IR 05000456/1986055

Insp Repts 50-456/86-55 & 50-457/86-42 on 861007-08 & 14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Open Items Identified During June 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal

ML20211F718
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	10/23/1986
From:	Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211F691	List: IR 05000456/1986055 ML20211F686
References
50-456-86-42, 50-456-86-55, 50-457-86-42, NUDOCS 8610310239
Download: ML20211F718 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/86055(DRSS); 50-457/86042(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Permit Nos. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 >

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Station, Braceville, Illinois Inspection Conducted: October 7-8 and 14, 1986 t.A. S.dl Inspectors: T. Ploski e A,/a c Date w.s.2/~

T. Allen , ./u/s Date

' tr C 33, /I8C Date M. Smith tw.S.d/ [

N. Williafnsen / M Ve4 Date S~tAl Approved By: W.Sne w'll, Chief m A.rAc Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on October 7-8 and 14, 1986 (Reports No. 50-456/86055(DRSS);

No. 50-457/86042(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Announced, followup inspection by five NRC inspectors of open items identified during the June 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisa Results: All emergency preparedness open items requiring completion of corrective actions by fuel load have been close go188uBW$i!6

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DETAILS I

1. Persons Contacted

• • E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager C. Schroeder, Services Superintendent

• • • L. Davis, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

• R. Aker, Rad / Chem Supervisor

• • • L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator

• • • A. Scott, Assistant GSEP Coordinator

• • • H. Pontius, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• P. Boyle, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• G. Garrett, Project Construction Department N. Coan, Office Supervisor J. Burns, Chemist N. Sanhorn, Shift Foreman D. Walls, Training Instructor

• Attendeo only the October 8, 1986 exit intervie ** Attended only the Octcber 14, 1986 exit intervie *** Attended both exit interview . Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-03 and No. 457/86019-03: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must reevaluate the Shift Foreman's multiple emergency assignments to ensure manning requirements are met during fires and/or other GSEP events which may warrant OSC activatio By letter dated October 2, 1986 from Mr. D. L. Farrar, Commonwealth Edison Company, to Mr. J. G. Keppler, NRC, the applicant provided a clarification to the original formal response to this Open Item. The inspector reviewed this revised response and discussed its meaning with the GSEP Coordinator and Station management personne The applicant has now stated that, if for any reason the Shift Foreman is unable to perform one or more of his procedurally assigned emergency duties, a qualified alternate person has been procedurally designated to assume each of the possible emergency duties. The applicant has stated that the licensed Shift Foreman for the affected unit would remain a part of the Control Room crew under the direction of the Shift Engineer. Thus, the licensed Shift Foreman from ine unaffected unit would be available for such emergency duties as Operational Support Center (OSC) Director, Fire Brigade Leader, or the lead person at the scene of an onsite accident involving a contaminated, injured worke The applicant has also stated that the term " shift foreman" also applied to such non-licensed, onshift personnel as the Rad / Chem Foreman and the Radwaste Foreman. The Rad / Chem Foreman has been procedurally designated as the alternate to the licensed Shift Foreman for the OSC Director position. The Station Fire Marshall, either of his assistants, or another member of the onshift fire brigade can be assigned the duties of Fire Brigade Leader in lieu of a licensed Shift Foreman. As more than one member of the Station's

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Rad / Chem Department will be onshift at all times, any raember of that department can be designated as the person in charge at tr.e scene of an accident involving a contaminated and/or lajured individual in lieu of a licensed Shift Foreman, while another member of the Rad / Chem department provider care for the victi This item is close (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-08 and No. 457/86019-08: Prior to Fuel Load, the Control Room inust be completed. Speci fically, the following items, must be instr.11ed and operational: the ODCS A-Model; Unit 1 SPDS; tha RM-11 system; readouts from the Fir Detection System; digital and analog readouts of onsite meteoro-logical measurements: the e.mergency ventilation system; the access control system; ano readouts from tSe Seismic Monitoring Syste The (nsoectors toured the Control Room and roy1ewed documentation regarding the operability of certain of the aformentioned equipmen The access control system was fully operational. Dccumentation ;

indicated that the aps,licant and tho architect / engineer had completed verifiertion/ validation testing on the A-Model such that the system was considsred fully cperational to provide digital meteorological data, offsite dose projecti6ns, accident classification, and affected downwind sector information in the event that plant conditions would automatically initiate geheration of system outputs. The Unit 1 SPDS was observed to be operable. Both the A-Model and SPOS will be evaluated in greater detail during a future emergency response

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facility appraisal. Analog meteorological data readouts were available in the Control Roco. The analog recorders had been calibrated in early October 1986. The RM-11 system was observed to be installed and operable, as also indicated by internal correspondence. Based on a review of internal documentation, the inspector determined that the Seismic Monitoring System had been tested and was considered to be operable by the applican The fire detection annunciator panel had been insta} led, and some trecific annunciators were considered fully operational. Per an October 1986 agreement between the applicant, NRR, and Region III fire protection spe.ialists, the Fire Detection System's annunciators in the Control Room would gradually achieve fully operational statu In the interim, the' NRC has agreed that the applicant could continually post perscnnel on firewatch duty in those inplant areas where the system would still not be considered fully operable. This interim measure would be acceptable per the Technical Specifications, and system completion would be tracked by other than emergency preparedness inspectors. The emergency ventilation system u s one of a number of systems included in September 19, 1986 correspordance from the applicant to NRR. In this correspondence, the 2pplicant requested deferral beyond Fuel Load for the test program crmpletion dates for a number of plant systems. The deferral request has been made a license condition. As such, completion of the Control Room ventilation system will be tracked by other than emergency preparedness inspector Based on the above findings, this Open Item is close . - - .

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(Closed) Cpen Items No. 456/86021-14 and No. 457/86019-14

Prior to 5 Fuel Load, the applicant must complete installation of: (1) route i

signs showing the directicns to onsite assembly areas; (2) emergency lighting for each of the three assembly areas for nonessential l personnel; and (3) assembly card readers in the onsite assembly areas. Route si0 ns have been installed to indicate directions to onsite assembly areas for ronessential applicant and contractor personnel. In the Service Cuilding lobbies, offices and hallways, the fire-emergency evacuation route signs serve the same purpose as the route signs posted in other onsite location In addition, certain procedures indicated that security guards would be deployed to help direct nonessential personnel to their assembly areas and to ensure that these persons would reaain within these areas until

otherwise directed. The inspector observed an unsuccessful assembly /accountabilty drill conducted on the evening of October 7, 1986 and a successful drill on October 14, 1986. The inspectors j witnessed the drills froc various locations and toured many onsite areas in additton to the assembly areas during the drill. The i inspectors dia nnt observe any problems with the drills that could j be attributed to inadequate route sign The inspector also determined that fixed emergency lights had been installed in all three onsite essembly areas for nonessential personnel. Multiple assembly card readers had also been installed and were operable in each of these three predesignated areas. This item is close (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-15 and No. 457/86019-15: Prior to Fuel Load, the medical treatment and decontamination facilities located on the 426 foot level of the auxiliary building must be ,

completed, including installation of associated medical,

decontamination, and communication equipment. The inspector

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toured the facilities and noted that the installation of a shower

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head, medical treatment and decontamination supplies had been i completed and that the facilities were ready for use. The room's i telephone was on order; however, multiple telephones were installed and operable in the adjacent Rad / Chem Department offices. This item is close (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-19 and No. 457/86019-19: Prior

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to Fuel Load, the following must be installed and operational: the j public address (PA) systea and the assembly / evacuation / fire alarms.

l The PA system and the assembly and fire alarm system have been installed and were considered to be operational by the applican The assembly alarm and fire alarms used common equipment. The two alarms could be activated individually or simultaneously. Either or both of these alarms could be interfaced with the PA system.

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The PA and assembly and fire alarm systems were tested on October 14, 1 1986, and were found to be functional. A walkdown inspection of the complete systems was conducted by the applicant's Operational Analysis Department some hours before the evening assembly drill. The inspector reviewed the monthly equipment surveillance list and determined that the PA system and assembly and fire alarm systems were scheduled to be tested on the first Tuesday of each month.

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Operation of the PA system and evacuation alarm systems was adequately demonstrated during the applicant's successful accountability orill conducted on October 14, 1986. The inspectors monitored this drill from various indoor and outdoor locations and determined that PA announcements and the assembly alarm could be adequately heard at those locations within the protected are This item is close f. (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-20 and No. 457/86019-20: Prior to Fuel Load, and in accordance with IE Bulletin No. 79-18, the applicant must develop and be ready to implement adequate interim measures for alerting personnel in high noise areas of a fire, assembly, evacuation, or local high radiation alarm. By the end of the first refueling outage, the applicant must have operable visual alarms for alerting persons in all identified high noise areas of such hazards. The inspector reviewed relevant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and discussed the interim measures with the applicant. Per procedures BwZP 300-5 and 300-6, once an evacuation of a specific onsite area has been ordered, affected personnel would be notified by a PA announcement, a local alarm, or by dispatching an individual to evacuate the personnel from the area. The procedures also described the composition and use of search and rescue teams which would seek persons who may not be promptly accounted for following initiation of an onsite assembl In the event of an onsite fire, nearby persons who did not leave the fire scene would be told to do so by the station's fire brigade, whose equipment included bull horns to facilitate telling nearby personnel to leave the fire scene. This item is close g. (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-21 and No. 457/86019-21: The ENS equipment must be installed in the Control Room and must meet the power failure requirements of NRC Bulletin 80-15. The inspector determined that the ENS telephone instruments were installed and operacle in the Control Room and the TSC. The power failure I requirements have been met, as both instruments receive power from the Security Bus wl.ich was backed-up by the Security Diesel Generator, which would start and take load if the bus would fai This item is close h. (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-23 and No. 457/86019-23: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must replace the existing Figure 6.3-1 of BwZP 380-4 with a legible copy of this figure. The inspector examined a samplino of onsite copies of BwZP series binders and determined that distribution of corrected, legible copies of Figure 6.3-1 of BwZP 380-4 has been completed. This item is close . (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-28 and No. 457/86019-28: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must position the analytical counting equipment at its designated location on the 401 level of the Turbine Building to serve as a backup counting facility. Appropriate personnel must also have completed training on the use of the equipment. The inspectors had previously verified by records check

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that appropriate persons had completed required training on the use of the equipment. During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the backup counting equipment had been installed within a predesignated, fenced-in area on the 401 level of the Turbine Building. This item is close J. (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-29 and No. 457/86019-29: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete operator training on the seismic monitoring system. Training on the seismic monitoring system was included in initial Licensed Reactor Operator classroom training and walkthroughs. This nine-month initial training program was conducted at the Production Training Center's (PTC) simulator training facilities. A review of training records revealed that a total of 47 licensed operators had completed this progra This item is closed, k. (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-30 and No. 457/86019-30: Prior to

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Fuel Load, the applicant must complete operator training on the fire monitoring system. Training on the fire monitoring system was included during initial Licensed Reactor Operator classroom training and walkthroughs. This nine-month initial training program was conducted at the PTC's simulator training facility. A review of training records revealed that a total of 47 licensed personnel had completed this training program. This item is close . (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86021-32 and No. 457/86019-32: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must conduct a successful onsite assembly and accountability drill involving a total number of applicant, contractor, and construction personnel as may be expected onsite during a refueling outage. The inspectors witnessed the onsite assembly / accountability drills conducted on the evenings of October 7 and 14, 1986. The exact start times of both drills were not made known to other than drill observers and controller The October 7 drill was not successful; however, the October 14 drill was a successful demonstration of the applicant's onsite assembly / accountability procedures and equipmen Four inspectors witnessed the first drill and three inspectors witnessed the second drill from various onsite areas including: all onsite assembly areas for essential and nonessential personnel; various levels of the Service and Turbine Buildings; and outdoor areas near both buildings. Between 800 and 950 personnel participated in each dril During both drills the security force adequately demonstrated the capability to control the crowds of persons in the various assembly areas. Applicant, contractor, and construction personnel demonstrated an adequate awareness of their responsibility to promptly report to predesignated assembly areas upon hearing the PA announcement and associated assembly siren. The inspector did not observe any onsite personnel to be ignoring the drill or to be exhibiting uncertainty about where they should assembl m

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The goal of both drills was to have all onsite personnel accounted for within about thirty minutes after the start of the dril Within that time limit, the last known locations of those few onsite personnel who may have not been accounted for in an onsite assembly area should have at least been known so that search and rescue teams could begin their work. The October 7 drill was judged unsuccessful as roughly 60 persons had not been accounted for within 45 minutes of the start of that drill. The inspectors and the applicant noted problems involving the audibility of the PA announcements and/or assembly siren in several location Prior to the successful October 14 drill, the applicant conducted several practices to refine accountability procedures and to identify and correct any equipment problems. The applicant had adequately accounted for over 900 onsite personnel about 30 minutes after the October 14 drill began. Only three persons had not been accounted for in an assembly area; however, their last locations were known to TSC personnel so that search and rescue efforts could have begun. Therefore, the October 14 drill was judged successful by the inspectors. This item is close m. (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86046-01 and No. 457/86034-01: The Technical Support Center (TSC) must be completed. Specifically, the following must be done: the installation and operability of the aperture card reader / printer; the operability of the emergency ventilation system; the operability of the SPDS system for Unit 1; a procedure for the operation of the ventilation system (including operator action in the event of a CAM alarm); and including a copy of the approved Technical Specifications in the TS The TSC's aperture card reader / printer was still on order; however, as an interim measure, portable equipment could be taken from the Service Building to the TSC after facility activation. The inspector accepted this interim measure until initial criticality. The TSC emergency ventilation system's filters have not yet been installed and tested, although other aspects of system installation and testing had progressed. The due date for operability of the TSC's emergency ventilation system has been changed to initial criticalit The TSC's SPDS system was operable, and will be evaluated in greater detail during a future emergency response facility appraisa The inspector reviewed Revision 52 of Procedure 18w0A Rad I, which included adequate instructions on operator actions in the event of a CAM alar Approved copies of the Technical Specifications will be available for use onsite after receipt of a fuel load licens The inspector reviewed internal correspondence which indicated that Central Files has been assigned responsibility for maintaining controlled copies of the Technical Specifications at a number of inplant locations, including the Control Room and TS F

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Based on the above findings, this item is closed for tracking

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purposes. However, by initial criticality, the TSC must be equipped with its own aperture card reader / printer and the TSC's emergency ventilation system must be fully operational. This is an Open Ite (No. 456/86055-01 and No. 457/86042-01) (Closed) Open Items No. 456/86046-04 and No. 457/86034-02: All first aid kits and stretchers must be positioned in predesignated inplant locations prior to Fuel Load. The applicant had identified twenty-four locations for first aid kit The inspector made a spot check of one half of the procedurally identified locations and saw that the kits were in plac This portion of the Open Item is close The inspector also verified that thirteen of twenty-seven stretchers had been installed in predesignated locations listed in procedure BwRP-1630. The inspector determined that the remaining stretchers were onsite, but had not yet been hung in their predesignated locations, as hooks were being procured and some approvals had yet to be obtained before mounting the stretchers on seismically qualified walls. Since a reasonable number of stretchers have been deployed onsite, this item is closed for tracking purpose However, by initial criticality, the applicant must have all stretchers positioned in their procedurally specified location This is an Open Ite (No. 456/86055-02 and No. 457/86042-02)

3. Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Improvement Itens The inspector reviewed the applicant's actions on the 64 improvement items previously identified during the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal and determined that the responses were complete and adequate on 53 items. Actions were still in progress on the remaining items, with planned completion of actions on the majority of the 11 items scheduled by the end of 198 . Exit Interview On October 7 and 14 the inspectors met with those applicant representatives identified in Paragraph 1 to discuss their preliminary inspection finding The applicant did not indicate that any of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur