ML20141J930
| ML20141J930 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141J903 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-97-08, 50-456-97-8, 50-457-97-08, 50-457-97-8, NUDOCS 9705280262 | |
| Download: ML20141J930 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000456/1997008
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION lli
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Docket Nos: 50-456; 50-457
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Reports No: 50-456/97008(DRS); 50-457/97008(DRS)
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison (Comed)
Facility: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
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Location: RR #1, Box 79 1
Braceville,IL 60407
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Dates: April 17-30,1997
Inspectors: S. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist
Approved by: T. Kozak, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
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9705280262 970519
PDR ADOCK 05003456
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
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NRC Inspection Reports 50-456/97008; 50-457/97008
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- This announced inspection included aspects of licensee plant support performance and,
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specifically, an evaluation of effectiveness of the radiation protection program. This report
covers a 2-week period of inspection performed by a regional radiation specialist. Two
violations were identified concerning the failure to adequately implement procedures.
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Plant Suonort
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The licensee effectively used past performance and work estimates to prepare dose
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estimates and goals for the 1997 Unit 1 refueling outage. Although the licensee's
j reviews of outage dose performance were generally thorough, the licensee did not
] trend the amount of dose attributable to re-work activities. (Section R1.1)
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Implementation of the ALARA program was a strength. ALARA planning and pre-
job meetings were thorough; the radiation protection staff effectively
communicated radiological work requirements and implemented dose reduction
techniques. Planning problems were identified by the licensee concerning the
installation of steam generator gallery steel. Other minor problems were identified
concerning coordination of work groups and the use of low dose areas. (Section
R1.2)
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The whole body counter (WBC) was properly calibrated, and the quality control ;
program for the WBC was properly implemented. Problems were identified by the
inspector concerning the calculation of radioactive materialintakes. (Section R1.3)
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Two violations were identified concerning the failure to adequately implement
procedures. A violation was identified for not properly locking the entrance to an i
area posted as a locked high radiation area. Another violation was identified for the
failure to adequately follow procedures concerning control of vacuums within the
radiologically protected area. Access to safety related equipment was relatively
unencumbered by radiologicalimpediments. (Section R2.1)
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, Report Details
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IV. Plant Sunnort
j R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1.1 Unit 1 Outaae Dose Estimates and Dose Control
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a. Insoection Scone (83750)
The inspector evaluated the licensee's process for developing outage dose goals for
the Unit 1 re-fueling outage (A1R06). The inspector discussed the licensee's
projected dose estimates with radiation protection (RP) staff, reviewed the
licensee's historical data, and reviewed the licensee's current outage performance.
In addition, the inspector discussed with the RP staff the oversight and control of
outage dose.
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee maintained historical files for repetitive outage tasks and used the
information as a basis for A1R06 estimates. The implementation of ALARA
initiatives and lessons learned has resulted in an overall dose reduction for repetitive
work activities during successive outages.
On March 29,1997, the licensee began a 53-day refueling outage on Unit 1. The
licensee estimated an outage dose goal of 215 person-rem which included the
following outage work:
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Steam Generator (SG) Tube inspections / Repairs (40.5 rem);
Preparation Work for planned 1998 SG Replacements (29.2 rem);
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Valve No. RC8002C (Loop Stop Isolation Valve (LSIV)) Repair (15.8 rem);
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General Valve Work (10.2 rem);
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In-Service-Inspections (8.9 rem); and
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Reactor Head Work (S.5 rem).
Prior to A1R06, the plant staff submitted work duration estimates as part of the
radiation work permit (RWP) requests. Based on the anticipated dose rates in the
work area and the estimated work duration, the RP staff developed dose goals for
non-routine outage evolutions. However, the RP staff indicated that the plant staff
frequently overestimated the time required at the work site to perform the activity.
The RP ALARA planners compensated for the overestimates and reduced the time
estimates based on a historical fraction of time at the work area versus total work
crew time (i.e. preparation, meetings, etc.). RP management acknowledged the
inaccuracies in the plant staff's time estimates and indicated that the staff was
making improvements in this area.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's outage work progress and the initial work
projections. With the exception of SG gallery steelinstallation (Section R1.2), the
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licensee's outage performance was consistent with dose and time estimates. At
the time of the inspection, the accumulated dose for the LSIV repair, in-service
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inspection (ISI) activities, and reactor head work was consistent or better than ;
initial outage estimates.
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The licensee perform 9d daily reviews of outage dose. An ALARA planner prepared
a daily report containing accumulated dose as a function of department and by each
RWP. In addition, the report contained a daily dose for each individual within a '
department. The ALARA planner indicated that he used the report to identify RWPs
which were at or above 70 percent of the estimated dose and to identify any <
disparities between individual doses within departments. The inspector observed !
that the report provided a good comparison of current performance data and the
licensee's goals. The inspector also noted that the licensee monitored re-work
activities and determined the percentage of total work that was attributed to re-
work. However, the inspector observed that the RP staff did not have a measure of
dose attributable to re-work activities. The licensee acknowledged that they had
not separately accounted for this dose but planned on evaluating a method to
perform this type of analysis.
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c. Conclusions
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The licensee effectively used past performance and work estimates to prepare dose j
estimates and goals for the 1997 Unit 1 refueling outage. Although the licensee's 1
reviews of outage dose performance were generally thorough, the licensee did not
trend the amount of dose attributable to re-work activities.
R1.2 Unit 1 Outaae Work Performance and ALARA Imolementation
a. Insoection Scone (83750)
The inspector reviewed aspects of the licensee's RP planning, attended pre-job
meetings, observed work in progress, and reviewed licensee post-job evaluations.
The inspector also reviewed the 1:censee's implementation of the following
procedures:
BwAP 700-1, "ALARA Policy Procedure", Revision 4, dated November 29, i
1994,and )
BwAP 700-2, " Guidelines for an ALARA Action Review", Revision 9, dated
August 27,1995.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspector observed some licensee initiatives in the ALARA program. During
A1R06, the ALARA staff lowered the threshold for performing reviews. As
required by Procedures BwAp 700-1 and BwAP 700-2, the licensee was required to
perform ALARA Action Reviews if any the following conditions existed: (1) dose
estimate for the work was greater than or equal to 1 rem total effective dose
equivalent (TEDE); (2) working exposure rates were greater than or equal to i
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to 1,000,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm) over 100 square centimeters. In
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addition to the required ALARA Action Reviews, the licensee also performed less
- formal reviews of outage work activities which had total dose estimates between
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0.1 and 1.0 rem TEDE. For these jobs, the licensee's objective was to better define ;
the dose goals, to increase awareness of ALARA/ dose reduction concerns, and to
provide a better interface between the work group and the ALARA staff. The
, inspector observed that the licensee achieved positive results from these reviews.
! For example, the scope of the residual heat removal (RHR) drain valve repair was
i initially to replace the valve internals. However, the increased ALARA interface
! resulted in the complete valve replacement which eliminated a 1 rem per hour
- (rem /hr) hot spot within the plant. The inspector also noted that the several
l reviews resulted in more aggressive dose goals. In addition, the licensee identified
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were not well defined. The licensee planned to determine if thresholds, similar to
L those used as requirements for ALARA Action Reviews, should be used as
j requirements for pre-job meetings.
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During the outage, the licensee p rformed repairs on the loop C SG LSIV
(1RC8002C). In accordance witt. Procedures BwAP 700-1 and BwAP 700-2, the
- licensee prepared an ALARA Action Review for the activity which contained a l
comprehensive description of the anticipated radiological conditions, lessons
learned, dose reduction techniques, and contamination control practices. The
licensee used cameras to reduce personnel exposures. In addition, the inspector
noted that a mock-up of the valve provided excellent training for both the work
crew and the radiation protection technicians (RPTs) involved in the evolution. The
inspector observed personnel completing this repair and noted good radiation
worker (radworker) practices and good oversight of personnel by RPTs. As of April
30,1997, the licensee had accrued about 10.3 rem of exposare and anticipated
about 1 rem in additional activities as compared to the original dose estimate of
15.7 rem.
The licenses also removed, inspected, and replaced the Unit 1 lower internals (core
barrel) to perform the 10 year ISI inspections of the reactor vessel welds. The
inspector reviewed the planning and ALARA Action Review for the evolution and j
found it to be comprehensive. Based on 1996 data from the licensee's sister plant l
(Byron Station), the RP staff identified the potential for dose rates exceeding 15 rad l
per hour (rad /hr) near the internals and general area dose rates exceeding 1 rad /hr
on the 426' elevation of containment. With the exception of the two necessary
crane operators, all other personnel monitored the evolution via cameras and !
robotics. As documented in the ALARA review, the RP staff emphasized the use of I
cameras, the required posting and control of effected plant areas, the control of
reactor cavity water level, and the communications with and monitoring of the two
crane operators. Within the ALARA Action Review, the staff also identified
contingency actions. Prior to the removal, the licensee conducted practice
manipulations of the crane to ensure the work crew was well prepared.
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On April 18,1997, the inspector attended a prejob meeting for the replacement of
the core barrel and noted that there were excellent discussions among the workers
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radiological conditions and concerns, and discussed contingency actions. In
- . addition, the staff reviewed the lessons leamed from the original core barrel
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removal. For example, during the removal, the licensee identified problems
concerning the control of personnel access to containment. Prior to the evolution,
the RP staff projected the potential dose rates in the containment and required that
4 no personnel were to be allowed above the 401' elevation of containment. Once
- the 401' elevation and upper containment elevations were evacuated, RP staff was
to restrict access to containment. During the evacuation verifications, the radiation
protection manager (RPM) identified personnel preparing to enter containment.
Consequently, he evacuated all areas within the containment building to ensure that
no further problems were encountered. The licensee determined that a
misunderstanding at the RP desk contributed to the problem. During the April 18,
1997, meeting, the RP staff described the issue and clearly communicated
management's expectations to the plant staff. In addition, the licensee identified
the need for additional lead for the crane operator, which resulted in a reduction in
worker doses. The removal of the core barrel was accomplished for about 132
millirem (mrem) of dose. As a result of the lessons learned, the core barrel was re-
installed for about 26 mrem of dose.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's installation of reactor head o-rings. The
pre-job meeting was well conducted. The RP and maintenance representatives
were well prepared for the meeting. The maint3 nance supervisor discussed the
scope of the evolution, emphasizing that the area under the reactor head was of
greatest dose concern. The RP representative provided a thorough discussion of
the RP concerns and RWP requirements, including dosimetry alarms, protective
clothing requirements, high radiation area control considerations, and dose
reduction techniques. The inspector observed good job performance and radworker
practices, with some minor problems. For example, the inspector observed some
coordination problems between work groups. As the maintenance crew was
preparing to enter containment, the staff was informed that reactor head
inspections had not been completed as scheduled. Since the reactor head
inspections impacted the reactor head o-ring installation, the maintenance crew left
the area and postponed the evolution. In addition, the inspector observed personnel l
donning an additional level of protective clothing at the job site instead of moving '
to a lower dose area. The health physics and chemistry supervisor indicated that
the observations revealed areas that could be improved. .
The licensee identified problems concerning the planning of SG gallery steel work
associated with the anticipated 1998 SG replacement. Approximately 2 weeks into
the evolution, the RP staff's initial dose estimate of 3.5 rem was increased to about
12.5 rem. In an April 13,1997, ALARA Job-in-Progress Review, the licensee
reviewed the work activity and identified some planing weaknesses. During the
planning of the evolution, the licensee did not recognize that the early reduction of ;
SG secondary side water level to support other critical work activities would result
in an increase in general area dose rates for the SG gallery steelinstallation. In
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addition, the licensee underestimated the time in the radiologically posted area
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(RPA) required for the installation. The inspector noted that the licensee identified
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the problems early in the process and re-emphasized uposure reduction techniques
- within the ALARA Job-in-Progress Review.
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- c. Conclusions
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! Implementation of the ALARA program was a strength. ALARA planning and pre-
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}ob meetings were thorough; the RP staff effectively communicated radiological
work requirements and implemented dose reduction techniques. Planning problems
i were identified by the licensee concerning the installation of SG gallery steel. Other
j minor problems were identified concerning coordination of work groups and the use
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- of low dose areas.
l R1.3 Internal Dosimetry Proaram
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l a. Insnection Scone (83750)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's intamal dosimetry program. The inspector
aviewed the calibration and quality control of the whole body counter (WBC),
d including the implementation of the following procedures:
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fj BwRP 5410-7 " Quality Control Operations for Whole Body Count Systems", ;
Revision 0, dated April 22,1997;and l
!- BwRP 5410-8 " Canberra Fastscan Whole Body Counter Calibration", Revision 0,
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dated December 15,1993.
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i in addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's April 12,1997, evaluation of
i internal exposures of three SG workers and reviewed the licensee's implementation
of procedure BwRP 5400-1 " Guidelines for a Comprehensive Bioassay Program", J
Revision 1, dated December 27,1994.
b. Observations and Findinas
The licensee determined personnel internal exposures via a monitoring program
consisting of WBC results and alarming' portal contamination monitors. As required
by procedure BwRP 5410-8, the licensee performed the WBC calibrations at an 18-
month frequency. The current calibrations for the two WBCs were performed on
January 1996 and March 1997. In performing the calibrations, the licensee used a
tissue equivalent phantom and calibration sources traceable to the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). The inspector noted that the licensee ,
prformed verifications to ensure that the new calibrations were acceptable. With i
the cxception of some minor documentation problems, the inspector found the
calibrations to the properly performed. i
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The licensee effectively implemented the WBC quality control (OC) program as ;
defined in procedure BwRP 5410-7. The licensee maintained statistical control '
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checks of instrument p2rformance. Prior to each use and after every four hours of
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! use,'the licensee performed a OC background test and a QC efficiency test. The
WBC software verified that the results of the tests were within the licensee's !
! statistically derived acceptance criteria. A health physicist (HP) reviewed monthly l
- and quarterly OC data trends to identify performance biases and to identify and i
- reject invalid points (e.g. source not in counter or source drops during count). The i
inspector reviewed the monthly reports for December 1996 and January through l
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March 1997 and did not observe any notable statistical biases. However, the ;
l inspector identified that the licensee's justi*ication for rejecting OC points was not l
well documented,
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- The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of intamal contaminations
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j associated with SG work. On April 12,1997, three individuals alarmed portal . j
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contamination monitors when exiting the area. The RP staff decontaminated the i
, individuals and performed bioassay measurements via the WBC. The individuals' !
l initial results indicated intakes of about 5 25 nanocuries (nCi) of cobalt-58,3-6 nCi -
- of cobalt-60, and 10-20 nCi of iodine-131. Subsequently, the licensee identified l
and corrected problems with the SG shield doors and with the high efficiency l
particulate air (HEPA) filtration unit which contributed to the unplanned !
contaminations. In accordance with procedure BwRP 5400-1, an HP evaluated the i
l Intakes to determine if the intakes met or exceeded the licensee's derived l
j investigation level (DlL), which was one percent of an annual limit of intake, if the l
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Dll was met or exceeded, the licensee was required to perform additional i
investigations and to determine and record the intamal dose. The inspector l
l identified some errors in the licensee's calculations: (1) the licensee used the ,
! incorrect intake retention fractions in determining the DIL for the ingestion pathway ;
] and (2) the licensee used the incorrect time of intake. The licensee performed I
i additional calculations which verified that the errors had only a minor effect on the I
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l r-mults and that the DILs were not exceeded. Although the intakes were below the
- UA the calculational errors indicated a lack of attention to detail. The licensee j
i discussed the matter with the HP and planned to provide additional reviews.
k c. Conclusions
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l The calibration of the whole body counter and the quality control program were
{ properly implemented. Problems were identified concerning the calculation of
j radioactive material intakes.
. R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
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I R2.1 Control and Postino of Radioloaically Posted Areas (RPAs)
l a. insoection Scone (83750)
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- The inspector reviewed the radiological conditions in the Auxiliary Building (AB), l
! Containment Building (CB), and the Turbine Building (TB). The inspector reviewed ;
j the identification, posting, and control of radiological hazards as required by the i
i following procedures:
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BwRP 5010-1 " Radiological Posting and Labelling Requirements", Revision 5, dated !
- November 12,1996; and l
BwRP 5310-2 " Control and Access to High Radiation Areas and Very High I
Radiation Areas", Revision 1, dated February 27,1996.
. In addition, the inspector reviewed the control of radiological vacuum cleaners
! within the RPAs which is required by procedure BwRP 6210-17 "Use of Vacuum
- Cleaners and Fans in Radiologically Posted Areas", Revision 2, dated September 16,
J 1996.
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b. _ Observations and Findinas
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} The inspector cbserved that the licensee maintained good access to safety related ;
i equipment with minimal radiological impediments. Based on licenses survey data i
i and independent measurements, the inspector verified that the licensee properly
1 posted areas within the AB, CB, and TB as required by procedure BwRP 5010-1. In
- - addition, the licensee posted surveys on each floor of the AB to ensure that i
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workers were aware of the radiological conditions. The inspector observed that
individuals working in those areas were knowledgeable of radiological conditions
! and RWP requirements.
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j On April 17,1997, the inspector identified that a door posted sa a locked high
! radiation area (LHRA) was not locked. The door provided access to the high l
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integrity container (HIC) storage area in the Radwaste Building (RB) and was posted
as " DANGER, LOCKED HIGH RADIATION AREA, > 1000 MREM /HR". The licensee
- immediately secured the door and corrected a problem with the locking mechanism.
- On April 21,1997, the licensee conducted a survey of the storage area and
j measured dose rates of 200-250 mrom/hr at contact with the only HIC in storage. ,
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Since dose rates in the area routinely exceeded 1000 mrem /hr when HICs were ;
! loaded, the licensee maintained the LHRA posting and control as a precautionary l
7 measure. Step G.2.c.1 of Procedure BwRP 5310-2 requires that radiation !
j protection technicians post areas as " DANGER, LOCKED HIGH RADIATION AREA,
j > 1000 mrem /hr" when dose rates exist or potentially exist which are in excess of
l_ 1000 mrom/hr and less than 15000 mrom/hr. Step G.2.a.1 of procedure BwRP :
] 5310-2 requires that when a normally locked high radiation area or very high
! radiation area remains temporarily unlocked, additional positive controls shall be
j established to prevent unauthorized entry.
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Technical Specification (TS) 6.12.2 requires, in part, that areas accessible to l
personnel with radiation levels greater than 1000 mR/h at 45 cm from the radiation !
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source or from any surface which radiation penetrates shall be provided with locked
i doors to prevent unauthorized entry. Procedure BwRP 5310-2 provides controls for l
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, areas controlled as LHRAs. The failure to adequately implement procedure BwRP ;
5310-2 is a violation of TS 6.12.2. (50-456/97008-01 and 50-457/97008-01)
{ The licensee conducted a thorough investigation of the event and concluded that
1 there were no unauthorized entries into the area. Based on the resu!ts of the
- investigation, the licensee (1) repaired the locking mechanism on the door to the
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HIC storage area and inspected / repaired all other LHRA door locks, (2) added
preventative maintenance tasks to inspect / repair LHRAs on a six month frequency,
- and (3) reviewed the event with RPTs to reinforce the need to inspect the LHRA
doors after a door has been operated. The licensee also revised procedure BwRP
5310-2 to require an independent verification of locked doors after any access to
an LHRA.
On April 23 - 29,1997, the inspector identified problems concerning the control of
vacuum cleaners within the RPA. RP procedure BwRP 6210-17, "Use of Vacuum
Cleaners and Fans in Radiologically Posted Areas", Revision 2, contained the
following requirements: (1) "If the vacuum cleaner will be needed beyond the end
of the work shift, the responsible department shall be responsible for controlling the
vacuum (i.e. locked)" and (2) "After each use, the openings on the suction line and
hose ends SHALL be covered to prevent the spread of contamination." On i
April 23,1997, the inspector and a licensee representative identified the followmg
problems: (1) a vacuum cleaner stored for over one shift on the 401' elevation of
the AB near the boric acid batch tanks was not locked and (2) the openings on l
vacuum hoses were not covered in the 401' elevation RP storage area. On April 25 I
and 29,1997, the inspector identified additional problems: (1) vacuuma stored for
in excess of one shift in the 1 A residual heat removal (RHR) and in the Unit 1
blowdown condenser rooms were not locked and (2) the openings on vacuum
hoses were not covered on vacuum cleaners stored in the 401' elevation RP
storago area and in the 401' elevation scaffolding storage area. The inspector
reported these problems to RMs who corrected each of the problems. i
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a requires that procedures be implemented for ,
activities covered in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33. Appendix A of RG !
1.33 recommends that RP procedures be implemented for contamination control. l
Procedure BwRP 6210-17 provides controls for vacuums within RPAs to prevent l
the spread of contamination. The failure to adequately implement procedure BwRP l
6210-17 is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a. (50-456/97008-02 and 50-457/97008-02). l
The inspector noted that a number of problem identification forms (PIFs) concerning
the implementation of the vacuum cleaner control program were initiated between l
March and August of 1996 and observed that the licensee had completed ;
corrective actions for the PIFs. The inspector noted that the initial PIFs were
immediately corrected and the work group supervisor was notified. However, the {
licensee identified that the initial corrective actions had not resolved the issue.
During June and August of 1996, the licensee's corrective actions became more i
comprehensive. The licensee revised the program, including the governing
procedure, the responsibilities of each departinent, and the system by which :
vacuum cleaners were issued. The licentas did not fully complete all of the
corrective actions until late September 1996. However, the inspector's
observations indicated that the licensee's corrective actions were not fully :
effective.
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c. Conclusions
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Two violations were identified concerning the failure to adequately implement j
procedures. A violation was identified for not properly locking the entrance to an
area posted as a LHRA. Another violation was identified for the failure to
adequately follow procedures concerning control of vacuums within the RPA.
Access to safety related equipment was relatively unencumbered by radiological
impediments.
R6 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities
The inspector assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and
resolution of problems. The inspector reviewed PIFs generated by the licensee over -
the previous 12 month period to assess the licensee's evaluation of RP issues and
to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspector
observed that the licensee's trending and analysis of personnel contamination
events (PCEs) was thorough. The RP staff maintained a data base indicating the
PCE and assigning a root cause, in addition, the licensee correlated the PCEs to
significant plant events, i.e. refueling outages, SG work activities, etc. A licensee
representative indicated that a number of recent PCEs had been attributed to
contaminated protective clothing received from its laundry service. The inspector
observed that the licensee was in the process of investigating the issue and
developing corrective actions. The inspector noted that the actions taken by the
licensee were appropriate. However, as described in Section R2.1, licensee's
corrective actions for problems controlling vacuum cleaners within the RPA were
not as effective.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meetino Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on April 30,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
M. Cassidy, NRC Coordinator
A. Creamean, Lead Radiation Protection Supervisor
M. Finney, Lead Health Physicist - Operations
A. Haeger, Health Physics and Chemistry Supervisor l
T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor - Technical '
R. Thacker, Lead Health Physicist
T. Tulon, Station Manager
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 83750 Occupational f(adiation Exposure
ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Ooened
50-456/457-97008-01 VIO Failure to lock the entrance to an area posted as a I
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50-456/457-97008-02 VIO Failure to follow procedures concerning the control of
vacuum cleaners within the radiologically protected area l
Closed l
None
Discussed
None
12
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_ - . . _ __ .
'
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AB Auxiliary Building
Dil Derived investigation Limit
'
DPM Disintegrations Per Minute
HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air
, HIC High integrity Container
'
'
ISI in service inspection
LHRA Locked High Radiation Area '
LSIV Loop Stop Isolation Valve
MREM Millirem
MREM /HR Millirem per hour ,
NCI nanocuries '
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
. PCE Personnel Contamination Event
PlF Problem Identification Form
l QC Ouality Control
i Radwaste Radioactive Waste
RB Radwaste Building
i
RG Regulatory Guide
RP Radiation Protection
4
'
RPA Radiologically Posted Area
RPT Radiation Protection Technician
RP&C Radiation Protection and Chemistry
'
RWP Radiation Work Permit
4 TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent
1
TS Technical Specification
VIO Violation
, WBC Whole Body Counter
,
4
.
4
i 13
9
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4
PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
.
ALARA Action Review Plans- -
. Installation of Unit 1 Lower Internals (Core Earrel),
} Addendum to Installation of Unit 1 Lower Internals (Core Barrel), and !
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4
{ Disassemble / inspect / Repair / Reassemble 1RC8002C. l
i l
i ALARA Job-in-Progress Review for RWP 97-4032, dated April 14,1997. f
i Problem identification Forms (PIFs) Nos. 456 201-96-042900,456-201-96-143400,456- 1
1
! 201-96-143401,456-201-97-1120,456-201-97-1184, and 456-201-97-1231. I
- .
j Problem investigation Report No. 456-200-040, " Required Locked High Radiation Area
>
Door Found Unlocked"
!
.;
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3
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$
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$
- 14
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