

In addition, specific operations department managers were assigned to track OOS

errors and configuration control problems. In March 1997, a series of OOS errors

were identified by the licensee before the OOSs were placed in the field. This

demonstrated that the implementation of the work execution center function as a

final check on OOS work was effective. The inspectors observed that the licensee

identified the trend and initiated corrective action.

The inspectors have concluded the licensee was moderately successful in reducing

the number of valve mispositionings and configuration control events. The number

of events appears to correspond to the amount of emphasis placed on configuration

control by plant rnanagement. The inspectors have no further concerns at this

time. This item is closed.

,

I

8 ,

!

l

-

l

l

'

. 1

.

lj< Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

4

M1.1 Observation of Unit 1 18-Month Diesel Generator Maintenance Activities

a. Insoection Scone (62707)

The inspectors observed maintenance performed on the 1 A and 1B Emergency

Diesel Generators (EDG) during Unit 1 refuelir.g outage A1R06. The following

maintenance activities were observed: ,

-

l

1 A EDG

-

jacket water pressure test with boroscopic examination of engine cylinders,

- installation and maintenance of FME barriers,

-

cleaning proparation of gasket surfaces,

-

governor oil replacement preparations, ,

- measurement of piston crown thickness,

-

priming of the fuel oil system,

1B EDG l

- installation and maintenance of FME barriers,

-

jacket water pressure test with boroscopic examination of engine cylinders,

-

jacket water heat exchanger inst ction,

-

reset of engine driven lubricating I discharge pressure,

-

bearing high temperature eutectic inp device inspection,

- installation of cylinder head covers and rocker arm covers, and

- turbocharger boroscopic inspection.

The inspectors also reviewed all or portions of the following documents:

- BwMP 3100-22, " Diesel Generator Annual Inspection," Revision 8

- SMP-M-04, " Foreign Material Exclusion," Revision 0

- Work Package 960022660, "1 A EDG 18 Month Inspection"

- Work Package 960022979, "1B EDG 18 Month inspection"

- Work Package 970029414, " Ultrasonic Measurement of Piston Crown

Thickness"

9

- . _ ~ . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . - . _ _ .

.

,

'

i

l b. Observations and Findinas

,

1 A EDG

4

1) Boroscooic Insoection of Power Cylinders and Jacket Water Leakaaq

.

Insoection i

i

The inspectors reviewed the results of the boroscopic inspection of the

20 power cylinders and interviewed the Mechanical Maintenance

i Department (MMD) foreman and the system engineer. The licensee's j

l documentation of the inspection did not indicate the presence of any leakage

j around the rocker arms, cylinder external flanges, or cylinder liner bellows.

'

No surface irregularities were observed on the cylinder liners, face of the

i cylinder head, piston crowns, or piston skirts.

.

.

2) Installation and Maintenance of FME Barriers

The inspectors observed the installation and maintenance of FME barriers

throughout the progression of the maintenance on the 1 A EDG. The

inspectors observed compliance with SMP-M-04 and the required FME

documents were included in the work package.

3) Cleanina and Preoaration of Gasket Surfaces

The inspectors observed the cleaning of the gasket surfaces for the

crankcase access covers. The inspector observed the application of a

aerosol solvent to remove residual gasket material and noticed that the

overspray was going into the crankcase. The inspectors questioned this

practice with the MMD foreman who told the inspectors that the solvent

was approved for use under the chemical control progrcm. The inspectors

confirmed this by checking the labeling on the aerosol can and found no

material use restrictions nor any indication that the solvent was corrosive to

metals. The maintenance foreman also indicated that the crankcase receives j

a thorough cleaning prior to performing the crankcase inspection section of

BwMP 3100-022.

4) Precarations for the Chance of Governor Oil

The inspectors observed the preparation for the change of 1 A EDG governor

oil. The inspectors verified that the oil obtained for the replacement was

required by Section F.24.b of BwMP 3100-022 and that the proper material

control documentation was attached.

5) Piston Crown Thickness Measurement

The inspectors observed the ultrasonic (UT) measurement of piston crown

thickness on the 1 A EDG's 5 exposed pistons. The system engineer told the

inspectors that these measurements were to : address concerns raised by the

10

. .

- - - - - . . - - . - . - . ..-.- - - _ _ . - - - ~ ~

t

'..,

.

failure of a piston on Zion Station's 2A EDG. The licensee established a

minimum crown thickness of 0.185 inch which was based on verbal ,

information from Cooper-Bessemer. The inspectors observed that pistons in  !

cylinders 9L and 10R had measured crown thicknesses of less than i

O.185 inch. These pistons were subsequently removed and replaced with ]

pistons having sufficient crown thickness. The inspectors observed the UT

technician make numerous measurements to ensure the entire crown I

thickness was measured, perform frequent accuracy checks of the UT l

instrument, and refer to the work package for guidance.

6) Primina of the 1 A EDG Diesel Fuel Oil System

,

, The inspectors observed the priming of the fuel oil system. MMD personnel

performed the priming in accordance with Section F.18 of BwMP 3100-022.

The inspectors verified the proper installation of the priming pump from the

day tank instrument leg drain to the fuel oil header priming connection. The

inspectors observed the sequential venting of fuelline components up to and

including the cylinder fuel pumps. The maintenance personnel were careful

to minimize the amount of fuel oil released and immediately cleaned up

released fuel oil. Following the priming, the inspectors checked for fuel oil

system leaks but found none.

1B EDG

7) installation and Maintenance of FME Barriers

The inspectors made frequent walk-through inspections of the 18 EDG room ,

to evaluate the licensee's FME controls. On two occasions, the inspectors l

identified conditions that were not in compliance with the licensee's FME l

procedure, SMP-M-04, and work package #960022979 requirements. The -l'

inspectors discussed these findings with licensee management on April 25.

On April 21, the inspectors observed that FME covers were missing on two

of the engine's cam shaft access ports. The inspectors did not observe any

maintenance in progress that would require the removal of the FME covers  !

and the FME covers had not been reinstalled prior to all maintenance .

l

personnel leaving the work area. After the inspectors informed the system

engineer of this condition, the FME covers were properly reinstalled. l

On April 25, the inspectors observed that the plastic sheeting FME barrier

used to cover the cylinder heads had been folded back exposing the right

bank of cylinder heads and no work was in progress at the time. In addition,

upon further investigation, the inspector noticed foreign materialin the 10R

cylinder head. The inspector informed the system engineer who told the

inspectors that the foreign material was small pieces of insulation from the

diesel exhaust header. The inspectors retumed later that day to verify that

corrective action had been taken to remove the foreign material and replace

the FME barrier.

11

_..__ _ _ _ . _ _ -

.

'.

.

The inspectors identified two examples where the requirements of

Section 6.4.2, of SMP-M-04 were not met. The failure to follow SMP-M-04

is a violation of TS 6.8.1a (50-456/97007-02a(DRP)).

8). Boroscooic Insoection of Power Cylinders and Jacket Water Leakaos

inspection

The inspectors reviewed the results of the boroscopic inspection of  ;

- the 20 power cylinders and interviewed the system engineer. The licensee's

documentation of the inspection did not indicate the presence of any leakage

around the rocker arms, cylinder external flanges, or cylinder liner bellows,

-- and no surface irregularities were observed on the cylinder linersrface of the

cylinder heads, piston crowns, or piston skirts.

The licensee identified that the jacket water (JW) system had been over-

pressurized during the performance of this inspection. A Problem

identification Form (PlF) was written and an investigation was to be

performed by the mechanical maintenance master mechanic. The inspectors

'

found through review of the licensee's investigation that the jacket water

pressure exceeded the maximum pressure permitted by Section F.5.b.1 of

BwMP 3100-022 by more than 12 psig for approximately 10 minutes before

it was discovered and corrected. The licensee identified that the root cause

was that the first line supervisor's attention was diverted. This diversion

resulted in his failure to close one of the two isolation valves fro n the

demineralized water system to the JW system and a failure to tightly close

the other. Leakage past the closed valve caused the jacket water system to

increase to greater than 30 psig with a limit of 18 psig.

The licensee took the following actions in response to the jacket water over- 1

pressurization event:

- performed a informational tailgate session with diesel generator crews

detailing the inappropriate actions taken in this event;

- contacted Cooper-Bessemer to discuss post-event inspection actions;

- performed a visualinspection with the system pressurized to 15 psig;

,

- disassembled the turbocharger and inspected intercoolers for the

presence of water;

,

- visually inspected cylinder liner bellows (wrinkle bellies);

4 - sampled crankcase oil and examined it for water; and

- - performed an engineering evaluation assuming a maximum possible

i pressure of 80 psig (demineralized water pressure adjusted for head

loss).

j

12

.

i

-. -- - - . 1

_. ._ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ .... _ ._ _ .__ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .

l'.-

1

.

'

l The licensee's visual inspections revealed no signs of Jacket water leakage.

t

The licensee identified the following long term corrective action to prevent i

.

recurrence:

1

-

evaluate the installation of a pressure relief valve in the JW system, r

and

4

- incorporate lessons learned into BwMP 3100-022.

,

i TS 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented,

3

- and maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, ,

Revision 2, Appendix A. TS 6.8.1.a applies to BwMP 3100-022 and

therefore, the failure to follow BwMP 3100-022 is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a.

j This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-

!

Cited Violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement ,

Policy. (50-456/97007-03(DRP))

l 9) Jacket Water Heat Exchanaer insoection i

I

i

! The inspectors observed a routine inspection of the 1B EDG JW beat ',

, exchanger. The tube side of the heat exchanger's as-found condition was

clear of sediment. The inspectors observed no plugged tubes; however, the

i licensee unexpectedly found sediment in the shell side of the heat exchanger

] (JW side). A Cooper Bessemer engineer indicated that the source of the

L sediment was'probably casting and milling debris from the manufacturing of I

! the engine. This was subsequently confirmed by chemical analysis. The

'

inspector observed the' licensee pull and clean the tube bundles and noticed

that there was only a very small amount of sediment in the heat exchanger.

10) Adiustment of Enaine Driven Lube Oil Discharae Pressure l

l

The inspector observed operations and maintenance conduct a pre-job

briefing where the diesel operator was instructed to manually trip the engine

if problems were encountered in setting the tube oil pressure. The

inspectors observed maintenance personnel review the applicable section of

the procedure prior to making the adjustment, monitored diesellube oil

pressure during and following the adjustment, and ensured that the

adjustment had been properly made.

11) Bearina Hiah Temoerature Eutectic Trio Device insoection

The inspectors observed maintenance personnel and the Cooper-Bessemer

technical representative measure the clearances on the eutectic (rod bearing

and main bearing over-temperature fusable link) trip devices. The inspector

verified that maintenance personnel used the applicable section of the

13

.. ._ ..- -, ,... . - - - . . - - - . - - . - . - -. . - - . .-. . - -.-- -.

.

L-

!

! .

'

procedure, that personnel were taking the proper safety precautions prior to  ;

turning the engine over with the turning gear, and FME covers were removed  :

only as needed and replaced upon completion of the measurement. ]

'

!

c. Conclusion )

l 'l

, Conclusions for maintenance observations 3-6 and 9-11

! The inspectors concluded that these maintenance activities were performed in

'

accordance with the applicable procedural guidance. Procedures for these activities

were well written and provided the necessary guidance. Supervision of.these

activities was good.

i

! Conclusions for maintenance observations 2 and 7 I

i

{ The inspectors concluded that the FME controls were good on the 1 A EDG.

!- However, the inspectors identified two examples of a violation for failure to follow

f- FME procedures on the 1B EDG.

l Conclusion for maintenance observations 1 and 8

1 1

The inspectors concluded that the nressurized inspection of the jacket water

system on the 1 A EDG was performed in accordance with the procedure and the

results met acceptance criteria; however, this was not the case for the same

j inspection on the 1B EDG. The inspectors concluded that this resulted from the

maintenance foreman becoming involved in the performance of non-supervisory

i- stasks concurrent with his supervisory responsibilities.

-

1

,

The licensee identified the event, took immediate corrective action, identified long-

'

l term corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and it's investigation of the event

was prompt and thorough. The inspectors concluded that the immediate corrective

actions were adequate and that the problem was a noncited violation. 1

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 1RC8002C. Reactot Coolant System (RCS) Looo C Cold Lea Stoo Valve Reoair

s

a. Inspection Scone (6270_Z1

The inspectors observed portions of the repair of the Unit 1, RCS Loop C Cold Leg

Stop Valve; viewed the video tapes of the as-found internal condition of the valve;

conducted interviews with the project manager, work supervisors, in-service

inspection (ISI) technician; and reviewed associated work packsge 960094676-01.

b. Observation and Findin_gs

The inspectors observed portions of the disassembly and assembly of 1RC8002C

which progressed smoothly with no observable delays.

14

_ _

.

~ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . ,

, ,

c

4

The inspectors also observed the video tape of the as-found inspection and the

'

more detailed ISIinspection of the valve internals. The as-found inspection

confirmed the conditions observed on the radiograph taken during the previous

a mid-cycle outage where the tab at the bottom of the valve guide was missing

allowing the valve guide to move in the path of the valve disc preventing the

valve's full closure. The inspectors confirmed the licensees finding of no evidence

of any damage to the valve body caused by the failure of the valve guide. The

4 inspectors did observe cracks in the failed valve guide and the location of the

crack.s supported the licensee's evaluation that they were caused by the initial

attempt to close the valve following dislocation of the valve guide.

f

c. Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the repair work on 1RC8002C was completed

expeditiously in accordance with the work package. The maintenance was well

planned and practiced on the mock up valve prior to the outage.

M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation

M3.1 Procedure Problems With Westinahouse Contracted Breaker Refurbishment

a. Insoection Scoce (62707.37551)

The inspectors reviewed Operability Determinations97-040 and 97-041, and

interviewed site engineering personnel,

b. Observations and Findinas

Westinghouse Corporation contracted with Comed to perform breaker

refurbishment for 12 DS-206 480V breakers. After the refurbishments were

completed Westinghouse Corporation personnel performed a quality assurance

check of the work performed and identified 12 concerns.

The concerns were all based on Westinghouse Corporation procedure and

documentation weaknesses of the work performed. The inspectors questioned why

the procedures had not been approved by the licensee before work began. Licensee

personnel stated that Westinghouse Corporation would not allow the licensee to

review the procedures because of the proprietary nature of the information.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability evaluations and how each

procedure or documentation weakness was addressed. The inspectors reviewed

the licensee's determination of operability and the outcome of additional testing

that was performed by the licensee when the problems were discovered. The

inspectors had no additional concerns.

The inspectors also reviewed a report issued by Westinghouse Corporation on

May 14,1997, on the procedural defects as required by 10 CFR 21.21. The only

stations affected by the procedural defects were Braidwood and Byron.

15

. - -. ._. - - . _- .. - - - . . - _ . - .

_ .-- . -

.

.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's review of the problem, additional

testing, and determination of operability were satisfactory. The inspectors

determined that the problem appeared to be properly reported by Westinghouse

Corporation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.

M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance

M4.1 Unit 1 Refuelino Activities

a. Insoection Scoce (627_Qll

Unit 1 refueling outage A1RO6 began March 29,1997. During this inspection

period and the previous inspection period, the inspectors observed refueling

practices, including new fuel receipt, reactor core offload, and reactor core reload.

Fuel movement operations were observed in the fuel handling building, reactor

containment building, and main control room. The inspectors interviewed nuclear

engineering, operations, fuel handling, maintenance, and radiation protection

personnel who were either performing and/or supporting fuel movements. The

inspectors also reviewed the following procedures to verify UFSAR and technical

specification requirements were satisfied:

- BwAP 370-3, " Administrative Control During Refueling," Revision 16

- BwFP FH-1, "New Fuel Receipt." Revision 8

- BwFP FH-2, "New Fuel Inspection," Revision 5

- BwFP FH-5, " Fuel Movement in Containment," Revision 5

- BwFP FH-12, " Operation of the Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane," Revision 5

- BwFP FH-14, " Operation of Refueling Machine," Revision S

b. Observations and Findinos

During the previous inspection period, the inspectors observed portions of the new

fuel receipt activities in the fuel handling building including plant personnel following

appropriate procedures while moving fuel. l

During this inspection period, the inspectors noted that maintenance personnel

supporting fuel receipt were knowledgeable on use of equipment and provided

efficient support for fuel handling personnel. Fuel handlers were proficient in the

use of fuel movement equipment and nuclear engineering personnel were present to

inspect the fuel assemblies as they were unpacked. Radiation protection personnel

were present during unpacking of new fuel assemblies and closely monitored the

assemblies for radiation and contamination.

During new fuel receipt, the irispectors verified that areas of the fuel building were

well controlled and that the licensee was following FME procedures around the new

fuel vaults and in the area where new fuel was unpacked,

i

!

16

i

!

!

!

_ _ _ _ . .__ _ . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ ~ _ _ _ _. _.

6

'

,

,

4

Reactor core offload and reload operations were also observed by the inspectors.

The inspectors verified that operations and fuel handling personnel followed

procedures and updated documentation continuously during fuel movemont

including updating status boards and Nuclear Component Transfer Lists, and

maintaining constant communications between the Unit 1 Control Room and the

i SRO in containment. Fuel handling personnel were knowledgeable of their

responsibility and in the use of fuel movement equipment. FME areas were also

established and appropriately controlled around the spent fuel pool and around the

reactor refueling cavity during fuel movements. Radiation levels in refueling areas

were also routinely checked by radiation protection personnel. l

1

- During previous refueling outages, water clarity in the refueling cavity and spent

fuel pool was a concern. However, during this outage, the inspectors noted

improvement in the water clarity during fuel movement in the spent fuel pool and in l

the refueling cavity. This was attributable to the licensee using different filters in

the spent fuel pool cooling system that had higher filtering capability.

1

The inspectors also verified the availability and operability of systems and l

components during fuel movement such as proper configuration of Residual Heat j

Removal and Spent Fuel Cooling.

Several problems caused minor delays during fuel movement including blown fuses

on the fuel hoist and the trolley in the fuel handling building. Plant engineering and

maintenance personnel promptly evaluated the situations and took corrective

actions. This resulted in satisfactory performance of the equipment during the

remainder of the fuel moves.

The review of procedures showed that technical specifications and UFSAR i

requirements would be satisfied by performance of the procedures. I

1

c. Conclusions l

The inspectors concluded that plant support for fuel movement in preparation for

and during refueling outage A1RO6 was good. Plant personnel were knowledgeable

of their responsibilities and the use of fuel movement equipment. Documentation

and status boards were maintained as required by procedure.

Plant systems were found properly configured to support fuel movement. Areas

involved with fuel movement were properly controlled.

Personnel response to problems that arose during refueling was good. Engineering

and maintenance personnel provided troubleshooting to solve problems in a timely

manner.

<

17

-.- - . ... --

.

.

.

~ '

M4.2 Surveillance Observations

a. Insoection Scone (61726) .:

!

The ir:spectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities: "

- 18wVS 6.2.1.b-2, "ASME Surveillance Requi.ements for 1B Containment

Spray Pump and Check Valves 1CS0038 and 1CS011B," Revision 2;  !

- BwVS 8'.1.1.2.f-19, "1 A Diesel Generator 5500 KW Load Rejection and

Simulated Si in Conjunction With UV During Load Testing," Revision 7; .

,

- 18wVS 8.1.1.2.f-21, "1 A Diesel Generator 24 Hour Endurance Run and Hot

,

Restart Test 18-Month," Revision 0;

i

'

- 1BwVS 8.1.1.2.f-15, "1 A Diesel Generator Loss of ESF Bus Voltage With

'

,

No SI Signal," Revision 5;

- 18wVS 900-34, "1B Diesel Generator isolate Switch Functional Test,"

Revision 1;

,

'

- 18wVS 8.1.1.2.f-22, "1B Diesel Generator 24-Hour Endurance Run and Hot

Restart Test 18-Month," Revision 0; and

- 1 BwVS 8.2.1.2.d-112 " Unit One 125 Volt ESF Battery Bank 112 Service

Test," Revision 1.

b. Observations and FindiDQ1

The inspectors observed pre-job or Heightened Level of Awareness (HLA) briefings

for each of the surveillances listed above. The inspectors found that the briefings

exceeded the requirements of BwAP 100-12, " Human Performance Awareness."

Briefings stressed the sequence of tasks for the activity to be performed, direction

of the activity, potential problems, and contingency plans in the event that a  ;

problem arises.

x

The inspectors observed and verified that all surveillances were performed in

accordance with their applicable procedures, that equipment operation and

performance parameters met acceptance criteria, that proper communication. ,

between the control room and personnel in the field occurred, and that all

'

instruments were in calibration. The inspectors reviewed applicable TSs and

applicable sections of the UFSAR and found no discrepancies.

c. Conclusions j

The inspectors concluded that the surveillances listed above were performed in

accordance with procedures and all acceptance criteria were met. HLA and pre-job

briefings were thorough and exceeded minimum briefing requirements. The  ;

i

18 i

.

- . . _ _

_ . _

.

.

inspectors also concluded that the procedures were well written and ensured TS

and UFSAR requirements were tested.

M4.3 Several Problems Observed Durina Safety Iniection Valve Surveillance

a. Insoection Scoce (61726)

The inspectors reviewed 18wVS 0.5-2.SI.2, " Safety injection System Check Valve

Stroke Test," Revision 15; attended the HLA briefings; observed portions of the

above surveillances on April 28; reviewed UFSAR Section 6.3; and interviewed

system engineers and the system engineering supervisor,

b. Observations and Findinas

On April 28, the inspectors observed that BwVS 0.5-2.St.2, Step 1.11 (which

tested the cold leg injection check valves) clearly listed the acceptance criteria for

total flow from the 1 A safety injection pump as between 612 and 655 gallons per

minute (gpm). The upper flow limit was based on TS 4.5.2.h.2.b limits to prevent

safety injection pump runout. The inspectors observed that the documented flow

for Step 1.11 was 656.5 gpm, which exceeded the clearly marked acceptance

criteria. The inspectors brought this to the attention of the test director who stated

that the 655 gpm was not an acceptance criteria and the recorded flow value

would have to be evaluated.

Step 1.13 recorded differential pressures across flow orifices installed in the

injection lines to the cold legs. Each individual injection line flow was calculated

and added to recirculation line flow to give a total flow of 653.1 gpm. The licensee

considered this to be the more accurate of the readings based on the accuracy of ,

the instrumentation and the conservative values used for the constants to calculate i

flow.

The inspectors observed later during the same surveillance that for flow testing of

the hot leg injection check valves with the minimum flow valves shut, in

Steps F.3.7 and F.4.7, the 655 gpm upper flow limit was not listed as an

acceptance criteria. The B train flow recorded in Step F.4.7 was 660 gpm based l

on control room instrumentation for pump flow however, the calculated value for  !

flow at that orifice was later determined to be 654.9 gpm.

During the review of the completed surveillance the inspectors identified that the

licensee failed to record pump minimum flow line flow during system restoration as

required by Step F.4.24. The pump flow instrument (FI 922) was affected by the

minimum flow line flow read at flow instrument FI 9:2 because the minimum flow

line taps off up stream of FI 922. Had the minimum flow been recorded properly by

summing the values of RI 922 and FI 972, the acceptance criteria for that step may

have been exceeded. System engineering management stated that having the

minimum flow line open dunng Step F.4.24 changed the system flow curve for the

expected system configuration when injecting into the reactor coolant system hot

legs and thus would have changed system flow. System engineering management

19

.

.

.

stated that the procedure should have closed the minimum flow valve before pump

flow was measured. The licensee's operability determination stated that pump

operability was demonstrated in Step F.4.7 where pump flow was calculated to be

654.9 gpm.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2,

" Safety injection System Check Valve Stroke Test," Revision 15 and had no further

concerns with the operability of the safety injection system pumps. However, the

inspectors were concerned with the failure of the system engineers acting as test

-

directors to understand TS limits, control the evolution, and ensure procedural

compliance.

The inspectors concluded that the test director failed to recognize test acceptance

criteria. The test director failed to complete Step F.4.24 of BwVS 0.5-2.St.2 in

that a required flow as the sum of flow instruments FI 972 and FI 922 was not

recorded. This could have resulted in exceeding the acceptance criteria without

being detected. TS 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established,

implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide

1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. TS 6.8.1.a applies to BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2, Revision

15, and therefore, the failure to follow BwVS 0.5-2.St.2 is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a

(50-456/97007-02b (DRP))

> M4.4 Qbserved Problems Durina Charnino System Check Valve Surveillance

a. Insoection Scone (61726)

The inspectors reviewed BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2-3, " Safety injection System Check Valve

Stroke Test," Revision 8E1; attended the HLA briefings; observed portions of the

above surveillances on April 29; reviewed UFSAR Sections 6.3; and interviewed

system engineers and the system engineering supervisor.

b. Observations and Findinas

On April 29, the inspectors observed testing of the Unit 1 charging system check

valves in accordance with BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2-3. During Step 3.11 for the B train of

the charging system the inspectors observed that total recorded flow exceeded

550 nom. The inspectors observed that the test director stopped the test and

informed the shift manager who directed that the B centrifugal charging pump be

stopped in accordance with Steps D 2 and E.1 of BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2-3. Step D.2

specifically stated that total flow was not to exceed 550 gpm based on TS 4.5.2.h.1.b.

The licensee later determined that the reason for the high charging system flow

s was due to an instrument that had been installed by instrumcr ,.5intenance

personnel that had a different output range than what was called for in the

procedure. The instrument read out in percent of full range. A 0-800 inches of

20

,

l

. l

-

1

l

.

water instrument had been substituted for a 0-1000 inches of water instrument

specified in the procedure. This resulted in a higher flow indication than what

actually existed due to the failure to consider the difference in the scales. i

The inspectors reviewed the data from the testing that had been performed on the

A train of the charging system the previous shift and found that total flow for the A

train had also exceeded 550 gpm. The inspectors determined that the same

instruments were used for the A train section of the surveillance. However, there

was no indication that the A centrifugal charging pump was stopped in accordance

with Steps D.2 and E.1 of BwVS 0.5-2.St.2-3. Step D.2 specifically stated that

total flow was not to exceed 550 gpm based on TS 4.5.2.h.1.b.

c. . Conclusions

The inspectors reviewed the operability determination for BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2-3,

" Safety injection System Check Valve Stroke Test," Revision 8E1; and had no

further concerns with the operability of the charging system pumps. However, the

inspectors were concerned with the failure of the system engineers acting as test

directors to control the evolution and ensure procedural compliance. The inspectors

concluded that the test director should have stopped the A charging pump

following Step 2.11, of BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2-3, due to a indicated flow greater than

550 gpm.

The inspectors also concluded that there was a breakdown in communications

between maintenance and engineering that resulted in the use of the wrong

instrument range in flow calculations. The substitution of the 0-800" instrument i

for the 0-1000" instrument was documented on the surveillance cover sheet in  !

accordance with Step E.4 of BwVS 0.5-2St.2-3. However, the cover sheet I

description of the substitution failed to discuss the affect the change in instrument l

range would have on the flow rate calculations. l

1

1

TS 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and i

maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,  !

Appendix A. TS 6.8.1.a applies to BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2-3, Revision 8E1, and l

'

therefore, the failure to follow BwVS 0.5-2.St.2-3 is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a

'

(50-456/97007-02c(DRP)).

M4.5 Review of Work On the Unit 1 Steam Generator Automatic Blowdown Flow Control

Valve 1SD007

a. Insoection Scone (62707)

The inspectors reviewed work in progress on 1SD007; the Unit 1 steam generator

automatic blowdown flow control valve work request (WR960104793-01); SMP-M-

04, " Foreign Material Exclusion," Revision 0; and radiation work permit (RWP)

970013, " Routine Contractor inspections, Walkdowns, and Miscellaneous Work

Approved By Radiation Protection."

21

- - -. - . -. - -- . - _ _ _ . - , . - - . . . --

'.

.

.

~

b. Observations and Findinag

The inspectors visited the job site and noted that adequate scaffolding was in place

for the work performed. The work package was reviewed and adequate

engineering evaluation of the rigging necessary to perform the job was documented.

The valve (1SDOO7) was open and covered with an FME barrier. The FME

procedure SMP-M-04 required logging of materials in and out of an FME area only if

foreign material could fallinto an area that would not be visible or retrievable. Also,

the procedure did not require that an FME boundary be established in this type of

area. The FME protection at the work site appeared to be adequate.

The inspectors reviewed RWP 970013, " Routine Contractor inspections,

Walkdowns, and Miscellaneous Work Approved By Radiation Protection." The work

on 1SD007 was performed in a clean area with a general area dose rate of less

than 1 mrem per hour. The inspectors considered the RWP to be adequate for the

work performed.

The work request prejob briefing sheet had both the RWP and OOS number written

on it and appeared to be signed by all workers assigned to the job.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that pre-job briefing, scaffolding, and RWP documentation

for the job was adequate. The inspectors also concluded that the FME protection

established on the jobsite was adequate for the work to be performed.

Ill. Enaineerina

E8 Miscellaneous engineering issues (92902)

E8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-456/96007-00: " improper Placement of

Spent Fuel Assemblies With Regards to Checkerboarding Due to Personnel Error,

and Procedural and Management Deficiencies." On June 17,1996, spent fuel was

repositioned in the spent fuel pool into a configuration that was not bounded by the

existing criticality analysis. The inspectors verified that BwAP 2364-3T3, " Nuclear

Component Transfer List Verification," was created to list the requirements for fuel

positioning. The inspectors verified that fuelinterface requirements had been

incorporated into Attachment B of procedure BwAP 2364-3, " Safeguarding and

Controlling Movements of Nuclear Fuel Within a Station." The inspectors also

interviewed nuclear engineering personnel and reviewed the Nuclear Material

Custodian qualification guide to verify that specific guidance for fuel movement

reviews was incorporated into the guide. Additionally, the licensee counselled

personnel involved in this event regarding the failure to meet expectations. The

inspectors considered the licensee's corrective actions appropriate. The safety

significance of the event was minimal based on a Westinghouse analysis showing

excess boron in solution in the fuel pool water kept the shutdown margin as

22

- . - . . - . - - - - - - - - . . ~ - - - . - . . -- . -. - .-.

.

l" . *

l

• ;

,

t

,

required. The inspectors concluded that the failure to identify fuel positioning

requirements and a failure to use verified and controlled information to generate a

Nuclear Component Transfer List resulted in inadequate procedural requirements

and was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. This licensee

identified ano corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation

consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-456/97007-

l

04(DRP)). This item is closed.

E8.2 (Closed) LER 50-456/96008-00: " Improper Placement of Spent Fuel Resulting in

Technical Specification Violation Due to Personnel Error." On July 10,1996,

during verification of spent fuel storage locations, it wcs discovered that one

assembly was stored in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool, and not in the required

checkerboard configuration, based on the burnup versus initial enrichment. The

inspectors verified that BwAP 2364-9, " Controlling Movements of Nuclear Fuel into

the Spent Fue! Racks," was revised to require independent verification of the

calculations, retention as plant documentation, and performance of the procedure j

when the burnup versus initial enrichment limits are changed. Licensee personnel

l

verified the location of all fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool using an underwater

camera. Additionally, the licensee counselled the individual involved in this event

_

regarding the failure to meet expectations. The licensee also planned to perform an

I effectiveness review of the corrective actions before December 31,1997. The

inspectors considered the licensee's corrective actions appropriate. The failure to

l maintain the fuel in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool in a required checkerboard

configuration was a violation of TS 5.6.1.1.b.2. This licensee identified and

corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with

Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-456/97007-05(DRP)). This item

is closed.

l: E8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item (IFI) 50-456/96011-01: During an inspection in  ;

June 1990, the inspectors reviewed reactor defueling practices and the licensing I

basis As part of the review, the inspectors noted that the licensee proposed to

l revw the UFSAR to explicitly state that full core offload is a routine, or normal,

practice. The revision to UFSAR was not scheduled until December 16,1996,and

the Inspector Followup Item was generated to track the proposed changes. The

inspectors reviewed revised Section 9.1.3 of the UFSAR and verified the changes

were incorporated. This item is closed.

IV. PLANT SUPPORT

l R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiation Protection

l

R4.1 RCS Looo C Cold Leo Stoo Valve Renair

a. Insoection Scone (71750)

f The inspectors monitored the work in progress and interviewed radiation protection

j. personnel,

f

'

23

l . - .. - --

. _ - -. _- . _ _. . . - .

.

l'.

'.

.

~

b. Observations and Findinag

i The inspectors observed good ALARA practices by workers moving to low dose

areas when not directly engaged in the valve work. The inspector also observed

, good Radiation Protection Department support throughout the project. The

I

inspectors interviewed radiation protection personnel to determine the person-rem

for the work on 1RC8002C. The inspectors were told a total of 15.7 person-rem

was estimated and the actual exposure was 13.477 person-rem.

c. Conclusions

-

The inspectors concluded that compliance with radiation protection procedures was

l

,

good and total radiation exposure was less than expected.

t

j S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

S2.1 Perimeter Surveillance Eauioment Ooeration

a. Insoection Scone (71750)

The inspectors observed the operation of the perimeter surveillance equipment

shortly following a heavy rain and during high winds.

b. Observations and Findinas

On April 30, the inspectors observed the operation of the perimeter surveillance

I equipment. The inspectors observed that the security system appeared to be

functioning normally. Perimeter lighting was sufficient for surveillance.

i

The alarm system appeared to be functioning normally since several alarms were

received due to wind blown debris. The inspector observed security personnel

'

successfully perform a routine check of system operability.

The inspectors did not observe any degradation in system performance due to the

l

heavy rain or high winds.

c. Conclusion

l

!

The inspector concluded that the perimeter surveillance equipment was performing

as expected and was being properly operated by security personnel.

l

l

t

i

!

,

24

!

l

.

< ..

.

.

.

F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities

F1.1 Inattentive (Sleettna) Hot Work Fire Watch

a. Insoection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors performed a routine inspection tour of the turbine building; reviewed

BwAP 1100-15, " Fire Prevention When Welding, Cutting, Grinding or Performing

Open Flame Work (Hot Work)," Revision 7; and interviewed the operations field

supervisor.

b. Observations and Findinos

On April 23, the inspectors observed an individual sitting in the dark under the

Unit 1 turbine hood. The hood had been removed and placed on the Unit 2 turbine

deck. The inspectors informed the operations shift field supervisor who, along with

another senior reactor operator found the individual and told the inspectors that the

individual was found asleep. The field supervisor informed the inspectors that the

sleeping individual was a contract worker assigned as the fire watch for welding

that was in progress.

The inspectors then informed the station manager of the finding. The sleeping

individual was given a day off without pay.

BwAP 1100-15, Step F.2.c.10) instructs the job supervisor to ensure that a fire

watch is available (attentive) throughout the job t ad at least 30 minutes after.

BwAP 1100-15, Step 6a states in part that one or more individuals in each welding,

grinding, or open flame work area SHALL be designated to watch for potential fire

or smoldering. This task could not be performed while the fire watch was asleep or

even with his eyes shut,

c. Conclusions

4

,

The inspectors concluded that the fire watch was inattentive to his duties. The

failure to perform the duties of a fire watch was an example of a violation of TS - 6.8.1.g. (50-456/97007-06a(DRP)).

i

'

F1.2 Blocked Onen Fire Door

, a. Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspectors routir y monitored status of plant fire doors during the period. The

inspector also reviewed procedure BwAP 1110-3, " Plant Barrier impairment

Program," Revision 3 and interviewed the Fire Marshall.

25

.. .- - - - . - -- _ _. - .. - . . _ - - . _ - - - - .

.

c

.

.

, b. Observations and Findinos

l On April 22, the inspectors discovered that a fire door from the condensate polisher

room to the turbine building on the 401 foot elevation was propped open with a

hose passing through it to support maintenance activities on the 18 emergency

,

diesel generator. No PBI tag was affixed to the door. The inspectors questioned

fire protection personnel and found that no PBI permit was in place as required by

,

BwAP 1110-3. The inspectors reported the condition to plant management and fire

protection personnel directed maintenance personnel to remove the hose and close

the door,

i

c. Conclusion._g

The inspectors concluded that the failure to obtain a PBl permit prior to blocking

-

open the Condensate Polisher Room door on April 22,in accordance with GwAP

1110-3, was an example of a violation of TS 6.8.1.g (50-456/97007-06b(DRP)).

F1.3 Transient Combustibles in Auxiliarv Buildino -)

!

a .- Insoection Scoce (71750)

l

The inspector routinely monitored conditions in the Auxiliary Building, including

status of fire loading in the building. The inspector also reviewed procedure BwAP

1100-11, " Fire Prevention for Use of Lumber and Other Combustibles," Revision 7.

b. Observations and Findinog l

On May 19, the inspector found combustible materialin the auxiliary building on the l

346 foot elevation at column P-23. The area was roped off and labeled "SX Water i

Laydown Area." Combustible materials in the crea included large rubber hoses,

several pieces of lumber, and temporary ductwork. There was no one attending the

material at the time the inspectors found it.

In order to temporarily store combustibles in the auxiliary building, a transient fire

load permit is required by procedure BwAP 1100-11. No transient fire load permit

tag was found at the location and fire protection personnelindicated to the

inspector that no permit was in effect for the materials.

Fire protection personnel contacted the supervisor in charge of the area and

generated a transient fire load permit. Fire protection personnel also generated PIF

A1997-02213 to investigate the causes for the failure to follow plant procedures.

c. Conclusions

Combustible materials were stored in the auxiliary building without proper

authorization by the fire protection department. Failure to obtain a transient fire

load permit per BwAP 1100-11 prior to storing materialin the Auxiliary Building is

an example of a violation of TS 6.8.1.g (50-456/97007-06c(DRP)).

26

, ~ . . . - . . . . - . - . - . . - - . . . . - . ~ . . - - . - . . . - - . .

,

. l

.

..

l

.

.

.

F1.4 Conclusions On Control Of Fire Protection Activities

! The inspectors concluded based on the findings in Paragraphs F1.1 through F1.3

that the control of fire protection activities during this inspection period was poor.

V. M_angaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee ,

management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 20,1997. The licensee

acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

l

1

l

-

,

27

..

.. . . . - . .. - - . . _

- . _ . . . - . - - - . . - . . - .

.

,

.

e

' '

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

H. G. Stanley, Site Vice President

"T. Tulon, Station Manager

A. Haeger, Health Physics and Chemistry Supervisor

"R. Byers, Maintenance Superintendent

• R. Graham, Work Control Superintendent

T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• C. Dunn, System Engineering Sucervisor

"J. Meister, Engineering Manager

• R. Wegner, Operations Manager

• K. Bartes, Quality and Safety Assessment Manager /SOV Director

• B. Boyle, Fire Marshall

"M. DiPonzio, Licensing

"L. Weber, Shift Operations Supervisor

• M. Cassidy, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator

R

N_R.C

• R. Lanksbury, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3

• C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector

• J. Adams, Resident inspector

IDNS

• T. Esper, Resident Engineer

• Denotes those who attended the exit interview conducted on May 20,1997.

l

l

!

l

!

28

.

_ . _ . - - - -

. . . . - . _ - - . - . - - .. ._. - _ ~. - . -.,-. -. - - .-

- 1

,

'

,

.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l

,

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

j IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62707: Maintenance Observation

i IP 71707: Plant Operations

'

IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

Facilities 1

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED 1

Ooened

50-457/97007-01 VIO failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.59  ;

50-456/97007-02 VIO failure to follow procedure  !

50-456/97007-03 NCV failure to follow procedure

50-456/97007-04 NCV inadequate procedure

50-456/97007-05 NCV failure to comply with TS 5.6.1.1.6.2 l

50-456/97007-06 VIO failure to follow procedures

Closed

50-457/96002-00 LER failure to follow procedures

50-456/96005-01 VIO failure to follow procedures

50-457/96005-02 VIO failure to follow procedures

50-457/96005-03 VIO failure to follow procedures

50-457/96005-04 VIO failure to follow procedures

50-457/96005-05 VIO failure to follow procedures

50-456/96007-00 LER failure to meet expectations

50-456/96008-00 LER improper placement of spent fuel

50-456/96011-01 IFl reactor defueling practices

50-456/97007-03 NCV failure to follow procedure

50-456/97007-04 NCV. inadequate procedure

50-456/97007-05 NCV failure to comply with TS 5.6.1.1.6.2

29

. . ~ . . . - . - - . _ _ - .

. ._ .. - . - . _ ..

1

a

.

1P

P

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CV Centrifugal Charging

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

ESF Engineered Safety Features

FME Foreign Material Exclusion

gpm Gallons Per Minute

HLA Heightened Level of Awareness

ISI In-Service Inspection

JW Jacket Water

LER Licensee Event Report

MMD Mechanical Maintenance Department

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSO Nuclear Station Operator

OOS Out of Service

PBI Plant Barrier Impairment

PIF Problem identification Form

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RWP Radiation Work Permit

SRO Senior Reactor Operator

TS Technical Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

UT Ultrasonic

VIO Violation

1

.

30

- _-.