IR 05000456/1989019

Safety Insp Repts 50-456/89-19 & 50-457/89-19 on 890618- 0729.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review,Regional Request,Followup on TMI Action Items & Fuel Handling

ML20245F217
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	08/04/1989
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245F207	List: IR 05000456/1989019 ML20245F203
References
TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.2.02, TASK-TM 50-456-89-19, 50-457-89-19, IEIN-86-053, IEIN-86-53, NUDOCS 8908140206
Download: ML20245F217 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-456/89019(DRP); 50-457/89019(DRP)

Docket"Nos. 50-456;.50-457 License Nos. NPF-72; NDF-77

, Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767

1. Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois

, Inspection Conducted: June 18 through July 29, 1989-

' Inspectors: T. M. Tongue T. E. Taylor G. A. VanSickle D. R. Calhoun 1: . &

Approved B * J M.- in'ds, Jrd Chih'f MB 0 41E43 eactor Projects TeTEion lA Date Inspection Summary Inspection from June 18 through July 29, 1989 (Report Hos. 50-456/89019(DRP);

50-457/89019(DRP))-

-Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on previously identified items; licensee event report review; regional request; follow-up-on THI action items; dual unit reactor trip and unit 1 delta flux excursion; fuel handling; installation and testing of modifications; operational safety verification; engineered safety feature (ESF) systems; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; training effectiveness; report review; and meetings and other activitie Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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l DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

• R. E. Querio, Station Manager

• D. E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent

• K.'L. Kofron, Production Superintendent

• S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent - Operations

• G. E. Groth, Braim.aod Project Manager, PWR Projects Department

• R. J. Legner, Services Director

• M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance P. Smith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1

• B. McCue, Operating Engineer

• R. Yungk, Operating Engineer - Unit 2 J. Bowers, Operating Engineer - Unit 0

• R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• D. E. Cooper, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• R. C. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor J. Gosnell, Quality Control Supervisor D. Ambler, Radiation Protection Supervisor F. Willaford, Security Administrator

• R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup

• L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor W. McGee, Training Supervisor

• J. Kuchenbecker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor

• E. W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance

• P. G. Holland, Regulatory Assurance R. J. Ungeran, Master, Instrument Maintenance L. Guthrie, Master, Mechanical Maintenance J. Smith, Master, Electrical Maintenance

• D. J. Skoza, Project Engineer

• M. R. Trushe.m Shift Control Room Engineer

• B. Herbert, Nuclear Engineer

• J. Roth, Technical Staff

• T. M. Bandura, Quality Assurance

• F. A. Lesage, Quality Assurance

• E. E. Adams, Projects

• H. D. Pontious, Operations Staff

• R. Flessner, Operations Staff

• S. T. Shields, Quality Assurance

• P. Stanczak, Technical Staff

• R. Francoeur, Technical Staff F. Trikur, Technical Staff

• M. Gorski, Nuclear Safety

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on July 28, 1989, and at other times throughout the inspection perio The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and

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f electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract--

security personne .. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Inspection Report 456/88032(DRP); 457/88032(DRP): In the management /

plant meeting on December 6, 1988, the licensee committed to conduc.t l; an evaluation of_ instrument air piping solder joint quality.

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The inspector ~ reviewed the licensee's final report which provided a description of the overall evaluation. The evaluation consisted of l constructing a number of solder / copper joints of varying amounts of solder and insertion, performing nondestructive examination with resistance and ultrasonic testing (UT)'for solder bonding and depth, loading the samples to simulate the stresses involved up to and including joint / pipe failure, and developing an acceptance criteria for the piping installed in the plant.

l The licensee then sampled thirty installed solder joints based on hanger placement, forces, etc., and conducted UT measurements on the joints. This sampling revealed that all installed joints were acceptable by at least two times the licensee's acceptance standar In addition, soap bubble tests revealed several joints with minor leaks that were repaired and additional supports have or will be added in creas of overspa Following the review, the inspector had no further questions on this matte Violations (Closed 457/88012-01: 28 SI pump failed to meet operability requirements as specified by Technical Specifications. The inspectors verified that all corrective actions had been implemented by the licensee. The event was incorporated into the licensed and non-licensed operator's training ;,rogram as required reading. A training course on Communications was developed by the Training and Operating department to provide the operating staff with a clearer understanding of the concept of teamwork, their individual responsibilities as team members, and effective communication with team members. Also, Braidwood Operating Memorandum, No. 3-88 was developed and issued to provide the operating staff.with more clearly defined guidance on effectively communicating orders and carrying out those orders. In addition, clarification had been provided with respect to what constitutes a component alteration, thereby, requiring that component to be logged in the " Abnormal Position" log. Based on this corrective action, this violation is considered close (Closed) 456/88028-01A, B, D, H & I; 457/88028-01A, B, D, H, & I:

Missed or improperly performed surveillance. This notice of violation identified several instances of missed or improperly performed surveillance due to problems in scheduling, document

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control, and procedures. This issue rece d consideration. The licensee ls corrective,iyed act,igns'includedadoption'.j.*.h/.,I e'sc'aTated enfokc i incorp, orated, , ',',7 f;'.

of intoa.theprocedure surveillance byprogrdm; which non-routilie*surve1]lancesiare,

heightened *managemeht a fterit'1on.to '-

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j surveillance completion; a pol,1cy, under which a'ny Tsch'rt i cal.* f.9 h . .ir' 7, ../1 Specification'(TS)requiredsurvej wnhin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ,of its due date/is,1,la,nc,e that is not c'ompletedv, reporteqahthePlanofthe.Dpy s <

(F0D) meeting; reformatting. of shiftly/da'il.g surve.i'.11tnce' packages %,1w y.%' ' I to preclude sep*arat,18rf t'djf*acdl,1,t

. .of the ' post-surveillaricgreV.iew'p,a,te rdcess tot avefc6mpTeted h '

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the'ip c.ompletdonSand*rev .. . . surveillance patka' ges**forfarded f: rom.the* ope *r,ating sitif,'t' difectly to v "'. "'i ' .

theOperatingSurveil'lanceC6ordinatgr'*',Thepesiden

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• been moni,toring ths Tidensee lac'eb sf surv'611'lanc'd

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rrientioned identified any .c'orrectiv6 survei11ancis. actions in'.tin p,heYl(st' * p1 spbeto tagno$,Qr hav'e -l'f; ',ke see'lscorrectye'fa.ctionI.t,'"4('

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. exceeded their* c' itic,a:1,d'a,tes7 r ,

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/.3 similarly missed or improp.etl  !

successful implernentatio'rf'of' y'herforrded'survejJ]anegsp, the? licensee.'s' corrective ctiondthe m . ,,c Bas

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(0 pen) TI-2500/17.:,'.+ InspectionLGd ore, feat' SErlnkablih4'iing ut k  : .1 (HST). T ajaat'iri@i'cEnsee -

resulting(iisTIprovides9;01 from,IE,"Ihfofmatidr)(Noti'E dance',ifoP (IiQj,l8,6-53( r ."imgrpepp

. Installation of: h*dai',Shr'.inkab1'.

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d T6bing;" This IhYconc .

.. deficiene.ies iden(f e1eetrica1 spl'1ces ifiediwJth', !

and,"termi,n[tt at ons',oif, safety-re;1j,t ink 1 Ti,censeefs y'ng,# k [. f.' 1J The IN provided.the nam $s'ofds OeFi.lflicensees who u K dent. W 94 ,') .v

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k genced.. "[ H' M, j those specific ~ deficiericpesTexperiencedC%Tfi @ ice j ,1st.68% *FEv 'Iveld* <

applic'db1'd ' B did' wood.$Ji c #*- l IN and determined thatilt.w'is',,tR,ay'cherFs]toEices identified seve'ral cases'whi'r'e we'rd";lmp,roli*e li'inseh'M #WN' '

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installed due 'to thb. fa'il'urerdf the'e'idct calInfaintenan'ce -pc sorinel d '

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was ecritracted by' li tfie71i'cknj%gej'$o)y).,'th' '

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' perfoyn5' aria)ises of almt pos'slh'atf!'"

ande theTresul'tsfiniice.thdf configurations'of all in-line Raychemisp'Ticds9 Raych'erbs'g'wo'ces;Cdid f'un'ctionitTride if0'Ch4c61 Ldent k b

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In addition to r'eviewing the' lh86-53,* * .

the inspector reviewed!the fN.;1 ice'risee's evsllu'ation: of I116s'ing v procedures to assure that the\'requirem6nts specified by the vendor were incorporated into the applicab.le' maintenance procedures and, *

to verify that the procedures were*" user. friend.ly" and tfiat they ,

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included the acceptance criteria: ,[;' ,

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EQ Binder, EQ-BB-120

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BwhP 4006-08, Rev 2, Cable Terminating and Splicing BwHP 4006-43, Rev. O, Insulating and Environmentally Sealing Electrical Connections ano Terminations Using Raychem Heat Shrinkable Products

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. The licensee has incorporated the vendor instructions into the i

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'.,'+- Braidwood Station Maintenance Procedures to ensure proper

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., installation of Raychem splices. The inspector-also reviewed

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inspection, the inspectors could not adequately determine if c,g.%..f4.-')[ .< - *

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)reviously installed Raychem splices of the following junction I

" ' M4 ,.  ? foxes /,condulets were properly installed: IJB1860A for 1PT-514, 4* M ,jp.f**- and condulets for 1PT-534 and 1PT-524. Therefore, the inspectors

.f/ p ' ..will perform a more detailed visual inspection of the above  !

• i. ; .C < .* junction boxes /condulets; and of those Raychem splices installed

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3 in accordapce,with BwHP 4306-43, Rev..O, during the upcoming Unit y*'Q,dl,\ . M ,w., g,,,h

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.a1* outage to better ofR*ychemsplice This TI determine the adequacy will remain open of the isinstallation of until the foregoing

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%,q'l,4No vfolat. ions or deviations were identifie ;'.

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3 Licen$eEventReport(LER) Review (92702)

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'M i Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and w . 4 ' *;f Feview of r,ecords, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

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' : d.* P. - l actionri that deportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective

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was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence m *. , . . "t ' ' ' ' . had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical f, "

Specifications:

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. , (Closed) 456/87057-L1: Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Trip

. '. During Monthly Turbine Valve Cycle Surveillance. This LER was P $ initially discussed in Inspection Report 456/87044; 457/87045 and

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• * closed in Inspection Report 456/88022; 457/88022. This LER has

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been supplemented to update the status of corrective action Westinghouse has reviewed the data obtained from temporary

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did not cause the turbine trip. Also, simulator testing of the Braidwood digital electro-hydraulic (DEH) system software has revealed no software problems. Thus, the cause of the event remains indeterminate, and no additional instances of control instability have been experienced. Braidwood is implementing Westinghouse-proposed changes to DEH system control parameters to decrease the likelihood of control instability, and Westinghouse will install diagnostic tapes in the DEH system during the next outage of suitable length. The licensee is tracking these actions; this LER is considered close (Closed) 457/88024-Ll: Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level Due to Incorrect Operation of High Pressure Cleanup Loop as a Result of a Design Deficiency in the Man-Machine Intertace. The original LER was closed in Inspection Report 456/88032; 457/88032. The revision points _out that the Unit 2 startup feedwater pump shares its l

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recirculation line with main feedwater pump 2C, not with main feedwater pump 2B as indicated by piping and instrumentation drawing l M-124 and the original LER. The drawing will be corrected. The drawing error had no effect on the event. This LER is considered close _- __-__-_

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(Closed) 457/88029-Ll: Manual Reactor Trip and Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance in Excess of Required Time Interval Due to Condensate. Pump Suction Strainers Plugging. This supplemental LER clarifies that the prerequisites for a reactor coolant system inventory balance were invalidated by-the reactor trip, and that the inventory balance was successfully performed following trip response activities after stable plant conditions had been established. This LER is considered close In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's )

Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This ;

was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or i personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed to ensure that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and the QA manua q No violations or deviations were identifie . Regional Request Technical Specification Required Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator During the inspection period, Region III, Division of Reactor Projects requested information on Technical Specifications and how they relate to surveillance testing of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs).

This issue was raised as a result of findings identified at Byron Station. The Technical Specification referenced is 4.8.1.1.2.f(6)(c),

and the memo raised four questions on testing to be submitted to the licensee. The licensee provided the following responses:

] What EDG trips are active during manual / maintenance / test modes of operation?

Test Mode Trips: I (1) Generator differential tri (2) Dyerspeed tri (3) Engine lube oil pressure low tri (4) Turbocharger lube oil pressure low tri (5) Main / connecting rod / generator outboard bearing high temperature tri (6) Engine vibration tri '

(7) Turbocharger thrust bearing failure tri (8) High jacket water temperature tri (9) Generator overload tri _ - _ _ _- _

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(10) Generator ground fault tri (11) Loss of field tri (12) Reverse power tri (13) Under frequency tri (14) Crankcase high pressure tri (15) Incomplete sequence tri b. What EDG trips are active during ESF actuation / loss of offsite power (LOOP)/ degraded voltage automatic starts of the EDGs?

EDG Emergency Mode Trips (LOOP with SI):

(1) Generator Differential Tri (2) Overspeed Trip.

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NOTE: With LOOP only, no SI signal present, the following trip signals will trip the EDG's output breaker, but the EDG will continue to run.

l (9) Generator overload tri (10) Generator ground fault trip.

l (11) Loss of field tri (12) Reverse power trip.

(13) Under frequency tri c. If present in the design, is the bypass function tested?

The Test Mode only trips (#3 thru #15) are bypassed in the Emergency l Mode. Trips #3 thru #14 are individually tested in Surveillance l BwVS 8.1.1.2.f-9/10 to be bypassed in the Emergency Mode. Although l- the incomplete sequence trip bypass is not individually tested, the bypass circuit is the same as the other trips.

l NOTE: Surveillance BwVS 8.1.1.2.f-9/10 also verifies that the I trip signal to the EDG output breaker is bypassed (for these signals) with LOOP and SI signals both presen d. Are the exception trips, such as overspeed and generator differential, tested to ensure that they will perform their function?

The generator differential trip relay (SA-1) is tested by the operation analysis department (OAD); however, the repeater relays l

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The overspeed trip is tested in Surveillance BwVS 900- The foregoing information was transmitted to Region III on June 21, 1989 for evaluation by the Division of Reactor Safet ho violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up on TMI Action Items II.K. This item is not applicable to Braidwood station. The issue is not addressed in the Byron or Braidwood SER. This issue is considered closed for braidwood Units 1 and II.F.2.4 Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling -

Install Additional Instruments On November 4, 1982, the Commission determined that an instrumentation system for the detection of inadequate core cooling (ICC) consisting of an upgraded subcooling margin monitor (SMM), core exit thermocouple (CETs), and a reactor. coolant inventory tracking system (RCITS), is required for the operation of pressurized water reactcr facilitie NUREG-1002, Supplement 1, Section 4.4.7, documents that the NRC staff has reviewed the applicant's submittals for the SMM, CET, and RCITS and concludes that the :CC detection system design is acceptable and considers the item closed. The resident inspector staff at braidwood has verified the installation of the ICC systems and, therefore, considers this item closed for Units 1 and II.E.1.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) Evaluation - Short and Long Term hocifications

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The purpose of the AFWS reliability analysis, which was evaluated by the NRC staff, was to provide a means of comparison of the reliability of the AFWS with those of other plants and to identify the dominant contributors to AFWS unavailability so that action could be taken to fix or minimize the impact of their failure. The staff's review of the AFWS design and the associated numerical unavailability acceptance criteria

. identified that the system configuration is acceptable. Results of the l staff's review are documented in Section 10.4.9 of NUREG-0876 and l Supplement 2 of NUREG-087 The AFWS system has been installed and tested as designed. As the system design is changed, 10 CFR 50.59 reviews will be conducted, and possible Technical Specification revisions will be reviewed. This item is considerec closed for Units 1 and No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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. Dual Unit Reactor Trip and Unit 1 Delta Flux Excursion

< On July 18, 1989, both units tripped from Hode 1 operation. Unit 1 tripped from 75% power at 8:20 p.m., and Unit 2 tripped from 84% power at 8:26 p.m., apparently due to closely spaced lightning strikes. The

,_ lightning strikes caused overvoltage protection devices to trip all ten l-

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of. Unit l's and seven of Unit 2's rod drive control power supplie Interrupting power to the rod control system of each unit caused enough rods to drop into the core to actuate the power range high negative flux rate trip in each case. For both units, all safety systems actuated as designed in response to the trips. Fo11cwing the resetting of rod drive control system overvoltage protection and other trip recovery actions, Unit 1 was restarted on July 19, and Unit 2 was restarted on July 2 On July 23, operators began a slow (0.1 MW/ minute) ramp of Unit 1 from 50% to approximately 75% power. The uppower was completed on July 25, with delta flux and Tave within acceptable limits. However, at the endpoint of the uppower, the continuing build-in of xenon increased the negative reactivity addition to the core, causing a decrease in Tave to add positive reactivity. The effect of the Tave decrease was greatest in the upper region of the core, promoting neutron flux generation there and tending to skew neutron flux distribution to the upper part of the cor The operators could not dilute the boron concentration in the core to add positive reactivity because of the unavailability of radwaste collection tanks and the boron thermal regeneration system. With the unit past its end of life with a very small boron concentration, it is doubtful that dilution could have affected reactivity very much anyway. Therefore,in order to maintain iave acceptably close to Tref (plus or minus 5 F), the operators were forced to reduce power. The power reduction caused an immediate additional xenon concentration increase and resultant Tave decrease and delta flux increase. With delta flux now outside acceptable limits and penalty minutes building up, operators were forced to reduce power below 50%, in accordance with the action statements of the axial flux difference Technical Specification. The unit was maintained below 50% power until delta flux returned within its target value At the end of the inspection period, Unit 1 was again being slowly ramped up, this time with greater care by operators to ensure that xenon, Tave, and delta flux effects were small enough that unit parameters could be maintained within existing limits without abrupt changes to the transien No violations or deviations were identifie . Fuel Handling On several occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors witnessed the receipt and stcrage of new fuel within the fuel handling building. The inspectors verified the appropriate documentation of new fuel and that station procedures were followed in unloading, lifting, moving, lowering, and inspecting new fuel assemblies. Appropriate cleanliness controls were implemented. Efficient communications between fuel handlers, crane operators, radchem technicians, and the fuel

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handling foremen facilitated fuel handling operations. .A discovered fuel element flaw was thoroughly investigated and evaluated by the station's

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nuclear technical staff and a Westinghouse technical representative; the element was later. returned to Westinghouse for rewor No violations or deviaticns were identifie .- Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)

The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain that onsite activities and hardware associated with the installation of plant modifications which are not submitted for approval to the NP.C are in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS), 10 CFR 50.59, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Contro Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of completed modification packages the inspector verified that the modification activities were performed by qualified workers in accordance with approved instructions ar.d procedures, that lifted ~1eads and jumpers were properly controlled, that quality assurance and quality control reviews were conducted and documented, that operational testing was performed as required, that required personnel training was completed, that document-required reviews concerning FSAR, operating license, TS and equipment environmental qualification changes were conducted, and that the performance of 10 CFR 50.59 reviews was documented as required. In addition, the inspector verified the identification of required changes to maintenance activities and procedures which were affected by the modifications. The modification packages reviewed were H20-1-094 and H20-2-017, and no deficiencies or violations were identified. At the time of this inspection there were no in progress modification activities to m nitor. This module will remain open until this activity is complete No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operatio This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0/as), corrective action, and review of facility record On.a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control rocm staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);

including compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features {ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; 10  ;

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l monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operatcr understanding, off-normal condition, and corrective actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operabilit During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety items, etc. The specific areas observed were:

Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or FSAR; and the operability of suppnrt systems essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also

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visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, et *

Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibratio *

Security The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital areas were kept locked and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or monitorin *

Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protectio The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillance, daily orders, maintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.1 _ _- _ _ _ _ -

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On several occasions during plant tours, the resident inspectors were I accompanied by members of senior plant management. This practice has I proven to be beneficial for both the licensee personnel and the resident inspectors with regard to exchanging information, concepts, thresholds on where action is needed, et During the inspection period, the licensee provided responses to a number of inquiries resulting from observations in the plant. The following is a summary of those responses:

Reference Inspection Report 456/89015(DRPi; 457/89015(DRP).

Alarm response procedures were missing for the 1A auxiliary feedwater pump. The licensee conducted a sampling survey of ten (about 10%) alarm response (AR) books in the plant (outside of the main control room) and found two pages missing from one book and one page missing from a second book. Otherwise, the other Ak books sampled were found to be acceptabl In addition, the licensee is establishing a routine survey to monitor 25% of the AR books on a six-month frequency; this will result in an audit of all AR procedures on a two-year basi This response was found to be acceptabl *

s Mey ring containing auxiliary building operator round keys was Wst. The inspectors inquired about the impact on operations, the ability of personnel to perform their jobs, and the potential for a loss of component control, i.e. locked valve The licensee confirmed that security locks were not affecte There did not seem to be an effect on operation, as all of the keys were replaced with spares, and system / component control is also maintained by numerous routine surveillance. At the close of the inspection period, the licensee was continuing efforts to relocate the lost key rin '

On July 7, 1969, it was noted that Unit 2 exceeded 100% power during i an approach to full power. Indicated power level was 101.6%, and a later calorimetric shched that the maximum power level was 101.2% for a period of less than two minutes, after which it was detected and corrected. Review by the inspectors showed that this was within the guidelines of an NRR memo dated August 22, 1980. In addition, the licensee published a Special Operating Order for guidance when I operating near 100%, which approximates the guidance of the KRR j

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memo. This is acceptable for the interim; however, the inspectors plan to discuss certain items in the order in the future with the license ,

Other issues of lesser significance, such as a loose grounding cable on a motor-operated valve, a door lock defeated on a cage door to a room where potential radioactive material is scrted, and some specific minor ,

housekeeping items, were discussed and resolved routinel l l

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No violations or deviations were identified..

, 10. - Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710)

I l' During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of several ESF systems to verify their status. Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable requirement Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping; whether freeze protection. if required, was installed and operational; valve positions and conditions; potential ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.;

interior conditions of electrical breakers and control panels; whether instrumentation was properly installed and functioning and significant process parameter values were consistent with expected values; whether instrumentation was calibrated; whether necessary support systems were operational; and whether_ locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve positions agree During the inspection, the following ESF systems and components vere

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Unit 1 1A Emergency Diesel Generator 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater System Unit 2 2A Emergency Diesel Generator 2B Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater System ho violations er deviations were identifie . , Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities affecting the safet2 related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in acccrdance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; epprovals were obtained prior to

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initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were L accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were L properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were impleraented. Work requests were reviewed to

determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is l- assigr:ed to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The 'ol kwing maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:

wit 0 Troubleshooting and resetting of damper OVC09Y (make-up intake from turbine building for control room ventilation train 08)

Troubleshooting and repair of damper DVA072Y (flow control damper for charcoal booster fan 0F)

Unit 1 1B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump troubleshooting and repair for overcrank failure to start Troubleshooting and repair of 1C Main Steam Isolation Valve limit switch Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Filter changecut Unit 2 lTrovaleshooting/ repair of power range channel N41 Repair of power supply for hot leg wide range RTD The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of tim No violaiions or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with ad'quate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and

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procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate

. management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 0 Security computer outage for surveillance of power supplies and equipment Unit 1-BwVS 3.1.1-5, Incore-Excore Axial Flux Quarterly Calibr?. tion Bw0S 3.2.1-8/6, Unit 1 ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (Train B, Automatic Safety Injection K611)

Sw0S 8.1.1.2a-2, Unit 1, 1B Diesel Generator Operability Monthly (Staggered) and Semi-Annual (Staggered) Surveillance Special Test SPP 89-6, Autostart Verification of the 1A Auxiliary

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Feedwater Pump from the Remote Shutdown Panel Unit 2

.lBw05 8.1.1.2a, Rev. 1, 28 Diesel Generator Operability (Staggered)

and Semi-Annual (Staggered) Surveillance BwVS 0.5-3, SX-1, Rev. 4, ASME Surveillance Requirements for Essential Service Water Pumps - for 2B SX pump BwVS 0.5-2.SI.2, Safety Injection System Check Valve Stroke Test During this inspection period, the Byron Senior Resident Inspector noted that periodic surveillance of the actuating circuitry for the auxiliary feedwater pumps and other safety-related pumps did not test the circuitry with the pumps under local control at the remote shutdown panels (RSPs).

When the pumps are locally controlled, actuating signals are sent through different sets of closed contacts from those made up when the pumps are remotely controlled from control room panels. This concern also applied to Braidwood surveillance tests. A Braidwood review of preoperational testing determined that the actuating circuitry for all pumps in question had been tested with the pumps under local control, with the exception of :

the lA auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pum On June 23, 1989, the licensee performed a special test to verify ,

automatic starting of the 1A AFW punp with the pump under local control at the Unit 1 RSP. With the pump breaker in the " breaker test" position to prevent an actual pump start, simulated loss of offsite power and safety injection signals were imposed on the actuating circuitry. A

" pump run" indication resulted in each case, verifying the continuity of the local contact l

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L .During a conference call on June 22, 1989, the licensee committed to an engineering review for Byron and Braidwood which would address the need for periodic testing of pump actuation with pumps locally controlle .No violations or deviations were identified.

l 13. ' Training Effectiveness (41400, 41701)

l L The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed l personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during-the witnessing of the I licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and

, operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the ins)ection period. Personnel.

- appeared to be knowledgeable of the tas(s being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of trainin ho violations or deviations were identifie . Report Review During the inspcction period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for June 1989. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The inspector.also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Reports for May and June 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Meetings and Other Activities (30)02)

Management / Plant Status Meeting A meeting was held on July 28, 1969 between the Station Manager, and Mr. J. M. Hinds, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects Section lA, and members of their staffs. The purpose of the meeting was for the licensee to provide an update on the status of Units 1 and 2, to discuss improving trends in reportable events, to discuss recent reactor trips, and to discuss the preparations for the upcoming Unit I refueling outag The NRC identified issues such as minor deficiencies of control room logs and various items identified during plant inspection tours. In acdition, the recent enforcement conference corrective action results were addressed. There was also an exchange of information on issues of interest to the NRC and the license No violations or deviations were identifie '

16. Exit Interview (30703) ,

i The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 28, 1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur