IR 05000456/1986046
| ML20215F817 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1986 |
| From: | Ploski T, Sneil W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215F810 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-86-46, 50-457-86-34, NUDOCS 8610160388 | |
| Download: ML20215F817 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/86d46(DRSS); 50-457/86034(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Permit Nos. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Applicant:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braceville, IL Inspection Conducted:
September 15-19, 1986
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Inspectors:
T. J. Ploski Team Leader Date k
l0 Plf(p WoAW N. R. Williamsen Date Approved By:
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Emergency Preparedness Section Date ~ '
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 15-19, 1986 (Reports No. 50-456/86046(DRSS); and No. 50-457/86034(ORSS)).
Areas Inspected: Announced followup inspection of Open and Improvement Items identified during the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal at the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, which was conducted on May 29 through June 13, 1986. The present inspection involved two NRC inspectors and two consultants.
Results: Sixteen Open Items were completely closed.
Four more items were reduced in scope. One new Open Item was identified, which will not impact Fuel Load.
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8610160388 861000" PDR ADOCK 05000456 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Fitzpatrick, Station Manager
- D. Scott, Operations Manager, Nuclear Stations Division
- P. Cretens, Assistant Superintendent
- C. Schroeder, Services Superintendent
- D. O'Brien, Assistant Supterintendent, Operations
- D. Paquette, Assistant Supterintendent, Maintenance
- L. Davis, Assistant Supterintendent, Technical Services
- L. Literski, GSEP Coordinator
- A. Scott, Assistant GSEP Coordinator
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- M. Whitemore, GSEP Coordinator, Byron Station
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- P. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
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- J. Jasnosz, Regulatory Assurance
- P. Boyle, Regulatory Assurance
- J. Jursenas, Quality Assurance
- R. Aker, Rad / Chem Supervisor H. Pontious, Regulatory Assurance G. Masters, Operating Engineer R. Yungk, Assistant Operating Engineer G. Pietraszewski, Assistant Storekeeper C. Trikur, Computer Programmer R. Benn, Assistant Security Administrator L. Duchek, Emergency Planning Supervisor J. Anspaugh, Health Physicist
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R. Richards, Technical Staff Engineer T. Keith, Health Physicist
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M. Lohmann, Asst. Project Construction Supterintendent J. Burns, Chemist G. Nelson, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor R. Mertogul, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor M. Melnicoff, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor S. Hedden, Master Instrument Mechanic T. Bobic, Master Electrician J. Huffman, Master Mechanic J. Larsen, Staff Assistant R. Schorie, Shift Engineer C. Chovan, Shift Engineer B. McCue, Shift Engineer J. Bowers, Shift Engineer P. Smith, Shift Engineer G. Vanderheyden, Shift Foreman J._Chojnicki, Shift Foreman L. McCoy, Shift Foreman S. Jensen, Shift Foreman W. Best, Shift Foreman D. Miller, Shift Control Room Engineer J. Nalewajka, Shift Control Room Engineer C. Walrath, Shift Control Room Engineer
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M. Prospero, Shift Control Room Engineer D. Cooper, Shift Control Room Engineer N. Sanborn, Training Department R. Ungeran, Operations Engineer
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on September 19, 1986.
2.
Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Open Items (a) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-01 and 457/86019-01: Prior to Fuel Load, there must be at least three persons identified for all onsite em'ergency organization positions. The inspector examined the GSEP Training Records Log and determined that at least three persons had completed training for each position in the onsite emergency organization.
Revision 2 to Procedure BwZP 600-1, Prioritized Call Listing for Staff Augmentation, was scheduled for implementation on October 1, 1986. This procedure listed those same persons icr each emergency position as were also identified on the training records log as having completed relevant training requirements. The
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inspectors also conducted walk-throughs with the newly assigned Security, Stores, and Administrative Directors. All three persons demonstrated adequate understandings of their emergency roles. This item is closed.
(b) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-02 and 457/86019-02: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must conduct a successful off-hours augmentation drill of the onsite emergency organization. The inspector reviewed records of three off-hours augmentation drills conducted on July 29, August 7, and August 21, 1986. The August 7 drill was announced and was intended to provide additional familiarization training on the call-out procedure. All drill records were complete, including critique comments and individuals' response times. Based on a review of the July 29 and August 21 drill records, the inspector concluded that the applicant had successfully demonstrated the capability to adequately augment onshift personnel within the 60 minute augmentation goal. This item is closed.
(c)
(0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-03 and 457/86019-03:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must re-evaluate the Shift Foreman's multiple encargency assignments to ensure manning requirements are met during l
fires and/or other GSEP events which may warrant OSC activation.
l During the June 1986 appraisal and this followup inspection, the l
' inspectors determined that the Shift Foreman was identified in j
various BwZP-series procedures as the only person or as one of several persons who could fill any of the following emergency l
response positions:
Shift Foreman in the Control Room; Fire Brigade Leader; OSC Director; and the applicant's lead person at an accident scene involving a contaminated, injured individual.
In the l
August 21, 1986 formal response to this Open Item, the applicant l
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indicated that."Braidwood Station has assigned three (3) Shift Foreman to each shift.
To restate, it is the intent of
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Braidwood to staff three Shift Foremen on each shift to ensure adequate coverage in an emergency." The applicant's response did
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i not, however, indicate when it would begin having three Shift Foremen on each shift, or whether three such individuals would
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'be onshift regardless of operating modes for one or both units.
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Based on discussions with Station management and the GSEP
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Coordinator, the inspectors learned that additional types of foremen,
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such as the Radwaste and Rad / Chem Foremen, would also be onshift to
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fulfill some of the aforementioned duties that could also be done
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by a licensed Shift Foreman.
Furthermore, Station management did not
intend that the Shift Foreman of the affected unit would be dispatched from the Control Room to assume OSC Director, Fire h
Brigade Leader, or accident scene supervisory duties. However, Station management also did not foresee that there would always be i
three licensed Shift Foremen onshift. The inspectors concluded that ' #
x the applicant's Aug'ust 21 response-had been poorly phrased and/or
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inadequately reviewed during its preparation. At.the September 19, 1986. exit interview, the applicant committed to provide the necessary clarifications to its August 21 response so that this Open Item can be re-evaluated prior.to Fuel Load. This item will remain
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open.
(d) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-04 and 457/86019-04:
Prior to Fuel Load, the GSEP Telephona Directory must be revised to include a
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priority notification scheme for members of the off-site emergency.
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organization who would report to the Mazon EOF following an
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appropriate emergency declaration at the Braidwood Station. The inspector reviewed an approved copy of the GSEP Telephone Directory
'which is now in effect.
It included a prioritized listing of members of the off-site emergency organization, as described in the current.
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Revision 5/5A of the GSEP, who would report to the Mazon EOF in the event that that facility is activated for an incident at the Braidwood
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Station. This item is closed.
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(e) (Closed) 0 pen Item Nos. 456/86021-05 and 457/86019-05:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete the following tasks:
implement and complete the GSEP testing program for Station Group Directors; establish and implement a required read M program for all members of the onsite emergency organization; O ta!lish a training method l-
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implement the Braidwood GSEP'instrg :or.;ection/ qualification
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program; and establish and implement the ' Station Emergency Plan Training" program. The applicant has implemented and completed GSEP
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testing for all currently assigned Station Group Directors. A
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h review of the test records and the actual tests was conducted and
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determined to be adequate. The applicant has established ~and l
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implemented a required reading program for the on-site emergency organization. A review of the program administrative procedure, station Emergency Plan Training (BwTP-37), and actual records of required reading was conducted and determined to be adequate. The applicant has comitted to establishing a task force to determine future needs for training non-licensee emergency augmentation personnel. This task force has been assigned to the Production Training Center (PTC). A formal program was scheduled to be available by September 1, 1987. A corporate memo to all Station Managers detailed the interim role expected of their training departments in an emergency. This memo was reviewed and determined to be adequate. The applicant has established a minimum level of qualifications for GSEP instructors. A Procedure titled " Station Emergency Plan Training Program Administration" adequately detailed the requirements for Braidwood's GSEP instructor qualifications.
This item is closed.
(f)
(Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-06 and 457/86019-06:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete all initial GSEP training requirements for all members of the onsite emergency organization.
The inspector checked relevant training records and verified that every individual listed in the Prioritized Call Listing for Staff Augmentation (Procedure Bw2P 600-1, Revision 2) had completed the generic training given to all employees plus the training specific to their emergency response positions. This item is closed.
(g)
(Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-07 and 457/86019-07:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must create within the GSEP Training Program an integrated training section that provides CR personnel an opportunity to simultaneously practice both Reactor Plant Procedures for off-normal events and the GSEP Procedures. The applicant has incorporated into the Braidwood licensed operator training program currently in progress, an integrated GSEP training program. One full day of the license operator class was scheduled for GSEP training.
Included will be a scenario of off-normal events that require use of multiple plant procedures and the Emergency Plan.
Several table-top scenarios of off-normal events have already been conducted with Control Room personnel.
For those personnel who have completed the licensed operator training class, a day training on use of reactor plant procedures and GSEP procedures was scheduled to begin with the 1987 simulator requalification program. This item is closed.
(h)
(0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-08 and 457/86019-08: Prior to Fuel Load, the Control Room must be completed. Specifically, the following items must be installed and operational:
the ODCS A-model; Unit 1 SPDS: the RM-11 system; readouts from the Fire Detection System; digital and analog readouts of onsite meteorological measurements; the emergency ventilation system; the access control system; and readouts from the Seismic Monitoring System. The applicant has installed and placed in operation the Control Room access control system. However, some system testing was still in progress.
In the event the card reader system fails, adequate compensatory measures have been developed.
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Work continued on installation and/or testing of the Fire Detection System, the Seismic Monitoring System, the RM-11 system, and the Unit 1 SPDS. The applicant has stated that the above systems will be completed by September 30, 1986.
The Control Room ventilation system was being re-evaluated. The applicant was keeping the Resident Inspector informed of progress.
Completion progress was being monitored by both the applicant's Nuclear License Administrator and NRR. The applicant has stated that one train of CR ventilation will be ccmpleted by fuel load.
The target date for fuel load has since slipped from September 30, 1986 to October 15, 1986. It is expected that some of the above system completion dates may also slip to October 15.
Analog readouts from the Station's meteorological monitoring system were not fully operational. While the chart recorders were operable, they had not been calibrated and were not all inking properly.
Chart scale changes to convert wind speed and temperature difference readouts to metric units have been developed; however, the revised chart scales had not been installed.
The inspector discussed the status of the ODCS A-Model with cognizant Station and corporate personnel.
The inspector also reviewed an internal document, dated August 4, 1986, regarding the time schedule for completion of software testing of the A-Model Program for Braidwood Station. The A-Model software had been loaded on the station computer and the associated hardware was being linked to the Station's process computer. The onsite A-Model validation / verification testing was scheduled to begin on September 17. Annunciator procedures associated with the A-Model were under development, as were the lesson plan and training schedule for users of the program. A review of the installation, testing, and calibration of instruments, systems, and components needed for operation of the A-Model was also scheduled to begin on September 17.
Completion of training of Station personnel and completion of all testing was scheduled for September 29, 1986.
Based on past success with meeting milestone dates, the applicant was optimistic on meeting the September 30 deadline for full implementation of the A-Model.
Based on the above information, this item remains open.
(1) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-09 and 457/86019-09:
Prior to Fuel Load, the TSC must be completed. Specifically, the following items must be installed and operational:
entry foyer portal monitors and decontamination facilities; microfiche printer / reader; emergency ventilation system and associated continuous air monitor; SPDS displays for Unit 1; a procedure for operation of the ventilation system, including operator action in the event of a CAM alarm; Point History / Point Trend computer software; and a copy of the approved Technical Specifications.
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The inspector observed that the TSC portal monitors were operational and had been electronically calibrated. Also, the small decontamination facility adjacent to the TSC portal monitors was cleaned and completed. The applicant stated that an aperture card reader / printer had been ordered in August 1986. However, delivery of this item. had not been accomplished at the time of inspection.
Delivery was still expected in September 1986. The inspector observed the operation of the SPDS in the TSC; however, most parameters were not displayed.
Full implementation of the SPDS was expected by September 30, 1986.
A licensee representative stated that both the ARMS and the CAM associated with the'TSC had been calibrated, but that the ARMS had not been turned over to the applicant and the papers needed to verify a source check on the CAM had not been received from the vendor. All these monitors are expected to be fully operational (including valid calibrations) by September 30, 1986.
The inspector reviewed a draft procedure which was being revised to address operator response to a CAM alarm and ARM alarms.
This procedure was scheduled to be finalized by September 30.
It was also noted that Point History / Point Trend computer software was operational on the TSC and that provision had been made to place a copy of the approved Technical Specifications in the TSC.
The approved Technical Specifications were expected to be placed in the TSC upon receipt.
This item is closed for tracking purposes.
However, a new open item (456/86046-01 and 457/86034-01) is being created to track corrective actions on the following rbmaining concerns:
The installation and operability of the aperture card reader / printer; the operability of the emergency ventilation system; the operability of the SPDS system for Unit 1; a procedure for the operation of the ventilation system (including operator action in the event of a CAM alarm); and including a copy of the approved Technical Specifications in the TSC.
(j) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-12 and 457/86019-12:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must satisfactorily demonstrate the use of the HRSS for primary coolant sampling under simulated accident conditions.
Based on discussions between the applicant and NRC Region III staff, the end point for this demonstration has been changed from Fuel Load to Initial Criticality.
For tracking purposes, this item is closed.
A new Open Item No. 456/86046-02 will be utilized to track the need for the applicant to successfully demonstrate the use of the Unit 1 HRSS for primary coolant sampling under simulated accident conditions prior to Initial Criticality.
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(k) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-13 and 457/86019-13: Prior to Fuel
, Load, the applicant must satisfactorily demonstrate the use of the
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-Containment Air Sampling Panel (CASP) under simulated accident-conditions. Based on discussions between the applicant and NRC Region III staff, the end point for this demonstration has.been
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changed from Fuel Load to Initial Criticality.
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purposes, thisLitem is closed.
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A new Open Item No. 456/86046-03 will be utilized to track the need
for the applicant to successfully demonstrated the use of the Unit 1-i CASP under simulated accident conditions prior to Initial Criticality.
(1) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-14 and 457/86019-14:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete installation of: -(a) route signs showing the directions to onsite assembly areas; (b) emergency lighting for each of the three assembly areas intended for
non-essential personnel: and (c) card readers in the onsite assembly areas. The following paragraphs discuss the progress made to date:
(1) -Route signs delineating directions to onsite assembly areas t
have been installed on the turbine deck (Level 451) and elsewhere, showing the directions to assembly areas on Level'401.
For example, on the west side of the turbine deck there were-two signs directing the workers to the two outboard stairwells (out of.four stairwells total).
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There were no signs in the lobbies or main corridors of
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the service building; the requisite signs.were the fire-emergency evacuation route signs posted within
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l-each office.
In addition to the-signs, at the double
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doors from Unit 2 at the 401 level (approximately
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location L-20), guards would be posted during an
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direct the flow of workers.
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(2) Emergency lighting was'being installed in the various
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assembly areas. The lighting was scheduled to be. completed
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before Fuel Load.
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(3) All of the assembly card readers needed for accountability have been installed.
l This item will remain open.
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(m) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-15 and 457/86019-15:
Prior to Fuel L
Loan, the medical treatment and decontamination facilities located i
on the 426 foot level of the auxiliary building must be completed, including installation of associated medical, decontamination, and
communications equipment. The inspector observed that the medical
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treatment and decontamination facilities described were not yet-
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completed; however, the facilities lacked only a shower head and installation of medical, decontamination, and communications i:
equipment. A new completion date of September 30 was given by the applicant for these facilities. This item remains open.
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(n) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-16 and 457/86019-16:
Prior to Fuel Load, the ambulance emergency kit must be positioned in the guardhouse, as stated in BwZP 500-8. All first aid kits and stretchers must also be positioned in predesignated inplant locations period to Fuel Load.
The inspector observed that the ambulance emergency kit had been positioned in the guardhouse.
First aid kits and stretches intended for positioning in predesignated inplant locations were onsite and in storage. The applicant stated that the first aid kits and stretchers would be placed in the designated locations as soon as the mounting brackets were placed on the walls. Orders for placing the brackets on the walls have been written. The mounting was expected to be completed by September 30.
This item is considered closed for tracking purposes; however, a new Open Item (456/86046-04 and 457/86034-02) is being identified to track corrective action on the remaining concern: All first aid kits and stretchers must be positioned in predesignated inplant locations prior to Fuel Load.
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(o) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-17 and 457/86019-17:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must provide an approved means of determining containment humidity such that an emergency condition would be classifiable per the humidity criteria in EAL Condition No. 24. The curves used to determine containment humidity have been reviewed and approved. Percent humidity is determined from temperature indications on the Control Room panel by means of the curves. The approved curves were available in the Control Room. This item is considered closed.
(p) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-18 and 457/86019-18:
Prior to Fuel
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Load, storage locations for protective clothing for emergency use must be determined and the clothing must be in place. The inspector observed that protective clothing for emergency use were stored in all these intended locations:
the laundry facility in the auxiliary building; the OSC; and the Braidwood storeroon. This item is closed.
(q) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-19 and 457/86019-19:
Prior to Fuel Load, the following must be installed and operational:
the public address (PA) system and the assembly / evacuation / fire alarms. The inspector noted that th public address system had been installed and was operational in only a few locations. However, the applicant stated that testing of the assembly / evacuation / fire alarm portion of the system was not completed and that the system had not been turned over from the construction crew to the applicant.
Turnover of the PA system was expected to occur by September 30, 1986. This item remains open pending successful testing of the PA system and successful testing of the assembly / evacuation / fire alarm system.
(r) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-20 and 457/86019-20:
Prior to Fuel Load and in accordance with IE Bulletin No. 79-18, the applicant must develop and be ready to implement adequate interim measures for i
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alerting personnel in high noise areas of a fire, assembly evacuation, or local high radiation alarm. By the end of the first refueling outage, the applicant must have operable visual alarms for alerting persons-in all identified high noise areas of such alarms.
Although the applicant stated that interim measures would be taken to assure personnel in high noise areas were alerted to fire, assembly, and local high radiation alarms, the specific measures to be used had not yet been defined. This item remains open.
(s) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-21 and 457/86019-21: The ENS I
equipment must be installed in the Control Room and must meet the power-failure requirements per Bulletin 80-15. The onsite wiring for the ENS phone in the Control Room and TSC had been completed and the phones would be powered from the Security Bus which was backed up by the Security Diesel-Generator which would start and take load if the bus fails.
However, the ENS system components under NRC control have not yet been installed. This item remains open.
(t) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-22 and 457/86019-22:
Prior to exceeding five percent power, procedural provisions must be established for ensuring that the GSEP van can be dispatched from the Mazon E0F during normal and off-hours. Also, procedural guidance must be established for ensuring that suitable station vehicles would be identified for off-site survey team use should the GSEP van and/or Rad / Chem Department vehicle not be available. The applicant stated that the environs team personnel would be originally dispatched during an emergency from the station and would use only station vehicles. To facilitate the onsite Environs Director in obtaining suitable field team vehicles, the applicant had revised BwZP 100-9 to include a list of station vehicles available for such use. The inspector found this list to be adequate for the intended purpose.
The applicant also stated that the purpose of the GSEP van was to provide longer-term environs monitoring and to relieve station personnel of these activities. With the activation of the EOF, detailed plans for continued monitoring of the environment would be developed.
If the accident situation warranted, any or all of the applicant's three GSEP vans could be dispatched to the Braidwood area through the direction of the Environmental Emergency Coordinator at the EOF. This item is closed.
(u) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-23 and 457/86019-23: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must replace existing Figure 6.3-1 of BwZP 380-4 with a legible copy of this figure. The inspectors examined a sampling of onsite copies of BwZP-series binders. The inspectors determined that legible copies of Figure 6.3-1, Recommended Protective Actions - General Emergency, and Table 6.3-1, Recommended Protective Actions for Actual or Imminent Gaseous Release Conditions, had been distributed onsite during the week of September 15-19, 1986.
However, the revised copies of Figure 6.3-1 contained several typographical errors which the applicant agreed must be corrected. This item will remain open, pending distribution of corrected, legible copies of Figure 6.3-1 as found in BwZP 380-4.
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(v) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-24 and 457/86019-24:
Prior to Fuel Load, the following inconsistences and discrepancies in the EALs must be corrected:
(1) The wording of the Alert EAL for Condition 2 must be revised to include the words "and control is established from local control stations within 15 minutes."
(2) The wording of the General Emergency EAL for Condition 16 must be revised to repeat the wording currently for Site Emergency, as well as the existing words under General Emergency, in order that the General Emergency EAL will stand alone.
(3) The applicant must re-evaluate EAL Condition 24 in light of a primary to secondary LOCA and an accompanying un-isolable steam leak outside containment, which equates to two fission product barriers breached. The review should be directed at whether the use of existing EALs will result in a correct classification.
(4) The applicant must resolve the apparent disparity in feedwater temperatures between the Braidwood EAL Condition 21 for an Unusual Event and the corresponding Byron EAL.
All items have been satisfactorily resolved, as shown below.
(1) The applicant has included the additional wording in the Alert EAL for Condition 2, per Bw2P 200-1, Revision 1.
(2) The applicant has included the additional wording in the General Emergency EAL for Condition 16, per BwZP 200-1, Revision 1.
(3) The applicant has adequately reviewed EAL condition 24 to insure a primary to secer.dary LOCA and an accompanying un-isolable steam leak outside containment will result in a correct classification.
Per EAL 17, Main Steam Line/ Feed Line Break, a ten gallon per minute primary to secondary leakage and
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significant fuel damage will result in an emergency classification of Site Emergency. This classification meets the guidance in NRUEG-0654, Revision 1, Appendix 1 No. 5 for Site Area Emergency, i
l (4) The feed water temperature value at Byron has been changed to match the Braidwood temperature value.
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This open item is closed.
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(w) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-25 and 457/86019-25:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must include the responsibility for requesting L
federal assistance, and responsibility for authorizing emergency worker radiation exposures for vital equipment protection ano saving of life to the list of non-delegable responsibilities of the Acting Station Director and Station Director in the appropriate Bw2Ps. The I
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inspector reviewed Revision 0 of BwZP 090-1, Acting Station Director Implementing Procedure, and Revision 3 of BwZP 100-1, Station Director Implementing Procedure. Both procedures clearly identified the aforementioned responsibilities, along with the responsibilities for declaring an emergency condition and for making protective action recommendations to offsite authorities, as being non-delegable until the Acting Station Director or Station Director has been properly relieved of command and control of emergency response activities. This item is closed.
- (x) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-26 and 457/86019-26: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must revise those BwZPs where reference to NRC notifications occurs to correctly reflect the current wording of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3). The applicant has adequately. revised BwZP 300-1 Notification Procedure, to correctly reflect the current wording of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3).
Specifically, the procedure wording was revised to state:
"Immediately after notification of the appropriate state and local agencies and within one hour, the NRC shall be notified of a GSEP event."
This item is closed.
(y) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-28 and 457/86019-28:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must position the analytical counting equipment at its designated location on the 401 foot level of the Turbine Building to serve as a backup counting facility. Appropriate personnel must also have completed training on the use of the facility's equipment.
The inspector observed that a location for the backup counting facility had been designated at the 401 foot level of the turbine building, and that a cage to protect the counting equipment was being built.
However, the counting equipment had not been moved into this location. Appropriate personnel had completed training on the use of the equipment. This item remains open.
(z) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-29 and 457/86019-29:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete operator hands-on training on the seismic monitoring system. The seismic monitoring system installation was incomplete.
The applicant has stated that training will be completed prior to Fuel Load. This item remains open.
(aa) (0 pen) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-30 and 457/86019-30:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete operator hands-on training on the fire monitoring system. The fire monitoring system installation and testing was incomplete. The applicant has stated training will be completed prior to Fuel Load.
This item remains open.
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(bb) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-31 and 457/ 86019-31: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must revise appropriate BwZPs to include
_ guidance regarding hazards which may exist and may warrant continued sheltering of non-essential onsite personnel in lieu of their-evacuation following completion of. assembly / accountability activities.
The inspector reviewed Revision 1 of the following implementing procedures:
BwZP 300-5, Assembly and Evacuation of Personnel (Primary Responsibility -- Security Director) and BwZP 300-6, Assembly and Evacuation of Personnel (Primary Responsibility -- Operations Director). Both procedures had been revised to contain appropriate guidance regarding which hazards could warrant continued sheltering
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of onsite non-essential personnel in lieu of their evacuation following completion of assembly / accountability activities. This item is closed.
(cc) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-33 and 457/86019-33: Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must develop procedural guidance to address the means of maintaining accountability once it has been established. The inspector reviewed a Security Post Order issued during the week of September 15, 1986.
It included instructions for maintaining accountability of onsite personnel once it had been established. This item is closed.
(dd) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-37 and 457/86019-37:
Prior to Fuel Load, additional emergency preparedness training must be completed by all Shift Engineers, Shift Foremen, and Station Control Room Engineers, with emphasis on the following:
identification of Control Room shift personnel and completion of integrated training for each shift requiring the concurrent use of reactor plant procedures and EPIPs; understanding which emergency response facilities must be activiated for each emergency class; understanding of off-site evacuation time estimate data used in making PAR decisions; familiarity with the guidance provided in NRC Information Notice 85-78; and the ability of all persons who could become Acting Station Director to correctly classify emergencies. The applicant has identified five shift teams consisting of a Shift Engineer (SE),
Shift Foreman (SF) and Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE). These teams were expected to operate as teams through at least the end of 1986. A sixth shift was planned to be operational in January 1987.
Nine of the 15 persons have attended additional GSEP training such as GSEP table-top discussions and a scenario walk-through. At least one member of each team has attended one table-top. The remaining personnel will be scheduled for table-top training as they are available.
Guidance of NRC Information Notice No. 85-78 has been incorporated into the Event Notification Procedure (BwAP-1250-6T2) worksheet, Revision 0, dated July 23,1986.
Evacuation time estimates have been included in the procedure for protective action recommendations.
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Walk-thoughs were conducted with the five shift teams.
Each walk-through was about two hours in duration and consisted of general emergency preparedness question and a scenario of off-normal events requiring classification of emergency conditions from Unusual Event through General Emergency. The scenario required the shift team to use plant normal, abnormal and emergency procedures as well as the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. Other av ions tested the teams' knowledge of which facilities would b tivated at each emergency level and their understanding e
- uation time estimates. Each shift demonstrated substantial-ovement compared to walk-through performances during the e-gency preparedness appraisal, in overall knowledge level and the ability to simultaneously use multiple plant procedures. Their overall performances were adequate.
This item is closed.
(ee) (Closed) Open Item Nos. 456/86021-38 and 457/86019-38:
Prior to Fuel Load, the applicant must complete remedial GSEP training for the following types of Station Group directors:
Station, Operations, Technical, and Maintenance Directors. The inspectors verified through records checks that all persons assigned to the aforementioned positions had received additional training relevant to their positions. The inspectors also conducted walk-throughs with three individuals assigned to each of those four positions.
All twelve personnel demonstrated adequate understandings of their emergency organization responsibilities. This item is closed.
3.
Open Item Identified During This Inspection During the walk-throughs of the five teams of Control Room personnel, the teams were asked to classify a situation where EAL Condition No. 24, Loss of Fission Product Barriers, was applicable. Three of the five teams classified hypothetical plant conditions of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers (FPB) lost, with suspected loss of the third'FPB, as a Site Emergency.
NUREG-0654 Appendix 1 guidance would lead to classification of General l
Emergency for the given plant conditions. The Site Emergency classification l
was,however, consistent with the current Braidwood Emergency Active Levels
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(EALs).
EAL 24 of BwZP 200-1A1 for General Emergency contained a requirement that primary containment radiaiton levels must also be greater than 2000 R/ hour in addition to the loss of FPB requirements.
Prior to exceeding 5% power the applicant must review the General l
Emergency EAL for Condition 24 in BwZP 200-1A1 to insure the correct l
classification is made based on the FPB guidance provided in NUREG-0654 for General Emergency. This is an Open Item (456/86046-05 and 457/86034-03).
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4.
Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Improvement Items The inspectors reviewed the applicant's actions on the followirg improvement items summarized in Appendix B to the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal (EPIA) (Reports No. 456/86021; 457/86019). The following improvement items were inspected and considered acceptable:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 27, 38, 47, 48, 52, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, and 63. The following improvement items were partially completed:
29, 30. The remaining items were still being addressed.
5.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on September 19, 1986, to present the preliminary findings regarding the status of emergency preparedness related open items, improvement items, and the newly-identified open item. The inspectors also discussed the content of the forthcoming
. report to determine if the licensee thought any of the information was proprietary. The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
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