ML20202F195

Insp Repts 50-456/97-19 & 50-457/97-19 on 971104-1215. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20202F195
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	01/02/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202F168	List: IR 07100104/2012015 ML20202F164 ML20202F195
References
50-456-97-19, 50-457-97-19, NUDOCS 9802190148
Download: ML20202F195 (17)

See also: IR 05000456/1997019

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMill860N

REGION 111

Docket Nos: 50 456,50-457

Uoense Nos: NPF 72 NPF 77

Report No: 50-456/97019(DRP); 50-457/97019(DRP)

Ucensee: Commonwealth Edison (Comed)

Facility: Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

- Location: RR #1, Box 84

Braceville,IL 60407

Dates: November 4 December 15,1997

Inspectors: C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector

J. Adams, Resident inspector

D. Pelton, Resident inspector

T. Tongue, Project Engineer

T. Esper, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

Approved by: Michael J. Jordan, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 3

9902190148 900102

PDR

8 ADOCK 05000456

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Unita 1 and 2

NRC inspection Report No. 50 456/97019(DRP); 50 457/97019(DRP)

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This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant

sup,x>rt. The report covers a 6-week period of resdent inspection from November 4 through

December 15,1997.

Operatione

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The inspectors concluded that the operating crews performing the startup from the Unit 2

refueling outage demonstrated excellent human performance when challenged by a

waterhammer event on the 2D tempering feedwater line on November 10 and a boron

dilution prevention system actuation on November 14. The operators were observed to

quickly identify the problem, enter the appropriate procedu,es and terminate the

transients. The inspectors observed that throughout the startup, pre-evolution briefings

met or exceeded management expectations, operators followed procedures, and there

was continuous supervisory involvement and oversight. (Section 0.1)

Maintenangs

On November 14, inspectors observed maintenance activities for the repair of hydraulic ,

actuator leakage on main steam isolation valve 1MS001C. The inspectors concluded that

the work package was property preparsd and the work was property performed in

accordance with the work package. However, the inspectors observed that the

mechanics had to realign the hydraulic tubing and this was not documented in the work

package. The inspectors concluded that not documenting as found conditions was a

poor work practice. (Gection M1.1)

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The !nspectors concluded that licensee personnel failed to identify and remove all loose

materials from the containment as required by a containment loose debris survollisnce

conducted on November 2. A Notice of Violation was issued (Section Mt.1)

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On November 24, tho inspectors observed the parformance of 2BwVS 1.2.3.1 1, an

American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code performance test, on the 2A centrifugal

charging pump, and concluded that the surveillanca test was properly perfomied and

acceptance criteria were met. (Section M4.2)

Enalnes,rina

• The inspectors performed a review of three safety-related modifications installed during

the most recent Unit 2 refueling outage (A2R06) and concluded that the modifications and

revisions were processed in accordance with the appropriate procedures, were property

documented, and received proper safety evaluations. The inspectors concluded *Ast .

post modification test procedures were well written and adequately verified that the

modification performed as des!gned. The physicalinstallat'on of modification hardware

appeared to match the work package specifications. (Section E2.1)

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Plant tuonort

• The inspectors concluded that threo vehicle searches observed on November 21 at the

entrance to the protected area were performed in sooordance with the appropriate

licensee procedure and that the pmper revision of the procedure was used. No problenis

were observed. (Section 81.1)

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Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit i enterM the inspection period at '00 percent power and stayed at or near full power for the

entirs period. On November 24, Unit 1 had run for 182 consecutive days exceeding a previous

Unit i record run of 181 days.

Unit 2 entered the inspedion period shutdown for refueling outage A2R06. The unit was made

critical on November 14, was synchronized to the grid on November 15, reached full powwr on

November 26, and operated at or near full power until the end of the period.

L Operations

01 Conduct of Operations

01.1 Unit 2 Startuo From Refuelino Outaae A2R06

s. - Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed portions of the licensee's preparation for startup of Unit 2 after ,

refueling outage A2R06 on November g and 10 and aga', on November 14. The

inspectors observed the licensee's pre-evolution briefings and reviewwd BwAP 10012,

" Human Performance Awareness of Pre Job Briefings / Meetings and Self Checking,"

Revision 5. The inspectors also reviewed BwGP 1001, * Plant Hestup," Revision 10;

BwGP 100 2, * Plant Startup," Revision g; BwVS 500 3, " Reload Startup Physics Tests

Following Refueling," Revision 13; BwVS 5004, " initial Criticality After Refueling and

Nuclear Heating Level," Revision 12; and 2BwoA SEC 6, "Feedwater Tempering Line

Loss of Subcooling," Revision 4.

b. Observations and Findinah

on November 10, the inspectors verified that the pre evolution briefings met the

requirements of BwAP 10012. All the necessary personnel attended the meeting. The

inspectors observed that at least one nuclear station operator (NSO) had received

training on the startup and physics testing prior to the sairtup. The NSO specifically

asked fc ' management expcetations on what contingency actions were to be taken if

unexpected rod position indications were received at different points in the rod withdrawal

sequence.

iinspectors performed a partial verification of the lineup requirements of SwGP 100-1

and verified the prerequisites for RwGP 100 2 h6d been met. While performing steps of

SwGP 100-2, just prior to control rod withdrawal, the licensee opened the prehester

bypass valve 2FWO3gD. A inud waterhammer was heard in the control room. Shortly

after that, indications were received in the control room that the 2D tempering feedwater

line had lost flow. The inspectors verified that the operations crew identifkwi that there

was m ioss of subcooling in the tempering feedwater line to the 'D' steam generator. The

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operations crew entered and followed 2BwoA SEO 4 for loss of foedwater tempering line

subcooling. At that point the startup was terminated until further troubleshooting could be

completed.

Further inspection on November 11, revealed significant damage to the 20 tempering

feedwater line piping supports inside the Unit 2 containment. Additional details regarding

the cause of the waterhammer, the adequacy of procedures, and the extent of the

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damage will be discussed in inspection Report No. 97021.

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Repairs were made to the feedwater line supports and sanctor startup recommenood on

November 14. Within minutes of reactor criticality, a boron dilution prevention system

(BDPS) actuation occurred and borated water was iriected into the reactor. Tho

actuation occurred due to the slow power ascent at a 0.1 decade per minute startup rate.

One intermediate range instrument associated with the 'B" train BDPS momentarily went

abovo 10 X 10* amps which unblocked the BDPS actuation signal and then dropped

below 5 X 10-" amps which reanned the SDPS actuation system. Concurrently, source

range counts had doubled within the last 10 minutes which actuated BDPS. The

actuation did not occur due to operator error. The operators were observed taking the  ;

appropriate actions to secure the borated water irQoction. An estimated 120 gallons c7

borated water was irSected. Attar the boration was secured, a positive 0.1 decade per

minute startup rate was observed. Thus, the negative reactivity inserted from the borated

water injection had little offect on the powerlevel. The sta: tup then continued witho t *

Incident up to 1X104 arrips.

c. Concheulo.a

l The inspe ctors concluded that the opemting crews prforming the startup from the Unit 2

refueling outage demonstrated excalient human perfom'anoe when challenged by ,

equipment failures. On November 10, the inspectors observed operator action after a

waterhammer event on the 20 tempering feedwater line. The operators entered the

appropriate procedure and quickly terminated the event. On November 14, a BDP8 -

actuat!on occurred moments after the reactor was made critical. The operators were

obswrved tenninsting the BDPS actuation quickly and appropriately. The inspectors

observed that throughout the startup, pre-evolution briefings met or exceeded

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management expectat!ons, operators followed procedures, and there was continuous

supervisory involvement and ovansight.

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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02.1 Out of Service (003) Review

a. Inspection Scoon (71707)

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The inspectors reviewed an OOS in effect and an OOS recently closind. The inspectors

also interviewed operations personnel in the work control center,

b. htoatientandfbdinali

The inspectors uviewed OOS 050001122, which was placed on essential service watSr

components for admini:Wative control to assure compliance with TS 4.7.4. The OOS was

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property prepared and authortred. M components listed on the 008 were in thu required

position with appropriate 008 cards affixed. Documentation for the 000 was compWo.

The inspectors also reviewed recently cleared 008 970012343. The 008 was placed

on 18 emergency diesel poneretor Ltarting air compressor #2 in order to perform

lubrication of the compressor motor. M components were retumed to the required

position listed for the retum-to service of the starting air compressor. M 008 tags were

removed from components. Documentation for the cleared 008 was complete.-

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the two out-of-services reviewed c wfety related

components were property placed, removed, and documented.

08 Mlaoellaneous Operatione issues (92700 and 92901))

08.1 Institute For Nuclegr Power Operations (INPO) Recod Review

The inspectors reviewed the INPO evaluation repost of Exidwood Station 1997

- performance dated October 6,1997, on November 28. The inspectors concluded that -

- there were neither findinos that effected too health and safety of the public nor that

required additional followup tr/ the resident inspectors.

08.2 (Closed) Ucensee Event Report (i PR) 50 fAZl20004-03: On Mry 23, and again on

May 24,1996, T8 3.0.3 was not entered as required by TS 3.4.6.1 when leak detection

systems woru inopereblo. The plant was placed in this condition during routine filter

changes on the containment atmosphere monitor with tim containmer.t floor drain leak

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detection system flow transmltter inoperable. The containment atmosphere monitor was

returned to service prior to the expiration of the limiting candition for operation. The

licensee determined that both events were caused by Saman error. The inspectors

reviewed the licensee's completed corrective actions and considered them appropriate.

This item is closed.

11. Maintenanott

M1 Conduct of Maintenance ,

M1.1 Maintenance Activities Performed w Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSM 1MS001C

. a. Insoection8523 (62707)

On November 12,'.he inspectors observed rnanntenance actises on MSIV iMS001C.

The inspectors reviewed work request 970119298-01, *2 Drop per Second Fyrquel Leak -

on Hydraulic Pump Discherge! (no revision); reviewed and monitored the establishment

of required system status; monitored the performance of maintenance work; reviewed the-

completed wost package, and interviewed licensee po.mel at the job site.

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b. Qb.es,tions end Findinas

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Work request 970119798 O'l was written 10 provide instructions for the removal,

inspection and replacement of a portion of tubing tc repair leakage on the hydraulic

operator of 1MS001C. The inspectors reviewed the work package f rior to the start of the

l work, no problems were observed.

The inspectors monitored the performance of work laciuding tae estabilshment of

required system status and the removal, inspection, and reinttcIlation of the tubing.

During reinstallation of the tubing, the mechanica identified that the tubing was

misaligned which was the probsble cause of the reported leak. The tubing was property

aligned tr.d cubsequently did not leak. No problems were noted with the performance of

the work.

The inspectors reviewed the completed work package. Mhough the work package

includes a section for the documenting of as found conditlens, work performed, and root

cause, the tubing misalignment problem was not documented. Th!s was discussed with

the field supervisor. No other problems were noted w;th the completed work package.

c. Coriciusione

On November 14, inspectors observed maintenance retivities for the repair of hydrau;ic

actuator leakage oa MSlV 1MS001C. The inspectors concluded that the work package

was property prepared and the work was property performed in accordance with the work

package. However, the inspectors observed that the mechanics had to realign the

hydraul;c tubing a.id this was not documented in the work package. The inspectors

concluded that not documenting as-found conditions was a poor work practice.

M1.2 Cold Weather Preparationg  :

a. Jnspection Seppjt (71714)

The inspectors reviewed the licenssa's preparations for protection from cold weather.

The inspectors reviev'ed procedure OBwCS XFT A1, ' Freezing Temperature Equipment

Protection Annual Surveillance," Revision 5. The inspectors also intery;ewed operations

and system engineering personnel,

b, Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed the completed surveillance procedure OBwOS XFT-A1. The

procedure was property completed and all discrepancies were addressed with action

requests. The inspectcre verified that procedure OBwCS XFT-A1 checked safaty-related

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systems and components that are susceptible to cold weather effects.

Only one item identified in the completed procedure was a icng standing deficiency. The

deficient item was a turbine building louver which was required to be closed for secondary

system (non safety-related) protection. Ar action request was written on June 19,1996,

to repair damper OHS VT404 LV 7.

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The inspectors checked for licensee response to deficient items idenufled during

performance of the cold weather choolm. Actions to repair deflolerd items were

scheduled for repair soon after discovery. For example, the security diesel generator

jacket water cooling system did not meet saceptance criteda for anti freeze protection.

The licensee scheduled and implemented repairs within five weeks of dismvery, and

before extreme cold weather conditions were experienced.

c. Conclusions

The inspedors concluded that the licensee propedy completed cold weather

preparshs. The licensee implemented appopdate and timely corrocuve actions to

address the deficionoles identified while performing the annual oold weather surveillance

procedure. Safety-related components appeared to be protected from the effects of cold

weather.

M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance

M4.1 Unit 2 Containment closeout inspection

a. inspection Scogi(61726)

The inspectors pe,1ormed an independent inspection of the Unit 2 containment following

the licensee's contalament locss debris inspection prior to entry into Mode 4 (hot

shutdown) from refueling outage A2R06. Tho inspectors reviewed BwV8 5.2.d.2.1,

" Visual Surveillance of Containment Recimulation Sumps,' Revision 4: 2BwoS 5.2.01,

" Containment Loose Dobrts inspection,' Revision 6; Braidwood Problem identification

Form (PlF) # 456 20196 0979; Operability Scrooning Form for PlF #456 201-96 0979;

Braidwood Updated Final Gafety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Appendix A, ' Application of

NRC Regulatory Guida," Regulatory Guide 1.82; and NRC Regulator / Guide 1.82,

" Water Sources For Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following A Lnss-Of-Coolant

Accident,' Revision 2.

b, Observations and Findinas

on November 2, the inspecters performed a containment loose debris inspection of the

Unit 2 containment following notification from licensee management that operations

department personnel had completed the containment loose debria surveillance

inspection 2BwoS 6.2.c4. The inspectors walked down all accessible elevations inside

and outside of the missile barrier, inspectors found that all trash, rags, protective

clothing, and foreign material exclusion barrier matedals had boon removed. The

containment sump covers and screens were found free of debris. However, the

inspectors did observe several material condition problems, and loose materials. For

example, the inspectors identified the following material condition problems:

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the 2B charcoal unit door was found unnatched;

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charging valve,2AOV-CV8147, had a minor packing leak; _

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seal table area radiation monitor meter,2RIA-AR303, was erroneously reading

10,000 millirem per tour;

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• surface gaps larger than the 3/8 inch mesh in the outer containment toolroulation

sump screens and a hole larger than the 7/16 inch mesh in the Intermediate

containment roolroulation sump screen covers; and .

the 28 reactor cooling pump number 2 seal leakoff flow indicator reading less than

aero.

The inspectors also identifled the following examples of loose materials:

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tools were staged near the reactor head area (426 foot elevation) with no work

requiring the tools being performed; and

sheet metal covers on two of the incore drive units were not fastened down.

The inspecaors discussed their findings with licenses managemord. The inspectors were

told that the surface gaps in the outer containmord toolroulation sump scroon had been

previously identified in May of 1996, and documented by PlF #456 201-96-0979. The

licensee told the inspectors that modification E200 97 298 woeld eliminate the surface

gaps and would be completed prior to the change from mode five to mode four. The

inspectors later verified that the modification was instal;sd. The inspootors asked if

modification E2M 97 298 would also eliminate the holes in the covers of the

Intermediate screen. The licensee told inspectors that it would not, but provided the

inspectors a copy of the operability screening justifying continued operation with the holes

in the intermediate screen covers. The inspectors reviewed the operability scrooning for

PlF #456-20196-0979 and found that the licensee had based the operebility of the

containment recirculation sump on the existence of a verticalinner screen also

constructed of 3/16 inch mesh located on the collection side of the containmord

recirculation sump weir plate. The inspectors found that the containment recirculation '

sump met the minimum design guidance found in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.82,

- Section C.1.3, with the holes in the intermediate screen covers.

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The inspectors were concemed with the amourd of loose equipment identified during the

inspection. The inspectors obtaired a copy of 2Bwo8 5.2.o 1 that was performed on

' November 2, at 4:40 p.m. Step F.2.c required that loose tools and equipment that were

not needed for approved work in progress be removed from containment. Tlw inspectors

found that loose materials and tools were not removed; tut none of the discrepancies

were documented co the surveillance data shoot; that the'ro yas no work in p: ogress  ;

associated with the incore neutron detector drives or the tools staged near the reactor

head area; and supervisory personnel were not aware that the (r. core drive mechanism

covers wste unfastened. Ucensee persomel that performed the surveillance test

procedure indicated on the surveillsnoe test data sheet tt at the requhments of

Step F.2.c were met with the exception of a clock that ricaded to be traowd.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.o states, ',n part, that mitten orocedures shall be

established, implement 6d, snd maintained covefirsg the applicable precedures. ,

recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Februg 1978. 3

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Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appenutr. A, Secticn 3.f. statse that there shail be instrucll",ns for

the staitup, uperat;on, and shutdown of safettrelated systems. Tha failure to fot!7.v

2RwoS 5.2.o 1 was a viola' ion of T6 6.8.1.a. (SO457/97019-01(ORP)).

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c. Conclusions

On November 2, the inspedors performed an inspecuon of the Unit 2 containmord

following noufication by the licensee that they had completed their okscout inspection

survelhanos, inspedors concluded that licensee personnel failed to identify and remove

aN loose materials from the containment. The inspectors identiflod unfastened covers on

two incore neutron detector drive mechanisms and unattended tools near the reactor

head. These were conditions that did not meet the acceptance critetta of 2Bwo8 6.2.01,

Step F.2.c.

M4.2 Burveillanos Testino of the 2A Centrifunal Chaminn Pumo

a. Inspection Soone (61726)

The inspecbra observed the performance of and reviewed procedure 2BwV81.2.3.1 1,

'American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Survenslance Requiremends For 2A

Centrifugal Charging Pump And Check Valve 2CV8480A 8troke Test," Revis!on 1. The

inspedors discussed the performance of the test with the system engineer,

b. Observations and Findinos ---

On November 24, the inspedors observed the performance of 28wV81.2.3.1 1. During

the pre-job brtefing, the system engineer discusseo the purpose of the surveillance test,

precautions and limitations, prerequisites, responslolilt!ss, contingency actions, and key

steps that required operator actions. The inspectors observed the system oncineer

obtain the required approvals for the commencement of the surveillance test and property

wmpiele the prorsquisites. During the performance of 28wV81.2.3.1 1, the inspedors

observed proper communications between the unit supervisor, nuclear station operators,

and the system engineer; proper self checkir.g; and proper independent verifications.'

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The inspectors found that the required soceptance orlierta for pump suction p; essure,-

pump differential pressure, total flow, and pump vibration were met. The inspootors .

- observed an soceptable flow rate through 2CV8480A, the 2A centrifugal charging pump

minimum flow check valve, to varify a full stroke of the valve. The inspectors observed

the proper operation of the 2A charging pump hMcating oil system and cubical coolers.

The inspectors verilled that the pump's perfon. .ece exceeded the UFSAR pump

performance curve's minimum design performance.

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On November 24, the incpedors observed the performance of 2BwV81.2.3.1 1 and -

corwiudod that the survoitlance test was property performed and soceptance critetta were

met. The pump's performance exceedad the minimum required performance specified in

the UFSAR.

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MS Miscotlaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

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M8.1 {Qjgiq$ Violation 50-40'//g6011-04a and 50-457/99011-04b: Failure To Follow Two

Procedures Regarding Maintenance Mterations and Operational Electrical Uneups. The

Ncensee retumed a redweste building ventilation damper to servios in the failed open

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condition following maintenance, and fskd to complete Procedure BwoP MP.08,

" Restoring Unit 2 Mein Osntrator, Main Power Transfermars 2E and 2W and

Unit Auxiliary Transformers 241 1 and 2414 * The inspectors verified that the licensee

completed the corrocuve act!ons for both eumples and that there has been no

recurrence of these spoolfic problems, This violation is closed.

M8.2 (Closed) LER 60-458/95020-Of}: On D6cember 23,1995, power range channel N43 was

placed in test for caliwst!on. Power re.nge N42 Indication began swinging by 10 percent

power, causing spurious rate inps. No other indications of changing roantor power were

present. The licensee invoked TS 3.0.3 s,nce both N42 and N43 were inoperable.

Channel N43 was rectored end TO 3.0.3 was axited. Power range channel N42 was

subsequently determined to have a pews,f suppii failure. The power supply was

replaced. The IWnssa perfomwd an anwyd: cf the failure mode for maintenance rule

applicability and determined that the bih c? not maintenance preventable. The

inspectors concluded that the licensee's correcuve actions were appropriate. This item is

closed.

E.gapineerina

E2 Engineering Support of Foollities and Equipment

E2.1 Review of Plant Modifications

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a. inanection Scoot (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the work packages, modiilcation approval letters, modification ,

approval letter addendums, modification test procedures, and 10 CFR 50.59 safety

evaluations, for modifications E20 2-96 250, *2CV 110A/2CV 111A Trim Change";

E20 2-96 256, ' installation of Permanent Power Source For Temporary 125 Volt DC

Battery Chargers"; and E20 2 97 225, " Containment Recirculation Sump Enhancement."

The inspectors reviewed procedures NEP 04-02, " Exempt Changes," Revision 0; .

SWAP 232121, * Exempt Changes," Revision 3; and NSWP A-04, *10 CFR 50.59 Safety

Evaluation Process," Revision 0. The inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible

portions of the installed modifications,

b. Observations and Findinns

The inspectors reviewed the completed work packages for mor'ificationc E20 2 96 250,

E242 96 256, and E20 2 97 225. The inspectors noted that the work packages were

complets, Work procedures appeared to contain sufficient detail for the installation of the

mod;fications. Procedure steps were propertf initialed and verified where required. The

pre-job briefing, foreign material exclusion, and calibration documentation were included

and appeared complete.

The inspectors reviewed the modification approval letters and any modification approval

letter addendums for modifications E20 2 96 250, E20-2-96-236, and E20-2-97-225.

Each letter included a description of the modification, a discussion of applicable oodos

and specifications, a brief discussion of the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, a list of

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l dmwings effected by the modification, cor.3truction and modification testing requirements,

t aining requirements, and a list procedures requiring review and revision. When the

modifications were required to be changed following their initial approval, the inspectors

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four.d appropriate addendums to the modification approval letters cordaining a discussion

d the reasons for the change. The inspectors verified compliance with procedures

NEP 04-02, * Exempt Changes," and BwAP 232121, * Exempt Changes,' in tn.

processing of the modihations.

! The inspectom reviewed the post-modification test procedures performed following the

completion of the installation of each of the modifications. The inspecters found detailed

procedures for each of the modifications. The post-modification test procedures I

appeared adequate to ensure the modification performed as designed. l

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The inspa Mors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluat!ons for each modification. The

inspectors concluded th at each safety evaluation was well written, complete, and

prepared in scoordance with Procedure NSWP-A-04, *10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation

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Process." The safsty evaluations appeared adequate to determine if an unroviewed

safety questim existed. The inspectors noted that changes to approved modification

packages receive 4 additional 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations prior to their approval and

installation.

The inspectors looked at the physical inttallation of socessible modification hardware and

compared the installatien to the documentation contained in the work osckar,es and _

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noted that the field installation appeared to match specifications in the work package.  ;

c. Conclus;ons I

The inspectors performed a review of three safety-related A2R06 modifications and

concluded that the modifications were processed in accordance with the appropriate

procedures, were property documented, and received a proper safety evaluation.

Revisions to the modifications were property documented and received additional safety

evaluations prior to approval end installation. The inspectors co.wiudod that post-

modification test procedures were well written and adequately verified that the

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modification performed as designed. The physicalinstallation of modification hardware

appeared to match the work package specifWsPons.

ES. Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E6.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-456/g6014-06: - Roll Up Fire Doors Failure To Close. On

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July 3,1996, mechanical maintenance personnel performed surveillance

BwMS 3350-001, " Fire and Security Door Semi-Annual Inspection," Revision 0, and

several roll-up doors did not go closed as expected with outside air ventilation to the

room. A violation was issued in inspection Report No. 96016 (50456/96016-04(DRS);

50-457/96016 04(DRS)) for the failure of the doors to close. This issue will be tracked by

that vlotation. This item is closed.

E8.2 ' (Closed) Violation 50-456/oO21-03(DRP): 50-457/96021-03(DRP): On December 23,

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1996, the licensee identified a through wall leak on ASME Class 3 piping in the 1A

essential service water (SX) system. The licensee failed 'o remove the 1 A SX train from ,

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l service and take corrective actions as required by ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

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em m- see +s-.-e.h. istm -s & m' eve rw- -ea+--a-+--um.er-w---ww--e+-enww--*e& w-ry-wa .-----,----a, ,,m,+ w+ ;+--+--rr 's--he us -++'s aw- erW '- vvv'--'Y-v'-'r -*-N t'w*r ftvt-- -* mew yTw-1---yr

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Code, Soodon XI. Part 60.55s(9)(4) of 10 CFR requires that aN components which are

classi6ed as ASME Code Class 3 must meet the requirements set forth in ASME

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Secuon XI. The inspectors reviewed the corrective acGons taken by the licensee in

response to this violation and considered them to be adequate.1Es violation is closed.

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E8.3 (Closed) Violation 50 456/g7005 04fDRP): 50-457/97005 04fDRP): Failure To Wdte  !

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10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation. The licensee tecked open the door between the

auxiliary building ventilation exhaust plenum and the auxiliary building to perform ,

modification work on the auxiliary building exhaust fans and did not perform a

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10 CFR 50.5g safety evaluation. The inspectors vedfied that the licenses changed

DwAP 1110 3, *Plard Barder impairment Program,' Revision 5, to clarify that impairments

to ventilation bounderles described in the UFSAR need to be screened for safety

evaluations. The inspedots had no further concems. This item is closed.

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E8.4 (Closed) LER 64456/9601100: On September 24,1996, the licensee determined, during

the performance of a surveillance test, that four rou-up doors separoung areas containing

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safety-related equipment from the turbine building failed to fully close under full ventilation

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cond,tions. A review performed by system engineering personnel indicated that the

, roll-up doors were not tested following installation. The licensets immediate corrective

scuons were to close the four roll-up doors. The event was documented in inspec6on

Report No. 50-456/96014 as an Unresolved item pending the results of additional rolo-up -

door testing and a follow up inspection by regional fire protection specialists. The

inspectors det6rrr.ined that since 1991 the roll-up doors were inoperable and did not meet

the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barrier lequirement. An apparent violation was written and

i documented in inspection Report No. 50 456/96016. The licensee's immediate correcGve

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. uctions have been completed and were appropnate. The licensee's long-term corrective

actions have been identified but have not been completed. The tracking of the licensee's

long-term conective actions will be done by Violation 50 456/96016-04. This item is-

closed.

E8,5 ff& lid).  : On October 12 and 25,1995, the

licensee identified that several incorrect cable separations assumptions could potentially

result in the inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions if a fire occurred in

certain fire zones. An apparent violation was written and documented in inspection ,

Report No. 50-456/96016, and subsequently received escalated enforcement without a

civil penalty. Design modifications are currently in progress to correct the deficiencies. 1

The tracking of the licensee's long-term corrective actions will be done by Violation

50 456/96016-03. This item is closed.

IV. Plant Support

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31 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

! 81.1 Vehicle Search.

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s. Inspection Scope (71750)

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The inspectors performed an inspecuon of the licensees vehicle search program. The

i. Inspectors reviewed BSP-09, " Vehicle Entry / Exit Procedure", Revision 7; reviewed

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+-e, e- e- y,--,,,- e-,,,, ~ -~p ,m,,-,..,w-,.. - , ,_. _n,,,-n,nn. . , . , . _ . , , , . - - - , . - . . - - - ,

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e,,-.,mme,,,,,,w--.n.. ,, , , , ,- , , , , , . - . . ,

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associated special security instructions; interviewed security personnel; and observed the

performance of three vehicle searches.

b. Observations and Findinos

on November 21, the inspectors monitored the performance of two vehicle entry

searches and one exit search performed at the entrance to the protected area in

socordance with B8P Og, All required areas of the vehicles were searched including the

engine, passenger compartment, cargo compartment, and the undercaninge. No

prohibited llams were discovered, and no problems were noted by the inspectors. The

inspectors (nonitored security personnel control of the vehicle drivers within the gate

. area. Driver access was controlled in accordaru with 88P Og. Inspectors also

monitored the control of the main gates during the vehicle searches. Actions taken by the

security individuals including ooordinating the opening and closing of the outer gate,

raising and lowering the vehicle barrier gate arm, and opening and closing the inner gate

were in socordance with BSP Og, inspectors reviewed the security procedures

maintained at the main entrance guard shack. The onpy of BSP-Og mahtained at the..

guard shack was the latest revision and all special security instructions applicable to

BSP-Og were enclosed,

c. 99aclusions

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The inspectors concluded that three vehicle searches observed on November 21 at the

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. entrance to the protected arsa were performed in socordance with the appropriate

l licensee procedure and that the proper revision of the procedure was used. No problems

were observed.

V. Mananoment Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

the conclusion of th9 inspection on December .15,1997. The licensee acknowledged the

findings presented. The inspectors asked i Nnsee whether any materials examined

during the inspection should be conslered ; arietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Lloensee

'T. Tulon, site Vice President

• K. Schwartz, Station Manager

A. Haeger, Health Physics and Chemistry Supervisor

'R. Byers, Maintenance Superintendent

R. Graham, Work Control Superintendent

T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

C. Dunn, System Engineering Supervisor

• J. Nalewajka, industrial Safety Engineering Group Cupervisor ,

• C, Herzog, Executive Assistant

• J. Meister, Engineering Manager

• R. Wegner, Operations Manager

• M. Cassidy, Regulatory Assurance NRC Coordinator

HBQ

M. Jordan, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3

• C Phillips, Senior Resident inspector

• J. Adams, Resident inspector

D. Pelton, Resident inspector

T. Tongue, Project Engineer

IQNA

• T. Esper

• Denotes those who attended the exit interview conk Wn December 15,19g7.

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

! IP 627C7: Maintenance Observations

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations

IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nontoutine E"ents at Power Reactor

Facliilles

IP 92901: Followup PlantOperations

IP 92902: Followup- Plant Maintenance

IP 92903: Followup - Engineering

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-456/97019 01 VIO Failure to follow procedures

Chtits

50-457/9601104a VIO Failure to follow procedures

50-457/96011-04b VIO Failure to follow procedures

50 456/96014-06 URI Roll up fire doors failure to close

50-456/9602103(DRP); VIO Failure to meet ASME Boller and Pressure Vessel

50-457/96021 n3(DRP) Code

50-456/97005 04(DRP); VIO Failure to write a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation

50457/97005 04(DRP)

50-456/95013-00 LER locorrect cable separations for fire protection

50 456/95013-01 LER Incorrect cable separations for fire protection

50 456/95020 @ LER Power range channel indication oscillations

50-457/96004-00 LER TS 3.0.3 was not entered as required by TS 3,4.6.1

when leak detection systems were inoperable

504 56/96011-00 LER Fire doors failure to close

Discussed

50-456/96016-03(DRS); VIO Incorrect cable separation assumptions

50-457/96016-03(DRS)

50-456/96016-04(DRS); VIO Roll up fire doors failure to test

50-457/96016-04(DRS)

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UST OF ACRONYMS USED

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

l BDP8 Boron Dilution Prevention System

l CFR Code of Federal Regulations

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INPO Institute for Nuclear Power

LER Licensee Event Report

MSIV Main Steam isolation Valve

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSO Nuclear Station Operator

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008 Out-of-service

l PDR PutJic Document Room

l PlF Problem identification Form

SX Essential Service Water

l T8 Technica: Specification

UFSAR Updated Finst safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved item

VIO Violation

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