IR 05000456/1990010

Insp Repts 50-456/90-10 & 50-457/90-11 on 900318-0428. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint/Surveillance Observation & Contractor Health Physics Technician Strike

ML20055C622
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	05/17/1990
From:	Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055C620	List: IR 05000456/1990010 ML20055C619 ML20055C621
References
50-456-90-10, 50-457-90-11, NUDOCS 9005290130
Download: ML20055C622 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION !!!

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Reports No. 50-456/90010(DRp);50-457/90011(DRp)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

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post Office Box 767

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Chicago, IL 60690 facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 ,

t Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, IL ,

Intpe, tion Conducted: March 18 through April 28, 1990 Inspectors: T. M. Tongue  ;

T. E. Taylor -

J. A. Hopkins J. F. Harold -

Approved By: ptinJ$/2 ief f/7!fo Reactorfr$/a75$

o ects Section IA Da'te/ *

Inspection Summary inspection from March 18 through A)ril 28. 1990 (Reports N :

35456/90DTO(DRP); EU-457/900ll(DR)))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident  :

Tnspectors and one project inspector of licensee action on previously +

identified items; operational safety verification; response to inspector inquiries; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; refueling activities; contractor health physics technician strike; training .

effectiveness; report review; events; and meetings and other activitie '

Results: Of the areas inspected, nu violations were identified in nine. In the remaining areas two violations were identified regarding operability of an one train failure to of containment follow spray a procedure chemical while additive performing an system (paragraph instrument calibrat 2) Io :

(paragraph 7). These violations are receiving appropriate attention from the ,

licensee and they do not represent a programmatic breakdow ;

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9005290130 900517-PDR ADOCK 05000456 O PDC

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)

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T. J. Maiman, Vice President, PWR Operations

• R. E. Querio, Station Manager

• D. E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent

• K. L. Kofron, Production Superintendent S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent - Operations

• G. E. Groth, Braidwood Project Manager, PWR Projects Department

• R. J. Legner, Services Director ,

• E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance

• P. Smith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1 R. Yungk, OperatinD Engineer - Unit 2

• W. B. McCue, Operating Engineer - Unit 0

• R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• D. J. Miller, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• D. E. Cooper, Technical Staff Supervisor A. D' Antonio, Quality Control Supervisor A. Checca, Security Administrator

• R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup

• L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor W. McGee, Training Supervisor

• D. F. Ambler, Health Physics Supervisor

• P. L. Maher, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

• E. W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance

• T. W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance

• J. D, Wagner, Regulatory Assurance P. Holland, Re

• J. Ungeran,gulatory Assurance Master Instrument Mechanic

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J. Smith, Master, Electrical Maintenance

• V. D. Bean, Chief Steward - Mechanical Maintenance

'R. J. Cozzi, Senior Participant - Offsite Review

• R. Vignocchi, Chief Steward - Physical

• D. Malone, Chief Steward - Clerical

• A. Gorski, Nuclear Safety

• A. R. Haeger, Operations Staff

• R. A. Flessner, Operating Engineer

• C, R. Chovan, Operating Engineer

• J. L. Grzenski, Technical Staff Engineer

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on April 27, 1990, and at other times throughout the inspection perio The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personne .

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2. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702{ Unresolved item (Closed)_ 457/89026 02(DRP): Containment Spray (CS) Train B Chemical Addition Throttle Valve Found Mispositioned., This issue has also been reviewed in Inspection Report 457/90006(DRP). The licensee evaluation by Sargent and Lundy (S&L) was forwarded to NRR for <

review and validation. The NRR reviewer independently verified the ,

licensee's calculation that the initial Train B CS would have a pH ,

of 10.9 with the throttle valve fully ope In addition, the NRR review recalculated the rates of corrosion of metals, such as aluminum, zinc, etc. to evaluate the hydrogen (H ) buildup in the containment. Thereviewerfoundthatthelicens$e'sassessmentwas over conservative in that the corrosion rates were much less than stated by the licensee S&L asm.sment, and hydrogen buildup would be considerably less than first thought. NRR also concurred with

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the resident inspector in that the Equipment Qualifications (EQ)

impact would not have been as serious as initially thought and as stated ir. the previous inspection reports. it was also noted that ,

the immediate recognition and prompt corrective action was a favorable action by the operators. At the time of the discovery, the licensee was implementing corrective actions to earlier inspectionfindingsforOut-of-Service (005) equipment. As the licensee had insufficient time to implement corrective action to the previous finding regarding misaligned valves, this event was considered as another example of valve misalignment that occurred during the same period of time. However, this was a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 for operability of the Train B Containment Spray Chemical Additive System in that the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.6.2.2.d could not have been met. Technical Specification 4.6.6.2.d requires a flow rate of 68 (+6, -0) gallons per minute (gpm) of 30% Sodium Hydroxide (Na0H) from the spray additive tank to the CS syste This is considered in violation of Technical Specification 3.6. in that the condition of surveillance 4.6.2.2.d could not be met '

(457/90011-01(DRP)).

- Violatig (Closed) 457/89017-01: Inoperability of Centrifugal Charging Pump 2 Corrective action for this violation was to revise '

Procedure BwAP 330-3, " Locked Equipment Program," and BwAP 340-2,

"Use of Mechanical and Electrical Lineups." These procedures were ,

revised to include lock cores for locked safety-related equipment and administrative controls of the keys for these locks. All of the accessible valves for both units have had their cores changed. The core change out of the inaccessible Unit 1 valves has been included

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in the station't Nuclear Tracking System, they are scheduled for completion during the next Unit 1 refueling outage. The Unit 2 valve core changes are being implemented while completing the surveillance requirement to support the present Unit 2 refueling outage. The cause of this violation was the improper alignment of a valve. The licensee's corrective action appears adequate. This issue is considered close One violation was identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

Overview of Activities During this inspection period, Unit 1 operated at or near full power with some power reduction as directed by the load dispatche Unit 2 was in it's first refueling outage throughout the inspection period. Activities included emergency diesel generator maintenance, <

containment local leak rate testing, preparation for and reload of

, the core, et '

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operatio This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review of facility record !

On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);

including compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; i monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for I abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator understanding,off-normalcondition,)andcorrectiveactionsbeingtaken; examined nuclear instrumentation (NI and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System .

-(SPDS) for operability, j

During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note l of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in l progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, !'

I general safety items, etc. The specific areas observed were:

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• Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of I power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or FSAR; .ad the operability of support systems essential to system actution or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, et *

Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physic procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, i etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for -

use, operability, and calibratio Several issues arose with respect to radiation protection which were i licensee identified. One issue was of an individual working on a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) who received 201 mrem in one day when he was authorized 100 mrem. This occurred while cutting used thimble tubes in the refueling cavity. The cutting was to be done under water and the thimble was allowed to come too close to the water surface causing the exposure to the individua ~

A second issue was the identification of contaminated scaffolding clamps onsite that had apparently.been transferred from Dresden in error. This matter was promptly noted and corrected by the. licensee at Braidwoo Both issues have been turned over to a Region III Radiation Specialist for evaluatio *

Security The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital areas were kept locked and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or monitorin ,

Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protectio The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.1 ;

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No violations or deviations were identifie Response to inspector Inquiries (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors identified or were  ;

informed of various issues that required a response by the license The responses have been evaluated and verified by the inspector The following is a sunrnary of the issues and responses during this inspection:  ;

• Inguiry 90-014: Questionable "0" rings presently installed in plant component While monitoring maintenance of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) '

operator "0" ring replacement and testing, the inspectors found that the spare operators may have had Buna N vice Viton "0" ring Buna N "0" id deterioration and failure in the presence rings are hydraulic of the subject tooilrap (fyrquel) used at the statio The replacement and testing was found acceptable on the spare operators; however, the question was raised about the confidence in the "0" rings installed on the operating component The response was that the "0" rings had been installed for over one year and based on information from the supplier (Anchor-Darling Valve Company) deterioration of Buna would be expected within a much shorter time; no evidence of such deterioration has been noted. in addition, Unit 2 was checked during the refueling outage and no Buna N "0" rings were found. Further support was offered in that the MSIVs are given a 10% stroke test quarterly and daily walkdowns of the MSIV rooms have shown no failures (evidence of leakage). The change outs were in response to an Anchor Darling letter to the licensee, dated January 30, 199 No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and i components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance wift h approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting ,

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

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control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc V .

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i The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:

Unit 0 Main Steam ! solation valve spare operators "0" Ring replacements and testin ,

Unit 1 IB Emergency Diesel Generator trouble shooting for slow start tim .

IB Main Steem Isolation Valve (MSIV) hydraulic operator "0" ring replacement.

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Reactor Water Storage Tank Level Channel Test Card Repai Unit 2 20 Emergency Diesel Generator trouble shooting for auto speed control circui Turbine Generator overhau B B Diesel Generator (DG) Troubleshooting On April 4, 1990, the electrical maintenance group was troubleshooting the 28 DG. The resident inspector's observations were as follows: The work package requested description was to " assist technical staff trouble-shooting new relays installed in the 2B DG local panel and repair / replace equipment found not properly functioning." The work instructions were to

" perform work per maintenance / modification procedure, Revision 0." The post maintenance verification identified under work instructions was " relay operability shall be verified during performance of BwVS 900-7." The maintenance / modification procedure traveler, Revision 0, identifie , steps to be taken for relay trouble shooting and to troubleshoot per BwHP 4006-11, Revision 7 BwHP 4006-11 identified that the major components and/or areas in which troubleshooting would take place was to " inspect and >

test the 2B DG control / relays listed on Attachment E." Attachment E listed the relays end resistance readings for relays referred to on the work reques The work performed and observed by the inspector was trouble-shooting of the auto speed control circuit. Discussions with the DG system engineer identified that the relays identified in the work request were not directly involved with the voltage drop resistors. The power to the resistors was energized and deenergized during the relay maintenance and troubleshooting. The resident inspector's concern is that Quality Control review was not evident and the work package used for trouble- ,

shooting of the auto speed circuit did not appear to identify the auto speed control circuit as an area authorized to perform troubleshooting activities. This issue will be evaluated by the Region !!! maintenance team inspection which is currently being conducte The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of tim T~ '

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Diesel Governor Power Voltage Dropping _ Resistors

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On April 4,1990, the 28 Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) was started for a maintenance test run after its 18 month maintenance outage. The operators did not have speed control and immediately secured the D '

Troubleshooting indicated that one of the two governor power voltage dropping resistors was physically loose in their heat sinks and both were opened (lacked continuity). The resistors were replaced from onsite stores and post-maintenance testing was continued successfully, i

On April 11, 1990, a duplicate DG at the Byron station experienced speed oscillations (300 600 rpm) during a surveillance startup. Trouble-shooting revealed one dropping resistor was opene Both resistors were replaced. Additional investigation at Byron found one loose resistor in another DG. Replacement parts were ordered from the manufacturer (Woodward Governor), sent to Byron and Braidwood, and were installed in the remaining DGs at Byron from April 12 through 15, 1990. The Braidwood station began to develop a schedule to replace the resistors in the remaining DGs and started monitoring the voltage drop across the resistors as an indication of the resistors condition. The readings were compared with Byron and Woodward Governor and found to be within acceptable toleranc On April 15,1990, the 2B DG was declared operabl On April 16,1990, the 2A DG was started for a maintenance test prior -

to its schedule 1 18 month outage maintenance. The 2A DG experienced 300-600 rpm speed oscillations. Troubleshooting revealed that one of the dropping resistors was open. Both resistors were replaced as part ;

of the scheduled maintenanc Based on the retent rc51stor failure of 2B DG and the DGs at Byron, the licensee performed operability tests en the IB and 1A DGs. The IB had a slow start and was declared inoperable, troubleshooting indicated that the slow start was caused by two sets of pilot starting air lines being crossed (see section below for details). The dropping resistors, which did not contribute to the slow start, were replace On April 18, 1990, the IB EDG was declared operable. That same day, the dropping resistors on the 1A EDG were replaced and the DG was tested and declared operabl The licensee is continuing it's evaluation of the exact failure mechanism of the resistors. Commonwealth Edison corporate engineering department is evaluating the failure for 10 CFR 21 applicabilit IB Diesel Generator (DG) Slow Start On April 16, 1990, at about 11:24 a.m., during a IB DG run associated with the dropping resistor problem in the auto speed circuit, the IB DG took 12 seconds to reach rated rpm and voltage. The Technical Specification requirement is 10 seconds. The licensee entered the proper LC0AR and began troubleshooting activities. The licensee found

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the cause of the slow start to be that the air pdot lines for the air start lines to lef t bank cylinders 6L-9L and SL 8L were crossed. Further ;

investigation identified that the air lines on the IB DG could have been !

crossed during the 5 year tear down inspection completed in November 1989. A statistical analysis by the DG system engineer showed that with *

the lines crossed and depending on crank shaft position at the time of diesel starting, 27% of the time a slow start could occur and 1% of the time the diesel may not start. The IB DG has not experienced any feilures to star The licensee's corrective actions included; returning the air start lines '

to their proper configuration, better identification on the starting air pilot line tubing connectors, and developing a test to verify a proper starting air lineu Subsequent to the initial investigation and troubleshooting for the IB DG, the licensee checked the 2A DG lines and found the 6L and 9L starting '

lines reversed. Investigation of this condition identified the probable cause was an error by the DG manufacturer. The licensee has committed to check the air line configuration of the remaining DGs (1A and 28). The air line check for 1A and 2B DGs will be conducted upon completion of the 2A DG 18 month surveillance inspectio The successful starts for the 1A and 2B DGs are 107 and 40 respectively, which indicates a very low probability that the air lines are crosse ,

The licensee is evaluating the air line problems with the manufacturer (Cooper Bessemer) for possible 10 CFR 21 applicabilit No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical '

Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing ,

was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were proper,ly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 1 Bwl5 3.1.1-232, Modes 1 through S Analog Channel Operational Test of Nuclear Instrumentation System Source Range N31 and N3 Bw15 3.3.6-003, Rev. 2, Analog Operational Test and Channel Verification / Calibration for Loop IL-0932, Reactor Water Storage Tank (SI)ChannelIII, Cabinet L

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Unit 2 2A Emergency Diesel Generator 18 Month Surveillance inspectio B Emergency Diesel Generator 18 Month Surveillance Inspectio Dwls 3.1.1-220, Channel Verification / Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Intermediate Range N35 and N3 Bwls 3.1.1-304 Analog Operational Test and Channel

Verification / Calibration for Loops 2T-0441 and 2T-0442 Delta T and Tavg Protection loop 2D Channel IV, Cabinet 2pA04 BwVS 0.5.2.51.2, Safety Injection Check Valve Stroke Tes No violations or deviations were identifie . RefuelingActivities(60710) ,

During the report period on March 18, 1990, the first Unit 2 refueling outage was started. At the writing of this report, the outage was on ;

schedule and has been well managed. Major items completed were vessel - '

head removal; fuel off load, which was accomplished about one week ahead of schedule; steam generator eddy current testing and sludge lancing; a number of containment local leak rate tests (LLRTs); snubber testing; 2A and 28 emergency diesel generator 18 month inspection; reactor vessel head replacement; reactor and vessel inservice inspection testing; and fuel reload. The unit is scheduled to be back in operation on May 24, 199 The inspectors monitored portions of the ongoing activities by verifying that controls were implemented for refueling operations and maintaining control of plant conditions as required by Technical Specifications and approved procedures. This was done by observing testing and verification of the operability of refueling related equipment and required systems, observing fuel handling operations, monitoring plant conditions, that housekeeping was appropriate for conditions in the applicable areas, and that staffing was as required. This included observation of various maintenance, surveillance, refueling, and operational activitie During the fuel shuffle in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFp) four Rod Control ClusterAssemblies(RCCAs)wouldnotinsertintotheirdesignatedfuel assemblie Four replacement RCCAs were inserted into the fuel assemblies with no difficult Examination of the RCCAs with an underwater camera showed signs of bowing of the rodlets. No swelling or cracking was observed. Prior P.CCA drop times were reviewed with no abnormalities found. The licensee will continue to investigate the RCCAs to determine the failure mechanis Damaged Thermocouple (T/C) Conduit On April 17, 1990, the Unit 2 manipulator crane mast impacted a

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The two T/C conduits were slightly bent. No damage or deformation

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to the conduit support bracket or the welded upper support plate >

enetration was observe Preliminary evaluation by Westinghouse p(W) determined that the likelihood of loose parts occurring is minima Acettionally, if a loose part does occur, the probability of migration out of the upper head region is remot The licensee conducted a final safety evaluation for loose parts on April 27, 199 During reactor coolant system fill, vent and pressurization the licensee ,

committed to closely monitor the T/C sheaths for indication of leakag If leakage is observed, the licensee plans to cap off the T/C at the reducing union above the thermocouple port column. The two T/Cs will be tested for operability during routine surveillanc Inadvertent Actuation of pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

1RY456 On March 14, 103 at 11:31 a.m., during restoration activities associated wi? .t 1 pressurizer channel 456 following completion of a Micro Electre' DurveillanceandCalibration[MESAC)surveillanceBwi$

3.1.1-338, th6 '0RV r 456 auto opened. TheNuclearStationOperator(NS0)

on duty noted the alarms and plant condition and immediately closed the PORY and its associated block valve. The event lasted about eleven ,

seconds and resulted in a 60 psi decrease in RCS pressure (lowest RCS pressure reading was about 2190 psi). The cause of the event was a personnel error by 6 junior Control System Technician (CST) instrument mechanic performing the MESAC surveillanc The mechanic omitted a step in the surveillance procedure system during restoration, which caused the inddvertent inducement of a high pressure signal into the restored 456 chennel and subsequent PORV opening. After identifying the event cause ,

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and verifying the high pressure signal had been removed, the 456 PORV and block valve were returned to a normal operating configuratio The individual who omitted the ste) was a newly promoted CST who had received appropriate training and 1ad been performing MESAC surveillances under the direction of a senior CST. This test was also under the direction of the senior CST. On Tuesday, the senior CST let the junior CST start performing MESAC surveillances. Prior to the event, the junior CST had successfully completed five MESAC surveillances while being monitored by the senior CST. During performance of the BwlS 3.1.1-338 on March 14, 1990, the senior CST failed to notice that-the junior CST had skipped a step in the restoration portion of the surveillance procedur A contributing cause to the event was that the omitted step was positioned in the midst of several procedure steps performed in the instrument panels. The omitted step is performeo at the MESAC uni The licensee is in the process of reviewing and revising ME$AC j surveillance procedures to help prevent any future events of this typ This event is an example of lack of attention to detail and the failure l to perform the MESAC surveillance in accordance with Bw!S 3.1.1-338 is I considered a violation of 10 CFR SO Appendix B Criterion V (456/00010-01(DRP)). I

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Leakage into Unit 2 Reactor Cavity Sump

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On April 11, 1990, during the core reload, the licensee noticed an increase in the frequency of operation of the reactor containment cavity sump pump. The f requency increased from once every eight to twelve hours to approximately one every thirty to forty minutes. (This corresponds to about 1.8 gallon per minute (gpm) inleakage.) The most probable leak path to the cavity sump is the excore nuclear instrumentation ports (sandbox covers). The licensee's initial response was to trend cavity sump pump run times and inform the Shift Control Room Engineer or Shif t Engineer (SCRE/SE) of any large change. Additionally, the auxiliary building "B-man" and the fuel handlers were directed to closely monitor the ref9eling cavity and spent fuel pool levels and report any evidence of leakage into the cavity sum The cavity sump pump run times were still approximately once every 30 minutes during April 12, 1990. By mid-morning on April 13, 1990, the frequency increased to about once every 20 minutes (approximately 2.7 gpm leakage). A sample of the reactor cavity sump to help identify the source of the leakage was inconclusive. A contingency plan, approved by the Onsite Review Committee, was developed to detail actions to be taken if the cavity sump pump run time frequency decreased to five minute intervals (10 gpm leakege). The plan consisted of using a portable sump pump to pum to the containment floor drain sump or the reactor coolant drain tank RCDT).

from April 13 to 16,1990, the cavity sump pump run times increased to eleven minutes apart (five gpm leakage). The following morning the cavity was drained to the reactor vessel flange level. The cavit pump run frequency decreased to approximately every eight hours. y sump The licensee determined the increased leakage did not present a personnel or equipment hazar On April 25, 1990, the licensee inspected the cavity sump area to identify the source of the leakage and evaluate any possible damag Initial visual inspection did'not indicate an obvious sigas of damage nor any clear source of the leakage. Personnel working near the

" sandbox covers indicated that the gaskets over loops A and B appeared loose. When the licensee removed the sandbox cover, two gaskets were damaged. The licensee is evaluating a different gasket material to use during the next refueling outag One violation was identifie . Contractor Health Physics (HP) Technician Strike (92709 and 92710)

On March 29, 1990, the resident inspectors received information through the NRC and the licensee of an impending strike by contractor HP technicians. This was an attempt to hold a concerted strike at all stations where these people were working, but was primarily in the eastern United States. At Braidwood, there were two groups of HP contractor technicians working onsite for the Unit 2 refuel outage in addition to the full time CECO Radiation Technicians (RTs).

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. j On April 2, 1990, 21 contractor HP technicians failed to show up for work on the day shif t, and over 90% had returned prior to the next shift. The remainder returned within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The inspectors noted and verified that HP activities went on undisturbed and there was no i noticeable disruption of associated work, i.e. Unit 2 refueling outage or other plant activities,

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i No violations or deviations were identifie . TrainingEffectiveness(41400.41701)

The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period. Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of trainin During the week of April 2, 1990, the NRC administered requalification examinations for 21 licensed operators (15 SRO, 6 RO). Based on the criteria in The Examiners Standard, the licensee's requalification program was evaluated as satisfactory. No procedural or simulator fidelity concerns were identified during the examination. The resident inspector was made aware of the examination results and the strengths and weaknesses of the licensee's requalification program by the examination team (Examination Report 50-456/0L-90-01 ) .

No violations or deviations were identifie . Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for March 1990. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The inspector also reywwed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report for March 1990, i No violations or deviations were identifie '

11. Meetings and Other Activities (30702)

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Feriormance ($ ALP)

The SALP 9 meeting was held onsite on April 26, 1990, between the NRC and the licensee. The meeting was open to the public and media. Its purpose was for the NRC to present a summary of the most recent SALP report (456/90001;457/90001) covering the period of February 1,1989 through January 31, 1990. It was also an opportunity for the licensee to present their response to the repor . .- .

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The senior NRC participant was Dr. Carl J. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator and the senior licensee representative was Mr. Bide Thomas, President of Commonwealth Ediso There were no inquiries from the public or the medi Plant Tour Prior to the SALP meeting on April 26, 1990, Dr. Paperiello, Deputy Regional Administrator; Mr. W. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects in Region III; and the resident inspectors made a tour of a number of plant areas with emphasis on Unit 2 as it was in a refuel outage. Some of the areas toured were the Unit 2 containment, chemistry laboratories, the spent fuel pool, the control room, and portions of the turbine and auxiliary building In general, the comments on observations were favorabl Several minor items identified were pointed out to the licensee for followup correctio '

No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview (30703) l The. inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 17, 1990. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur __

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