IR 05000456/1989022

Insp Repts 50-456/89-22 & 50-457/89-22 on 890730-0916. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review,Followup on Temporary Instructions,Self Assessment,Osha Issues, Inspector Inquiries & Degraded Main Steam Safety Valve

ML20247R857
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	09/25/1989
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247R843	List: IR 05000456/1989022 ML20247R841 ML20247R849
References
50-456-89-22, 50-457-89-22, NUDOCS 8910020089
Download: ML20247R857 (17)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION"

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REGION III

y 4 Report Nos' 50-456/89022(DRP);50-457/89022(DRP). .

4 Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 License Nos. NPF-72; NPF-77

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Iicensee: Commonwealth Edison. Company

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Post Office Box 767 Chicago,tIL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station,' Units 1 and 2

[ Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois-Inspection Conducted: July-30- through September 16, 1989

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Inspectors: .T.-M.' Tongue

~T. E. Taylor

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G.i A. VanSickle W.(J. Kropp D. Calhou ~

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. Approved By: J. . Hinds ,' Jr. , SEP 2 s 193; Reactor Projects Section 1A 'Date

Inspection Summar Inspection from July 30'through Sestember 16, 1989 (Report No /89022(DRP); 50-457/89022(DR))). ..

~' Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on previously identified items; licensee event report review;' followup on temporary instructions; self: assessment; OSHA issues; inspector inquiries (blue sheets); auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump suction pressure transmitter setpoint changes;. degraded main steam safety

! valve; Unit 2-reactor trip due to lightning strike; ESF actuation while draining AFW pump suction line; operational safety verification; monthly

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maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; training effectiveness; evaluation of. licensee performance; and report revie Results: 'Of-the fifteen areas inspected, no violations were identified in fourtee In the remaining area one violation was identified regarding a

' late ENS notification (paragraph 9). The violation is repetitive; however, this and previous similar violations had minimal affect on public health

'and' safety. Because of the potential for more serious situations, the licensee should provide l additional information related to management actions to prevent recurrenc PDR ADOCK 05000456 Q PDC

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, DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECc)

q T. J. Maiman, Vice President, PWR Operations

• E. Querio, Station Manager

• E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent

• L. Kofron, Production Superintendent

• C. Hun 3ader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• B. Saunders, Corporate Nuclear Safety Administrator

• P. Barnes, Performance Improvements

• R. Erwin, Safety /IH Advisor

• G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent - Operations

• G. E. Groth, Braidwood Project Manager, PWR Projects Department

• R. J. Legner, Services Director

• M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance P. Smith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1 R. Yungk, Operating Engineer - Unit 2

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• B. McCue, Operating Engineer - Unit 0

• R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• D. E. Cooper, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor-R. C. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor A. D' Antonio, Quality Control Supervisor

• A. Checca, Security Administrator

• R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup

• L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor W. McGee, Training Supervisor

• D. J. Miller, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

• Pierce, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

• E. W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance

• P. Holland, Regulatory Assurance J. Smith, Master, Electrical Maintenance

• H. D. Pontious, Operations Staff

• R. Fay,. Radiation Protection

• L. Bush, Regulatory Assurance

• R. C. Ward, Technical Support

• D. Elias, Technical Support

• M. R. Trusheim, Shift Control Room Engineer

• J. M. Watson, Quality Assurance Engineer

• K. M. Dundek, Technical Staff Engineer

• M. J. Smith, Thermal Group Leader

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• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on September 14, l 1989, and at other times throughout the inspection period.

l l The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee

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employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary cperators, shift engineers and foremen, and electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personnel.

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> Licensee' Action on Previously Identified Ifemss Inspection' Report 456/89019(DRP); 457/89019(DRP), Paragraph 1.2: .r E5F circuits associated with the remote shutdown panel (R5P)..

- This issue was . identified by- the senior resident inspector at Byron and'is identified as inspection item 454/89014-01(DRP);.

455/89016-01(DRP);itisalsoapplicableto'Braidwood. This item'

addresses testing of circuitry from the RSP involved in' automatic-starts of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW), centrifugal' charging (CV),

component; cooling (CC), and essential service water (SX) pumps upon a safety injection (SI) signal or loss of offsite power (LOOP) while equipment.is being controlled from the RSP.

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By letter, dated August 1,1989, the licensee stated that- the

• removal of the: circuitry was not economically feasible at this

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time and committed to incorporate-testing into appropriate surveillance. This issue is' considered close .

. Open Items (0 pen) 456/86065-01 (DRP): Need for performing periodic discharge test on auxiliary feedwater (AFW) diesel driven pump Nickel-Cadmium (NiCd) batteries to evaluate their capacity. On. September 12, 1989, the resident inspectors discussed this issue'again with a licensee technical staff representative. The discussion identified that a capacity test for Braidwood AFW pump NiCd batteries has not-been performed. 'The technical staff representative said that a pro'cedure was being developed-for a NiCd. capacity test using IEEE-1106, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Nickel-Cadmium Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations," and test results obtained from Byron station NiCd battery testing. IEEE-1106 was issued in February 1988, and the Byron testing was completed in June 1989. The only check of the NiCd battery as identified by the technical staff representative was a. voltage check performed during the monthly AFW pump ASME run. The resident inspectors identified, to the licensee, the need for battery testing to assure AFW pump operation. The licensee has not yet performed any testing recommended by IEEE-1106 or verified that the AFW batteries will deliver the required power for the pump starts identified in the FSAR. The resident inspectors are continuing to monitor the licensee's progress on this issu The AFW system is an engineered safety features (ESF) system and the NiCd batteries are a critical components for diesel-driven pump operation. The licensee has tentatively scheduled battery testing during the refueling outages for both units. With the present outage schedule the battery test will be completed in about two year _____-_____ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ .- - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ -_ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _

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U l(Closed)' 456/87041-01(DRS) 457/87039-02(DRS): During an inspection to evaluate the results of preoperational test BwPT SI-52, an NRC

. inspector noted that the acceptance criteria-specified by the test included a requirement to maintain seal injection flow greater-than~78 gpm while determining total centrifugal charging pump flow rat The Technical Specification requires a value of 80 gpm for the' seal injection flow rate. The actual value.obtained was 78.77 gpm. .The NRC inspector determined that the actual value.obtained during the performance of the test was acceptable "as-is." Due to its minimal safety significance,.the inspector has no further concerns'; therefore, this issue is considered close o- Violations (Closed) 457/88007-02A,028,02C,020,02E(DRS): .Five examples were-identifica where procedure BwAP 330-1, " Equipment Out-of-Service," was not appropriate to the circumstance, or activities

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.had not=been accomplished in accordance with the procedure. The licensee revised appropriate administrative procedures to preclude further violations. The licensee's corrective action included further sampling of temporary lifts for identification of any other anomalies and the training of appropriate shift personnel in the out-of-service program. The inspector reviewed ten temporary lifts and noted no problems. Based on this review and the fact that there have been no significant events caused by an improper out-of-service since the issuance of the violation, the inspectors consider the-licensee's corrective action effectiv (Closed) 456/89017-01(DRP); (0)en) 457/89017-01(DRP): Inoperability of centrifugal charging. pump 2 This violation was erroneously labelled as a two-unit violation in the original Notice of Violation (enclosed with Inspection Report.456/89020; 457/89020). It should be changed to a one-unit violation and listed as 457/89027-01(DRP)

in all tracking system Unresolved _:em (Closed) 456/87023-02: Diesel Generator (DG) Load Swings. As documented in NRC Inspection Report 456/87023, the inspector identified that on two separate occasions severe load swings had occurred during surveillance activities, for which operator action was require Subsequent to the 456/87023 report item, the inspectors have been monitoring DG surveillance activities. For subsequent identified problems the licensee has taken prompt and effective corrective actions. The inspectors have discussed this issue with the licensee's technical staff personnel and have determined that appropriate attention has been directed to this issue. The inspectors have no further concerns. This issue is considered close _ - _ _ . ___ _ _ _- -_ - _ _ - _ _ _ __ -

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,?\a Information Notices-(Closed) 456/87041-IN; 457/87041-IN, 456/87059-IN; 457/87059-IN,

.and 456/88001-IN; 457/88001-IN The' preceding list of.Information~ Notices are being closed in this

' inspection; report based on direction from NRC managemen The decision to close.these' items is based on the' length of time the-items have been in existence, recognition of limited safety'

significance and availability of agency resource Should the necessity arise in;the future, any.of these issues may be resurrected for further evaluation. This would be done with appropriate authority from the NR Generic Letters-(Closed) 456/85007-HH; 457/85007-HH'and 456/88014-HH; 457/88014-HH The preceding list of Generic Letters.is being closed in this inspection report based on direction from NRC management. The decision to'close'these items is based on'the length of time the-

. items have been in existence, recognition of limited safety

' significance and availability of agency resource Should the necessity arise in the future, any of these issues may be. resurrected.for further evaluation. This would be done with appropriate authority from the NRC.

>+ No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92702)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and' review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled,.that

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immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS):

(Closed) 457/89003-LL and 457/89003-L1: Mispositioning of the 2B Centrifugal Charging Pump Manual Mini Flow Isolation Valve Due to Personnel Error. This event, involving the erroneous shutting of one charging pump's manual isolation valve and the resulting degradation in the pump's operability, was discussed in detail in Inspection Report 456/89017; 457/89017. Planned corrective actions were presented by the licensee in an enforcement conference on

. July 11, 1989, and documented in Inspection Report 456/89020; 457/8902 Corrective actions will be tracked with violation 1 457/89017-01. This LER and its revision are considered close g

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(Closed)456/89006-LL: Unit 1~and Unit 2 Reactor Trip as a Result'

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of. Lightning-Induceo Voltage Transients'Affecting the Rod Contro Syste The trips of both units on July 18, 1989, due to lightning

strikes were discussed.in detail in Insp_ection Report 456/89019; 457/89019. Immediate' corrective actions involved the resetting of the rod control' system overvoltage protectors and the' recovery of both units. The-licensee and two contractors are also conducting a long-term review of the station's. lightning protection syste Based on these corrective actions, this LER'is. considered closed.-

In addition to the foregoing,-the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This was-done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed to. ensure that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and the QA manua No violations or deviations were identified.

' Follow-up on Temporary Instructions-(Closed) TI 2515/101: Loss of Decay Heat. Removal. This TI provides guidance for evaluating the licensee's response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-17 expeditious action requirements. GL 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat

. Removal," requested the~ licensee to take action to correct existing procedural aid training deficiencies at the Braidwood station to prevent and/or mitiga e'the consequences of a loss of decay heat removal event during operations with the reactor coolant system partially draine The GL provided eight recommendations which when implemented would allow more stable and reliable operations during reduced inventory conditions; and would provide the operating staff with more readily available information in order to exercise more control over mid-loop operations and reduced inventory condition After~the inspector reviewed the licensee's package for GL 88-17, the inspector concluded that the licensee had aggressively addressed the concerns associated with mid-loop operation, even though the licensee does not plan to be in that condition during the Unit 1 outage because the licensee decided to totally offload the cor j The licensee has met the short-term requirements / recommendations discussed in the GL by revising the appropriate procedures, which are on schedule to be completed prior to the start of the Unit 1 outage, and-by providing operator training on the Diablo Canyon event during the first cycle of Operator Requalification training. Also, the licensee plans to repeat the training on the Diablo Canyon event prior to each outage involving mid-loop operation Based on the successful implementation of the licensee's corrective actions, this TI is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ __ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _

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i 5. Self Assessment (40500)

During the inspection period, the~ resident inspectors were provided with self assessment reports in the areas of operations and maintenance that were conducted from June 5-9, 1989. The inspectors reviewed the reports and found that the results showed no findings of urgency, i.e.,

requiring a formal prompt response. Of the observations made, none were such that a violation should be issued, and a number of strengths were identified. The resident inspectors will monitor the station's' responses when they become availabl In addition, the inspectors were informed of a creative audit technique, referred to as " extended surveillance," which had been employed by the quality assurance auditors onsite. This technique is to extend the observation period over a longer period of time and has resulted in several findings that were not apparent through the conventional shorter quality assurance audits. One finding involved the failure of security guards to proper follow health physics procedures in the usage of ANTI C clothing when entering or exiting potentially contaminated areas. The second finding was that numerous individuals were not filling out_and submitting " Dose Cards" after exiting known or potential radiation or high radiation area Because these issues were self identified and the licensee has taken prompt corrective action, formal violations are not warranted at this time. The resident inspectors will monitor the ongoing effect of the corrective action It was further pointed out by the onsite quality assurance supervisor that the station, including construction personnel, has recently been more responsive to quality assurance audit findings. This is apparently due to the influerce of the Station Manage A resident inspector attended the licensee's personnel error evaluation presentation concerning a June 20, 1989 event in which the Unit I condenser vacuum was degraded. Maintenance personnel did not completely isolate the e tergency drain valve from the IB first stage reheater drain tank before removing the valve for maintenance. Upon discovery, maintenance personnel quickly shut the downstream isolation valve (between the emergency drain valve and the condenser), and condenser vacuum was recovere The root cause of the event was that all necessary isolation points were not identified in the out-of-service (005) documentation by the responsible nuclear station operator (HS0). Contributing causes were the limitations of the licensee's " Outage Editor" system, which is used by NS0s for entering 00S information, and the NS0's unfamiliarity with the recently implemented system, for which he had not yet received formal trainin During the presentation, operations personnel provided a comprehensive account of the event to senior licensee management representatives, including the Braidwcad Station Manager. The individuals presented

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t discussions.on the details and causes of the event and debated ways to address identified weaknesses. The licensee identified items for action,. specifically (1) modifications to 'the outage editor system and -

-(2) improved controls to ensure that operators receive appropriate

. training in new programs and procedures before they are required to implement them on shif The' presentation involved a free exchange of facts, ideas, and opinions, and the individuals involved focused on generic issues and solution Overall,-the presentation proved to be an effective forum for addressing operating weaknesse No violations or deviations were identified l- OSHA Issues On July 18, 1989, a Braidwood operator was splashed in the face with acid. The accident occurred in the make-up demineralized room as the operator attempted to adjust a temporary sump pump used to empty an acid skid _ bermed area. A discharge fitting on the pump broke, and the pump sprayed acid on the operator through a seam in the' pump's protective

. curtain. The operator immediately flushed his face and soon thereafter was taken by ambulance:to the hospital. He sustained some burns, but returned to work the next day.

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'The licensee conducted an accident investigation to determine.the causes and to document the details of the accident. As a result,-the investi -

gation identified the need for protective clothing requirements and l potential changes to the procedure.- The licensee completed an OSHA L Report of Occupational Injury or Illness on the operator and made an l entry in its OSHA 200 log, as required.

I During the week of August 7,1989, the inspectors were contacted by two l_ contractor personnel complaining of excessive machinery noise levels L in the. contractor lunchroom. This new facility on the 401' elevation,

which is adjacent to the turbine building was verified by the inspectors to have higher ~than expected noise levels due to the levels nearby turbine building ventilation blowers. Follow-up by the inspectors revealed that the Commonwealth Edison Safety Advisor was aware of the problem and had completed a sound level study. The study showed that although noisy, only one location (by the door to the turbine building) exceeded OSHA 1 guidelines. The highest noise level detected was 89.5 decibels, and l the OSHA guideline limit is 85.0 decibels. The licensee acknowledged I this condition and is planning to install door and window covers to suppress the nois On another occasion, during the same week of August 7, 1989, another contractor, who had received minor injuries (burns) while working onsite, approached the inspectors with concerns about retaliatory actions if he was injured again while working. Follow-up activities by the 1 inspectors revealed a miscommunication in that no threat was ever communicated to the contractor. The issue did point out the necessity I of good communications between contract workers and supervisors, as

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well as between contractors and the Commonwealth Edison organizatio The senior resident inspector used the opportunity to emphasize the importance of safety and that a disregard for safety rules could result in punitive-action. This information was relayed to contractor personnel through safety meeting No violations or deviations were identifie . Inspector Inquiries (Blue Sheets)

During the insoection period, the inspectors made inquiries into a number of matters in the plant, and the following is a summary of the licensee's responses:

Contamination was identified in the containment chiller room The source was found to be from the failed fuel monitor drain lin The corrective action was to provide a procedure for flushing the monitor and the technical staff is evaluating the possibility of hard piping the lin Large "Out-of-Service" tags were identified on the Unit I remote shutdown panel. This resulted from the use of the new computerized Out-of-Service system. The licensee is taking precautions to assure that miniature tags are used on all control panel *

Faulty headsets were identified in the remote shutdown panel (RSP)

room. The licensee has requested that the electrical maintenance department repair and replace any faulty sound-powered headset . Miscellaneous Blue sheets were made up for inquiring about oil leaks, water leaks, work request tags, fire door tagging in the plant, housekeeping matters, etc. The identified issues were promptly addresse No violations or deviations were identifie . Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) Pump Suction Pressure Transmitter Setpoint Changes On August 30, 1989, the AFW pump suction pressure transmitters were recalibrates by the licensee to accommodate a revised suction pressure setpoint reference. The previous reference point was the pressure transmitter location. The new reference point is the instrument tap i

location on the AFW suction piping. A letter, dated September 5, 1989, i

to the Plant Manager from Sargent and Lundy, stated that relative to the initial reference setting, the allowable value of inches Hg vacuum specified in Technical Specification 3.3-4 was exceeded for all the AFW pump suction pressure transmitters. As a follow-up action, the resident l inspectors have submitted questions to the licensee relative to how I the new calibration reference points affect AFW system operabilit Additionally, new information concerning another change of the setpoint reference has been introduced and discussed with the licensee. This item is considered unresolved (456/89022-01(DRP); 457/89022-01(DRP))

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, Degraded Main Steam Safety Valve During the late evening of September 1 and the early morning of September 2, 1989, the licensee and a contractor conducted ASME testing of the Unit 1 main steam safety valves (manufactured by Consolidated Valves). After successfully testing all valves on the B and D steam lines (a total of ten valves), valve IMS017C (which has the lowest setpoint of the loop C safety valves) failed open for approximately 42 minutes, beginning'at about 1:00 a.m. on September 2. The valve failed open during its fourth relief test; the valve had failed to relieve at an in-specification setpoint during three previous attempts. Reactor coolant system temperature decreased by05 F as a result of the stuck open relief valve. The contractor managed to reseat the valve by alternately closing down on the valve and then releasing it with the test rig. Observations by personnel on the scene indicated that the valve was obstructed by debris on the seat, which was subsequently blown out or disintegrate The licensee made an Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification for the stuck open safety valve at 7:55 a.m., almost six hours late, (10 CFR 50.72 requires notification within one hour for a degraded safety barrier). Testing of the remaining nine safety valves was completed satisfactorily at 12:00 noon on September 2, 1989. The late ENS notification is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements (456/89022-02(DRP)).

Four previous violations of 50.72 have occurred, two in 1987 and two in 1988. The repetition of these violations is considered an adverse trend. Subsequent 10 CFR 50.72 violations may be considered for further enforcement actions. A management evaluation should be performed to determine the cause of these events and to identify a resolution to prevent recurrence of these event . Unit 2 Reactor Trip Due to Lightning Strike On September 7, 1989 at 8:33 p.m., a Unit 2 reactor trip occurred due to a lightning strike from severe thunderstorms'in the area. The lightning strike induced a voltage surge in the rod drive control panels (RDCPs),

for which the RDCP power supply overvoltage protection actuated and de-energized the power supplies. The de-energized power supplies caused control rods to drop into the core, resulting in a high negative flux rate reactor trip. As a corrective measure the licensee installed a voltage suppression modification in the RDCPs prior to the restart of ,

Unit 2. The licensee plans to install two more modifications to help prevent future reactor trips due to lightning strikes. Upon completion of the modification installations, Braidwood station will have taken the same preventive measures as Byron station has for lightning strike protectio No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _

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L 11. ESF Actuation While Draining AFW Pump Suction Line L

L On September 8, 1989,.at 11:56 a.m., with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (cold shutdewn) in-preparation for refueling, the essential service water (SX)

suction valves for the IB auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump opened while the IB AFW pump suction line was being drained. Draining the suction line apparently drew sufficient vacuum to complete the coincidence for opening the SX suction valves (an ESF actuation). The SX suction valves open when the low level setpoint has been reached in at least one of four steam generators (three were drained) and the AFW pump suction pressure decreases to 14.1 psig-(0.6 psi vacuum). After flow from the SX system began, the valve opening signal immediately reset, and operators quickly shut and deenergized the suction valve During the draining)

out-of-service operation, (00S for the operating the SX suction shift was valves which preparing would an have disabled the ESF function. The draining was apparently not delayed for completion of the 00S because operators felt that the likelihood of drawing a vacuum in the AFW pump suction line was sufficiently low. The licensee's procedure for draining the AFW system does not require disabling the SX suction valves. The cause of this event was failure of the operations personnel to adequately evaluate the potential for this event to occur during the suction line draining activity. An LER will be issued to document the licensee's investigation of this even No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operatio This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review of facility record On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);

including compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator understanding, off-normal condition, and corrective actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the

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P station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System

.(SPDS) for operabilit During tours of accessible areas of the p~lant, the inspectors made note of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety items, etc. The specific areas observed were:

Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems

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Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or FSAR; and the operability of support systems essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, et Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that. workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibratio ALNOR Digital Radiation Dosimeter Failures During the inspection period, beginning on about August 17, 1989, the licensee experienced a series of failures of the ALN0R digital radiation dosimeters, Model RAD 85, by individuals in the fiel The dosimeters had been acquired in the July 1989 time frame and were calibrated and placed in service in early August. The failures experienc.ed were "no readings" and an apparent. failure to take a battery charge. The response by licensee 3ersonnel was excellent and the licensee's investigation along wit 1 the vendor revealed that the circuitry on these units was misconfigured and required an internal switch change. In addition, some were found with a circuitry solder connection problem. The licensee removed all of the RAD 85s from service and replaced them with calibrated RAD 80s that had been used satisfactorily in the past. The licensee also verified that no one using the affected RAD 85s had received an excessive radiation exposure resulting from the failure Further investigation revealed that the failures occurred when the instruments (RAD 85s) were in the proximity of a keyed radio  ;

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Upon -learningLthis, the senior resident. inspector (SRI) acquired information on:the manufacturer. and. any further use of'these instruments withinLCECo. 7At the time, Dresden and LaSalle stations

.had ordered'and/or-received quantities of these' instruments, but had W .not placed them in: service. They stopped any possible use until the n -_ problem wasiresolved. 'This information was: relayed to the SRIs

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iat those station After considering the potential for problems if these-dosimeters d -

were used at.other utilities or in other radiation protectio programs, the SRI relayed. the.-information to the Chief of the'-

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Reactor Projects Branch ~in Region III, who in turn passed it on to NRC Headquarters for.further' evaluation and action if necessar The. licensee also provided an account of the. issue to INP0 for-j evaluation and dissemination to its member Security

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-The inspectors, by. sampling, verified that persons in the protected area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital areas were kept locked .and alarmed, or guards posted. if required; and personnel _and packages entering-the PA received proper search and/or monitoring.: ,

On August 22, 1989,. at about 6:00 to 6:30 p.m., the senior resident inspector noted a non-vital security related door 'open and unattended. .This' finding was discussed with regional security specialists and~. licensee-persnnnel. The circumstances and licensee actions were' documented in a memo to Region III files dated September 14, 1989. The finding was corrected by the. licensee and will'be reviewed by Region III-security. specialists during a future inspectio During.the' inspection, several contractor personnel complained of

.the hand search of lunches in the security access building. The SRI discussed the complaints with the Security Administrator and found that this practice was authorized and would be' continued in order to properly evaluate material being brought into the site. A licensee memo was supplied to all personnel requesting that food be in transparent wrappers and that cans and thermos bottles be x-ray separately from lunch boxes, etc. To date, these measures have worked satisfactorily and no additional complaints have been receive *

Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protectio ;)

Emergency Preparedness Exercise On September 6, 1989, both resident inspectors participated in the

, licensee's emergency preparedness exercise. One resident inspector

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participated as a role' player by performing his normal. function as a resident inspector, and the other served as an evaluato '

The licensee's overall response to the scenario was good, and only a few minor findings were noted. Details of the scenario and the licensee's performance will be contained in Inspection Report 50-456/89023; 50-457/8902 The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillance, daily orders, maintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10.CFR 19.1 No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating'the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were' inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:

Un'it 0 Repair and isolation of control room ventilation damper VC0184.

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Charcoal filter replacement in Inaccessible Filter Plenum Unit 1

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Troubleshooting and repair of power supply for 1RE-AR011, containment building fuel handling incident radiation monitor.

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The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of tim __ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -

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i No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726).

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that tes instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 1 BwVS 0.5-3.AF.1-2, ASME Surveillance for the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and B Train Auxiliary Feedwater Valves IBw05 3.4.2.a-1, Turbine Throttle, Governor, Reheat, and Intercept Valve Mor.thly Surveillance 18w0S 8.1.1.2.a-2, IB Diesel Generator Operability Monthly Surveillance 18wVS 3.1.1-3, Rev 1, Source Range Discriminator Plateau Determination and Calibration Unit 2 BwVS 0.5-3.SX.1, ASME Surveillance of Essential Service Water Pump 2B BwVS 0.5-3.AF.1-2, ASME Surveillance for the Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and B Train Auxiliary Feedwater Valves 2Bwls 3.2.1-307, Analog Operational Test and Channel Verification / Calibration for Loops 2F-0540, 2F-0542, and 2P-0544 The turbine throttle, governor, reheat, and intercept valve surveillance on Unit I resulted in unexpected oscillations that necessitated prompt correction. The surveillance verifies proper shutting and opening of each valve, one at a time. While the nuclear station operator (NS0) in the control room was shutting governor valve 1 at the turbine control panel, the positions of all four governor valves began to oscillate erratically, causing rapid steam flow and steam generator water level oscillations. The NSO at the turbine control panel immediately took manual control of the turbine and opened the governor valves to increase

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power; turbine output had-dropped significantly- (a' few hundred NW).

during the oscillations. The- unit . foreman, the; shif t control: room engineer, the shift . engineer,- and'other NS0s' responded quickly to assist the NS0 at the-turbine control panel in restoring normal-conditions..' Unit restoration was accomplished in a matter of minutes and this demonstrated a high level of professionalism on_the part of the operating shift. The surveillance was suspended while licensee and contractor personnel investigated potential causes of the oscillation To avoid atrecurrence of the oscillations, the surveillance was conducted again about'a week later with turbine control feedback loops bypasse Without feedback, the turbine control valves'would not open farther in response to one being shut and that the unit would therefore cycle through different power outputs. All valves passed the surveillance and control of the unit was maintained through the= power swing No violations or.. deviations were identifie . ' Training Effectiveness (41400, 41701)

The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed

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personnel Was reviewed by the inspectors.during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities'and during the review of the licensee's response

'to events which occurred during-the inspection period. Personnel

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appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.

! No violations or deviations were identifie .- Evaluation of Licensee Performance (35502)

A review of site operations from January through August 1989, was conducted to evaluate the performance of the licensee as it may require adjustment of the NRC inspection plan. The review included operational events and trends-indicated by monthly status report . Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for July 1989. The inspector confirmed that

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the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.

l The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report L for July 1989 and the minutes of the Corporate Overview Meetings held on L July 13 and 27,198 INP0 Audit l A twenty-one member INP0 team was onsite for a routine audit from I August 21 through September 1, 1989. A summary of the findings was

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provided to the resident inspectors within two days of the preliminary exit briefing conducted onsite on September 1, 198 L - - _ _ -_ ---- ----_---_____-- _ _ -

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A number of strengths and weaknesses were identified, of which none warranted prompt NRC response inspections or enforcement actio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 during the inspection period and at the conclusion'of the inspection on September 14,.1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and results _ of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.

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