ML20154J210
| ML20154J210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1988 |
| From: | Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154J207 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-88-22, 50-457-88-22, NUDOCS 8809220285 | |
| Download: ML20154J210 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000456/1988022
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Reports No. 50-456/88022(DRP);50-457/88022(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457
Licensee: Confronwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braidwoo6, Illinois
Inspection Conducted: July 10 through August 27, 1988
Inspectors:
T. M. Tongue
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T. E. Taylor
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Approved B :
~It. Hinds,
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ou 14 86
seactor Projects ection 1A
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Inspection Summary
Inspection from July 10 thrc, ugh August 27, 1988 (Reports No. 50-456/88022(DV);
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No. 50-457/88022(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routihe, unannounced safety inspection by the resident
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Tiispectors of Itcensee action on previously identified items; licensee
event report review; overtime by personnel perfoming safety-related
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activities; drought and heat wave effect; startup test observation;
operational safety verification; radiological protection; engineered safety
feature (ESF) systems; physical security; monthly maintenance observation;
monthly surveillcnce cbservWon; training effectiveness; report review;
licensee actions in response to substance abuse; and meetings and other
activities.
Results:
No violations ur deviations were identified.
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88092202S5 880914
FDR
ADOCK 05000456
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contteted
Coninonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)
T. J. Maiman, Vice President PWR Operations
K. L. Graessen , General Manager, Power Operations
S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
R. E. Querio. Station Manager
- D. E. O'Brien Station Scryices Superintendent
- K. Kofron, Production Superintendent
- L. E. Davis, Assistant $uperintendent Technical Services
B. Byers, Assistant Construction Superintendent
M. Lohman, Project Startup Superintendent
P. Cretens, Station Startup Assistant Superintendent
F. Willaford, Security Administrator
S. C. Roth, Assistant Security Administrator
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D. E. Paquette, Maintenance Assistant ', superintendent
G. R. Masters, Operations Arsistant Superintendent
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- P. L. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
M. Takaki, Regulatory Assurance
J. Gosnell, Quality Control Supervisar
R. E. Aker, Radiation / Chemistry Sup O visor
J. Jasnoz, Technical Staff AR/PR Coor11nstor
R. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor
G. E. Groth, Startup/ Testing Supervisor
- P. G. Holland Regulatory Assurance
R. C. Bedford, Regulatory Assuraace
R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Superviser
L. Kline, Regulatory Assurance Industry Group
L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety
R. J. Ungeran, Operating Engineer, Unit 1
R. Yungk, Operating Engineer, Unit 2
B. McCue, Operating Engineer. Unit 0
R. J. Legner, Lead Operating Engineer
T 0'Brien, Technical Staff
S. Hedden, Master, Instrument Maintenance
J. Huffman, Master, Mechanical Maintenance
J. Smith, Master, Electrical Maintenance
W. McGee, Training Supervisor
B. Tanouye, Project Construction Departtt.it
A. J. D' Antonio. Quality Cont ol
D. H. Schavey Training
E. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on August 24, 1988
and at other times throughout the inspection period.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
erployees, including retters of the technical and engineering staffs,
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startup engineers, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and
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forerren, electrical, rrechanical and instrurrent treintenance personnel,
as well as contract security personnel and construction personnel.
2.
Licensee _ Action on preyi_o_usly__ Identified items,
a.
Unresolved _ _ Item
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(Closed) 456/88003-01:
Inadequate nrveillance test shift brief.
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The licensee's resporise to this item was to issue a special
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oaerating order entitled "Surveillance Briefing Responsibilities."
T1e order rectrphasizes the respcnsibility of the control room
supervisor to review upcoming surveillances regardless of frequency
and to conduct or direct others to conduct appropriate briefings
coninensurate with the complexity of the evolution and the expected
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results.
The inspector has rnonitored general surveillance briefings
subsequent to the eighteen-month Bus 142 undervoltage test, during
which the inspector raised the concern of inadequate shift briefs.
The results of the reviews show that the shift briefs appear to be
adequate, with all participating persons being knowledgeable of
expected surveillance test activities and their impact on plant
operations. This item is considered closed,
b.
V,iolation
(Closed) 456/87042-01: Manipulation of reactor controls by an
unauthorized individual on September 20, 1987. The inspector has
monitored the implerrentation of the licensee's corrective actions
for this event. On October 1,1987, the Nuclear Operations Division
issued a letter which defines the personnel allowed to maritpulate
reactor controls.
This letter was reviewed with licensed shif t
personnel.
In addition, the Station Training Department issued a
letter on October 18, 1987 (periodically updated), specifying by
name the individuals in license training who currently qualify for
the exerption described in 10 CFR 55. A copy of this letter is
available in the control room.
The inspectors' periodic monitoring of the above corrective action
has identified no further violations in this area.
This item is
considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
LicenseeEventReport(LER) Review
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personrel, cod
review of records, the follcwing event reports were reviewed to detemine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that irrrediate corrective
action was acccmplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence
had been or would be accomplished in accordance with technical
specifications:
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(Closed) 456/87048-L2:
Loss of Offsite Power Due to Inadvertent Deluge
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System Actuation Resulting from a Mispositioned Yalve.
During the
performance of a deluge system surveillance, a loss of offsite power
occu rred. The root cause of this event was a mispositioned auxiliary
drcin valve.
The licensee has concluded that the mispositioning occurred
as early as August 20, 1987, during performance of a surveillance between
August 20, 1987 and September 11, 1987.
Corrective actions taken included
revising two fire protection procedures to verify valve positions prior
to starting surveillances and to verify deluge system valve positions
monthly. Also, corrective actions included a requirerc.ent for personnel
to obtain shift engineer or station control room engineer permission
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prior to entry into the deluge system area. The inspector has verified
implementation of the corrective actions.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 456/87057-LL:
Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Trip During
Monthly Turbine Valve Cycle Surveillance.
This event was previously
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discussed in Inspecticn Report 456/87044; 457/87045.
The cause of this
event is still not known. Several successful valve cycle surveillances
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had been perfomed subsequent to this event. This item is considered
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closed.
If another event occurs, another review will be perforned.
(Closed) 456/87063-L1:
Two Inoperable Non-Accessible VA Filter Plenums
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Due to Misalignment. The subject of this supplement to LER 87063 was
previously reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 456/88011; 457/88013, for
which a Notice of Violation was issued.
This item is considered closed
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based on the previous review and the content of this supplement.
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LClosed) 456/88001-LL:
Train A Control Room Radiation Monitoring
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Tno~perable Due to Noisy Pressure Switches. On January 8,1988, at
9:50 a.m.; on January 11, 1988, at 12:30 a.m.; and on January 12, 1988,
at 10:24 a.m.; spikes occurred on control room intake radiation monitors
OPR32J and OPR31J. The spikes resulted in the OA train of control room
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ventilation (VC) switching to the makeup rnode.
The spikes were determined
to be spurious, and the monitors were returned to service. The events
resulted from the operating characteristics of the trcnitors' pressure
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switches. During modulation of the monitor's flow control valves, the
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switches emit electrical ncise spikes which ultimately are interpreted
as radiation-propagated current pulses by the monitor's preamplifier
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circuitry.
Action to prevent recurrence includos adding noise attenuating
filters to the pressure switch circuitry to eliminate the false trips,
The inspector's review of the event verified that the licensee's actions
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are adequate.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 457/88002-LL:
Containrrent Ventilation Isolation From Loss of
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Pulses to Radiation Monitor 1RT-AR011 Due to Lcw Background Radiation,
Unit 2 containment area radiation
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rtonitor 2AR11J went into an interlock-alert alarm status due to a
no-pulses tirreout failure. The no-pulses tineout failure indicates that
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the radiation monitor has detected no radiation in the last five minutes,
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The alaret generates a containrcent ventilatien isolation, which is an ESF
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actuation. The licensee's corrective action was to return the system to
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normal and to increase the pulse tima interval from five to ten minutes
as noted in the vendor manual. The inspector has no further concerns.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 456/88003-LL:
Loss of Pulses to Fuel Handling Incident Monitor
ORT-AR056 for Unknown Reasons. At 7:10 p.m. on January 13, 1988,
radiation monitor ORT-AR056 went into the interlock mode due to a loss
of pulses. The train B fuel handling charcoal booster fan started,
and the charcoal filter was placed in service.
The failure of monitor
ORT-AR056 was verified to be spurious, the fuel handling charcoal booster
fan was shut down, and the system was returned to normal.
The root cause
of the event is unknown. The inmediate corrective action was to determine
that the source of the actuation was spurious in nature and not due to
actual radioactivity. There have been no further spurious loss-of-pulse
events concerning ORT-AR056. The licensee's actions for this event are
adequate. This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 457/8800_3-LL:
Inadvertent loss of Power to Instrument Bus 212
Resulting in a Reactor Trip Oue to Personnel Error.
At 10:52 a.m. on
January 31, 1988, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, a reactor trip signal was
received as a result of removing power from instrurrent bus 212.
The bus
is the control power source for source and intermediate range channels.
The event was caused by contractor personnel working in the area. The
contractors were preparing the inverter cabinet for the bus for painting
and inadvertently tripped a breaker on the inverter.
Power to bus 212 was
restored from its constant voltage transformer, and the painters were
told to discontinue work on the inverter cabinet. The inspector has no
further concerns with this item; this item is considered closed.
(Closed) 457/88004-LL: Undervoltage Start of 2A Diesel Generator (DG)
Due to Operator Error. At 10:27 a.m. on January 29, 1988, the Unit 2 2A
DG auto started. The auto start resulted from an undervoltage signal
which was generated by the inadvertent removal of the bus 241 potential
transfomer (PT) fuses by an equipment operator (EO), instead of the
intended bus 241 system auxiliary transformer (SAT) feed PT fuses. A
contributing cause to this event was a comunication problem between the
center desk nuclear station operator (NS0) and the E0. The information
sheet used, which will be revised, did not reflect the actual equiptrent
field norrenclature.
The event has been reviewed with the E0 involved,
who has received additional training, including a walk-through with a
training indructor and a licensed foreman to verify his technical
knowledge.
There have been no subsequent DG auto starts of this type.
The licensee is evaluating this event with emphasis on how to prevent
further personnel errors of this type.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 456/88005-LL:
1A Diesel Generator (DG) Start on a Safety
Injection Signal Instead of an Undervoltage Signal During Testing Due to
Operator Miscornmunication. During the perfomance of IBwVS 8.1.1.2.f-13
(a DG sequencing surveillance), on February 4,1988, due to a
miscorrunicatien between two NS0s, the diesel auto started on a safety
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injection signal instead of the planned undervoltage signal. The test
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was successfully completed at 2:12 a.m. on February 4,1988.
The fiS0s
involved were counselled on the event. The inspector has no further
concerns relative to this event.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 457/88006-LL:
Inadvertent Start of the Unit 2 Auxiliary
Feedwater (AFW) Pump Due to Personnel Error.
The start of the 2A AFW
pump was caused by the misuse of the volt-ohmeter used to conect data
for surveillance 2 Bw05 3.2.1-941, "Unit 2 ESFAS Instrumentation Slave
Relay) Surveillance (Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation, Lolo SG Level
-K633 ," which was being performed at the time of the pump starts.
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surveillance is nos intended to start the 2A AFW pump. The operator
misuse of the volt-ohmeter was considered a violation and is discussed
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in fiRC Inspection Report 456/88008; 457/88009. This LER is considered
closed.
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(Closed) 456/88008-LL:
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Due to Broken
Relief Valve Disc Pin.
On March 25, 1988 and March 27, 1988, with the
unit in Mode 4, the Unit I fiS0s identified that unidentified leakage
was in excess of the one gallon per minute (GPM) Technical Specification
limit. Licensee investigations identified that the leakage on March 25,
1988 was due to valve IRH8729A; although locked in the closed position
the valve's disc was off its closed seat. The March 27, 1988 leak was
due to leaking residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves,
fluclear Work Requests were written, and the valves were repaired or
recalibrated. The Itcensee corrective actions were appropriate for
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the two events. The inspector has no further concerns.
This item is
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considered closed.
(Closed) 457/88011-LL:
Reactor Shutdown Required as a Result of Valve
25188098 Declared Inoperable Due to fion-Environmentally Qualified Motor.
At 6:00 p.m. on June 7, 1988, Westinghouse Electric Company notified
Braidwood Station that no environmental qualification (EQ) documents
could be found for the motor operator installed on containment isolation
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valve 25!88098. The valve was declared incperable, and the Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) of Technical Specification 3.6.3
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(containtrent isolation valve operability) was entered. A plant shutdown
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was initiated, and the unqualified motor was removed and replaced with
one that was EQ qualified. An Unusual Event was declared.
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declaration time of the Unusual Event was not considered by the f1RC to be
in corpliance with the licensee's General Station Emergency Plan (GSEP),
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A flotice of Violation was issued for a violation of the GSEP program,
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Part of the licensee's corrective action for this event has been to
review all remaining open Westinghouse Field Deviation Reports for
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similar problems.
The inspector has determined the licensee's actions
to be adequate and has no further concerns.
This item is considered
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closed.
(Closed) 457/88012-LL:
Reactor Trip Due to Phase B Overcurrent Protective
Relay CO-7 DefecWe~ Current Switch. At 12:12 p.m. on June 20, 1988, a
shorting switch on Phase B overcurrent protective relay C0-7 on unit
auxiliary transformer (UAT) 241-2 was opened in preparation for taking
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current readings on the relay. Opening of the shorting switch caused
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a voltage spike and actuated the instantaneous overcurrent protective
relay, which ultimately resulted in a turbine trip / reactor trip. An AFW
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pump also auto started on Lolo steam generator (SG) level caused by the
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resultant shrink in the SG 1evel.
The root cause of this event was
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attributed to a defective current test switch on the B phase of the CO-7
overcurrent relay.
The defective switch was replaced and tested.
The
inspector has no further concerns.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) 457/88013-LL: Low Steam Generator Level Results in Reactor
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Trip Due to Inadequate Procedure Guidance.
On June 21, 1988, at
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1:07 a.m., a reactor trip occurred due to a Lo-Lo steam generator level
caused by insufficient feedwater (FW) flow.
The low FW flow was due
to an out-of-service (005) that isolated FW flow to the SG. On June 20,
1988, at 11:45 p.m., the Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE) had
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authorized clearance of the 005, but a high priority was not given to
its clearance and to establishing a normal FW lineup.
Consequently,
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when the reactor startup on June 21, 1988 was at the point of adding
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heat, the insufficient flow caused the reactor trip.
Personnel
performing the reactor startup were not aware of the FW system lineup.
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The licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to:
(1) revise procedures to verify proper FW system lineup prior to
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increasing power from the point of adding heat; (2) review the event
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with the personnel involved and errphasize the need for awareness of
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system configuration; and (3) issue a memo to the operating staff
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describing the evert and actions to prevent recurrence.
The inspector
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has no further concerns.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) 457/88014-LL:
Reactor Trip Due to Low Water Level Caused by
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Erretic Operation of Main Water (sic) Regulating Valve.
On June 22, 1988,
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at 12:29 a.m., a reactor trip occurred due to a Lo-Lo steam generator
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level.
The trip was due to a feedwater transient initiated during a
normal switchover f*om the feedwater regulating) bypass valves (FWRBPVs)
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to the main feedwater regulating valves (MFWRVs for SG level control.
During the transfer from the FWRBPV to the MFWRV for the 28 SG, an MFWRV
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malfunction caused the 2B SG level to reach its Hi-Hi setpoint, which
actuated a turbine trip, feedwater isolation, and feed pump trip.
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Approximately 18 seconds later, the 20 SG 1evel reached tt.e Lo-lo level
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setpoint, which resulted in a reactor trip.
The root cause of the event
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was the erratic operation of the 2B MFWRV.
Plant conditions were
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restored to a normal status by 12:22 a.m.
The 2B MFWRV was repaired and
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returned to service.
The inspector's review of this event identified
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that the licensee's actions were prompt and adequate in nature.
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item is considered closed.
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(Closed) 457/88015-LL:
Feedwater Isolation Due to Hi-Hi Steam Generator
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Level Caused by 5 team Generator Sensitivity. On June 26, 1988, at
4:06 a.n., a feedwater isolation and turbine-driven FW purip trip occurred
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on Hi-Hi SG water level.
The cause of the event was the level control
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sensitivity of the Model D-5 Westinghouse SGs and the operator's
relative inexperience with the D-5 SGs. The operator's irrediate
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corrective actions were to reset the FW isolation and to restart the
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feed pump. This event will be included in operator required reading to
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heighten all operators' awareness of the differences between the Model
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0-4 (Unit 1 SGs) and Model 0-5 (Unit 2 SGs) level control sensitivities.
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The inspector has no further concerns with this event.
(Closed) 457/88016-LL: Unit 2 Reactor Trip on Lo-Lo 2B Steam Generator
Level. On June 24, T988, at 12:21 p.m. , a reactor trip occurred due
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to a Lo-Lo level in the 2B SG. The cause of the trip was a failed
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open heater drain tank (HDT) makeup valve, which caused the condensate
booster (CB) pump discharge pressure to decrease.
The CB pump discharge
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pressure decrease resulted in a loss of feedwater flow and subsequent
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decreasing SG levels.
The trip occurred about one minute after the loss
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of FW flow.
The imediate corrective actions were to recover SG levels
and to establish stable conditions.
The HDT makeup valve has been
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repaired. The licensee performed an FW system walkdown to ensure that no
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more abnormalities existed in the system.
The inspector has no further
concerns. This LER is considered closed.
In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This
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was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or
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personnel performance, potential trends, etc.
DVRs were also reviewed
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to ensure that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in
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a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and the QA manual,
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Regional Request
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Overtime By Personnel Performing Safety-Ralated A_ctivities
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By telephone request, Region !!! requested information on overtime worked
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by station personnel involved in safety-related activities, how the
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guidelines prescribed in Generic Letter 82-12 were being applied, and the
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number of occasions where the guidelines were exceeded. Generic Letter
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82-12 guidelines are required by Technical Specification 6.2.2.e and
implemented by Braidwood Administrative Procedures BwAP 100-7, "Overtire
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Guidelines for Persennel That Perform Safety-Related functions";
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BwAP 100-7A1, "Overtine Deviation Detemination"; and BwAP 100-7A2,
"Overtime Deviation Authorization Record Keeping Requirements."
Licensee personnel provided the entire package of Overtime Authoritation
forms sf nce January 1,1988, for review by the Senior Resident Inspector.
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In addition, overtine sumaries and charts were provided.
These were
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reviewed by the Senior Resident Inspector and a sunnary was provided
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to the Region III requestor.
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Drought and_Hea_t_ Wave Effect
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During the inspection period, considerable interest was shown by NRC
Headquarters and Region !!! in the drought's impact on the Braidwood Lake
(heat sink) and on station operation.
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Through observations by the inspectors and information provided by
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licensee personnel, lake status reports were submitted weekly.
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Throughout the inspection period, operation of the station was not
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affected by lake conditions.
The Kankakee River (the normal makeup
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source) went below the minimum flow for makeup of 442 cubic feet per
second on several occasions.
Intennittently, the rakeup purps could be
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run. When pumping from the river was insufficient to keep up with
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evaporation and normal losses, the licensee chose to take makeup water
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from nearby licensee-cwned strip mine lakes.
This was done after
Ccmonwealth Edison signed an agreement with local officials to provide
makeup water if local wells are affected and drilled 22 rnonitoring wells.
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At the cnd of the inspection period, local rainfall had created
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sufficient river flow for two makeup purps to be run from the Kankakee
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River, and the licensee continued to supplement cooling lake makeup with
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water from the strip mine lakes.
The licensee plans to pump cnly
two-thirds of the water from the strip mine lakes and has a plan for
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restoration of the strip mine lakes to preserve wildlife habitat.
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In addition to the foregoing, the licensee has established a contingency
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plan for ronitoring silt and sedirent pickup and deposition and for
monitoring selected heat exchangers should the cooling lake level drop
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to levels low enough for intake to be a prcblem.
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Startup Test Observation (72302)
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The inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the follcwing Unit 2
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startup test procedure in order to verify that testing was conducted in
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accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, that
test data was properly recorded, and that the performance of licensee
personnel conducting the tests demonstrated an understanding of assigned
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duties and responsibilities:
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BwSU IC-72C
Incore Moveable Detector and Thermocouple Happing at
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Power (QuarterCore)
No violations or deviations were identified,
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6.
OJerational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during the inspection pericd
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to make an independent assessment of equiprent conditions, plant
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conditions, security, fire protection, general personnel safety,
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hcusekeepir.g. and adherence to applicable regulatory requirements,
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During the tours, the inspectors reviewed various logs and daily orders,
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interviewed perscr.rel, attended shift briefings and plen of the day
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n.cetings, and independently determined equipment status. During the
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shift changes, the inspectors observed operator, shift control room
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engineer, and shift engineer turnovers and panel walkdewns.
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These reviews and observations were' conducted to verify that facility
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operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
RadiologicalProtection(71109),
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The inspectors selected portions of the licensee's radiological program
to verify conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory
requirements. Observed aspects included the health physics managers'
awareress of any unusual ccnditions or challenges, the implementation
of the ALARA program, the use of Radiological Work Pennits (RWPs), the
control and monitoring of radiation exposures, including work in high
radiation areas if applicable, and the control of radioactive material.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710)
During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of
several LSF systens to verify their status.
Consideration was given to
the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, limiting Conditiens
for Operation Action Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable
requirements.
Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports;
housekeeping; whether freeze protection, if requ'. red, was installed and
operational; valve positions and conditions; potential ignition sources;
major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; interior conditions
of electrical breakers and control panels; whether instrumentation was
properly installed and functioning and significant process parameter
values were consistent with expected values; whether instrumentation was
calibrated; whether necessary support systems were operational; and
whether locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve positions agreed.
During the inspection, the following ESF components were walked down:
Unit 0
Component Cooling Water System
Unit 1
Batteries 111 and 112, including battery chargers
Bus 141, 142 switchgear
Inverters 111 and 113
Component Cooling Water System
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1A Essential Service Water System
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IB Essential Service Water System
Unit 2
Bus 241, 242 switchgear
Inverters 211, 213
28 RHR train
Component Cooling Water System
2A Essential Service Water System
2B Essential Service Water System
During plant tours and ESF system walkdowns, the inspectors noted an
excessive accumulation of oil and water in the foundations of the 18
and 2B essential service water pumps and damaged bent cooling fins on
the associated room coolers. The licensee cleaned up the oil and water
in the pump foundations and noted the oil and water leakage in the daily
orders to all operators.
In addition, work requests were written to
straighten the cooler fins and to repair the oil and water leaks.
No violations or deviations were identified.
g.
Physical Security (71881)
At various times throughout the inspection period, the inspectors
monitored corpliance with the physical Security Plan (PSP). S.lected
observations were made of manning levels and collateral duties of
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assigned personnel; access control equipment and processes, such as
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x-ray machines, retal detectors, explosive detectors, and other search
rechanisms; whether protected area (PA) and vital area (VA) barriers were
properly maintained; whether procedures were properly folicwed; whether
coepensatory reasures were appropriately used when required; whether
persons in the PA and VA were properly badged and escorted if required;
whether various detection / assessment aids, such as fences and illumina-
tion of the PA, were operable; and whether TV monitors had sufficient
clarity and resolution.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Menthly Maintenanc.e_0_bs_ervation (62703)
Station matntenance activities affecting the safety-related systers ar.d
corpenents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they
were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides
and industry ccdes or standards, and in conferrrance with Technical
Specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior
to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved
procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or
calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems
to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were
accorrplished by qualified perscnnel; parts and materials used were
properly certified; radiological controls were irplemented; and fire
prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to
determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is
assigned to safety-related equipnent maintenance which may affect system
performance.
Maintenance activities on the following equipment were observed and
reviewed:
Unit 0
OB VC chiller seal replacement
Unit 1
Unit 2
2A Diesel Generator Troubleshooting incorrplete Sequencer Trip
2A Main Fcedwater Furrp Electric Aux Oil Pump Coupling Repair
The inspectors nonitored the licensee's work in progress and verified
that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures and
approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing
updates were rade and/or planned, and that operator training was
conducted in a reasonable period of tire.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61725)
The inspectors cbserved surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing
was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test
instrurentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation
were ret, that renoval and restoraticn of the affected components were
acccrplished, that results conferred with Technical Specificat'.ons and
procedure requirerents and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
daring the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
nanagement personnel.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
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Unit I
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1B Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Monthly Surveillance
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ASME Surveillance Requirements for Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feed
Pump
B Train Auxiliary Feed Valves
Unit 2
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2A Emergency Diesel Gererator Monthly Surveillance
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2B Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Surveillance
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Training Effe,etiveness (41400, 41701)
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The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed
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personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of
the licensee's perfornar.r.e of routine surveillance, maintenance, and
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operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response
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to events which occurred during the inspection period.
Personnel
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appeared to be knowled eable of the tasks being perforred, and nothing
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was observed which ind cated any ineffectiveness of training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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13. Report Review
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During the inspectiun period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
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Monthly Operating Reports for June and July 1988. The inspector
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ccnfirmed that the inforr.ation provided met the requirements of
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Technical Specificatien 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
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The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Reports
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for June and July 19E8, the Radioactive Effluent Report for January
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through June 1988, and the minutes of the "Braidwood Corporate Overview
Meetirig" held on August 17, 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14. Licensee Actions in Response to Substance Abuse
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Or. July 24, 1988, the licensee inferred the Resident Inspector and the
Chief of Reactor Projects Sectien 1A of evidence of offsite use of a
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controlled substance (marijuana) by an employee with unrestricted site
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access. The individual was a Senior Reactor Operator licensed
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supe rvisor. The individual's site access was renoved in accordance with
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licensee procedures, the individual was placed under redical evaluation,
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and a review of the individual's work record was conducted.
The work
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record review revealed no inconsistencies.
Following the nedical
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evaluation, the individual was returned to work; however, he will not
be allcwed to perforn licensed duties for 6 period of 12 months. During
that tine, the individual will be periodically evaluated for further
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substance abuse and closely monitored by the licensee management and the
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resident inspectors, and he will maintain license qualification. After
that time, following favorable evaluation, the individual may be
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permitted to return to licensed duties.
15. Meetings and_0ther Activities (30702)
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Site Visits by NRC Staff and PIant Sta,tus Meeting
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A meeting was held on July 26, 1984 between the Station Manager, the
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Region !!! Division of Reactor Projects 1A Section Chief, and trembers of
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each of their staffs.
The purpose of the reeting was for the licensee to
provide an update on the status of Units 1 ar.d 2.
The subjects discussed
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were deviations, events and persennel errors compared with Byron's at
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similar stages of plant life, reactor trip analysis, INPO key performance
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indicators, the effect of the drcught and the Kankakee River as a source
of makeup to the cooling lake, and the moveable incore detector blockage
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problem compared with other similar plants.
16. Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspectors ret with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I
during the inspection pericd and at the conclusion of the inspection on
August 24, 1988.
The inspectors sumarized the secpe and results of the
inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report.
The licensee ackncwledged the inforcation and did not indicate that any
of the inforr.aticn disclosed during the inspection could be considered
proprietary in nature.
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