IR 05000456/1990013

Insp Repts 50-456/90-13 & 50-457/90-16 on 900617-0728. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Follow Up on TMI Action Items,Increase in Unit 1 I-131 Activity & Condenser Tube Leak & Unit 2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor

ML20059B406
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	08/17/1990
From:	Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059B354	List: IR 05000456/1990013 ML20059B353 ML20059B356
References
TASK-2.B.3, TASK-TM 50-456-90-13, 50-457-90-16, NUDOCS 9008290061
Download: ML20059B406 (18)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/90013(DRP); 50 857/90016(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 L' A nses Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 707 Chicago, IL 60690 Faciiity Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and ?

Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois inspection Conducted: June 17 through July PB, 1990

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Inspectors: T. E. Taylor J. A. Hopkins B. L. Jorgensen M. A. Kunowski D. R. Calhoun H. Begel li. Peck jW_

Approved By: rb r Chi I O Reactor ojects Section 1A Defe 7 Inspection Summay Inspection from June 17 throuch July 28, 1990 (Reports No. 50-456/90013(DRP);

50-457 /90015(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors, and other region based inspectors of licensee action on previously identified items; licensee event report review; regional request; follow-up on THI action items; increase in unit one iodine - 131 activity; unit one main condenser tube leak; unit two heat flux hot channel factor exceeded; operational safety verification; engineered safety feature systems; monthly maintenance observation; morthly surveillance observation; training effectiveness; report review; events; and meetings and other activitie Results: Of the fifteen areas inspected, no violations were identified in thirteen. In the remaining areas, two violations were identified regarding failure to properly implement requirements of the station equipment 00S procedure (Paragraph 2), ant' nilure to perform required containment personnel air lock-leak test within allewble time (Paragraph 3). In the area of plant operations the licensee's performance continues to be good. The o) crating crew responded to the failure of the control room chiller circuit 3reaker in a calm and professional manner. In the area of engineering / technical support 9008290061 900817 PDR ADOCK 050004'56 O PDC

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the licansee's performance was mixed. The station received prompt support

' from both corporate and Westinghouse nuclear fuels groups when evaluating the i hot channel factor limits. However, the station had to reverse their position when the technical bases for raising the limit w c incorrect. The l',censee's

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overall performance in safety assessment / quality skrification, radiological controls, maintenance / surveillance, security an( uergency preparedness l

remained stead .

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[4 1 c, DETAILS U Persons Contacted h

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Commonwealth Edison company (Ceco)

. T. J. Maiman, Vice President, PWR Operations

, *R. E.,Querio, Station Manage ,

D. E.LO'Brien, Technical Superintendent lc K. L. Kofron, Production Superintendent (~' S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• G. R. Masters. Assistant Superintendent ~- Operations

?* *G. E. Groth, Project Manager-

• R. J. Leoner, Services Director M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance F P. Smith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1-E R. Yungk, Operating Engineer - Unit 2'

4 C. Chovan, Operating Engineer - Unit 0 s

R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• D J. Miller, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

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D. E. Cooper, Technical Staff Supervisor

A. D' Antonio,. Quality Control Supervisor A. Checca, Security Administrator

• R. L. Byers, Assistant Suoerintendent - Work planning L. W Rancy, Nuclear Safe'ty Supervisor G. Vanderheyden. Training Supervisor i- *J. Petro, Chemistry Supervisor

• E. W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance P. Holland, Regulatory Assurance

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• L. A. Boyle, Emergency Planning Coordinator

. *E. H. Roche, lead Health Physics - Operational

+M. J. Andrews, Operations 1 *J.'M. Watson, Nuclear Quality Programs Engineer

• D J. Malone, Chief Steward

• C, Zamudia, Chief Steward l

• J. Wagner, Regulatory Assurance L *R. Vignocchi, Chief Steward

• H. Gorski, Nucicar Safety

• A. Haeger, Operations

-*K Boyle Operations

• C Wiegand, Technical Staff - Nuclear

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on July 27, 1990, and at other times throughout the inspection perio The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering stoffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personne .c i

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.2. . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (9?701, 9?70?,) ,

Unresolved Item (Closed 457/90015-04(DRP): Inoperability of the 2A Auxiliary Feedwater TAF) Pump for Surveillance While the PB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)

r was Out-of-Service (005) for Maintenance. The inspectors continued their

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evaluation of the safety significance of the event and determined that the licensee was unaware of the adverse system configuration and was onl I-

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14 minutes away from a shutdown to Hot Standby required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. '

This is considered a violation of TS 6.8.1.a, which requires that written

, procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for the activities in Appendix (Sections 1.cAand of Reg'.ulatory Guide l 4 of Appendix 1.33. Revision A pertain ?, February to_ Equipment 1978.-

Controls and Procedure Adherence.) Step D.1 of BwAP 330-1, " Station Equipment Out-of-Service Procedure, requires the licensee to review all TS related

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005 conditions "to assure opposite train operability and determine any actions necessary to satisfy the TS or surveillance."

Because this was a licensee identified violation, the NRC considered L

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not-issuing a Notice of Violation based on the criteria. discussed in 10 CFR ?, Appendix , such discretion was found unwarranted because the licensee was unaware of the adverse system configuration involved in this event throughout the duration except for the last 14 minutes. The NRC is concerned wheneve multiple safety-related components are inoperable and the condition is not recognize This event is considered a violation of TS 6.8.1.a (50-457/90016-01(DRP))

in that the Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) failed to properly implement the requirements of DwAP 330-1, " Station Equipment 00S Precedure."

One violation was identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (9?700)

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel..and

, review of records, the following evem reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fu 'illed, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accompitsbed in accordance'with Technical Specifications (TS):

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(Closed) 456/90009-LL: Failure to Perform Containnent Air Lock Leak Test Within.the Allowable Time Due to Programmatic Deficienc i On the afternoon of June 8, 1990, with Unit 1 in Hot Standby, a

! containment entry was nade and the Containment Personnel Air Lock j leakage test required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1. =

L E was not completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. A System Test Engineer (STE), l

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e assigned to. determine when the leakage test was required, reviewed the High High Radiation Area (HHRA) Key Control Log and observed that a containment entry had been made that mornin During the week of June 11-15, 1990, the STE routinely reviewed the HHRA key log and did not observe any new entries. On the morning of June 15, 1990, the STE was informed that a Unit 1 containment entry had been made. The STE then reviewed the HHRA key log, which is kept in the Radiation Protection Office, and observed that the la d log entry was date:! June 8.,1990. The STE reviewed the entire key log in order to find the June 15 containment entry and discovered that a second log sheet had been initiated. The second sheet contained both the June 15 containment entry and containment entry for the afternoon of June 8, 199 The STE immediately initiated performanca of the leakage test. The results of the surveillances were satisfactory. The surveillance for the June 8, 1990 containment entry exceeded its allowable time, including extensions, by approximately three day The licensee identified inadequate scheduling methodology (using thq HHRA key log to determine when a non-routine TS surveillance was required) as the root cause of the evcnt. Part of the licensee's corrective action is to develop a program that provides positive notification and verification of notification of a containment entry to the STE. Additional corrective action includes the implementation of a Continuous Leakage Monitor System for the Personnel Air Locks and a TS amendment to eliminate the leak test following each entry has been submitte There were two other events over the past seven months that involved inadequate management control on non-routine TS surveillance On December 23, 1909, the licensee failed to verify that the boron concentration was within limits after level had been raised in two Safety injection (SI) Accumulators (LER 456/890?0-LL). A Non-Cited Violation (NCY 456/90006-01(DRP)) was documented for failure to perform the boron analysis within the required six hour time interval. A contributing factor identified was the lack of schedule control methodology to monitor the timely com)1etion of routine TS

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sampics performed on a non-routine basis whic, do not require entry into an action statement. The other event occurred on May 10, 1990, with Unit ? in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5), during a refueling outage,

, the Division 21 Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) 4160 VAC bus was taken Out-of-Service (005) prior to verifying that the ESF Onsite Power Distribution Weekly Surveillance for ESF Division 22 was current. (This surveillance verifies that at least one of the two ESF power sources is properly energired and aligned.) The surveillance for ESF Division 22. scheduled for April 29, 1990, was not completed because the electrical lineup was not appropriate to satisfy the surveillance. The surveillance was identified as overdue on the schedule. According to the control room logs, for

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l scene time b ' etween April 30 and May 5,1990, the electrical lineup was y >

appropriate to perform the surveillance. However, this information it was not forwarded to the appropriate surveillance coordinator and it,was not performed. (It should be noted here that only.one ESF i s Division is required during Mode 5 and Division 21 was operable during.this period.)

o On May 10, 1990, when ESF Division 21 was taken 005, the operating crew had verified that Division 22 was energized and properly aligned. Later, when the operating crew identified that the .

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surveillance was not current, it was immediately performed with L satisfactory results. The missed surveillance is another example -

of the lack of an adequate scheduling methodology to monitor timely

completion of non-routine TS surveillance The inspectors recognize that no single missed surveillance resulted -

in a significant degradation in safety. However, the licensee #

appears to have a weakness in their overall management control of non-routine TS surveillance activities. The inspectors are  ;

concerned that continued performance at this level may result in a i more serious situatio l The failure to perform the required Containment Personnel Air Lock l look test within the allowable-time is c violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Section III.C.2(b)(iii) (50-406/90013-01(DRP)). The licensee's corrective action will be reviewed and evaluated during ;

closcout of the NOV in future NRC inspection reports. This LER is considered close In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's DeviationReports(DVRs)generatedduringtheinspectionperiod. This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant er personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicaole procedures and tha OA manua One violation was identifie . Regional Request (97701)

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NRC Resident Inspector (RI) Office Key Control 4

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On July 9,1990. Region III asked the RI to review the methodology of '

controlling keys to the RI office that are held by the licensee. Of the 18 keys for the RI office (Key Code M3), five are controlled by the licensee's security force. These keys are now in a sealed envelope with the RI signature across the seal. The security force has been instructed -

to notify the Ri #nen an H3 key is checked out. Additionally, the RI will periodically inspect the sealed envelope to look for signs of tampering. Twelve keys are controlled and distributed by the Senior R Key number five has been lost for several year <

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The orly other keys that provide .taccess to the RI. office are Great Grand

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d Master (GSM) keys. These keys provide access to the entire station and

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are primarily designed for. the on-shift Fire Marshall. Region.III-

'r security specialists are evaluating appropriate methods of control over '

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The inspectors have no additional concern _

No violations or deviatiotis were identifie '

p Follow-up on THI Action items h Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) - TMI item 11.B.3 (84750 and 847?4) .

t The licensee's PASS for reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling during accidents consists of separate liquid and gas sample W panels. The gas, sample panels are located on a different elevation in ,

, the auxiliary building from the liquid sample panels. The system design, !

H analytical capabilities, and procedures were reviewed and-approved by the ,

y NRC prior to initial criticality of Unit 1 and Unit This review and :

L approval is documented in NUREG-0876, Supplement No. After initial c.riticality, onsite review and verification of selected PASS commitments ,

had.been made by regional MRC inspectors and is documented in various ;

,- inspection reports (50-456/0600?; 50-457/86002 50-456/86026; 50 457/86021, 50-456/86044; 50-457/8603?, 50-456/87010; 50-457/87010). :t Two recent inspections identified the lack of a quality control program ,

for.the-liquid sample portion of the PASS (50-456/90005; 50-457/90005) I and some operability problems and system configuration discrepancies for the gas sample portion (Inspection Report.50-456/90009; 50-457/90009).

The licensee promptly addressed these items and has corrected them or 1 '

established an acceptable action plan to correct them. Notwithstanding these items, the licensee's PASS for Unit 1 and Unit 2 eppears to satisfy i W regulatory requirements. TM1 Item 11.B.3.3'and II.B.3.4 are considered ,

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closed for Unit 1 and Unit No violations or deviations were identifie q 6.- Increase in Unit 1 Iodine - 131 Activity (92701) ,

On May P6, 1990, the. Unit i reactor coolant system (RCS) Iodine - 131 .

-(I-131) activity began to increase. 1-131 increased from approximately

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4.0E-04 uti/g to a peak of 3 to 4 E-03 uCi/g. The activity appears to have stabilized at approximately 2.0E-03 uti/g. An increase in 1-131 '

-activity usually indicates fuel rod cladding failur '

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Prior to the increase, Unit 1 was. estimated to have one defective rod carried over from the previous fuel cycle. Based on the new 1-131 m values, 2 to 5 fue' rods may have failed cladding. The licensee entered Action Level 1 of BrAP 2000-84, " Failed Fuel Action Plan." Action Level 1 activities tiiclude increased frequency of RCS sarples, estimating the number of defective fuel rods, identifying possible causes of the failure, ar.d coveloping short and long term plans to mitigate the

consequences of the existing failures on plant operation ,

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Currently ~, the.only. impact' the additional failed fuel has had is'

increased

[' Tank (VCT)roo general VCT area radiation room levels in the-Unit levels increased 1. Volume Control from approximately 280

F mR/hr to 340 mR/hr over the month'of-July. The licensee plans to

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continue to monitor general area. radiation levels for any adverse ,

l3 ; effects on plant operation.-

The inspector has no additional concern on-this issu ;

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.No violations or deviations were identifie . Unit One Main Cc % nser Tube Leak (9?701)

L In June 1990, increasing levels of sulfates were identified in the Unit 1  !

Steam Generator.(SG) chemistry samples. The station continued to monitor

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the trend and on June 24, 1990, took a 300 MWe derating (approximately 30 t percent) to isolate'1D circulating water (CW) water box to the main L condense Two CW tubes were plugged 6nd on June 26, 1990, the 1D C water box was returned to servic In early July 1990; CW tube leaks were identified in the.lc and 1D condenser water boxes. The 1D CW water box was isolated on July 8, 1990, t Additional maintenance items were performed on the secondary plant during- ,

the 300 MWo derating. On July 11, 1990, the 1D water box (with four ,

additional tubes pluoged) was returned to service and the 1C water box .

.was isolated. OnJuiy 12, 1990, the 1C water box (with'one tube plugged)

was returned to service. Unit 1 power was limited to 90%, while work continued on the condensate pumps. The unit was returned to full power on July 13, 199 '

On July 20,.1990, increasing sulfates were again. identified in Unit 1 SG- N chemistry samples. Leaks were identified in the 1B and 1C CW water box ,

tubes. The licensee plans to repair the leaks on two successive weekends beginning August 4, 1990._ Additionally. the licensee plans to. conduct 1

' eddy current testing on selected tube bundles and remove twr, failed tubes ,

- to analyze for the failure mechanis l The' inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee s ar,tion . No violations or deviations.were identifie y Unit Two Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Exceeded (9?701, 9370?)

On July 18,1990, Unit 2 exceeded its Heat Flux Hot channel Factors, F (2), limits by 0.45%. F  ;

i m9pusingtheMovableInco9e(2)wasevaluatedbyfirstobtainingaflux Detector System (MIDS) and then calculating

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the Radial Peaking Factors, Fxy, using procedure PBwVS 2.2.2-1, " Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Checkout Using Peaking Factors." (The flux map was performed with the unit stable at 99.1% power for approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.) Three points failed the Fxy criteria and procedure 2BwVS 2.2.3-1 'deat Flux Hot Channel Factor Verification," was performed to 3 ,

determine if F (2) was within its limits. Two points failed the .

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acceptance criteria and F (Z) was calculated to exceed its limit by 0.45%. Thelicenseeredu9edreactorpowerby1%,reducedthePowerRange High Flux Trip and Overpower Delta Temperature (OPDT) trip setpoints by 1% in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.2, and limited the unit-to 98% power. The unit was stabilized at 98% in order to obtain a flux map on July 20, 199 On July 19, 1990, the licensee corporate Nuclear Fuel Services (l'FS) and Westinghouse (W) evaluated the Fxy data and determined that the calculation used to generate the Fxy limits had unnecessary conservatism built into the mathematical model. Based on this evaluation, the licensee conducted an-Onsite Review (OSR) of the data and increased the Fxy limi On July 20, with Unit 2 stabic at approximately 98% for the past 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the licensee obtained ancther flux map. Initial evaluation determined that the revised Fxy limit was not exceeded and the TS Limiting condition for Operation (LCO) was exited. (It should be noted here that the licensee stated, that based on the July 20 flux map, the original Fxy limit appeared to have been exceeded, but F (2) was within lirits.) ThelicenseeincreasedUnit2to100%powerwhhntheTSLCOwas exited. The OPDT and the Power Range High flux trip setpoints were returned to their original value by July 27, 1990. The licensee made plans to reduce the rate of load change to one megawatt / minute and perform a flux map every two weeks until Fxy began to trend away from its upper limit On July 27, 1990, the licensee informed the inspector that the technical basis for revising the Fxy limits was incorrect and that the original Fxy limits should be used. The data taken in the July 20 flux map was reevaluated and contrary to these initial calculations Fxy was found to be within its or Qinally acceptable limits. The licensee stated that hased on these resuits Unit 2 did not exceed the Fxy or the F n (Z) limits when power was increased to 100% on July 20, 1990. The licensee and NFS have committed to perform a root cause determination of the mistakes and issue a report detailing corrective actio The licensee plans to perform a flux map on August 2, 1990, after the unit has been stabilized at 100% for a minimum of 56 hours6.481481e-4 days <br />0.0156 hours <br />9.259259e-5 weeks <br />2.1308e-5 months <br /> The licensee will evaluate data from the flux map to determine if any operational limits (i.e.. rate of load change or amount of load follow) should be initiated =.

The matter is considered an Open Item pending further review by the NR (456/90013(DRP)-02; 457/90016(DRP)-02)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the litersee's management control system was

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effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operatio This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review of freility record On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);

including compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features.(ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces end duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit ainunciators for operator understanding, off-normal condition, and correesive actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station maneger, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed tha Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operabilit During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety " ems, etc. The specific areas observed were:

• Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or FSAR; and the operability of support systems essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, et Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration. Additionally, the inspectors observed Radiation Technicians performing routine monthly radiation surveys on inservice reactor coolant demineralizer gf ~,._

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~* SecuNty; During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being implemented according to their approved security plan. the 3 inspector noted that persons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals requiring >

escorts were properly escorted. The inspector'also verified that !

checked vital areas were locked and alarmed. Additionally, the inspector also verified that observed personnel and packages f entering the protected area were searched by appropriate equipment or by hand, a

• Housekeepino and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protectio The. inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance itere, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and-postings required per 10 CFR 19.1 ,

No violations-or deviations were identifie i 10. Enoineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710)

During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of several ESF systems to verify their status. Consideration was given to ;

the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, limiting Conditions for Operation Action Requirements (LC0ARs), and other applicable !

requirement . Various observations, where applicable, were made'of hangers and :

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supports; housekeeping; whether freeze protection, if required, was !

installed and operational; valve positions and conditions; potential "

ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling, et_c.;

1 interior conditions of electrical breakers and control panels; whether L instrumentation was properly installed and functioning and significant l process parameter values were consistent with expected values; whether '

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instrumentation was calibrated; whether necessary support systems _were operational; and whether locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve a-positions. agree *

The inspector performed a partial walkdown of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater system using the licensee's lineup sheet, Dw0P AF-M2,

" Mechanical Lineup - Operating." Approximately 30 valves were inspected; *

all were found correctly positioned, and where specified, they were locke No violations or deviations were identifie .-

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C 11. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

h Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and'

! components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they F were conducted in accordance with. approved procedures, regulatory guides ;

and industry codes or standards, and in'conformance with-Technical ;

Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting '

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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were ,;

removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to '

!_ initiating the work; activities were accomplished using. approved .

p procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or :

[ calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to i

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service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts _and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire ;

prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to- ;

determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that. priority is ;

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assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system

. performance, i The following maintsnance activities w&e observed and reviewed: [

Unit 1 *

Inaccessible Filter Plenum A Charcoal Booster Fan OB Starting Relay failur ,

On July 19, 1990, the Inaccessible Filter Plenum A Charcoal Booster Fan OB failed to automatically start at Step F.13.5 of

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1Bw0S 3.1.1-21, " Unit 1 Train B Solid State Protection System Bi-Monthly Surveillance (Staggered)." The OB Charcoal Booster l Fan (which started manually) was declared inoperable and a .

work request was written to investigate the failure. The I investigation revealed that slave relay K60?, which is used to start various equipment during a Safety injection, energized and latched in place; but the fan, which uses contact block -

number 3-4, would not start. On July 23, 1990, the contact block was replaced and a partial surveillance using 10w05 3.1.1-21 to test slave relay K602 was performed satisfactoril On July 27, 1990, the automatic starting feature of the OB l Charcoal booster Fan was successfully tested using the appropriate portion of 1Bw05 3.2.1-810, " Unit 1 ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance." The OB Charcoal ;

3- Booster Fan was declared operable on July 27, 199 During the review of this maintenance activity, the inspector observed that the cover sheet for 1Bw05 3.1.1-21, performed on .

July 19, 1990, did not have any reference to the failure of the OB Charcoal Booster Fan to start. Braidwood Administrative Procedure BwAP 1400-9 " Station Surveillance Data Package Cover Sheet Completion and Use," identifies the " Comments Section" of

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. .. the cover sheet as the1 appropriate place to record. concerns identified during the surveillance. The licensee plans to

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conduct " tailgate training" (training immediately following the pre-shift briefing) to stress the importance of identifying and ;

recording any problems encountered during surveillance The L inspector has no. additional concerns.

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t IB Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Outage.

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-On July 24,:1990, the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was- ,

taken Out-of-Service (005).to perform several maintenanc :

item l li- l These items included: ,

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A40531 - Investigate and_ repair Incomplete Sequence Alarm. 'I j

' A41886 - Recalibrate EDG Lube Oil (LO) High Temperatur Switch.- t,

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A42045 -' Increase EDG Jacket Water Low Temperature Alarm p Setroin ;

A420A9 - Increase EDG LO Low Temperature Alarm Setpoin *

A40539 - Highlight Identifying Number Stamped on Air' !

Starting Lines Tubin ~!

Additional maintenance items were performed during the maintenance outage. The 1B EDG was declared operable on 1 p July 25,1990. The inspector- has no additional concern ;

Unit 2 '

20 SG Low Pressure Steamline Isolation Alert Alarm Circuit Card ,

, Replacemen (NWR A41971) l Field Calibration of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop 2D Instrument- [

. 2FI-044 (NWR A41814) .

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On June 27, 1990, the Unit 2 RCS flow instrument 2FI-0446 was 1 I

indicating approxim'itely 3%'below the.other two Loop D flow !

channels. (A 3% deviation is considered Out-of-Tolerance (00T), but not Out-of-Service-(005). The 2FI-0466 flow instrument was taken 005 and the flow transmitter (in .

containment) was recalibrated in the field to within acceptable 1 tolerances. The remainder of the 2FI-0446 channel was checked and found acceptable. Appropriate portions of Dwls 3.1.1-316, f

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" Analog Operational Test and channel Verification / Calibration !

for Loop 2F-0446," were performed and the channel was returned to servic !

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Several pieces of pipe insulation had to be removed during the field caircratien of ?FE-0446. One piece of insulation b"mped valve PLT-0461 causina pressurizer (PZR) level channel-2L-0461 and 2L-0462 to f ail high. (Yalve 2LT-0461 is the equalizing valve for hot calibration channel FL-0461 and cold calibration channel 2L-0467.) The equalizing valve was shut and both PZR level-channels returned to their previous indications. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's actions and has no additional concern Power Range (PR) Nuc1 car Instrument (NI) N-41 Isolation Amplifier Replacemen (NW3 A41918)

• The Unit 2 PR Channel Deviation Annunciator and the Comparator and Rate Drawer Channel Deviation Alarm were alarming intermittently with no indication of deviation between the PR channel Initial troubleshooting indicated that the isolation amplifier for PR HI H-41 was defective and should be replace On July 1?, 1990, Instrument Maintenance (IM) technicians replaced the isolation amplifier for N-41 and started calibration using the applicable portions of 2Bw1S 3.1.1-214,

" Channel Verification / Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range N-41." Initial readings indicated that the new isolation amplifier (Serial No. 6078) was defective and second one (Serial No.1172) was obtained from stores. Initial readings on the second isolation amplifier (Serial No.1172)

indicated that it was also defective. The IM technicians began troubleshooting and determined that the output of the N-41 summing am amplifier)plifier had been(which is upstream adjusted during aof the isolation calorimetri This caused the output voltage of the isolation amplifier to chang The work package was revised to include calibration of the summing amplifier prior to calibration of the isolation amplifie On July 1?, 1990, later in the day, isolation amplifier (Serial No. 6078) was installed and calibrated using applicable portions of 2Bw15 3.1.1-214. The annunciator and alarm cleared and there have not been any intermittent alatts since that dat Isolation amplifier (Serini No. 1172) was returned to store The inspector has no additional concern Train B Reactor Trip bypass Breaker Fails to Close from Main Control Boar (NWR A42142)

• On July 19, 1990, while performing Step F.3.5 of 2Pw05 3.1.1-21. " Unit Two SSPS, Reactor Trip Breaker, and Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Bi-Monthly (Staggered) Surveillance (Train

^ ;, " the B-train reactor trip bypass breaker would not close from the main control board (MCB) when " racked in" to the

" connect" position. (The breaker had successfuliy been cycled

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from the MCB in a previous step when " racked in" to the test positions.) The surveillance wa8 exited and the b) pass breaker was " racked out."

Troubleshootino efforts revealed that the oscillator assembly (a ratchet device which holds the closing spring while it is being compressed) was bent and prevented the breaker closing mechanism from compressing the closing spring. The oscillator assenbly was replaced and the breaker was tested successfully from the MCB using appropriate sections of 2Bw05 3.1.1-2 The surveillance was completed satisfactorily on July 20, 199 The inspector has no additional concern The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified-that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR S0.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of tim violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveills <e testing required by Technical Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restnration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requiremer,ts and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

Unit 1 DwVS 0.5-2.MS.1, " Main Steam Isolation Valve partial Stroke Test."

1Bw051.2.1.2-1, " Moveable Control Rod Assemblies Monthly Surveillance."

1BwVS 0.5.3.AF.1-1, "ASME Surveillance Requirements for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump an A Train Auxiliary feedwater Valves."

1Bw0S 3.1.1-20. "SSpS, Reactor Trip Breaker, and Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Bi-Monthly (Staggered) Surveillance (Train A)."

• On June 18, 1990, while performing Logic Actuations Tests with

" Blocks Inhibited," Step F.5.3, and " Blocks flot Inhibited,"

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-Step F.7.3, a card in the Steamline Low Pressure Safety Injection Logic C circuit failed. A work request'was written and the board was replaced. The inspector observed installation of the replacement card and repeating appropriate ,

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portions of the surveillance procedure to test the card. The !

L surveillance was completed satisfactorily. The inspector has -

no additional concern l p Unit 2 f

2BwYS 0.5-2.CS;1, " Containment Spray System Valve Stroke Test."

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2BwVS 1.2.3.1-1, "ASME Surveillance Requirements for 2A Centrifugal -l

, s. - Charging Pump.and Check Valve 2CV8480A Stroke Test."

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2Bw0S 3.1.1-21. " Unit Two SSPS Reactor Trip Breaker and. Reactor Trip s Bypass Breaker Bi-Monthly (Staggered) Surveillance Train B." ,

2Bw053.2.1-990, " Unit 2 ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance tirain B FW Isolation, Low Tave and Reactor Trip - ,

K637).  !

• i On July 16, 1990, at step F.1.12 of 2Bw05 3.2.1-990, test lamps for four Feedwater Isolation Yalves did not energize. The -

, illumination of these lights ensures that the Feedwater Isolation valves will not actuate during the remainder of the ;

surveillance. The operation of these lights is not part of the- l

,". acceptance criteria for the surveillance. The surveillance was !

emergency exited and the system was returned to its proper configuration. On' July 17, 1990, 2Bw0S 3.2.1-990 was performed -

satisfactoril +

During the review of this surveillance, the inspector asked the 3 licensee if maintenance was performed on the components prior i to the successful completion of the surveillance. The licensee'

stated that the test lamps did not illuminate due to sticky . i contacts on the te" relay. The relay was exercised until the

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contacts did not stick. The surveillance was then successfully performed. -Additionally, the licensee stated that no Nuclear ,

Work Request (NWR) was written between surveillances. The ,

licensee stated that this was an isolated example of a failure a to write a NW '

On July 26,1990, a NWR (A42251) was written to investigate and '

repair the sticky test. relay. Based on the date of the NWR, it :

appears that the inspectors inquiry prompted the licensee to

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initiate the NWR. The inspector will continue to monitor the ~

licensee's overall surveillance and NWR programs. The inspector has ne additional concern No violations or deviations were identifie t I s

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! 13. TrainingEffectiveness(41400,4170M The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed ;

personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the l licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and l operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response h to events which occurred during the inspection period. personnel .

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appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.-

L No violations or deviations were identifie !

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j 14. Report Review

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During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's konthly Performance Report for June 1990. The inspector. confirmed that the information provided met the. requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 l The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report for May and June 199 t No violations or deviations were identifie . Events-(93702,92701)

OA Control Room Chiller Circuit Breaker Trip itechanism Failur On July 11, 1990, with Unit 1 at 78% power, the A train of Main Control .

Room (MCR) Ventilation was being shut down to align the B train for  ;

e surveillance. At approximately 2:10 p.m., the 0A chiller circuit breaker failed to open when given a trip signal from the MCR. (The 0A chiller is ;

powered from bus 141, the Unit 1, A train 4.16 KV ESF bus.) The OA chiller circuit breaker could not be tripped locally.either. Personnel at the '

breaker cubicle reported smoke coming from the trit coil. Maintenance ;

ing tle breaker would i personnel advised bus require de-energizing the 141 control room that trip (p' racking out") the breaker and removing "

from its cubicle. All operating A train equipment was transferred to ,

the B train. The 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was placed in

" Maintenance Outage" to prevent an automatic start on bus 141 under-voltage. At 2:30 p.m., bus 141 was de-energized. A containment  :

Ventilation Isolation sivaal for train A was generated due to a loss of '

-power to the A train centainment atmos)here radiation monitor (1AR0110).

No equipment operatco as a result of tie signal. Appropriate l

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notifications were made after the plant was stabilize >

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Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered when bus 141 was de-energized. This occurred because the IB reactor containment fan cooler (RCFC), (train B), was out-of-service (005) while the A train >

RCFCs and containment spray pump were inoperable, p

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At 2:32 p.m., the 005 for 1B RCFC was removed, the RCFC started and TS 3.0.3 exited. Concurrently, the OA 14CR chiller breaker was " racked out" of its cubicle and. tripped. Maintenance personnel determined that there was no damage to bus 14 At 2:35 p.m., bus 141 was re-energized. The 1A EDG lineup was restored for automatic startup and the A train equipment previously operating was returned to service. On July 12, 1990, a spare 4.16 KV breaker was installed for the OA MCR chiller and tested satisfactorily. The licensee shipped the failed breaker to a Westinghouse f acility in Georgia for disassembly and root cause failure analysi The inspector (who was in the control room at the time of the event)

observed that the operating crew reacted to the event in a calm end professional manner. Extra licensed operators were used to shift equipment to the B train to allow the Jnit i Nuclear Station Operator to continue to monitor the entire plant. The decision to de-energize the bus 141 and enter TS 3.0.3 was a conscious and deliberate effort by the crew. The Shift Enoineer (SE), the senior licensed operator responsible for operating the piant, was clearly in control of the situation and kept the operating crew informed of the decisions made and the rationale for each decisio The inspector will review the 1.ER for appropriate corrective action and root caus No violations or deviations were identifie . Pectings and Other Activities (30702)

Site Visits by NRC Staff On June 20, 1990, Messrs. W. D. Shafer, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) Branch 1, M. J. Farber, Chief, DRP Section 1A, and B. t.. Jorgensen, Senior Resident Inspector at D.C. Cook, were onsite for a routine visit. During that time, they met with the resident inspector and made a plant tour. Additionally, a meeting was held with the station manager, station superintendents, and others to discuss the present plant status and other timely topics, such as communications between NRP and corporate licensing support groups, and upcoming personnel change No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 during the insaection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 27, 1990. The inspectors sumarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the inforeation and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur . . . . . .