IR 05000456/1997310
| ML20198A696 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198A668 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-97-310OL, 50-457-97-310OL, NUDOCS 9801060063 | |
| Download: ML20198A696 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i REGION lli l
Docket Nos: 50 456;50-457 !
Lloonee Nos: NPF-72; NPF 77 ;
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Report Nos: 50-456/97310(OL); 50-457/97310(OL) l
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Lloonsee: Commonwealth Edison (Comed)
FacilMy: Braidwoo1 Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 f
i Location: RR# 1, Box 79 l Braceville, IL 60407 t i
Dates: October 6,1997 through November 7,1997
. Examiners: J. Lennartz, Chief Examiner, Rill ,
D. McNeil. Examiner, Rlli :
J. Ellis, Examiner, Rlll Approved by: Melvyn N. Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, Division of Reactor Safety
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY >
- Draidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 anc' 2 NRC Examinatum Reports 50456/97310; 50-45* /97310 -
Examinadon Results:-
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Operator initial hoensing wxaminations were administered to four Sonior Reactor Operator ana -
L two Reacbr Operato applicants. Three Senior Reactor Operator applicants and one Reactor-Operator applicant passed the examinations; one Senior Reactor Operator applicant failcJ the - ,
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operating examination and one Reactor Operator applicant failed the written examinatio :
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Operations ,
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e The examiners noted that the control room environment was professional, access to the control room was well controlled. and extraneous activities were minimized. (Section *
01)
- The examiners identified a procedure weakness regarding BwOP OG-10T2, " Hydrogen Recombiner," Table 1. This weakness contributed to an applicant generic weakness
- discussed in Section 05.3 of this report. (Section 03) ,
" e~ The applicants' peer and self-checking techniques, and control and performance of
. reactivity manipulations were strengths during the dynamic simulator examination (Section 05.3)
e The crews displayed pro-active teamwork during the dynamic simulator examination One crew's diagnostic ability during an excessive steam flow event was poor. (Section
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- e- The examiners identified the following generic weaknesses in the applicants' abilitie (1) the ability to determine, based on given feedwater system and plant information, the expected position of faedwater valves affected by a feedwater isolation signal, (2) the -
ability to determine, based on various fuel oil tank levels, emergency diesel generator operability, and (3) the ability to start the Hydrogen Recombiners.- (Section 05.3)
Examination Materials:
e The written and operating e,xaminations were developed at an appropriate level of difficulty and were, for the most part, technically accurate. (Section 05.2)
e: The proposed examination material submitted to the examiners for review and approval
. generally met, and often exceeded, the examination development guidelines specifed in-F - NUREG 1021, Interim Revision 8. (Section 05.2) . The administered written examination was technically accurate and well structure _(Section 05.4) -
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- : The licensee's written examination results' matrix aided the examiner's post written examination review and the identification of generic weaknesses on 16 Individual e
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Reoort DetaPs 1. Operations 01- Conduct of Operations
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The examiners reviewed selected operations and administrative procedures during the examination development and administration process. These observations are documented in Section 03 of this report. Additionally, the examiners observed licensed operator performance on both Units 1 and The examiners' control room observations noted that the control roorn environment was professional, access to the control room was well controlled, and extraneous activities were minimize Operations Procedures and Documentation Insoection Scone The examiners reviewed BwOP OG 10,"Startup Of a Hydrogen Recombiner," Revision 8, and BwOP 10T2, " Hydrogen Recombiner Table 1,* Revision Observations and Findinas Procedure BwOP OG-10, Step 7, required the hydrogen recombiner suction valve to be throttled open to maintain 70 SCFM (standard cubic foot per minute) flow through the Hydrogen Rocombiner. Also, Step 7 stated that the flow indicated on flow instrument FI-OG041 reads in CFM (cubic foot per minute) and therefore, the Indicated tiow must be corrected to SCFM. This corrected value could be obtained by using the equation on page 1 or Table 1, * Hydrogen Recombiner," on page 2 of BwOP OG-10T2, Revision A NOTE before the equation on page 1 of BwOP OG-10T2 documented that containment pressure readings were in psig (gauge pressure) and they would have to be converted to psia (absolute pressure) by adding 14.7 to the containment pressure reading. This NOTE was not contained on page 2 of BwOP OG-10T2, Table 1. Table 1 columns were labeled to show that containment pressure readings were in psla; however, the need to converi containment pressure readings from psig to psia was not highlighted as it was on page 1 in the NOTE before the equatio Containment pressure readings had to be converted from psig to psia to obtain the correct value for the indicated flow that corresponded to the required 70 SCFM through the Hydrogen Recombiner. The examiners identified, during examination administration, that five out of six applicants failed to convert the containment pressure reading from psig to psia while using Table 1. Therefore, the flow through the Hydrogen Recombiner that the applicants determined did not correspond to the required 70 SCFM. The flow through the Hydrogen Recombiner that was determined by the
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appl 6 cants was greater than the flow required by the procedure. . This is discussed . ,
' further in Section 05.3 of this report);~ ,
. ' The licenses completed a procedure enhancement (Revision 7E1) for SWOP-OG10T2, j Table 1, after the examiners identified the applicants' inability to complete the procedure
_property. The NOTE on page 1 of BwOP OG-10T2 was added to page 2 to highlight the :
need to convert containment pressure readings from psig to psia.-
" Conclusions e
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The inspectors concluded that Procedure BwOP OG-0T2, Table 1, was technically -
L - accurate; however, the procedure was weak and required enhancement to highlight the need to convert containment pressure readings from psig to psia. The procedure
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weakness contributed to an applicants' generic weakness discussed in Section 05.3 of *
this report. A procedure enhancement was subsequently completed by the licensee that ,
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LOS Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 ' General Comments
. Operator initial lionnsing examinations were administered to four Senior Reactor ,
Operator (SRO) applicants and two Reactor _ Operator (RO) applicants. The written examination was administered by the licensee on October 6.1997, and the operating
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examination was administered by the examiners on October 7-11,1997.
E The licensee developed the initial operator license examination in accordance with the
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guidance prescribed in NUREG 1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," Interim -
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Revision 8. The examiners reviewed and approved all examination material developed by the licensee before examination administratio ;
- 05.2 Examination Development and Validation
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- Sogge The licensee developed the examination material in accordance with the prescribed
- . examination development guidelines. The examiners reviewed, revised, and validated the written and operating examination material during the week of September 29,1997.
I L ' Observations and Findings
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1.: Examination Outline
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- The examination outline was submitted to the NRC in the period requested by the Chief Examiner which facilitated the NRC review process.~ The examiners l noted the following regarding the licensee's proposed examination outline
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f e- l A good mix and distribution of K/As (knowledge / abilities) were selected -
for the written examinatio e: The individual walkthrough test outline included six new JPMs, one
> modified JPM; and only three JPMs directly from the licensee's ban _
, This exceeded NUREG 1021 examination development guideline ~
- : All seven proposed scenarios were newly developed. This exceeded q ( . NUREG 1021 examination development guidelines, j l
e .The licensee effectively incorporated important equipment and initiating '
events regarding risk assessment identified in the individual plant _ ; l examination into axamination development. The proposed outline clearly identified which section of the examination that the important equipment -
and the initiating transients which contributed to core damage frequency ,
would be tested o !
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2. . Wdtlan_ Examination The proposed examination was challeging and generally met the examination . I development guidelines. Occasionally, the proposed examination material '
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interim Revision 8. - However, some rninor changes were required to the examination following the NRC review. The examiners noted the following during the examination review: ,
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, o The SRO examination contained 81 new questions out of 10. total -
questions, Also,14 of the questions tested knowledge at the application level, 54 tested knowledge at the comprehension level, and 32 tested knowledge at the memory level. All 14 questions which tested knowledge
. at the application level wem new questions. The number of new questions, and the number of questions that tested knowledge above the +
memory level exceeded NUREG 1021 examination guideline e The RO examination contained 77 new questions out of 100 total -
5 - questions. - Also,16 of the questions tested knowledge at the application
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level,52 tested knowledge at the comprehension level, and 32 tested knowledge at the memory level. Fifteen of the 16 questions that tested
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knowledge at.the application level were new questions. The number of new questions, and the number of questions that tested knowledge
. above the memory level exceeded NUREG 1021 examination guideline . Six questions did not include a referenced loaming objective, o One question on the SRO examination regarding technical specifications:
-for AC power sources had no correct answe ,
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- Some questions required minor wording changes to ensure that there was a clear tie between the question stem and the response choice * One question that was common to both the RO and SRO examinations could be interpreted in a way that would result in multiple correct answers. The question pertained to nuclear instrumentation reactor trip coincidence while one power range instrument was being teste The examiner identified deficiencies were all corrected before examination administratio . Dynamic Simulator Examination The dynamic simulator scenarios met the examination development guidelines, were challenging, and required no substantive changes following the examiners'
review or during validation. The scenario guides were well written and included the necessary expected operator actions in order for the examiners to conduct a thorough evaluation of the applicants' abilitie . Job Performance Measure Walkthrouch Examination The JPMs developed for the Administrative Topics section of the examination were operationally oriented. The proposed JPMs generally met the examination development guidelines. However, one JPM regarding feedwater tempering had to be revised during validation. The JPM, as written, did not contain enough required operator actions to evaluate the operator's skills adequately. Additional required operator actions were added to the JPM to make it more discriminatin Also, the examiners identified, during examination administration, that one JPM was technically incorrect. The JPM required the applicant to align the residual heat removal pump in the emergency core cooling mode (JPM #6) and directed the operator to start the residual heat removal pump if subcooling was not adequate. The JPM documented, at step 14, that 180 degrees F was the required core exit thermocouple temperature from which to base a determination regarding adequate subcooling. However, the correct core exit thermocouple temperature to base adequate subcooling on was 190 degrees F. The licensee revalidated this JPM and agreed that 190 degrees F was correct. The JPM was corrected to reflect thi Conclusions The critten and operating examinations were developed at an appropriate level of difficuly and were, for the most part, technically accurate. The proposed examination
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material submitted to the examiners for review and approval generally met, and often exceeded, the examination development guidelines specified in NUREG 1021, Interim Revision 8. The examiners identified some minor examination deficiencies which were correcte l
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05.3_ Llanname Applicant Performanon SGQDR
. Written, Dynamic Simulator,'and Job Performance Measure Walkthrough examinationsi were administered to four SRO license applicants and two RO license applicants; Observations and Findings Written Examination One RO applicant failed the written examination; all other applicants passe The applicants' generic weaknesses on the written examination are discussed in Section 05.4 of this report.- Dynamic Simulator Examination
- All applicants passed the dynamic simulator examinatio The examiners observed the following attributes regarding the applicants'
performance:
e - The applicants consistently demonstrated good peer and asif4mcking technique i e Reactivity manipulations were performed in a controlled and deliberate manner, and were supervised by'the SRO.
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e Individual crew members were pro-active to interact with other crew members to obtain or lend assistance during abnormal events and emergency plant operation * One crew failed to recognize and mitigate an excessive steam flow -
malfunction during one of their evaluated scenarios. A steam dump valve, which did not have valve position indication available in the control room due to a previous malfunction, failed open following the reactor tri Indications of the excessive steam flow event available to the crew -
included: (1) a small amoun' of steam flow was indicated on all four steam generators' steam flow instruments, (2) reactor coolant system '
average temperature was decreasing slowly, (3) all steam generator pressures were decreasing slowly, and (4) all steam generator -
atmospheric dump valves were close One crew member identified the steam flow and reported "it looks like there is steam flow indicated on all four steam generators." However, no
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one on the crew heard the report and there was neither a Diiow-up to the original report nor any additional reports. This contributed to the crew's
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failure to diagnose that excessive steam flow was cooling down the reactor coolant system and depressurizing the steam generator Subsequently, an automatic steam line isolation' signal on low steam generator pressure isolated the steam flow and mitigated any further consequence . Jnb Performance Measure (JPM) Walkthrouch Examination One Senior Reactor Operator applicant failed the JPM walkthrough examination; all other applicants passe The examiners observed the following attributes regarding the applicants'
performance:
- Five out of six applicants failed to correctly simulate a JPM to start the Hydrogen Recombiners. The JPM directed the applicants to start the "A" Hydrogen Recombiner and align it to Unit 2 using Division 21 power valves per operating procedure BwOP OG-10. "Startup Of a Hydrogen Recombiner," Revision 8. Step 7 of BwOP OG-10 required the applicants to throttle open the hydrogen recombiner suction valve to maintain 70 SCFM (standard cubic foot per minute) flow through the Hydrogen Recombiner. Also, Step 7 stated that the flow through the Hydrogen Recombiner would be indicated in CFM (cubic foot per minute) and therefore, a conversion to SCFM using BwOP OG-10T2, " Hydrogen Recombiner Table 1," Revision 7, would be necessar The applicants were provided with information at the start of the JPM which included containment pressure at 20.3 psig and steady. BwOP OG-10T2, Table 1 flow values were based on containment pressure in psia and therefore, a conversion from 20.3 psig to 35 psia was necessary to obtain the flow value which corresponded to the required 70 SCF However, five of six applicants failed to convert the containment pressure from psig to psia. This resulted in the applicants' failure to establish the flow rate through the Hydrogen Recombiner required by the procedure for the given conditions. The applicants' failure to properly complete the procedure resulted in establishing more flow through the Hydrogen Recombiner than was required by the procedur * 50% of the applicants failed to answer a JPM question correctly (JPM #2, question #1) regarding the feedwater system. The question required the applicants to determine the expected position of the valves affected by a i
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feedwater isolation signal given the following conditions: (1) a manual reactor trip from 100% power, (2) no automatic trips generated, (3) an operator resets the feedwater isolation signal by depressing both the 1 main and auxiliary relay reset pushbuttons, and takes no further action l
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j e: 1 50% Ef the appelcents failed to answer a JPM question correctly (JPM #7, i question #1) regarding the emergency diesel generators. The question . l
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_ operability based on given information for Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank and : i Fuel Oil Storage Tank levels. - -j Conclusions 1
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The applicants' poor and self-checking techniques, and control and performance of ,
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reactivity manipulations were strengths _ during the dynamic simulator examination Also, the crews demonstrated strong teamwork skills during the dynamic simulator ,
examinations. One crew's diagnostic ability during an. excessive steam flow event was -
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The following generic weaknesses in tne applicants' abilities were identified during the -l JPM walkthrough examination: (1) the ability to determine, based on given feedwater ;
system and plant information, the expected position of feedwater valves affected by a feedwater isolation signal, (2) the ability to determine, based on various fuel oil tank l levels, emergency diesel generator operability, and (3) the ability to start the Hydrogen ;
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Recombiners per BwOP OG-1 !
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05.4. Post Examination Activities l M {
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The examiners reviewed each license applicants' written examination grading and the ;
written examination results' matrix submitted by the licensee following examination administration.
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) Observations and Findings The examiners approved the written exa ninetions grading as submitted by the licensee and noted that there were no licensee p ' written examination review comments. The
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lack of post review comments indicated that the written examination, as administered, was technically accurate and well structure The examiners identified, from the written examination results' matrix, that a total of 16
. written examination questions were answered incorrectly by at least 50% of the
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applicants. The knowledge weaknesses demonstrated were as follows: The operational modes when Emergency Operating Procedure BwCA-0.0, " Loss of All AC Power," would be applicable. (Question: SRO 14; RO 11)
l . The effect on Reactor Coolant Pump seals if the #1 seal bypass valve was
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- opened with one Reactor Coolant Pump running and with normal operating
, pressure in the reactor coolant systemi (Question: SRO 21; RO 17) -
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- The effect on the Reactor Coolant System cooldown rate if flow transmitter 1FT619, " Residual Heat Removal Discharge Flow," failed high with the flow controller for 1RH619, " Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve," in automatic. (Question:
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i 4. - The sequence that the automatic functions would occur during a lowering l pressurizer pressure. (Question: SRO 25; RO 26) The effect on pressurizer pressure during a downpower using boration as !
compared with a normal downpower. (Question: SRO 26; RO 27) _ The coincidence for the Power Range High Flux reactor trip if one power range channel was removed from service for testing. (Question: SRO 28; RO 30) The expected response for the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System if one Reactor Coolant Pump was started with the reactor coolant system saturated following a large break loss of coolant accident. (Question: SRO 36; RO 40) The time that it would take to damage the neutron monitoring equipment following a loss of tb reactor cavity fans. (Question: SRO 39; RO 43) The mechanism that reduces the effect of shrink and swell on indicated narrow range level for Unit 1 when load is reduced from 80% to approximately 60% for the loss of a feedpump. (Question: SRO 44; RO 49)
1 The availability of and requirements for auxiliary feedwater during a normal cooldown following a trip from 100% power as compared to a natural circulation coolewn following a trip from 100% power due to a loss of all AC powe (Question: SRO 50; RO 57)
1 The 125V DC ground detector status if DC Busses 211 and 111 were crosstied and energized. (Question: SRO 52)
1 The required technical specification action if the control room ventilation gas monitor, ORE-PR0328, failed low while control room ventilation radiation monitoring was being provided by Train "A." (Question: SRO 55; RO 62)
1 The reason an Anticipated Transient Without Scram would be worse at low power beginning of life conditions for the current plant cycle core physic (Question: SRO 77; RO 83)-
1 The location in the plant for the Upper Cable Spreading Room carbon dioxide system's manual actuation pushbuttons. (Question:' SRO 93)
15.- The flowpath to the 1B Charging Pump that could be established from the Control Room if safety injection will not reset, and there is blockage in the
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k suction line between the Refueling Water Storage Tank and the Charging Pump Suction Valves 1CV 112D and E. (Question: SRO 95; RO 96)
1 ' The effect that depressurizing 1 A Steam Generator would have on the safety injection and feedwater isolation signals if they had been reset by the operator -
with reactor coolant system pressure at 1885 psig and rising. (Question: SRO 97; RO 98) Conclusions The administered written examination was technically accurate and well structured. The
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licensee's grading of the written examinations was completed per the guidelines contained in NUREG 1021, Interim Revision 8. The written examination results' matrix submitted by the licensee summarized applicant performance on each written
- examination question. This matrix aided the examiners post written examination review and the identification of generic weaknesses on 16 individual question .5 Simulator Fidelity One simulator fidelity item regarding 345KV Electrical Busses 14 and 15 voltage indications was identified by the examiners during the examination validation week. The licensee corrected this deficiency before the exrmination administration week which precluded any impact on examination administration. This item is described in Enclosure 2, Simulation Facility Repor V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary e
The examiners conducted en exit meeting with members of licensee management on October 14,1997, and. conducted a telephone exit on November 7,1997, to inform licensee management of the examination results. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and indicated that the materials reviewed were not considered proprietar *
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee T. Tulon, Site Vice President, Station Manager - i R. Wegner, Operations Manager D. Burton, Operations Training Coordinator -
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C. Corovac, Operations Training Superintendent -
R. Coon, Acting Training Manager P. DiGivanna, NOD Operations Training Supervisor
.- P. Hippley, Licensed Training S. Rentz, Licensed Training NflQ ;
C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector
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- . i Enclosure 2
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SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station -
Facility Licensee Docket No.- 50-456; 50-457 Operating Tests Administered On: October 7-10,1997 -
- This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of -
noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC cert.4ication or -
approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observation While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
IIEM DESCRIPTION 345 KV Busses 14 and 15 Bus 14 was energized and Bus 15 was deenergize However, Bas 151ndicated energized and Bus 14 Indicated deenergized when they were selected on the voltmeter select switch. The licensee corrected this deficiency before examination administration.
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